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Abstract 
This thesis explores whether the extent of criminal networks in Serbia and their impact upon 
the country as it undergoes EU accession indicates a phenomenon that has been termed ‘state 
capture’. Through an analysis of Serbia’s stalled democratic transition and its association with 
the EU accession process, conditions for state capture in the field of crime control are found 
to have been established. Given recurrent references in international monitoring reports to 
organised crime as one of the key obstacles to accession, the impact of organised criminal 
networks on the crime control system is examined to understand their potential to act as 
captors. For the purpose of this exploration, the effectiveness of state institutions responsible 
for suppression of organised crime and drug trafficking, conceptualised as a state response 
network, is investigated. The findings of this research identified particular opportunities and 
mechanisms of capture, which involve systemic gaps or structural holes in the network of 
state institutions responsible for crime control. The positioning of these systemic loopholes 
creates points of arbitrage through a symbiosis of state actors, corruption and criminal 
networks, which hinders effective suppression of organized crime and eventually leads to 
state capture.  
The findings are based on a comprehensive review of official reports, international 
assessments and elite interviews with a sample of 65 state officials and civil society. Two 
methodological approaches were combined. First, a content analysis was used to identify the 
key issues hindering the effectiveness of crime control in this field. The identified issues were 
subsequently analysed using Social Network Analysis to increase the validity of the findings 
through quantitative assessment. Social network analysis was implemented in an innovative 
manner to map the state response network and quantitatively detect potential loopholes in its 
functioning, not all of which had been fully recognised in their extent or form in the first, 
qualitative, approach.  On the basis of these analyses, this research proposes that state capture 
can be defined as a set of seemingly inexplicable system deficiencies involving patterns of 
structural omissions and covert practices that have the potential to disrupt legitimate 
institutional behaviour and exert influence by using corruption and other forms of personal 
linkage and exchange. 
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Chapter I Introduction 
 
"A phantom ship that sails in the sea ... helpless but still alive" 
…A judge, about the state of affairs in fighting organised crime in Serbia… 
 
The process of democratic transition has been ongoing in the Western Balkans for almost two 
decades. The haste of transition varied in different states, but has overall resulted in 
approximation to the European Union. In pursuing the EU membership, the Western Balkan 
states have initiated comprehensive reforms which are closely monitored by the Member 
States. 
As one of the Western Balkan countries, Serbia has also been implementing extensive reforms 
associated with EU accession for a number of years, which resulted in the status of an EU 
candidate country. Nevertheless, despite broad legislative and institutional reforms, the 
velocity of its progress towards becoming the EU member state remains slow. Various factors 
hindering EU accession have been cited in the literature to explain this scarce progress, but 
some of those factors appear to be persistent throughout a number of years.  
This thesis endeavours to explore the causes of insufficient progress in the fight against 
organised crime, as one of the most severe factors continuously referred to as a key obstacle 
to EU accession, lately labelled ‘state capture’. In view of the evidence that Serbia lies on the 
Balkan route, as one of the key paths in international drug trafficking, reference to enduring 
organised crime remains a concern. Moreover, taking into account the severity of 
consequences of organised crime in Serbia, such as the murder of Prime minister in 2003, the 
lack of progress in the fight against organised crime is an issue of concern at the national level 
as well. 
Contemporary organized crime literature commonly comes to an understanding that these 
links between the legitimate and illegal actors entail an inherent feature of organized crime. 
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To this end, this complex alliance between the ‘underworld’ and the ‘upperworld’ i.e. the 
partnership between the state actors (law enforcement, politics and business) and criminal 
actors is perceived in this thesis as an environment that has the potential to enable the 
endurance of criminal networks despite suppression efforts. As it will be discussed, such 
partnership was established during the process of transition and appears to have sustained. 
Concurrently, the problem of state capture is frequently referred to in the literature and 
international documents as an important obstacle to EU accession. The European Commission 
recently stated that the Western Balkan countries “show clear elements of state capture, 
including links with organized crime and corruption at all levels of government and 
administration, as well as a strong entanglement of public and private interests” (COM 2018, 
65). 
Even though the phenomenon of state capture is recurrently used in discussions on Western 
Balkans, there is insufficient literature focusing on comprehensive understanding of its nature 
and roots. The understanding of state capture is usually associated with specific situation of 
the countries analysed, but its key ingredients are rarely discussed, except in the field of 
economics. Perry and Keil (2018, p.2) note there is a lack of “robust literature on state capture 
in the region”. Given that the structure of organised crime involves “…a concentration of 
illegal power in society that can significantly influence political, economic and social life” 
(Williams, 2002, p.165), discussing state capture without this element would be unreliable.  
As it will be thoroughly discussed in the literature review, contemporary analyses of the 
Western Balkans often use the concept of state capture to describe different interconnected 
phenomena of corruption, organised crime and patronage based systems. As Popivikij (2018) 
and Weber (2017) notice, the term has become a buzzword or a “catchphrase” used by 
analysts, academics and eventually the media. However, there is still limited empirical support 
for the concept of state capture. This may be attributed to the lack of measures and objective 
indicators and significant fragmentation of empirical tools, resulting in decreased possibilities 
of replication and statistical validation of empirical network patterns. 
In discussing whether the concept of state capture represents an added value in assessing the 
progress of the Western Balkan countries’ in EU integration, Priebe (2018) argues that it is 
still not unambiguously clear what this concept implies and how can it be clearly 
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differentiated from corruption or the concept of “failed states”. Acknowledging that these 
phenomena may be inter-related, Priebe maintains that the concept of state capture points to 
“systemic” shortcomings in the functioning of the state. Different aspects of such 
shortcomings in the system of crime control in Serbia are in the focus of this research, as they 
represent serious obstacles in the accession process.  
Following this line of opinion, this research attempts to add to contemporary literature by 
exploring organised crime related state capture in the field of crime control in Serbia, as one 
of the Western Balkan countries that aspires to join the EU.  In the course of addressing this 
issue, I make the case that certain social and political conditions in Serbia have contributed to 
the development of strong ties between organised crime and the state, thus creating systemic 
deficiencies which hinder effective crime suppression. Such conclusions rely on strong 
indications of structural and social difficulties in Serbia, common for other transitional states 
to a similar extent.  
As will be explained, in an effort to assess the potential ‘state capture’, this research takes an 
in-depth look at one specific country, as a case study, through examination of the effectiveness 
of efforts of the institutions as relevant actors in crime suppression. 
This research seeks to improve our knowledge of the state capture by focusing on one of the 
elements of the state i.e. crime control system. In doing so, it examines the obstacles to 
successful suppression of organised crime and explores whether the state institutions’ 
functioning contributes to sustainability of organised crime. This is scrutinized with a view to 
stalled transition and EU accession of Serbia, given that efficient suppression of organised 
crime is one of the key factors related to accession. 
By state institutions’ functioning, this research implies the activities of the institutions 
competent for suppressing organised crime and drug trafficking i.e. the crime control system 
and the effects of these activities. Hence, the phenomenon of state capture is explored as a 
result of embeddedness of organised criminal networks in a country undergoing EU 
accession. This is performed through examination of the effectiveness of state institutions in 
suppressing organised crime and drug trafficking in an attempt to identify potential structural 
holes that hinder the results of such efforts.  
13 
 
Aiming to bridge interdisciplinary literature on criminal networks, accession and state 
capture, this research adopts a network approach, to detect loopholes in which criminal 
networks manage to take benefit from the settings that lead to state capture. Identification of 
such loopholes is performed on the basis of official data and interviews, enabling deeper 
insight of the mechanisms that facilitate criminal networks operations and dynamics of state 
capture in the field of crime control.  In addition, identification of the structural holes in the 
crime control system through a network based analysis introduces objective measurable 
indicators and increases the chances of replication and statistical validation of empirical 
network patterns. 
Notwithstanding several studies in relatively similar fields (see Chapter V), the literature has 
not offered a transferable model that can be used to understand and compare the effectiveness 
of actions undertaken by the state to suppress organised crime. The structure of these 
empirical network patterns may provide a clearer picture of what the deficiencies of the 
system really are in practice. This raises questions related to governance and crime control 
and the dynamics between state governance and the impact of crime. Hence, implementation 
of a network approach may provide a more complex conceptualization of state capture.  
Despite these conceptual differences, it appears that analogous problems related to EU 
accession progress are often identified in various countries in the region. There is an 
impression that the extent of these similar problems has the capacity to impact the institutions’ 
functioning, thus leading to conclusions of state capture. Given that the processes of economic 
and democratic transition in the region had been widely researched, as well as post-conflict 
developments, it seems that there is a gap left in the understanding of the unresolved structural 
problems preventing finalisation of democratic consolidation and creating long-term 
consequences. The relations between these processes and unresolved issues accompanying 
them have been less examined, leaving a gap in the literature and potentially decreasing the 
importance of the perpetual problems. 
At the same time, the debate about the effects of EU conditionality approach towards the 
candidate countries show that its successfulness might have decreased. Questions arise 
whether the EU still has the power to set the conditions, or it has also given up or neglected 
the importance of its values? There is a perception that the EU has somewhat ignored these 
14 
 
aspects of states’ functioning which has over time resulted in slow progress or ‘relapse’ of the 
stakeholders’ behaviour in the candidate countries. To address these enduring issues, the EU 
might need to develop an innovative, issue specific approach to eliminate the roots of an 
accumulation of serious shortcomings.  
This thesis is structured as follows. Chapter I involves an introductory part, familiarising the 
reader with the focus of the research. Chapter II lays out the research background, including 
the main organized crime conceptions and the implications of this phenomenon in Serbia. 
Chapter III entails a comprehensive literature review, consisted of three sections. Initially, it 
offers a review of the current knowledge on democratic transition and discusses its association 
with the EU accession in the Serbian context. It then explains the framework of crime control 
in Serbia through a review of the network of state institutions responsible for organized crime 
suppression. The final section addresses the phenomenon of state capture and indications of 
its presence in Serbia, which have stimulated the main exploration in this research.  
Chapter IV focuses on methodology utilised in this research. It involves the conceptualisation 
of the research and key research questions. The combination of content analysis as a 
qualitative approach and Social Network Analysis as an additional methodological approach 
is addressed. The key analytic procedures are described. Finally, ethical considerations are 
addressed. 
Chapter V entails the key findings and discussion on the four sub-questions. It is divided into 
two parts, separating the two methodological approaches. The first part includes the results of 
the content analysis. The second part is consisted of the results of the Social Network 
Analysis. It addresses each of the questions in detail, including interview excerpts and 
conclusions arising from the analysis.  
Chapter VI summarises the responses to the four sub-questions and provides response to the 
main research question. It demonstrates state capture mechanisms arising from the loopholes 
of the crime control system, which have the capacity to enable the endurance of organised 
criminal networks in a country undergoing EU accession. 
This is followed by Chapter VII which entails the main conclusions, contributions and 
suggestions for further research. 
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Chapter II Research background – the contextual environment for 
organised crime in Serbia  
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
This Chapter provides the basic background information for this research i.e. the phenomenon 
of organised crime and its particularities in Serbia. In addition, given that this research explores 
organised crime related state capture in the field of crime control in Serbia, it is important to 
understand the contextual environment within which capture potentially takes place. Depicting 
organised crime in Serbia may be a key to understanding its interaction with the state. 
Initially, an overview of the main conceptualizations of organized crime and the conditions under 
which transnational and national criminal networks are developed and sustained is presented. 
Subsequently, the causes of the long standing problem of organized crime in Serbia are explored. 
This is followed by a brief review of drug trafficking as the key source of income of criminal 
networks in Serbia. 
 
2.2. Organised crime – a global phenomenon  
 
2.2.1. The crime problem: global policy on the subject of organised crime and trafficking 
 
The United Nations Sustainable Development Goals represent a historical landmark in the 
global awareness that criminal activities are not only detrimental to their direct victims but 
they represent a serious threat to countries, communities and their legitimate governments 
(United Nations, 2015). This awareness has been supported by a broad corpus of research 
worldwide that has shown the negative impact of criminal activities on sustainable 
development. One of the Sustainable Development Goals indicates that serious crime, both 
violent and nonviolent, needs to be addressed as it threatens peace, security, justice and the 
rule of law at large. According to the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime 
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(2015), the international development community has delayed in enforcing an adequate 
response to address the issue of organised crime.  
 
Serious and organised crime in the EU involves a wide range of criminal activities, generating 
enormous profits. Data provided by the EU serious and organised crime threat assessment 
(SOCTA, 2017) indicate that more than 5,000 organized criminal groups operating on an 
international level are currently under investigation in the EU, highlighting the substantial 
impact of serious and organised crime on the EU. SOCTA 2017 also notes that international 
organized criminal groups are typically active in more than three countries (70%).  
 
As proposed by Schultze-Kraft (2016), organised crime promotes “non-development” in the 
fields of: a) economy, by extracting proceeds from illicit activities from the legitimate 
economy, and distorting lawful markets; b) governance, by involving state and non-state in 
criminal activities, thus transforming economic, political and social institutions; c) society, 
by undermining social cohesion through emergence of criminal subcultures, and d) security, 
by endangering security of citizens and states. This is more evident in contexts where crime 
is violent and has a direct impact on personal security and rule of law, as demonstrated by 
experiences of recent decades in a number of countries in Latin America, Africa and Asia, 
which have indicated that violent crime is closely associated with weak rule of law, thus 
causing a negative impact on economic and development performance of countries and 
communities (World Bank, 2011; UNODC, 2014; UNDP, 2013). Although there is no general 
consensus on the concept of organised crime, there is an agreement among scholars that it is 
a distinct type of criminal offence, an “extremely dangerous, sui generis and complex form 
of delinquent behaviour, which undermines the foundations of modern state and the main 
principles of democratic system” (Grubac, 2008). Grubac argues that organized crime is 
established as a system parallel to the state, and it can be marked as an association operating 
outside control of the public and the government.  
 
Most attempts to measure organised crime are made by governments and law enforcement 
agencies, rather than scholars (von Lampe, 2004). According to Savona, Dugato, and Garofalo 
(2013), measurement challenges include the conceptual difficulty to precisely define the 
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object of research through operationally feasible terms and the poor availability of objective 
data, given the hidden nature of actors and activities of interest. Organized criminal groups 
vary in terms of service and the activities they engage in, concurrently reflecting the societies, 
cultures and value systems they originate from. The EU serious and organised crime threat 
assessment (SOCTA, 2017) articulates that: 
 
organized criminal groups operate in a criminal economy dictated by the laws of supply 
and demand and are favoured by social tolerance for certain types of crime, such as the 
trade in counterfeit goods and specific frauds against public authorities or large 
companies. 
(SOCTA, 2017, p13) 
 
It may be expected that these factors, along with the social context, flexibility of criminal 
groups and global development, will continue to shape the organised crime landscape, 
resulting in evasion of law enforcement efforts and identification of new criminal 
opportunities. As stated in SOCTA (2017), given that societies across Europe become 
increasingly interconnected and internationalised, organised crime is also more connected and 
internationally active than ever before. Simultaneously, scholars argue that the study of 
organized crime is still in its infant stages (von Lampe, 2016) and has not yet yielded a 
cohesive and cumulative body of knowledge (Schultze-Kraft, 2016). 
 
 
2.2.2. The concept of organized crime: definitions and the question of organisation 
 
The reference to the concept of organized crime brings into question the actual phenomena 
described by this term.  The importance of defining the phenomenon of organized crime lies 
in the fact that is represents a serious threat to social order, rule of law, institutions and the 
economy, which delineates it from criminal offences perpetrated by individual offenders.  
 
A number of formal or legal definitions exist worldwide, mainly since the international 
organizations utilise a variety of classifications of organized crime. The UN Convention 
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against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC) does not define organized crime per se (or 
transnational organized crime) but it provides a definition of organized criminal group as a 
‘structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert 
with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences established in accordance 
with this Convention, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material 
benefit’ (cfr. UNTOC, Art. 2 - a).  
 
This definition is considered a well framework for describing the phenomenon of organized 
crime and sufficiently adaptable to diverse conditions in states worldwide. Nevertheless, 
critiques refer to is over generalization, as it does not provide sufficient details which could 
distinguish different groups through their modus operandi, nature, and scope of activities. To 
address these shortcomings, an advanced analytical framework for defining the diversity of 
existing organized criminal groups was proposed by Bisogno (2016). The proposed 
framework would include additional determinants, such as: a) local/national/international 
group, b) hierarchical/network model of group functioning, c) types of illegal activities 
undertaken by the group: drugs/firearms/human trafficking, d) modus operandi: use of 
violence and/or intimidation, corruption of officials, and e) affiliation background: 
geographical origin/family/clan/nationality. Hence, the concept of organized crime is usually 
not defined in terms of criminal offences with specific characteristics - but rather in terms of 
the type of offender i.e. a group that is perpetrating it. 
 
Moreover, in terms of the acquis, Article 1 of the EU Framework Decision on the Fight 
against Organised Crime defines a criminal organisation as: a structured association, 
established over a period of time, of more than two persons acting together with a  view  to  
committing  offences  punishable  by  deprivation  of  liberty  or  a  detention  order  of  a 
maximum of at least four years or a  more serious penalty, to obtain, directly or indirectly, a 
financial or other material benefit  (Council of the European Union, 2008). Similarly, a review 
of academic research indicates that the topic of organized crime has always been a challenging 
issue for academics and criminal justice practitioners, possibly due to its secrecy. Despite 
numerous debates, there is no single definition of organized crime in criminology and criminal 
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procedural law. In an effort to summarize these diverse definitions, Von Lampe (2015) 
identified over 180 different definitions proposed by scholars.  
 
A number of authors proposed conceptual definition of organized crime, usually 
endeavouring to define the key characteristics of this concept. Abadinsky (1988) defined 
organized crime as a non-ideological activity, organized on a hierarchical basis including a 
large number of (relatively replaceable)  persons in a close interaction, inclined to use violence 
and bribery, who attempt to eliminate competition and realize monopoly over certain 
activities. This term was also described as execution of serious crimes, by at least three 
interrelated offenders united in a criminal association, aiming to acquire financial gain and 
social power, through secret activities and use of violence, intimidation or corruption, without 
respecting international borders (Sačić, 1997). Despite the diversity, the proposed definitions 
offer certain constituent elements of the concept of organized crime, such as: it is a lasting 
organization; it rationally works for profit; involves the use of force or threats, and utilizes 
corruption to preserve immunity from law enforcement (Albanese, 2000). 
 
In order to characterize a certain criminal enterprise as an organized criminal group, a number 
of conditions have been proposed in the literature.  Nevertheless, several conditions prevail 
among diverse authors (Albanese, 2000; Finckenauer, 2005; Hagan, 2006;), as classified by 
Bisogno (2015) including: a) group structure: hierarchical or network based, members 
characteristics such as ethnic/geographical background, family relationship, b) group’s modus 
operandi: use of violence or intimidation (traditionally), corruption, geographical territory 
where they operate, exercise of social or political control, lack of interaction or camouflage 
(Sallusti, 2014), c) group purpose: variety of illegal activities, illegal trafficking, either of 
goods or services, and d) group continuity: existence of the group beyond individual members.  
Varese (2010) has noted that, since the 1990s, an increasing number of definitions of 
organised crime have started to include the term ‘network’. Two different perspectives have 
been identified in proposed definitions of networks creating a long-standing source of 
ambiguity and misunderstanding among scholars and practitioners (Morselli, 2009, Von 
Lampe, 2009, Varese, 2010).  
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In spite of the differences in proposed definitions, the concept of organized crime is widely 
used in reference to different phenomena, ranging from mafia-type organizations to criminal 
enterprises perpetrating financial crimes (Varese 2010). Previous investigations on the 
structure of organized crime groups have usually focused on traditional hierarchical forms 
(Cressey, 1972, Boskovic, 1998). These principally included the analysis of Italian, 
Colombian or Mexican organized crime groups and other similar organizations worldwide.   
 
Nevertheless, it appears that the traditional perception of hierarchically structured criminal 
groups has been challenged. Modern conceptualizations support that traditional structure of 
organized crime groups such as the top-down hierarchy of mafia, has been replaced by 
business-like structures that operate as loosely-organized networks of cells (Finckenauer, 
2005; Morseli, 2009; Paoli and Fijanoau, 2004; Shelley, 2005; Varese, 2010). Contemporary 
research on organized crime characterizes many organizations as inherently complex, yet 
there are major inconsistencies among authors in comprehending this complexity. These 
inconsistencies mainly arise from the fact that there is no single global criminal organization 
(Galeotti, 2004), rather there are numerous separate organizations operating worldwide in a 
variety of illegal markets, such as drug (Shelley, 2005; Morselli, 2006), human (Bjelajac, 
2003; Kleemans and van de Bunt, 2003; Zhang and Chin, 2002), weapons trafficking 
(Castells, 2000; Paoli, 2004) and the like. This illegal trade involves different actors in a range 
of countries, who appear to function similarly to legal business organizations. Transnational 
criminal networks also appear to be major beneficiaries of globalization and the use of IT in 
international financial exchange, since these processes allow free transfer of individuals, 
goods and finances (Shelley, 2002; Williams, 2001).There are important indicators suggesting 
that the majority of powerful organised crime groups are far more cellular in structure, with 
less obvious chains of command and numerous loose affiliations that are formed or broken 
on a regular basis and interrelated through diverse transnational networks (Europol, 2013; 
Williams, 2001 Costa, 2010). 
 
The evidence suggesting that criminal groups nowadays function as networks could be 
perceived as a description of modus operandi at the external level, while their internal 
structure may still remain hierarchical. For instance, a systematic review of previous studies 
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using social network analysis by Bichler, Malm and Cooper (2017) examined 34 studies that 
describe the structure of 54 illicit drug trafficking networks. One of the results indicated that 
“drug trafficking networks are more apt to be sparse with central individuals connecting the 
group” (Bichler, Malm and Cooper, 2017, p. 15). The review therefore confirmed that there 
are individuals who are ‘central players’ i.e. those with important roles who are identifiable 
through centrality analysis, while diverse other ‘contacts’ are established for the market 
purposes (such as importing drugs, money laundering). Concurrently, the cited review found 
that in the context of the market operations of criminal groups, cooperation links between 
different groups are loose.  
 
Some scholars conceptualize networks as a form of organisation which is “pervasive and 
ubiquitous” (Williams, 2001, p.64) hence hierarchy-free, whereas others (Borgatti et al. 2013; 
Robins, 2015; Wasserman and Faust, 1994) support that networks are based on the presence 
of two constitutive sets of elements: actors (nodes) and relationships (ties). One of the initial 
studies utilizing the perspective of organised crime groups as social networks was focused on 
a threat analysis of organised crime in the Netherlands (Fijnaut, et al., 1998). The 'Fijnaut 
Group' conducted the study by analysing a large amount of confidential police intelligence 
reports nationwide, and offered an important critique of the organized crime groups as semi-
stable criminal structures with determined leaders. The results indicated the fluidity of 
organised crime, the importance of improvisation and the fact that illegal drug trade in 
particular allows rapid promotion of individuals on the basis of a few successful drug imports. 
The study emphasized the importance of "criminal cooperatives" rather than 'organisations', 
or 'groups', implying fluid network relations with occasional 'nodes' as the main form of 
criminal enterprise functioning. Other studies on criminal networks reported similar findings 
(Garay Salamanca, Salcedo-Albarán, and de León-Beltrán, 2010; Garay and Villaveces 2009, 
van Duyne, 2003). 
 
Considerations of the types of structure of organised crime groups are particularly relevant 
for the field of crime control, given the need to develop effective suppression policies. 
Williams (2001) supported that networks have greater capacity to exploit new modes of 
communication and international collaboration than state actors whose activities are based on 
22 
 
hierarchical models. Research has confirmed that fluid network structure provides criminal 
groups with numerous advantages including adaptability, wide-scale recruitment, resilience, 
as well as capacity for quick learning and innovation (Ayling, 2009; Shelley, 2005). This type 
of organization provides greater efficiency, organizational flexibility and hinders law 
enforcement efforts to identify and position group members (Shelley and Picarelli, 2005). 
Furthermore, networks’ resilience refers to the system’s capacity to absorb disturbance and 
reorganize while undergoing change so to preserve fundamentally the same structure, 
functions and identity (Bichler, Malm and Cooper, 2017; Walker et al., 2004).  
 
Elusive quality of networks comes from their ability to increase market efficiency, coexist 
within hierarchical structures or without them and be modelled in different ways (Williams, 
2001). Moreover, criminal networks lack specific ideology and often use political corruption 
as a tool for their ends, infiltrating in this way into the political system (Morselli and Giguere, 
2006; Shelley, 2005). Organised crime constantly uses corruption to infiltrate into public 
sector through bribery, conflicts of interest, trading in influence and collusion in order to 
facilitate criminal activities (SOCTA, 2017). In this way, organised crime groups are able to 
invest major profits in the legitimate economy, as well as into their own criminal enterprises, 
ensuring business continuity and expansion. This is becoming increasingly dangerous, given 
that involvement in serious and organised crime may allow terrorist groups to generate funds 
to finance terrorism-related activities (SOCTA, 2017). 
 
In terms of crime control, the resilience perspective suggests that for combating illicit 
networks, both strategic and operational pathways are necessary (Ayling, 2009). This would 
imply intelligence gathering based on a more vigilant consideration of potential unintended 
links, as well as operational activities that would target network’s structure vulnerabilities in 
order to reduce resilience. However, the inhered secrecy, covertness and security issues may 
hinder the efficiency of communication and information gathering. Moreover, certain 
networks’ advantages may concurrently become their limitations, i.e. increased recruitment 
based on informal ties increases potential impact, but may also reduce mutual trust among the 
actors, hinder internal security and intensify conflicts. This is associated with the lack of 
formal dispute resolution mechanisms that often leads to violence, creating a need for an 
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“efficiency/security tradeoffs” (Morselli, Giguere, and Petit, 2007). Hence, comprehending 
the key characteristics of criminal networks may assist in their identification and mapping. 
However, an in-depth understanding of their emergence and modes of networking represents 
a condition sine qua non to adequately and effectively address their impact on the society. 
 
There is also evidence about relationships between different crime types, as reports on 
organized crime commonly note that involvement of individuals in criminal network is often 
associated with their multiple roles in different types of criminal activities (UNODC, 2011, 
2017; ASTRA, 2011; SOCTA, 2017). Poly-criminality trends reported by SOCTA (2017) 
indicate that 45% of the organised criminal groups are involved in more than one criminal 
activity. Apparently, investigations in practice often lead to identification of multiple criminal 
offences, for instance, it is frequently reported by law enforcement agencies that arrests 
associated with drug trafficking led to discovery of human trafficking as well. Similarly, a 
study by Porobic (2010) found that arms smuggling in Southeast Europe is consistently linked 
to drugs trafficking. The author underlined that police reports reveal how police operations 
aimed at organized crime groups often lead to seizures of large quantities of both drugs and 
arms. Similar findings have been reported in earlier studies on organized crime in Southeast 
European region (Anastasijevic, 2006). Recently, many organised criminal groups have 
expanded their crime portfolio in response to the sustained high level of demand for 
smuggling services during the migration crisis. Confirmations of multiple linkages among 
individuals and their activities in criminal networks indicate that assumptions of specialisation 
are perhaps no longer valid. 
 
Despite various perceptions regarding the definitions or particular structure, the phenomenon 
of organized crime commonly involves a variety of illicit activities (drugs/migrants/arms 
smuggling, human trafficking, extortion, mafia executions, terrorism financing), as well as 
intensive involvement of ‘white collar criminals’ i.e. state actors enabling its functioning. 
Given the evidenced adaptability to changes in the environment and the speed of adjusting 
modus operandi, organised crime remains of the main challenges for crime control systems 
worldwide. However, depending on state features, such as the quality, independence and 
integrity of the institutions safeguarding the rule of law, including police services and the 
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judiciary, the effectiveness in addressing the problem of organised crime significantly differs 
across countries. This research explores how effectively this challenge is addressed in Serbia. 
 
 
2.3. Organized crime - key features in Serbia 
 
2.3.1. A brief history of Serbia 
 
With an aim to understand the socio-political context of the examined country, a brief 
historical review of the modern Serbian state is provided. In the period from 1945 to 1990, 
Serbia was a republic within the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (hereinafter: 
Yugoslavia), as an entity of six republics. In 1990, the period of the dissolution of Yugoslavia 
initiated by various political events, to reach its peak in 1991 by the declarations of 
independence of Slovenia (25th June), Macedonia (25th September) and Croatia (8th October). 
In 1992, Bosnia and Herzegovina declare independence, which was followed by a creation of 
a state between Serbia and Montenegro in April 1992 under the name Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia.  
The death of Yugoslavia was followed by a 10-day war in Slovenia and devastating civil wars 
in Croatia and Bosnia during the period between 1991 and 1995. Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia was placed under a United Nations embargo which lasted until December 1995. 
The period of embargo was accompanied by the hyperinflation, the third highest inflation in 
the world. The Kosovo War (1998–1999) resulted in the new sanctions by the UN, the EU 
and the United States, which were lifted in January 2001. In 1999 NATO was bombing 
Yugoslavia for 78 days. Following the overthrow of the president Slobodan Milosevic on 
October 5th 2000, Yugoslavia initiated democratic transition. Prime Minister Djindjic was 
murdered in 2003 at the entrance of the Government. Members of organised criminal group 
and members of security service were convicted for this murder. In 2006, the country was 
dissolved by the declaration of independence of Montenegro. This resulted in declaration of 
Serbia as an independent state.  
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Serbia signed the Stabilisation and Association Agreement in 2007 and filed an official 
request for membership in the EU in 2009. In 2012, Serbia obtained an official status of a 
candidate country. Negotiations with the EU on the accession of Serbia initiated with the 
opening the first Chapters in January 2015. 
 
2.3.2. A contextual review of organized crime in Serbia 
 
It is interesting to note that organized crime principally did not exist in the former Yugoslavia. 
This may be explained by the system organization, as a socialist economy, controlled market, 
a one-party, semi-police state and well-controlled borders. As Grubac explained, foreign trade 
operations and money flows were under direct control of the intelligence services, which were 
controlled directly by the party leadership (Grubač, 2008). 
A significant scope of organized crime started appearing in Serbia in the early 90s of the last 
century. In that period, the majority of former Yugoslavian states passed through a decade of 
civil wars, armed conflicts and massive political transformations, which created social 
confusion and vulnerability to crime. Corruption, and misappropriation of state funds were 
widespread while the population became impoverished (Pesic, 2007). In addition, FR 
Yugoslavia passed through a period of hyperinflation between 1992 and 1994. By its length, 
intensity and devastating consequences, the Yugoslavian hyperinflation phenomenon was 
almost unrecorded in economic history1. This extreme stage of inflation included a rise in 
prices at a monthly level above 50%, acting as a generator of economic breakdown and 
upsurge of speculative behaviour. Inflation was as high as 19,810.2% and at the end of 1993, 
at the peak of hyperinflation, the National Bank of the FRY issued a bill of 500 billion dinars. 
Prices doubled every 16 hours. In such a situation, the Milosevic regime accepted organized 
crime as a means of obtaining money and arms for the country and criminal activity was 
treated as a normal occurrence (Grubac, 2008). Anastasijevic argued that:  
The regime of Slobodan Milosevic was not only corrupted, autocratic, and criminalised: 
it was a criminal regime, whose whole security sector was deeply involved not just in 
                                                             
1 Hyperinflation in Yugoslavia occupies the third place, immediately after Russia and Nicaragua 
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war crimes, but also in classic forms of organised crime: drug and weapons trafficking, 
extortion, kidnappings, and targeted assassinations. 
Anastasijevic (2006, p.2) 
Illuminating this phenomenon, Stojarova (2007) argued that “Serbian organised crime lived 
in symbiosis with the state and both players profited from this symbiosis”.  
Moreover, Serbian geographic position, as a crossroad between East and West, as well as the 
fact that it lies on the main path of the “Balkan route” contributed during the 90s to the 
development of organized crime. A combination of unconsolidated democracy, unstable 
politics, affected institutional capacity, and high centralization of power in ruling elites 
resulted in severe social tensions and “empowerment” of black economy. In addition, 
*Kosovo2, a modern de facto international protectorate, had become the unquestionable 
narcotics capital of Europe, as a result of lack of law coupled with the society reluctant to 
pursue organized crime, creating in this way a “black hole” in the centre of the Balkans 
(Chossudovsky, 2001; Graham, 2000; Kemp, 2017). 
Several specific traits of criminal groups associated with recent past and socio-political 
conditions in the region have been recognized. Reports have indicated that organized criminal 
groups in the region form an integral part of the international narcotics trade (Trifunovic, 
2007; UNODC, 2008). They are motivated by profit as a common goal rather than national 
interests, which allows close cooperation among diverse individuals regardless of their 
ethnicity, political or religious beliefs. Additionally, during the 90s, a “pact” between the 
secret services, corrupted political actors and organized crime has established strong grounds 
for the development of criminal organisations with a considerable social impact (Nikolic-
Ristanovic, 2004; Trifunovic, 2007;) Moreover, the routes utilised during conflicts for 
smuggling arms, cigarettes, gas, oil, cars and other products throughout the region and 
neighbourhood countries, formed a strong traffic structure unaffected by state actions. 
Organized crime persisted in the Balkans in the post-conflict period. In contrast to former 
Soviet Union states, where the old nomenklatura/political elite converted political capital into 
                                                             
2 This designation is without prejudice to positions on states in line with UNSCR 1244/1999. This stands for all 
the following references in the text. 
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economic and sometimes criminal capital, in many Balkan countries, criminal capital 
accumulated during the war has been converted into political capital after the war (Andreas, 
2004). 
Furthermore, the reference of Paoli (2002) that illicit networks operate both “without the 
state” and “against the state” has been substantially confirmed in Serbia, as criminal groups 
had significant involvement in political murders (Nikolic-Ristanovic, 2004). This can be 
understood as a consequence of allowing organized crime in Serbia to become an integral part 
of economic and political structures during the 90s. The assassination of Serbian Prime 
Minister Djindjic in 2003 and subsequent murders of prosecution witnesses demonstrated a 
clear message  of organized crime’ s resistance to the social change and a warning to the 
political structures that distortion of the formed symbiosis3 will not be simple. According to 
Dallara (2008, p.164), at this time, “the role of military and paramilitary forces, and their 
connection with organised crime, emerged with dramatic clarity.” It can be argued that such 
demonstration of power confirms the conceptual differentiation between traditional and 
“new” forms of organised crime. Similar standpoint is held by Mladenovic, who maintains 
that:  
The murder of Prime Minister Djindjic was the result of a struggle between organized 
crime forces and modernizing and democratizing forces in Serbia. It was also an attempt 
to secure impunity for war criminals still active in the Serbian police and military forces. 
It was a show of power that serves even today as a warning to anyone who dares to 
democratize Serbia by building strong democratic institutions and securing the rule of 
law. 
(Mladenovic, 27 November 20124) 
Finally, it has been put forward that traditional criminal groups require the state to retain their 
financial profit, thus using corruption as an operative tool to affect the state in which they 
have a vested interest. In contrast, criminal groups that emerged in the Western Balkans 
                                                             
3 After the assassination of the Prime Minister Djindjić, Serbian media reported a number of connections between 
key members of his coalition and the main organized crime groups (subsequently convicted for this murder) 
(Pavlaković, 2005, p. 39).  
4 https://jia.sipa.columbia.edu/failed-divorce-serbias-government-and-organized-crime  
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originated from ethnic conflicts, obtained power due to weak governance and have no interest 
or loyalty to the state. These criminal groups take advantage of institutionalized corruption to 
further destabilise the state and generate profit. They function as transnational networks and 
demonstrate more power over the state institutions than the traditional criminal groups.   
 
2.3.3. Drug trafficking as a key illicit activity of organized criminal groups – Serbia and the 
role of the Balkan route 
 
Globally, one of the main sources of income of (transnational and national) criminal networks 
refers to illicit drug trafficking. The SOCTA (2017) reports that drug markets remain the 
largest criminal markets in the EU. More than one third of the criminal groups active in the 
EU are involved in the production, trafficking or distribution of various types of drugs. Drug 
trafficking generates multi-billion euro profits for the groups involved in this criminal 
activity. The EU retail drug market is estimated to be worth at least EUR 24 billion a year 
(SOCTA, 2017). 
The term drug trafficking implies the supply of illegal drugs on the black market by criminal 
drug dealers in response to consumer demand, often controlled by organized crime syndicates 
(Stojanovic, 2003). Recent data indicate that global opiate market seam stable despite 
important regional changes (UNODC World Drug Report, 2016).  UNODC reports that there 
are signals that heroin use in the USA and Western and Central Europe revives again despite 
previous decline, as demonstrated by increased availability of heroin and larger size of 
individual seizure cases of heroin destined for Europe.  
Concurrently, the trends in the European Union show growth of the use of New Psychoactive 
Substances (hereinafter: NPS), with similar trends being recorded in Serbia as well. The 
European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (hereinafter: EMCDDA)  
reported (EMCDDA-Europol 2016, European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug 
Addiction and Europol, 2016, p. 23) that 419 previously undetected NPS were reported in the 
E7 for the first time over the past five years. According to SOCTA (2017), the industrial-scale 
production of synthetic drugs within the EU continues to expand, making the EU a key source 
region for distribution of these substances worldwide. Within the EU, the majority of 
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organized criminal groups involved in the distribution of illicit drugs deal in multiple illicit 
drugs, also called poly-drug trafficking. Concurrently, the State Department Report 2017 
notes that the use of NPS increases worldwide and certainly alters the overall picture of drug 
trade. Organized criminal groups of Serbian origin have recently become increasingly present 
at the intercontinental cocaine market used to smuggle cocaine from South America to 
Europe. Serbia remains solely a transit route to Europe for cocaine, while smaller quantities 
are used for the local market.  
Drug trafficking is also considered the key source of income for organized crime groups in 
Serbia. A study by the UNODC in 2011 revealed that the profit chain involves several levels: 
a) as large amounts of heroin and cocaine pass through the region, local organized crime 
groups and corrupt officials are able to gain immense profits, b) Serbia has low levels of drug 
use overall, which implies that the flow is conducted by highly organized groups aiming to 
gain the highest profit, rather than by the simple network of couriers and c) Balkan route is 
used to further spread illicit drug trade in the EU (UNODC, 2011). 
A number of reports have confirmed over the years that drug trafficking is flourishing in a 
part of European continent referred to as “the Balkans” (Europol, 2009; Michaletos, 2006; 
UNODC, 2011; SOCTA 2017; EU Peer review on organised crime and corruption, 20185). 
As the shortest road from the East to West, the so called ‘Balkan Route’ has been used for 
illicit trade since the seventh century. Nowadays, it is utilized by transnational and regional 
criminal groups for different forms of illegal activities. For instance, beyond drug trafficking, 
the Balkan route is along the path of migrants trying to move from Northern Africa and the 
Middle East to Europe. Vast number of refugees and migrants arriving in Greece had a major 
impact on the Western Balkans, given that they  passed via the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia, through Serbia into Hungary and then towards western Europe. As stated in the 
EUROPOL report, Frontex reported that in 2015, around 764,000 people illegally crossed the 
border into the Western Balkans – 16 times more than the previous year. The network of 
facilitators who provided know-how along the Balkan route have been described by the 
EUROPOL as a “crime-as-a-service” business model (EUROPOL, 2016). 
                                                             
5 This document is not publicly available. It was provided by the Ministry of Justice to the researcher. 
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The functioning of the Balkan route is inextricably associated with operations of criminal 
networks in the region of former Yugoslavia. Despite significant local and regional efforts of 
these states in the region, criminal networks continue to function and make large profits. It 
appears that the geographical location in relation to the EU as the final destination, trade 
liberalization, and relatively low risk of law enforcement activities make this path pretty 
convenient (EU Organized Crime Threat Assessment- SOCTA, 2017).  
Notwithstanding numerous methods used for drug transport worldwide, the Balkan route 
continues to be the key route for smuggling most of the opiates from Afghanistan. A UNODC 
study in 2016 on opiate trafficking on the Balkan route suggests that most of the opiates from 
Afghanistan in the period 2009-2012 were smuggled through the Balkan route (UNODC 
World Drug Report, 2016). UNODC (2015) suggested that between 60-65 tons of heroin 
flows into South-Eastern Europe annually and that most of the drugs are moved by road 
vehicles. UNODC (2015) estimated that the value of the drugs trafficked along the Balkan 
route amount to approximately $28 billion. 
The term “Balkan drugs route” refers to the main path by which narcotics and specifically 
heroine are smuggled into the European countries. Michaletos (2007) described this route as 
a network of contrabands, corrupted public officials and former warlords that make sure the 
heroine produced in Afghanistan is smoothly transferred into Europe. The UNODC defines 
the “Balkan route” as a path which supplies Western and Central Europe with Afghan opiates, 
through Iran and Turkey via South-Eastern Europe to Western and Central Europe.  
The Balkan route involves several South East European states6, which play significant roles 
in the distribution of heroin, cocaine and other drugs, including Albania, Southern Bulgaria, 
FYROM, Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia (Trifunovic, 2007; The 
Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime - Crooked Kaleidoscope Organized 
Crime in the Balkans, 2017). The route has been linked with several border points in 
Montenegro and Albania, the port of Constance in Romania, as well as the channel Rhine-
                                                             
6 Reports have indicated that there are basically two or three main routes of transporting heroin towards the EU, 
including southern and central path (Afghanistan, Iran, Turkey, Bulgaria, Greece, former Yugoslavian republics, 
towards Italy), and northern part through Hungary towards Austria/ Germany (International Narcotics Control 
Strategy Report, 2010; UNODC, 2008). Nevertheless, the minor paths often change pending the specific situation 
in different states. 
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Main-Danube as the main entry points into the EU (OCTA, 2009). According to the European 
Commission, “the Pan European Corridor X plays an important role as transit route for this 
illicit business and Serbia needs to focus its operational capacity on this route” (European 
Commission, Screening report on Serbia, 2014).  
Graph II.1: The Balkan route 
 
 
Source: UNODC 
 
Nevertheless, the state of art in the illegal drug market in Serbia and in the region has 
considerably changed in the last few years. The accession of Croatia to the European Union 
in 2013, along with the Republic of Bulgaria and Romania becoming members of the 
European Union in 2007, as well as the unilaterally declared independence of the Autonomous 
Province of Kosovo and Metohija are all important factors influencing drug trade. The 
smuggling routes of heroin used by organized criminal groups have altered to some extent, as 
the trafficking route of heroin transported to Western European countries is directed towards 
the Schengen borders and to the direction of the Republic of Bulgaria-Romania-Hungary in 
order to avoid increased controls of passengers and goods at the borders of Serbia. 
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Data indicate that Balkan nationals from the region are active in cocaine trafficking. For 
example, in early 2016 an investigation called Operation Danube7 led to the arrest of 13 
suspects (including six Croatians, five Austrians and two Serbian nationals) belonging to a 
Balkan organised crime group responsible for importing approximately 34 kg of cocaine from 
South America to Europe through the Netherlands. Even though the members of this 
organized criminal group were arrested earlier, Darko Saric as its leader was arrested in March 
2016 on charges of trafficking 5.7t of cocaine from Uruguay to Europe. In May 2015, over 
one ton of cocaine was seized on a yacht in Spain, on its way from South America to Western 
Europe, whereby one Serb and two Croats were arrested. 
Beyond drug trafficking, links to other crime types have also been identified.  Serbia has been 
recognized as a source, transit, and destination country, while Kosovo* has been recognized 
as the epicentre of all drug deals and sex trafficking from Asia into Europe along the Balkan 
route (International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 2010; Jopp and Sandawi, 2007; 
Michaletos, 2007; Trifunovic, 2007; State Department Report on Human Trafficking, 2017). 
Jopp and Sandawi (2007) argued that most of Kosovo’s* political elite are either a part of, or 
have direct links to Albanian organized crime groups, and are “internally protected by 
parliamentary immunity and abroad by international law”8. The State Department report on 
Human Trafficking in 2017 states that Kosovo* is a source and destination country for sex 
trafficking and forced labour. Most victims are internally trafficked for sexual exploitation, 
but Kosovo* criminal groups also force women from Albania, Moldova, Romania, Serbia, 
and other European countries into prostitution, Government corruption creates an 
environment that enables some trafficking crimes (State Department Trafficking in Persons 
Report, 2017). Several police officers, labour ministry employees, and other government 
officials have been charged with or convicted of trafficking crimes. Albania remains the main 
source of herbal cannabis trafficked to the EU (EUROPOL, 2016, p.35).  
 
                                                             
7 Europol supports Europe-wide crackdown on cocaine-trafficking Balkan Organised Crime Group”, 1 March 
2016 
8 They also support that  nearly a decade of administrative mismanagement of Kosovo by UNMIK created 
personal ties between international civil authorities and the Albanian criminal elite, effectively legitimizing 
organized crime as Kosovo’s first generation of elected politicians 
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Links with the weapons trade from the Balkans to the Middle East have been also identified 
by the Balkan Investigative Reporting Network (BIRN, 2016). BIRN reported that in the 
period 2012 - 2017, €1.2 billion have changed hands in arms deals between the Balkans and 
the Middle East. Links to other crime types such as terror financing have not been associated 
to Serbia, but this issue has been raised for the area of Novi Pazar. There are reports9 that in 
the recent terrorist attacks in France and Belgium, at least some of the weapons originated 
from the Balkans. 
Nevertheless, beyond the Balkan route as an important issue relevant for narcotics smuggling, 
there is a severe involvement of strong criminal networks inside Serbia as well. According to 
Prelevic (2018), a whole set of serious threats is present in Serbia nowadays in relation to 
organized crime and drug trafficking. This argument lies in the fact that the frequency of 
mafia murders in Serbia, even in the middle of the day in the central Belgrade areas, creates 
fear of the community. There is an understanding that the war between various criminal 
groups from Serbia and Montenegro has been ongoing for over a year in the territory of Serbia. 
This war involves a vast number of sport clubs supporters who are viewed as the ‘army’ of 
criminals in the general public. Even though these murders are classified as a reciprocal war 
for the drugs market, Prelevic perceives multiple victims of mafia, i.e. those who are 
murdered, those who consume drugs, as well as citizens as potential collateral damage of 
these murders. He identifies poverty and helplessness as key motives for engagement of new, 
often young, members in criminal groups10.  
Concurrently, this territorial war on the control of the drug market between various criminal 
groups, on the other hand, indicates that these groups function hierarchically at the internal 
level. That is, even though they engage in illicit operations worldwide through participation 
in various criminal networks, as an external mode of functioning, they appear to have clear 
internal Mafia-like hierarchical structure. Interestingly, their “bosses” are widely known and 
often presented in the media, almost as stars. 
                                                             
9 The Economist, “Ask not from where the AK-47s flow” (16 April 2016). See also Reuters, “Gaffer tape and 500 
euros: running guns to the heart of Europe (28 November 2015). 
10 As Prelevic explains, these young persons are unemployed, and they are doing nothing, except maybe spending 
hours in the gym. Once quick and large profits are offered, including expensive cars and influence, hey are easily 
trapped into criminal groups’ engagement.  
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Considering the advantage of transnational crime to invoke the international dimension of 
apparently localized issues, the ‘Balkan route’ may have significant impact on European 
societies and international affairs. In line with this, the role of Serbian criminal groups 
suggests a researchable topic on a social activity with significant implications in terms of 
economics, politics, transnational drug trafficking, international development and European 
integration. 
 
2.4. Conclusions 
 
The background review developed in this Chapter has particular importance for this research 
for several reasons. First, it is aimed at describing the contextual environment in which this 
research takes place. It therefore familiarises the reader with the state of play in Serbia and its 
historical background, as the country under exploration. Secondly, it summarises the relevant 
standpoints on organised crime, including the definitions and different perspectives on its 
structure. Given that the phenomenon of organised crime is one of the underlying reasons for 
recent evaluations of Serbia as a ‘captured state’, it was considered appropriate to include a 
relevant discussion on its key features.  
Third, the structure of organised crime discussed in this section is particularly relevant for this 
research, given the focus of the exploration on the developed response strategies. As discussed 
above, it is important to separate the conceptualisations of the internal organised crime group 
structure (which is mainly hierarchical) and its external or market structure (which often 
involves loose cooperation links with easily replaceable individuals). Given the described 
environmental framework in Serbia and the focus of this research on crime control, the 
concept of criminal networks is utilised. Thus, this research refers to ‘networks’ which 
cooperate both regionally and internationally, without neglecting the fact that these groups 
are internally hierarchically organised. This is particularly important given the aim of this 
research, which is to assess the effectiveness of a network of state institutions in supressing 
organised crime.  
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Finally, the fight against organized crime and drug trafficking groups remains one of the most 
significant priorities of international and regional cooperation due to the consequences and 
high risks for the society associated with this phenomenon. The multiple impact of organized 
crime is reflected in general fear in the community, a lack of trust in the state institutions, 
generation of huge financial resources commonly used to fund other criminal activities and a 
serious threat for different countries. Thus, the phenomenon of organised crime in the Western 
Balkans is not region-specific and directly threatens the interests of the region, as well as the 
broader international community.  
The boundaries of conventional international cooperation in the field of law enforcement and 
judiciary have changed, mainly due to swift mobility, significant diversity of structure and 
communication methods of criminal organizations. In accordance with these contemporary 
approaches, the government of Serbia has made the fight against drug trafficking groups and 
corruption top priorities11. These priorities are an attempt to send a clear message, both 
domestically, that there will be no impunity for such crimes, and internationally, that Serbia 
will act as a security partner capable of preventing spreading of crime into Europe.  
However, the EU Enlargement Strategy in 2018 reports that enlargement countries remain 
strongly affected by organised crime. It is stated that powerful criminal groups continue to 
operate in the Western Balkans, while the region remains an important entry route for the 
trafficking of illicit goods, in particular drugs and arms.  There is a remaining gap between 
the analysis of organised crime threats and operational priorities set and problematic respect 
for the operational independence of law enforcement bodies, all together reducing the success 
rate in effectively dismantling criminal groups. This state of play contributed to classification 
of Serbia as a captured state. The phenomenon of state capture in Serbia is therefore explored 
with a view to criminal networks as potential ‘captors’.  
It has been suggested that it takes a network to fight a network (Walker et al., 2004), implying 
that there is a need for both internal as well as international cooperation to address criminal 
networks. In this context, Serbia has over the years developed a ‘response network’ (described 
in Chapter III), comprised of a set of institutional and legislative changes, aimed at increasing 
                                                             
11 Each Government starting from 2003. 
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effectiveness of organized crime and drug trafficking suppression. The effects of state actions 
have not yet been assessed, but there are indications that organized crime groups are 
blossoming again, despite certain success that has been achieved.   
 
Chapter III Literature review 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
As stated above, this research explores the phenomenon of state capture in the field of crime 
control, as a result of embeddedness of organised criminal networks in Serbia, as a country 
undergoing EU accession. This is performed through examination of the effectiveness of state 
institutions in suppressing organised crime and drug trafficking in an attempt to identify 
potential systemic shortcomings or structural holes that hinder the results of such efforts.  
With an aim to explore potential state capture in the field of crime control, several inter-related 
features of the state of play in Serbia are assessed. Consequently, the literature review consists 
of several sections. The first section is consisted of two parts, whereby the first part involves 
a theoretical review on democratic transition and its key features, along with its links with 
organised crime, while the second part builds on the transition discussion, introducing EU 
accession as the key strategic continuation of the process. The second section describes in 
detail the network of state institutions (referred to in this thesis as ‘state response network’) 
in Serbia, developed as an institutional and legislative mechanism to address organized crime.  
 
The third section involves a review of the concept of state capture, given that Serbia has been 
characterized as a captured state due to significant impact of corruption and organized crime. 
The aim of this third section is to develop a link between seemingly fragmented literature on 
crooked states and state capture with the knowledge on corruption and organized crime 
networks as potential captors. Usually, organized crime is studied by criminologists, with a 
focus on its functioning, the effects on the states and legal aspects. It is also regarded as a 
factor influencing state development in a number of international reports and scientific 
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articles. Given that the dynamics of organized crime and states in transition and EU accession 
appear to be increasingly intertwined, this Chapter attempts to explore the causes for the 
prevalence of organized crime during period of transition in Serbia and make inferences of 
potential vulnerabilities of the state functioning in connection to criminal networks. These 
issues are further explored with a view to identify the extent to which crime control system, 
reflected in the ‘state response network’, is distorted by symptoms of state capture. 
 
3.1.1. Scope and definition of terms  
 
Given the nature of the concepts utilised in this research, it is important to delineate the scope 
and the definitions of the terms.  
“Criminal networks” – The term is used in a general sense, without explicit theoretical 
implications about the internal structure, either fluid or hierarchical, of a particular organisation. 
The term ‘networks’ is used interchangeably with the term ‘criminal groups’. 
“Structural holes” – The term refers to the gaps, vacuums or deficiencies in the functioning of 
institutions responsible for organised crime and drug trafficking suppression. The term builds on 
Cockayne’s (2017) conceptualisation of ‘points of arbitrage’, implying loopholes in the network 
of regular activities of crime control institutions.  It is conceptualised in this research that these 
gaps create opportunities for organised crime to capture the state’s crime control system. This 
term is not used in the meaning relevant for the network science, where it commonly signifies 
the vacuum that exists between two or more densely connected clusters.  
 “State capture” -the concept of state capture pertinent to this research refers to the inferences of 
links of state institutions with organised crime, at various levels of state governance, which lead 
to decreased effectiveness of state actions aimed at suppressing organised crime. This research 
later proposes a more specific definition of state capture (see 7.1.). 
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3.2. States in transition and process of EU accession 
 
3.2.1. The process of democratic transition – key concepts and approaches 
 
The concept of states in transition involves a group of countries whose economy is changing 
from centrally planned economy to a free market economy (Feige, 1994). The notion of 
transition became one of the most studied socio-political notions at the end of the 20th 
century. Following the collapse of communism in the late 1980s, countries of the former 
Soviet Union, as well as Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria, started abandoning central planning 
and turned towards market capitalism. The process of transformation of centrally planned 
economies into market economies, a decade later, resulted in diversification of the states, 
given that some countries are perceived as a ‘success story’, such as Poland, Slovenia, 
Hungary, and the Czech Republic, while others continue to experience problems and languish 
at various phases of the process. Moreover, the successful transition states have also reached 
a satisfactory level of liberal democratic consolidation. 
Even though usually described under the single term ‘transition’, different systemic changes 
take place within that process and regularly involve a set of different developments ranging 
from economic or democratic changes, as well as extensive social alterations.  The transition 
process mainly involves several simultaneous processes12 such as liberalization, which involves 
determination of price structures in free markets and lowering trade barriers, as well as 
privatization, referring to the transfer of public into private ownership thus establishing a viable 
financial sector and restructuring companies. This process also implies macroeconomic 
stabilization, which infers control over inflation i.e. enhanced fiscal and monetary policies. 
Finally, it is generally accepted that transition process should always be accompanied by legal 
and institutional reforms, aimed at establishing the rule of law, redefining the role of the state, and 
introducing competition rules. 
In the period of the beginnings of transition, socialism as a social order and economic model 
ceased to be an alternative to the capitalist economic model worldwide. The inefficiency of 
the system and the lack of motivation among workers are often stressed as the main causes of 
                                                             
12 See Transition Economies: An IMF Perspective on Progress and Prospects; November 3, 2000, 
https://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/ib/2000/110300.htm#I 
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its collapse (Cvijanović, Mihailović and Simonović, 2014), as well as the false growth of 
economic activity13. As mentioned above, there are a number of successful transition cases, 
mainly including former Soviet Union and Eastern and Central European states. These states 
also had centrally planned economy and functioned in an isolated economic system 
disregarding market demands.  Most of these states initiated transition processes in the 1980’s, 
undertaking efforts to transform centrally planned economies to a market economy.  
Similar to the other European post-socialist countries, the transition process in Serbia initiated 
approximately in the same time. Serbian economy in that period was characterized by 
comparable conditions, including direct state administration followed by the system of self-
management14, both leading to system inefficiency (Cvijanović, Mihailović and Simonović, 
2014; Stojiljković, 2011). The factual situation was not recognized, and the process of 
"socialization of losses" started, whereby the state was concurrently implementing the same 
approach towards companies with poor financial health which had a domino effect on strong 
companies. The overall effect of these processes has led to the collapse of socialism and the 
abandonment of the so-called "socialist paradigms” (Stojiljković, 2011). 
Serbia is one of the countries that approached the process of reform focusing on 
macroeconomic stabilization, liberalization and privatization, as the main principles of the 
Washington Consensus (Stefanović and Mitrović, 2012). The process was aimed to allow for 
the market forces to set prices rather than a central planning organization, removal of the trade 
barriers, privatization of the state-owned companies and restructuring of a financial sector to 
facilitate macroeconomic stabilization and the private capital flows.  
However, in the 1990s the country was still a part of Yugoslavia and it was experiencing 
regional conflicts and war, while other socialist economies were undertaking efforts towards 
transition. For a whole decade, financial situation in Serbia was marked by the economic 
sanctions, hyperinflation and a crash of the economic system. Following the democratic 
changes after October 5th 2000, the process of (economic) transition of Serbia initiated, in the 
period when the basic preconditions for its implementation were met. The changes in the 
                                                             
13 It was not the growth that creates, but the growth that destroys the value of the company. 
14 In such an economic system, there was no clear and direct connection between the results and the evaluation of 
the work. 
40 
 
domain of economy started in that period and are still ongoing . Namely, the whole process 
involved the transition of former socialist system into the market economy, which creates a 
new business environment and a new institutional infrastructure. Liberalization of trade 
relations and capital balance enabled the integration of Serbia's economic system into 
international financial and commodity flows (Djuricin, 1996). It could therefore be considered 
that economic transition in Serbia was significantly delayed when compared with other states 
in the region or other transition states.  
Nevertheless, despite the described delays in transition processes, it is necessary to take into 
account the actual process and its accompanying factors in order to understand the concrete 
state of play in a given country. For instance, research by the International Monetary Fund 
(World Economic Outlook, 2000) suggests that countries that have combined macroeconomic 
stabilization with extensive structural reforms have been more successful in overcoming the 
decline in production in the initial stages of transition, as well as achieving significant growth 
in production in the upcoming period. The IMF holds that these two components are equally 
important for the success of the transition.  
The focus on structural reforms brings to attention the role of the institutions, as key nodes of 
the structure of society. The perception of the necessary extensive structural reforms implies 
the process of democratic transition, which should accompany the economic reforms. 
According to Feige (1994), the complexity of the historically unprecedented transformation 
process from centrally planned economy into market economy 
 ...requires a fundamental restructuring of a nation’s economic, political, social and legal 
institutions, as well as its physical infrastructure. 
 (Feige, 1994, p. 1).  
Likewise, Besley, Dewatripont, and Guriev (2010) believe that effective transition is not 
possible without subsequent institutional changes, given that institutions represent the core of 
social and economic interactions. They consider that transition may be prolonged in case of 
absence of changes of the formal and informal institutions. Similarly, Golubovic (1999) 
maintained that democratic transition is not only a change of institutions and authorities, but 
a qualitative shift towards the realization of a new way of life and the promotion of autonomy, 
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freedom and responsibility of citizens in making constitutive life decisions. This reference to 
the interaction of institutional and economic changes has been supported by other authors as 
well (Acemoglu, Robinson, and Johnson 2012; Greif, 2006; Stojiljković, 2011). Contrary, 
Sachs (2012) believes that political institutions are not always decisive in a country’s growth 
performance. Sach argues that this is indicated by the success of some authoritarian 
governments. As he claims, authoritarian leaders often have very strong motivations for 
national economic success, as they are often engaged in aggressive international political and 
military competition with other states.  
On the other hand, Grief (2006) argued that the quality of institutional foundations is very 
important for the development, hence that the state of affairs of political institutions may 
indicate the causes of the differences in political orders and welfare of diverse states. As Greif 
(2006, p.4) explains, institutions are providing the setup for the quality market functioning by 
efficiently assigning, protecting, and altering property rights; securing contracts; and 
motivating specialization and exchange. Acemoglu, Robinson, and Johnson (2012) believe 
that institutions securing property rights have the great significance for economic growth.  
Tridico (2011) attributed different levels of performance among transition countries to the 
quality of institutions, along with policies and strategies implemented, the level of democratic 
political institutions, participation and accountability, levels of trust and social capital, 
citizens’ capabilities and control of corruption. Following this line of opinion, as a part of the 
wider framework of the process of transition, the structural and institutional reforms in Serbia 
were initiated in the same period.  
Acknowledging that democratic transition is a complex process, a set of other factors, beyond 
institutional changes, are often discussed when assessing the effectiveness (or lack of) 
transition. The focus of transitional studies is usually placed on political, legal and economic 
matters, as well as social factors.  
One of the factors discussed refers to the preparedness of the nation and population to change 
the inherited habits and enter the system different than the one they know. Abramovitz (1986) 
argued that the “social capability” of the nation is an imperative determinant of growth. His 
understanding was that not all nations are capable to adopt and adjust to changes. Abramovitz 
argued that educational system, labour force and performance on the individual levels are 
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equally important as economic factors and institutional development. Following this line of 
reasoning, democratic consolidation is reached when a “democratic culture” is deeply 
embedded socially and when institutions are able to function independently.  
Similarly, a Serbian author Srdja Popovic (2010), offered a comprehensive insight into two 
failed transitions in Serbia: one in 1990 and the other in 2000, in an effort to explain why 
Serbia failed to take advantage of the transitional chance both times. He indicates that the 
actors within the political arena framed by the dominant cultural patterns, as well as the 
legacies of the past played a key role in this failure. Hence it was impossible to simply implant 
a democratic government onto a non-democratically oriented society, as it would facilitate 
non-democratic elements to gain greater political legitimacy through democratic channels.  
Popovic (2015) sees the causes of Serbia's epochal failure in the main actors, i.e. the previous 
political order, the dominant cultural patterns, and, after 2000, a refusal to recognize the 
criminal inheritance from the nineties. The impression is that in describing the failure of the 
1990s, Popovic (2010) puts emphasis on actors who gain power within the political field 
through cultural manipulation. Popovic (2000) illustratively argued that the years of 1990 and 
2000 mark the boundaries between the three periods in the new Serbian history: a) the 1990, 
which he refers to as a period towards barbarism, b) the period between 1990 and 2000, which 
he perceives as the barbaric war years, and c) the period beginning in 2000, the period 
focusing on democratic transition. Popovic noted that Serbia failed to get out of the black hole 
of the 90s for two and a half decades. The reason for this is the dominant model that he labelled 
as "the culture of humiliation", whereas in the nineties, the "culture of fear" dominated 
(Popovic, p. 401). Popovic perceives the second half of the eighties of the 20th century as a 
possibility for the political transformation of Yugoslavia as the emergence of the federal 
framework opened the first opportunity for transition. Only if this Yugoslav transition failed, 
the opportunity was to be used by Serbia. 
Overall, the establishment of a democratic political framework in Serbia after October 5 th 
2000 has failed to produce a democratic political culture that has reconciled the past with 
political, social, and ethnic communities in Serbia, throughout the former Yugoslavia, and 
with Europe. There was a need to fully restructure the old system, including dissolution of the 
secret police and opening up the secret government archives, allowing for a free press, and 
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enabling democratic elections. These changes were necessary for the establishment of the rule 
of law and good governance (Popovic, 2005), whereby the rule of law denotes that a state 
applies its laws but also that these laws are legitimate and valid. 
This is consistent with Teitel (2014), who perceives transition as a process with the normative 
component of the conversion from a less democratic regime to a more democratic and liberal 
regime. Transition therefore implies that the whole society experiences its own political, 
social and cultural reconstruction. The need for such a major change stems from the insight 
that the former government has ruined the social capacities for concluding decent social 
arrangements. Hence transition, according to Teitel, involves a normative jump from the state 
of injustice to a more just democratic and liberal order, which is not possible without the 
change of normative forms and a cultural change. In some cases this implies the alteration of 
the identity of the given political community, such as Serbia. To summarize, even though 
different interpretations of democracy may be contested, the fundamental principles of 
democracy and the rule of law are never questioned (Laitin, 1998).  
The notion of rule of law (prééminence du droit) represents a fundamental principle and a 
common European value recognised in the Statute of the Council of Europe and the case law 
of the European Court of Human Rights, along with the principles of human rights and 
pluralistic democracy. Explicit reference to the rule of law can be found, inter alia, in 
European Union treaties, as well as in the Copenhagen criteria of 1993 for accession to the 
European Union. The United Nations define the term rule of law as: 
A principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and 
private, including the state itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, 
equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with 
international human rights norms and standards. It requires, as well, measures to ensure 
adherence to the principles of supremacy of law, equality before the law, accountability 
to the law, fairness in the application of the law, separation of powers, participation in 
decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and legal 
transparency. 
(United Nations, 2004, p.4) 
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Despite seemingly clear understanding of the rule of law concept, there is a significant 
inconsistency in terminology within the Council of Europe member states, as well as different 
comprehension of the term. The key debates within the Council of Europe referred to the 
adequate term that would reflect the English language notion of rule of law as adequately as 
the expression “prééminence du droit”15, whereas other terms often used such as the French 
expression “Etat de droit” do not always adequately grasp the same meaning (Lauc, 2016). 
These debates were of particular importance in terms of application of the term in some former 
Soviet Union (transition) states, where the notion was inappropriately understood to signify a 
state based on the principle of the supremacy of the laws. Therefore, the meaning of the rule 
of law concept and its translations have been considered within the Council of Europe and 
reflected by the Venice Commission.  A conclusion of these considerations was that a 
formalistic interpretation of the term “Etat de droit” runs contrary to the essence of rule of 
law/prééminence du droit (Venice Commission, 2016).  
In this sense, it can be concluded that the principles of good governance such as transparency, 
accountability and participation are a precondition for legitimate and efficient functioning of 
the public institutions. Good governance also implies the possibility of citizens to hold 
decision-makers accountable for their actions. The concept of good governance is often used 
to assess the evolution of the democratization process in transition countries (Regional 
Research Promotion Programme, 2013). Democratization commonly involves the process of 
change from an authoritarian or totalitarian regime towards a more inclusive democratic 
regime based on free, fair and competitive elections (Linz and Stepan 1996, Diamond 1999, 
Teorell 2010). Nevertheless, democratisation is often not simple and not always a successful 
process. Scholars have therefore discussed the effects of “linkages and leverages” (Levitsky 
and Way, 2006) as factors influencing democratisation. The framework proposed by Levitsky 
and Way suggests that ‘leverage’ of the West, reflected in different forms of vulnerability of 
governments to external pressure, has not proved to be sufficient for effective 
democratisation. The authors support that the other dimension i.e. ‘linkages’ has demonstrated 
more success in inducing democracy across the world. They refer to linkages as "soft power" 
or density of diverse social or economic ties and cross-border flows between states in 
                                                             
15 In the French version of the Statute of the Council of Europe, in the preamble to the European Convention on 
Human Rights and in the Strasbourg Court’s case-law 
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transition and the EU or the USA. Essentially, the concept of linkages refers to civil society, 
links with international actors and other societal connections whose existence increase the 
likelihood of internal pressure towards democratization. 
Moreover, discussions on the rule of law and democratisation in transition countries regularly 
refer to the differences between the medium-level and low-level developed democracies i.e. 
the old and new democracies. However, Svolik (2008) argues that this difference is not 
suitable to explain alternative paths, apart from consolidation, through which democracies 
stabilize. According to Svolik (2013), many democracies stabilize when the political 
representatives prove themselves accountable to public demands. The problem in many, 
typically young, democracies is that building such accountability depends on institutional 
quality. Different perspectives on successful democratisation in transition countries 
emphasize diverse elements, such as the rule of law, clear separation of powers and 
establishment of effective political institutions (Fukuyama, 2014), political parties (Pridham 
and Lewis, 1996), local ownership (Poppe and Wolff, 2013) or the external actors (Burnell 
and Calvert, 2004). An interesting perspective also involves the importance of preventing the 
members of previous regime to continue acting in political life, as one of the main factors 
influencing democratisation. This is particularly important with a view to prosecution of 
representatives of the old regime, commonly referred to as ‘lustration’, which may have a 
profound social impact (Horne, 2014). Even though the fairness of such an approach may be 
disputable, the key dimension of this process is the break of the linkages of the old regime 
with the new state representatives may be beneficial in the long run, as it prevents the same 
structures to remain in control of the system. The process of lustration has not been performed 
in Serbia, despite comprehensive debates and social appeals for its implementation. 
To summarize, it is understood that the rule of law, democracy, good governance and the 
respect of human rights standards represent specific values that should be achieved following 
the process of democratic transition. As reviewed above, democratic transition in Serbia was 
a process accompanying economic reforms, but it appears to be still ongoing while its effects 
are assessed in different ways.  
Some authors perceive that a new transitional attempt in Serbia that took place in the 2000 
has been delayed due to cultural patterns and the political order which did not allow the truth 
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about the nineties to be used for awakening of the citizens of Serbia, even though it became 
public. This view is often supported by reference to merely general orientation towards 
European values and EU integrations. Following this line of inquiry, the impact of social 
context has been emphasized in studies on developing and transition countries (Ivanova, 
2010; Fazekas and Tóth, 2014, Perry and Keil, 2018; Volkov, 2002). Others believe that 
democratic transition was prolonged as there was no radical break with non-democratic 
heritage, corruption and crime (Stojiljkovic, 2012).  
Concurrently, research in many transition countries has consistently supported that 
widespread corruption associated with weak governance and state institutions, facilitates 
proliferation of organized crime and reinforces illicit activities of transnational criminal 
organizations (Michaletos, 2009; Shelley, 2002; Vasic, 2010; Trifunovic, 2007). Studies on 
crime in transition countries reported valuable findings with regard to development of 
organized crime and its association to the state structures. Johnson (2005) developed a 
corruption model for post-socialist states: “oligarch and clan corruption takes place in a risky 
and sometimes violent setting of rapidly expanding economic and political opportunities and 
weak institutions. It is dominated by figures who may be government officials or business 
entrepreneurs, but whose power is personal and attracts extensive followings.” Volkov 
explained such dynamics as “existing institutions supplied staff for new private force-
wielding organizations that dealt in private protection and enforcement and accordingly 
governed the redistribution of the income of economic enterprises” (Volkov, 2002).   
Overall, a bulk of evidence suggests that a number of transition states developed strong links 
between organised crime, politics and the public sector (Ivanova, 2010; Fazekas and Toth, 
2016; Varese 2010; Garay and Villaveces, 2009; Morseli, 2009; Shelley, 2002; von Lampe, 
2006). Major effects of this form of symbiosis between the state and criminal organisations 
foster criminal activities and threaten social cohesion. It appears that criminal networks, based 
on a shared interest, have been much more successful in establishing cooperation than the 
state officials or law enforcement agencies. This phenomenon seems to be closely associated 
with the notion that illicit networks are sovereignty free (Kenney, 2007) and thus less 
accountable and more adaptable to changes. Contemporary investigations emphasize the 
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importance of the emergence of a symbiosis between legitimate actors16 and criminal 
networks, highlighting an increasingly active role of the legal sector in facilitating different 
forms of crime. Such symbiosis hinders effective suppression of organized crime and 
eventually leads to state capture.  
Moreover, some authors support that particularities of historical, social, cultural and political 
circumstances (Allum and Gilmour, 2012) determine the forms of criminal organisations and 
the type of illegal goods and services they exchange. In this line, it could be argued that the 
contextual environment in former Yugoslavian states, including the ongoing conflicts, 
embargo and associated state-led criminal activities, played an important role in the 
establishment of strong organized criminal groups in the region. As stated by Margaret 
Macmillan (2016), the Balkans has “too much history and too many neighbours”. As 
discussed in Chapter II, organized criminal groups were developed and utilised for purchasing 
high priced arms and ammunition for local wars, as well as trafficking in cigarettes and other 
goods. The regime in Serbia tried to evade sanctions and to preserve power, plotting organized 
crime as a source of necessary funds for the functioning of the state and the exercise of state 
functions. It was a form of self-defence and a “tactic of economic and national survival”. The 
authorities basically fostered crime and increased corruption, as a method to preserve political 
positions. In this specific context, multi-ethnic organized crime groups in the Balkans closely 
cooperated among each other and other European and transnational criminal groups (Porobic, 
2010).  Such deeply-rooted maladaptive relations appear to have sustained, hindering 
transition process and fostering a ‘status quo’ state of play even nowadays. 
Despite different ideas about the causes of long lasting transition, twenty years later, Serbia 
continues to work on the rule of law reforms in an attempt to reach international standards. 
Functioning rule of law enables effective control of both crime and corruption, however, the 
results of suppression efforts of Serbia in these fields do not show adequate progress.  As 
indicated, the notion of the rule of law is central in determining the degree of success in a 
transition state (Fukuyama, 2014; Linz and Stepan 1996). The need to address organised 
crime in Serbia as a threat to foundation for democracy, prosperity and long-term stability, 
                                                             
16 For instance, it is interesting that police does not follow the drugs in case it is informed of specific shipments. 
Instead of  tracing where or to whom this drug is going to, the police solely seizes the drug, as if it is not interested 
in identifying the higher level criminal group members.  
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has been emphasized in 2002 (London Statement, 2002). That is, seventeen years ago, the EU 
states placed a strategic partnership for freedom, justice and security with Serbia at the top of 
their agenda Nevertheless, assessments suggests that the principle of the rule of law has not 
been sufficiently achieved (e.g. EU Progress reports 2013-2018).  
The duration of the problems in the rule of law in Serbia indicates that there are also other, 
deeply-routed factors influencing its progress towards regular democracy. These factors usually 
refer to the problems in the field of the judiciary, organised crime, corruption and recently, 
democratic elections (Freedom House, 2018). Moreover, an independent judiciary is crucial for 
combating political corruption and organised crime; hence problems in this field significantly 
hinder the respect of the rule of law. 
Given that problems in the rule of law persist even nowadays, they bring to question the 
potential for Serbian EU integration as its key strategic goal. That is, while Serbia struggles 
to reach the expected level of the rule of law, and decrease the impact of organised crime and 
corruption, contemporary academic debates focus on increased democratic back-sliding in the 
countries in Eastern Europe, as well as other parts of the world (Dawson and Hanley 2016; 
Krastev 2016; Diamond 2015; Greskovits 2015; Fukuyama et al., 2015). Even though these 
states have entered the EU, the nature of their democratization is increasingly questioned 
(Hanley and Dawson 2017). In view of the present debates within the EU about the concept 
of further enlargement, it is possible that controversial democratisation of the states such as 
Hungary or Poland will negatively impact the accession of candidate countries in the Western 
Balkans. Therefore, it may be expected that particular attention will be given to questions of 
democratic governance and the rule of law in the EU candidate countries. This research adds 
to these debates by exploring the perspective of organised crime as a key factor hindering the 
rule of law and EU accession in Serbia. 
 
3.2.2. EU accession – impact and key obstacles to integration 
 
There is an overall consensus that democratization of Serbia started in the 2000, when the 
broad reform coalition Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS) overthrew Milosevic, after 
winning parliamentary elections. Following the citizens protests on 5th October 2000, the 
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reform coalition took control of the government and started restoring democracy. 
International sanctions against the country were lifted and a new constitution was written to 
replace Milosevic’s authoritarian governance structure. A number of democratic reforms were 
swiftly initiated but have however been interrupted again by the murder of Prime Minister 
Zoran Djindjic in March 2003.  
Stabilization and Association negotiations between the European Union and Serbia began in 
November 2005, whereas the Stabilization and Association Agreement, as well as the 
accompanying Interim Agreement on trade and trade-related matters were signed in April 
2008. On June 14, 2010, the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the member states of 
the European Union adopted a decision to start ratification of the Stabilization and Association 
Agreement with Serbia. The European Parliament ratified the Stabilization and Association 
Agreement with Serbia on January 19, 2011, and the ratification process in the member states 
of the European Union was completed on June 18, 2013 after the ratification of Lithuania. On 
the basis of the Stabilization and Association Agreement17 Serbia took over the two most 
important obligations i.e. establishing a free trade zone and harmonizing legislation with EU 
law.  
Since the Serbia has been dedicated to the process of European integration for more than a 
decade, all reform decisions should be taken into consideration in the context of 
harmonization with European standards and the best comparative practice. Following the 
process of bilateral screening18, Serbia officially received the Screening Report19 for 
Negotiation Chapter 23: Judiciary and Fundamental Rights and Negotiation Chapter 24: 
Justice, freedom and Security20. This document represents the final step of the screening, that 
is, the analytical review of the compliance of the legislation of the Republic of Serbia with 
the acquis and the standards of the European Union. 
                                                             
17 Stabilization and Association Agreement is an international treaty, which came into force on September 1, 2013, 
which gave Serbia the status of a country associated with the European Union.  
18 A process through which Serbia provides information to the European Commission about its domestic 
legislative and institutional framework and administrative capacities. 
19 The first step in negotiations is called “screening”; its purpose is to identify areas in need of alignment in the 
legislation, institutions or practices of a candidate country 
20 To facilitate the negotiations, the whole body of EU law is divided into “chapters”, each corresponding to a 
policy area.  
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A review of the content of the recommendations from the Screening Report was not 
unexpected, given that it entails a request for the continuity of reforms initiated over the past 
years, including a special focus on the areas identified by the European Commission as a 
priority. The obligation of the Republic of Serbia after the reception of the Screening Report 
consisted in the preparation of the Action Plans for the implementation of reform activities 
suggested by the recommendations contained in the Report. Following the adoption by the 
European Commission and the National Assembly of Serbia, the Negotiating Chapters 2321 
and 2422 were opened and all strategic documents need to be harmonized with the Action 
Plans for Chapters in order to achieve the consistency, continuity and stability of public 
policies in the subject area. 
By adopting the Action Plans for Chapter 23 and 24 by the Government of the Republic of 
Serbia in April 2016, and by harmonizing the Negotiating Position with the official opening 
of the negotiations in July 2016, the obligation of the Republic Serbia to align its legal 
framework with the Acquis communittaire (hereinafter: acquis) of the European Union was 
formalized. Currently, both Action Plans for Chapter 23 and 24 are in the process of revision, 
aimed at adequately addressing the Interim Benchmarks set by the European Commission. 
As an integral part of the accession process, principles of inclusiveness and transparency can 
certainly be classified into terms that are most frequently mentioned, even though it appears 
that most of the actors of this process still do not understand or do not understand them 
properly. The discussion about the transparency of the reform process, mostly refers to the 
segment of the design of reforms, that is, enabling the public an insight into the reasons, 
sources, process and potential directions of legislative changes. This also involves extensive 
participation of the civil society. However, an important segment of transparency is also 
transparency in the implementation and perception of reform results (reform visibility). The 
visibility of these results is important on two levels. First of all, they must be known and 
understandable to the citizens of Serbia, since the primary goal of any reform is that it 
produces positive effects on the individual and society. At the same time, the obligation of 
Serbia is to make the results available to the European Commission through the mechanisms 
                                                             
21 Judiciary and Fundamental Rights 
22 Justice, Freedom and Security 
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for reporting on the progress made in fulfilling the Interim benchmarks under Chapter 23 
contained in the Negotiating Position. 
In this sense, the impression is that the results and significance of the implementation of the 
revised normative framework are insufficiently discussed, that is, the fact that real progress 
under Chapter 23 will not be measured by the number of amended laws, but recorded by the 
track record in their implementation. Hence, not only effective implementation, but also the 
ability to record, analyse and present the results in the right way, play an important role on 
this path.  
Accession to the EU requires acceptance of the European law i.e. the acquis, compliance with 
the “Copenhagen criteria”23 ensuring “stable institutions that guarantee democracy, the rule 
of law, human rights” (European Council, 1993), and the participation of citizens in decision-
making processes, fight against corruption and transparency of state affairs (Regional 
Research Promotion Programme, 2013). The Copenhagen criteria are divided into three areas, 
including (i) political criteria: stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, 
human rights and respect for and protection of minorities; (ii) economic criteria: a functioning 
market economy and the capacity to cope with competition and market forces; and (iii) 
institutional capacity to effectively implement the EU acquis. According to the European 
Basic Treaties, the Union’s primary strategic goal should be to maintain its values, support 
and consolidate democracy, the rule of law, human rights and international law principles 
through external actions. As Ling (2013) argues, these principles should be implemented in 
order to promote global governance policies and realise the set goals. 
 
When it comes to the region of former Yugoslavia, the EU enlargement policy has been a 
valuable tool in promoting good governance in its neighbourhood (Brozel, 2010). Equally 
relevant for all states in South-eastern Europe/Western Balkans, EU membership requires 
fulfilment of a set of conditions of democratic standards. While other democratizing countries 
throughout the world were seeking to integrate their politics and economy within the larger 
                                                             
23 Copenhagen criteria were established by the Copenhagen European Council in 1993 and strengthened by the 
Madrid European Council in 1995. They involve stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, 
human rights and respect for and protection of minorities; a functioning market economy and the ability to take on 
the obligations of membership, including the capacity to effectively implement the EU law (the 'acquis'), and 
adhere to the aims of political, economic and monetary union. 
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global market, the position of candidate countries is unique as they are obligated to conform 
to an additional set of rules in order to meet the requirements for EU membership. The 
emphasis on standards is expected to result in the Europeanization of candidate countries 
which includes the assessment of how EU impact on domestic politics and policies takes place 
and how compliance with the EU norms can be encouraged (Schimmelfenning 2010; 
Sedelmeier, 2011; Noutcheva 2015). Hence good governance as one of the main principles of 
the EU is particularly reflected in its enlargement policy. According to the United Nations 
Human Rights: Office of the High Commissioner (UNHR, 2012) good governance 
encompasses: full respect of human rights, the rule of law, effective participation, multi-actor 
partnerships, political pluralism, transparent and accountable processes and institutions, an 
efficient and effective public sector, legitimacy, access to knowledge, information and 
education, political empowerment of people, equity, sustainability, and attitudes and values 
that foster responsibility, solidarity and tolerance.  
 
In the enlargement policy, the EU uses a variety of instruments to promote good governance, 
ranging from political dialogue, conditionality and assistance.  Conditionality serves in this 
context both as an EU promising tool to promote good governance and as a theoretical 
framework to explain causalities between the EU membership perspective and the 
implementation of good governance principles. According to Cierco (2011), positive 
conditionality corresponds to the promise of a benefit in return for the fulfilment of a 
predetermined condition and is frequently used in the deliverance of economic assistance, as 
well as in the perspective of EU enlargement.  Negative conditionality refers to a punishment 
for lack of implementation of precise obligations (Tocci, 2008). However, pursuant to Janine 
Reinhard (2010), if conditionality is a top-down approach, it can only produce changes at the 
governmental level, while the key actors of a democratization process, such as civil society, 
the administration or judiciary at a local level cannot be reached through conditionality. That 
is, the successful process of political democratization rests greatly on the commitments of 
governing parties to reform, as well as the degree of trust society places in its own government 
and international institutions and citizen’s participation.  
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As Dallara (2014) argues EU conditionality was ineffective in some periods, as a consequence 
of post-communist legacies, credibility of membership perspective and EU rewards and 
sanctions in different pre-accession phases. The literature shows that credible conditionality 
has played an important role in the EU integration process, as it has successfully induced 
pressure on candidates (e.g. Elbasani, 2013; Keil, 2013; Noutcheva, 2015). Nevertheless, 
socialization of domestic elites and persuasion, do not appear to have been effective 
substitutes for political accession conditionality (Sedelmeier, 2011), even though they are 
described as unique EU strategies. Similarly, Mendelski (2015) argues that the effects of 
reforms depend on the interplay between domestic conditions and the EU reform approach. 
In this context, progress of Serbia in the field of rule of law appears to be strongly affected by 
domestic conditions. 
 
Except conditionality, the EU utilises a variety of specific tools apart from the annual progress 
reports. These tools include systematic, case-based peer-review missions, rule of law 
advisory/expert missions and enhanced monitoring of reforms. Making these reports available 
to the relevant state actors, the EU attempts to assist them in addressing the key obstacles in 
the given field to foster implementation of the accession related criteria. In light of this, the 
European Commission’s Progress report 201824 identifies several internal constraints to the 
implementation of good governance principles, such as corruption, lack of independence, 
transparency and accountability in key institutions and organized crime. Based on the new 
EU assessment methodology, most countries have only “some level of preparation” in the 
three areas of the rule of law, including functioning of the judiciary, fight against corruption 
and fight against organised crime. 
 
As Serbia is in the process of becoming a member state, at the same time as the EU is facing 
an existential crisis following the UK’s exit, the effects of the process of Europeanisation is 
                                                             
24 See also the EC Progress Report 2016. The Report indicates a lack in judicial independence and impartiality as 
well as the pathology of politicisation of judicial structures. This signposts that judges’ accountability is not 
ensured in practice and that the pathology of lack of enforcement of law continues to exist. The Report states that 
corruption is still highly present and without progress compared to previous years, which indicates the existence 
of corruption in the judiciary. 
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heavily debated in political and academic discourse, particularly with respect to the rule of 
law, which is a key in the context of European integration as a politically driven process.  
 
Notwithstanding these debates, and the enlargement related exhaustion, conclusions of the 
EU Summit in Sofia 2018 refer to the Western Balkans in a relatively positive manner. It is 
stated in the Conclusions “Recalling the Thessaloniki Summit of 2003, the EU reaffirms its 
unequivocal support for the European perspective of the Western Balkans”. Hence 15 years 
later, these states still have the hope of the EU future. However, the key obstacles to EU 
accession are also mentioned in the Conclusions of the Summit, with an emphasis on the rule 
of law, especially the fight against corruption and organised crime25. Furthermore, the 
Conclusion of the Summit refer to the need to enhance support for judicial reform,  introduce 
trial monitoring in the field of serious corruption and organised crime, build capacity for 
corruption prevention and improve measurement of results in justice reform.  
Given the current focus of the EU policies to defence, the identified priority areas in the 
Western Balkans and Serbia in particular, requiring significantly enhanced operational 
cooperation in the field such as firearms, drugs, migrant smuggling and trafficking in human 
beings, appear to remain key challenges. It could be concluded that despite positive media 
statements, usually referred to as ‘the EU closing the eyes’, it seems that the EU is aware of 
important problems in Serbia that can impact its own member states in case of enlargement.  
 
3.2.3. Conclusions 
 
The stalled democratic transition of Serbia described above has eventually resulted in serious 
obstruction of its EU accession. The major delay in effectively implementing the reforms in 
the crucial fields, caused both by political and operational reasons, nowadays hinders progress 
of Serbia towards the EU. As demonstrated in the literature, the simple alignment with the 
acquis is not sufficient, given that the core of the contents of Europeanization in candidate 
countries is “of a more general character” (Schimmelfenning, 2012, p.22). That is, beyond 
                                                             
25 “The EU welcomes the Western Balkans partners commitment to the primacy of democracy and the rule of law, 
especially the fight against corruption and organised crime, good governance, as well as respect for human rights 
and rights of persons belonging to minorities”, EU Summit Sofia, April 2018 
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ticking the box of acquis alignment, it is the impact of these norms that is measured in the 
context of accession, i.e. the extent of achievement of democratization and the rule of law.  
Acknowledging that the process of enlargement has “considerably contributed” (Lavanex 
2004, p. 695) to the political transformation in Central and Eastern Europe, recent trends in 
these states indicate that the exported rule of law principle is not sufficiently implemented. 
This raises concerns about the potential of the EU to influence present candidate countries, 
particularly in the context of the mainstream debates in the Member States on the desire for 
further EU enlargement.  
In the context of the discussion on “linkages and leverages” discussed above, diverse factors 
may have contributed to stalled or unfinished democratisation and transition in Serbia. The 
framework offered by Levitsky and Way (2006) suggests that higher linkages lead to stronger 
pressure (boomerang effect) from inside for democratic change. However, in the case of 
Serbia (and Western Balkans overall), it appears that the internal linkages have not been 
strong enough, despite membership-related political conditionality of the EU 
(Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005). That is, the pressure of the domestic actors appears 
to be insufficient in sustaining or fostering democratic progress. It may be argued that the 
leverage was more efficient, while the EU was ‘pushing’ for results. 
An important consequence of the stalled transition and the associated remaining problems in 
the field of the rule of law and crime control leads to an additional loss of time. That is, while 
Serbia still works on the rule of law, organised crime suppression and wide-spread corruption, 
the EU has shifted its focus towards security, terrorism and migrant issues. It is therefore 
reasonable to expect that the EU will postpone enlargement of any potential pieces of the 
European puzzle that may impede the achievement of its goals. Given that organised crime in 
candidate countries continues to represent one of the main obstacles in regards to further 
development and European integration (Hajdinjak, 2002; Vasic, 2016), the impact of criminal 
networks needs to be carefully addressed.  
 
 
56 
 
3.3. State response network in Serbia 
 
This Section entails a brief overview of the crime control system in Serbia, as an element of 
the state under exploration. It involves international frameworks affecting the Serbian 
response and policies in the field of crime and drugs suppression, an outlook on specific 
strategies in the field, including an overall review of legislative and institutional framework. 
The mapping of the state response network is the basis of an exploration of the potential 
loopholes enabling the impact of organized criminal groups. 
 
3.3.1. International frameworks affecting the Serbian response and policies - UNTOC, EU, 
regional levels 
 
Serbia is party to a range of UN and the main international and Council of Europe conventions 
and protocols related to the fight against diverse forms of crime. Serbia has signed and ratified 
the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC/Palermo) 
and its protocols: Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, Protocol 
to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children. 
Moreover, Serbia actively cooperates with the United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC), while there is also continuous cooperation through participation of Serbian experts 
in regular and special CND Sessions and Paris Pact Initiative. Serbia is also a party to the 
United Nations Convention against Corruption of 31 October 2003, the United Nations 
Convention against the Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 19 
December 1988, the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of 
Terrorism of 9 December 1999. Finally, Serbia is a member of a number of organizations 
within the UN system, including World Health Organization. 
Agreement on Strategic Cooperation with the Europol has been signed, and the Department 
for Cooperation with Europol within Serbian Ministry of Interior is established. Cooperation 
with the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) is performed through Department for 
Narcotic Drugs and Precursors of the Ministry of Health. Serbia cooperates with the 
EUROJUST, while the full membership is pending the alignment of legislation in the field of 
personal data protection. 
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Serbia's cooperation with the Council of Europe (CoE) has a special significance in the 
context of Serbia's European integration, having in mind that the CoE activities are also based 
on the so-called Copenhagen criteria. Numerous reform processes have been taking place in 
Serbia, in cooperation with the CoE and with its assistance, mainly in the domains of legal 
and institutional organization of the state, implementation of reforms in the field of justice, 
and other fields in which the CoE is active. Serbia is a member of twelve partial Council of 
Europe agreements, which are an optional form of bringing together states that have expressed 
special interest in a specific field of CoE activity, including, inter alia, Group of States against 
Corruption (hereinafter: GRECO), European Commission for Democracy through Law 
(hereinafter: Venice Commission), Co-operation Group to Combat Drug Abuse and Drug 
Trafficking (Pompidou Group). Serbia is a member of the Committee of Experts on the 
Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism (hereinafter: 
MONEYVAL) and the EGMONT Group of Financial Intelligence Units. 
Serbia has a Permanent Mission to the OSCE in Vienna and actively participates in the 
organization's activities in the political-military, the economic and environmental, and the 
human dimension, as well as in the work of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly. The OSCE 
Mission to Serbia provides assistance in project implementation related to capacity building 
of police officers to recognize symptoms and signs of overdosing by drugs, and identification 
of illegal laboratories for producing synthetic drugs.  
Serbian legislation is partially aligned with the EU acquis in the field of organized crime and 
drug trafficking suppression and is therefore working on alignment of its legislation, mainly 
through the implementation of the Action plan for Chapter 24: Justice, Freedom and Security. 
During the Screening for Chapter 24 in the EU accession process, Serbian authorities reported 
that legislation was partially aligned with Joint Action 96/750/JHA on combating drug 
addiction and preventing and combating illegal drug trafficking. The legislation is also 
partially aligned with the Framework Decision 2008/841/JHA on the fight against organized 
crime. The established mechanism for the exchange of information on the results of chemical 
analyses of psychoactive controlled substances is still not in place, which implies that 
legislation is not aligned with the Joint Action 96/699/JHA concerning the exchange of 
information on the chemical profiling of drugs to facilitate improved cooperation between 
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Member States in combating illicit drug trafficking, nor is it aligned with Council Decision 
2005/387/JHA on the information exchange, risk-assessment and control of new psychoactive 
substances. There is still no legislation on the transmission of samples of controlled 
substances, not a national contact point designated to supervise such transmission, implying 
to need to align with the Decision 2001/419/JHA. In 2008, Serbia initiated cooperation with 
European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA), which is the 
reference point on drugs and drug addiction information in Europe.  
In the field of police cooperation, Serbia also cooperates with Interpol, Southeast European 
Law Enforcement Center, SELEC, as well as the EULEX mission. Serbia signed 42 
memoranda of understanding related to the exchange of financial intelligence data with third 
countries, 17 of which are with EU Member States. Serbia is also a party to the Police 
Cooperation Convention for South East Europe26. On 5 May 2006 in Vienna, during the 
Austrian presidency of the EU, the Ministers of Interior from Albania, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Romania and Serbia, signed the Police 
Cooperation Convention for Southeast Europe. The Convention entered into force on 10 
October 2007. In addition, Bulgaria acceded to the Convention on 25 September 2008, Austria 
on 24 May 2011, Hungary on 6 July 2012 and Slovenia on 14 December 2012. The full 
implementation of the Convention is expected to assist those signatory countries not members 
of the EU to accelerate their eventual accession. 
3.3.2. Serbian specific strategy and policing 
 
It is important to put forward that Serbia has been implementing a set of reforms of legal 
framework, intelligence services and judicial system as of 2000. Hence, a certain form of a 
‘state response network’ has been established and functional over the years. Since July 2008, 
suppressing organized crime and corruption was announced as one of top priorities of all state 
institutions.  A detailed set of measures was designed to address the identified legal and 
                                                             
26 The Convention envisages modern forms of cooperation among the Contracting Parties, such as joint threat 
analysis, liaison officers, hot pursuit, witness protection, cross-border surveillance, controlled delivery, undercover 
investigations to investigate crimes and to prevent criminal offences, transmission and comparison of DNA 
profiles and other identification material, technical measures for facilitating trans-border cooperation, border 
search operations, mixed analysis working groups, joint investigation teams, mixed patrols along the state border 
and cooperation in common centers. 
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institutional gaps. This mainly included a comprehensive work on the legislation as a 
precondition for strong institutional framework and adequate enforcement.  
 
Serbian strategic framework in this field involves the Action Plans for Chapters 23 and 24, 
National Strategy for the Reform of the judiciary (2013-208), National Strategy for the Fight 
Against Corruption, Strategy for prevention and combating human trafficking, particularly 
women and children and victims protection (2017-2022), Strategy for financial investigations 
of crime (2015-2016), Strategy for the Prevention and Fight against Drugs (2013-2020).  
Serbia had a Strategy for the fight against organised crime (2009-2014) and on this basis had 
developed the first organized crime threat assessment (SOCTA) in 2015, pursuant to Europol 
methodology. In the field of human trafficking, Serbia is placed on a Tier 2 of the Trafficking 
in Persons Report developed by the State Department.  
 
The detection of organized crime is under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Interior, 
Organized Crime Combating Service, which conducts pre-investigative procedure under the 
guidance of the Prosecutor's Office for Organized Crime, while other authorities, such as the 
Security Information Agency, the Military Security Agency, customs and other agencies 
participate in the detection of these criminal offenses. Prosecution is under the jurisdiction of 
the Special Prosecutor's Office for Organized Crime. In the first instance, the High Court in 
Belgrade (Special Department for Organized Crime) is responsible for court proceedings, and 
for the second instance the Appellate Court in Belgrade (Special Department). The 
competence of these bodies in the fight against organized crime applies to the whole territory 
of Serbia. The two institutions with special jurisdiction have been established in 2003, namely 
the Special Department of the Belgrade Higher Court and Special Prosecutors’ Office for 
Organized Crime, competent for the offences with elements of organized crime. Their 
introduction was aimed at improving the state’s capacity to combat drug trafficking and 
organized crime groups acting in the region. 
 
Pursuant to the Criminal Procedure Code (2012), the public prosecutor is the head of the pre-
criminal and criminal proceedings; the investigation is initiated on the basis of his order. The 
procedure for seizure and confiscation of property that originates from crime involves 
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financial investigation, seizure of assets arising from the criminal offenses by natural and 
legal persons and management of such assets. The financial investigation is carried out by the 
Financial Investigation Unit of the Ministry of Interior, while the procedure based on the court 
decision enables temporary and permanent confiscation of the property resulting from the 
commission of a criminal offense by natural and legal persons. Confiscated assets are 
managed by the Directorate for the management of confiscated property that is part of the 
Ministry of Justice. The Ministry of Justice is responsible for the legal framework on 
organized crime, corruption, drug trafficking, seizure of the proceeds from crime, and 
participates in the procedure of destruction of seized drugs with other responsible institutions. 
Through the Law on Organization and Jurisdiction of State Authorities in Combating Cyber 
Crime, Serbia established a special Department for the fight against cybercrime within the 
Ministry of Interior, as well as the Special Prosecutor's Office for Combating Cyber Crime.  
 
In the field of corruption, the institutional framework involves the Anticorruption Council, as 
the body advising the government on anti-corruption policy, and the Anti-Corruption Agency, 
competent for monitoring the anticorruption strategy, asset declarations, prevention of 
conflicts of interests, supervision over integrity plans and political party financing. 
 
The institutions responsible for the fight against money laundering and terrorism financing 
include the Ministries of Interior, Defence, Finance and Justice, as well as the judiciary and 
the Security Information Agency. A Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) is established within 
the Ministry of Finance and is in charge of discovering of property derived from criminal 
offence, and has the exclusive competence to conduct financial investigations in Serbia. It 
functions as a part of Administration for Prevention of Money Laundering. The leading 
service for fighting economic crime is the Department for Suppression of Organized Financial 
Crime (responsible for the fight against money laundering, corruption and counterfeiting of 
money) within the Service for Combating Organized Crime in the Ministry of Interior.  
 
The Ministry of Health is competent for prevention and health needs of the population, 
including manufacturing and dealing of narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances and 
precursors.  The multi-sectoral Committee for Psychoactive Controlled Substances was 
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established in 2014, which acts as an inter-departmental body, comprising a panel of experts 
and representatives of relevant authorities, to coordinate actions in the field of drugs 
implemented by entities representing different sectors. In addition, the Office for Combating 
Drugs was established in 2014 and it became partly operational in April 2016. The Office is 
responsible for coordinating the work of public authorities; participating in the development 
of strategies and laws; monitoring the implementation of drug-related projects; analysing the 
situation in the drugs field; establishing international cooperation; preparing annual reports 
for international organizations; and implementing the Strategy for Drug Abuse Suppression 
2014-2021. Its tasks are implemented in close cooperation with ministries, health institutions, 
NGOs and other national and local entities.  The Centre for Monitoring Drugs and Drug 
Addiction was established as part of the Ministry of Health, and it is the main contact point 
for the EMCDDA (national focal point). The role of the Centre for Monitoring Drugs and 
Drug Addiction is to collect and analyse data on key epidemiological and drug supply 
indicators, and on NPS through the early warning system. The Customs Service had signed 
agreements with customs authorities of 25 states, 13 of them EU Member States. 
 
3.3.3. Legislative framework – key features and obstacles 
 
Serbian legal framework for the fight against organized crime is primarily based on the 
Constitution, the Criminal Code, the Criminal Procedure Code, the Law on organization and 
jurisdiction of governmental authorities in suppression of organized crime, corruption and 
other particularly serious criminal offences, the Law on foundations of regulations of security 
services of the Republic of Serbia, the Law on police, the Law on security information agency, 
the Law on military security and military intelligence agency, the Law on psychoactive 
controlled substances, the Law on protection of participants in criminal proceedings, the Law 
on seizure and confiscation of proceeds of crime, the Law on the liability of legal entities for 
criminal offences, the Law on the enforcement of prison sentences for criminal offences of 
organized crime, the Law on the substances used in the illegal production of narcotics and 
psychotropic substances and the health records Law.  
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The Criminal Code is of the key legislative acts relevant for organized crime and its diverse 
forms, such as drug trafficking. It is important to note that the Criminal Code has been 
amended several times in the preceding years. Criminal justice professionals perceive these 
amendments as the first phase of the reform of criminal legislation, suggesting that it is 
necessary to reconsider a series of solutions and possibly change them (Skulic and Ilic, 2012; 
Stojanovic, 2013). These standpoints refer to the criminal offences related to narcotic drugs, 
which have been associated with significant problems in practice, and are not fully 
harmonized with certain international legal documents. Possession of small quantities for 
personal use is punishable by up to 3 years in prison, but punishment may be remitted in minor 
cases (Criminal Code, Art. 246a). However, it is not legally defined what constitutes a small 
amount of illegal drugs. Comparative overview of the contemporary legislation of European 
countries, including case-law, shows that there is no EU state where such a severe punishment 
can be imposed for very small quantities of narcotic drugs, regardless of its type. Additional 
legislative changes to the Criminal Code have been adopted in 2012 to improve the chapter 
on corruptive offences.  
 
The criminal procedure system in Serbia is subjected to an ongoing reform during the last 
decade27. The new Criminal Procedure Code came into force on January 15, 201228 only at 
the specialized courts for war crimes and organized crime. The new Criminal Procedure Code 
introduces a significant number of new features which, inter alia, contribute to the more 
efficient work of judicial authorities in the fight against organized crime and corruption. Some 
                                                             
27 The Criminal Procedure Code adopted in 2001 was amended in 2009, aiming to suppress organized crime and 
strengthen enforcement against narcotics and corruption, but failed to address a number of problems.  The 
Amendments introduced the plea agreement in Serbian criminal proceedings for the first time. In 2006, a new 
Criminal Procedure Code was passed, but has never entered into force. The new Criminal Procedure Code passed 
in 2006 aimed at better alignment of the criminal justice system with the newly reformed judicial system.  
Nevertheless, the Code did not address the lack of parity between the prosecution and defense, inefficient 
management of resources, and unclear application of prosecutorial discretion and plea bargaining. Facing 
widespread criticism from members of the Serbian Bar, the 2006 Criminal Procedure Code never entered into 
force 
28 In the period between 2011 and October 2013, two Criminal Procedure Codes were applicable in Serbia. The 
first is the 2001 Criminal Procedure Code, which was implemented before the courts and public prosecutor’s 
offices of general jurisdiction until October 2013. The second is the new Criminal Procedure Code adopted in 
2011 applicable in cases falling within the jurisdiction of Prosecutor’s Office for Organized Crime as of 15 
January 2012. The new Code introduces prosecutorial investigation aiming to expedite processing of criminal 
offenders, increase the trust in the judiciary, and reduce frequent conflicts between the police, prosecution, and 
courts that have plagued the criminal justice system. 
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of the key changes involve presentation of evidence at preliminary hearings, a fundamental 
change to trial advocacy practice and the roles and responsibilities of prosecutors and defence 
attorneys, measures to increase the use of plea bargaining, new evidence-gathering 
techniques, witness protection standards, and the ability to use mediation in certain criminal 
proceedings.  Innovative techniques for evidence gathering were introduced and more closely 
regulated, including the use of surveillance communication, secret monitoring and recording, 
undercover operations, and computer data searches. Moreover, the Law on Organisation and 
Jurisdiction of State Authorities in the Fight against Organised Crime, Corruption and Other 
Particularly Serious Criminal Offences was adopted in 2016 to improve the organizational 
structure and cooperation of state bodies aiming to enable more effective detection, 
prosecution and trial for organized crime, terrorism and corruption. The new Law on Police 
was enacted in January 2016, introducing a number of innovations29 in the legal system that 
is expected to significantly contribute to the improvement of quality in the performance of 
police. 
 
Serbia has a list of drugs and of drug precursors and it is regularly updated, on the basis of a 
proposal of the Ministries of Health or Interior. However, early warning mechanism on new 
psychoactive substances for collecting, managing and sharing information among state 
structures responsible for the fight against drugs has not yet been established.  Despite the 
relatively adequate legal framework, Serbia needs to improve conditions for the storage of 
permanently seized quantities of narcotic drugs and to fully launch a system for the 
destruction of confiscated drugs by clearly prescribing and implementing the procedure and 
designating the responsible state institutions.  
 
With regard to policies on discovery of new illicit drugs and precursors on the market, 
National Focal Point has been established and significant steps were made for its proper 
organisation and functioning. However, as it is established under public institution (Ministry 
of health) and on the basis of the agreement of Serbia with the Global Fund which prohibits 
                                                             
29 The most important novelties refer to the reorganization of the Ministry of Interior; separation into internal and 
police affairs; division into police, state and executive officers; the use of new means of coercion by police 
officers replacing the use of firearms; the introduction of integrity tests; career progression based on basic 
parameters as vocational training, education and more 
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to hire new personnel, the establishment of the National Focal Point and Early Warning 
System is significantly impeded at the operational level as the department is understaffed, 
with limited resources. There is a significant lack of available early detection, monitoring, 
screening and assessment strategies targeting drug precursors and NPS) use in Serbia. 
Effective control over the production and marketing of substances that can be used for the 
illegal production of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances is an important element in 
preventing the illicit production of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances and leading to 
a reduction in their supply. Since most of these substances are in regular circulation and are 
used in chemical, pharmaceutical, cosmetic and similar industries, control of production and 
trade, including import and export, must be carried out in accordance with legal norms, in 
order to prevent their unlawful use.  
 
The Law on Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime proved to be a major step 
in precluding property and funds which are proceeds of crime and often used to commit new 
criminal offences30. However, the total number of proceeds of crime seized remains low and 
management of seized property needs to be improved. An Asset Recovery Office remains to 
be designated and adequately staffed to foster international cooperation.  
 
In terms of customs cooperation, Serbia needs to access to the Convention on mutual 
assistance and cooperation between customs administrations (Naples II) upon accession to 
the EU. This process will need to be accompanied by amendments to legislation as regards 
central coordination units, special forms of co-operation and extension of the investigation 
powers of customs. The legal framework is largely aligned with Decision 2009/917/JHA on 
the use of information technology for customs purposes. There is an IT strategy for the 
Customs Administration covering the period 2011 till 2020, but there is a need to establish an 
                                                             
30 The Law is aligned with Council Framework Decision 2005/212/JHA on confiscation of crime-related proceeds, 
instrumentalities and property, Council Framework Decision 2003/577/JHA on the execution in the European 
Union of Orders freezing property or evidence, Council Framework decision 2006/783/JHA on the application of 
mutual recognition of confiscation orders, Council Framework decision 2001/500/JHA on money laundering, the 
identification, tracing, freezing, seizing and confiscation of instrumentalities and the proceeds of crime. The law is 
not yet aligned with Council Framework Decision 2005/214/JHA on the application of the principle of mutual 
recognition of financial penalties. The legal framework still needs to be aligned with the Directive 2014/42/EU on 
the freezing and confiscation of instrumentalities and proceeds of crime in the European Union 
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IT database (including digital records of investigations) and extent the IT application to the 
entire enforcement division in order to comply with Decision 2009/917/JHA. 
 
Following this review of the institutional, strategic and legislative set-up, it is also important 
to mention the certain notable effects of the crime control policies, as they entail the key 
feature of the state under exploration. One of such visible features is certainly the penal policy 
of a state. Penal policy in Serbia is often criticized by the professional public, experts and the 
media, particularly in regards to sentencing serious criminal offences. It is argued that courts 
pronounce conditional sentences for serious crimes, whereas minor offences are sentenced 
with imprisonment or tend to pronounce sentences within legally stipulated minimum (Delic, 
2010). Regular acceptance of various mitigating circumstances by the courts leads to 
conclusions that penal policy is inadequate or soft (Delić, 2010; Mrvić-Petrović and Đorđević, 
1998; Ćirić, Đorđević, and Sepi 2006). However, according to Stojanovic (2008), frequent 
legislative amendments often result from lack of consideration of scientific and experts’ 
standpoints and political polarization and are therefore inefficient.  
 
Moreover, the relationship of drugs and crime in the criminal justice system is of particular 
importance for the analysis of state policies on drug trafficking.  However, one of the key 
obstacles to objective analysis of penal policy refers to the lack of statistical data, since courts, 
prosecution and police do not perform aggregate analyses. Thus, evaluations are based on 
separate statistics which makes them incomparable and questions validity of results. In 
addition, relevant authorities do not keep statistical data on drug related offenses, which 
further complicates the analysis, as it remains unclear whether individuals are prosecuted due 
to possession of drugs for personal use or for the actual criminal offense involving 
unauthorized sale of narcotics. Finally, when discussing penal policy for organized crime and 
drug trafficking cases, it needs to be borne in mind that indigent individuals often lack access 
to legal aid, while mandatory defence is stipulated only in case of offences punished with 
imprisonment over 8 years (Criminal Procedure Code, 2012), whereas members of organized 
criminal groups have the potential to hire lawyers. 
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Overall, such sentencing trends result in lack of individualized sentences, recidivism related 
to lack of consequences, and potential reinforcement of further criminal behaviour. There is 
also a need to address current sanctioning policies and selective prosecutions. Recurrent and 
at times controversial changes in legislation aimed at increasing justice efficiency and 
suppression of crime, coupled with multiple postponement of their implementation, appear to 
hinder adequate criminal justice functioning. 
 
3.3.4. Conclusions – initial outlook of the state response network 
 
Focusing on governmental responses to drug trafficking with regard to legal and institutional 
framework, several initial conclusions arise. Revisions of the legislation have been designed 
to address legal and administrative loopholes, empower judicial authorities, asset forfeiture 
and introduce more severe sanctioning. Despite these efforts, the track record of 
investigations, prosecutions and final convictions in drug trafficking cases remains weak.  
A series of revisions of the normative framework still appear to be fragmented and 
inconsistent, with implementation being one of the key obstacles to efficient functioning of 
the criminal justice system. Problems with implementation are often associated with socio-
political context and absence of the so-called political will. The need for existence of political 
will, regularly cited in the media as well, indicates that institutions remain week and 
dependent on current political options. This correlates with the recorded overall citizens’ 
perceptions regarding trust in judiciary (World Bank Judicial Functional Review, 2014).  
Increased use of plea agreements is perceived as encouraging and boosting efficiency, while 
assets seizure remains unsatisfactory. Concurrently, the Anti-corruption Strategy and Action 
Plan offer an adequate framework for addressing corruption, but implementation with regard 
to drug trade related corruption is yet to be assessed. Corruption cases are addressed by 
specialized prosecutors; however there is no similar level of expertise in the police or the 
judiciary, hampering the adequate finalization of cases.  
Investigation on high level corruption remains scarce, particularly in connection with money 
laundering and the origins of such financial resources. Serbia has no legal framework 
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governing inexplicable wealth, which further hinders the state’s potential to effectively 
investigate ‘white collar crime’.  The European Commission reports that: 
Serbia has yet to establish an initial track record of effective financial investigations, as 
well as of investigations, prosecutions and final convictions in money laundering cases. 
The number of convictions for organised crime remains low. Serbia needs to focus on 
the implementation of the action plan agreed with the Financial Action Task Force. 
 
(EU Progress report, 2018, p. 4) 
Overall, lack of reliable data on organized and drug related crime hinders in-depth analysis of 
the effects of criminal justice policies. The lack of precise data on the extent of drug 
trafficking is mainly associated to the lack of joint databases, statistical and risk analysis. 
Moreover, the imprecise track record of drug seizures, inadequate storage of seized drugs and 
precursors and their highly problematic destruction represent some of the key challenges 
Concurrently, there appears to be a need to develop new measures for detecting drug flow 
along the "Balkan route", in particular taking into account the increased rates of the use of 
new psychoactive substances. In this particular field, there is an urgent need to fully establish 
an early recognition system and early warning mechanism for new synthetic drugs, strengthen 
the control of precursors and cooperation in this area between customs, police, producers and 
distributors of precursors in order to monitor traffic and use of precursors.  
Closely related field of drug demand reduction does not seam to be a focus of state activities. 
This field could be substantially improved through extension of the network of treatment 
facilities and introduction of new treatment programs, promotion of early detection and 
intervention activities, rehabilitation, social reintegration and harm reduction programs, and 
advanced cooperation with the EMCDDA. Finally, it seems better cooperation between the 
government and civil society in documentation and monitoring of drug trafficking related 
cases would contribute to state efforts in suppressing this phenomenon. 
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This brief review of the Serbian experience in organized crime and drug trafficking 
suppression is the basis for an exploration of the causes and specific loopholes due to which 
Serbia has become caught in a kind of mid-process state.  
 
3.4. State capture - has Serbia transited and to what? 
 
3.4.1. Is Serbia trapped in perpetual conversion enabling criminal governance? 
 
Despite diverse efforts to suppress organized crime and develop an efficient state response 
network described in Chapter III (3.3), it appears that Serbia still faces major problems in this 
field. In light of this, the question frequently raised among scholars in Serbia refers to the 
finalisation of the process of transition. Is Serbia still a country in transition? Or it has transited 
and if so, to what?  
In order to respond to these queries, it would be necessary to have a point of comparison i.e. 
a measure of successful transition. Given that there is no clear measurement of the level of 
transition, the process of EU accession has developed diverse levels of assessments of a 
country’s ‘readiness’ to join the EU. These certainly include progress reports, non-papers, 
peer review missions and the like. If these assessments are perceived as a form of 
measurement of a successful democratic transition, whereby the EU would accept 
membership of a state that fulfils these criteria, does this imply that a country has transited? 
In the absence of other firm measures, the EU criteria for membership can be taken as a point 
of comparison. Consequently, the issues identified as key obstacles in these assessments can 
be perceived as the main indicators of the remaining problems.  
Available research and assessments in relation to Serbian accession and democratic transition 
until 2018 has showed that EU reforms did not improve certain dimensions of the rule of law, 
which is particularly the case with enduring issues of organized crime and corruption. The 
discussion in Chapter III indicates that the stalled democratic transition and EU accession 
may have therefore resulted from a complex relationship between organized crime, corruption 
and illicit financial flows, coupled with specific geographic position and socio-political 
context.  
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For instance, the Sofia Declaration (2018) adopted at the latest EU Western Balkan Summit 
on May 17th 2018 states that “In the Western Balkans, the investment climate continues to be 
hampered by signs of state capture”. Such a strong statement, following a period of rather 
positive reports on Serbia caused significant interest. Most professionals following the EU 
accession process in Serbia perceived this statement as the end of a ‘honeymoon period’ i.e. 
the period during which the EU was closing the eyes in relation to major problems present in 
Serbia. The EU Communication on enlargement also states that: 
Organised crime's foothold on the enlargement countries remains strong. Powerful 
criminal groups continue to operate in and from the Western Balkans region and Turkey. 
The region remains an important entry route for the trafficking of illicit goods, in 
particular drugs and arms. 
(COM, 2018 (65), p.4) 
The same Communication further states that: 
Today, the countries show clear elements of state capture, including links with 
organised crime and corruption at all levels of government and administration, as well 
as a strong entanglement of public and private interests.  
(COM, 2018 (65), p.3) 
 
The diagnosis of state capture offered by the EU in not essentially a surprise for most 
professionals engaged in EU accession process. A brief review of the Reports on 
implementation of the Action plans for Chapter 23 and 24 in 2017 and 2018 provide similar 
conclusions. Little progress has been made in the fight against organised crime, corruption 
and money laundering. Concurrently, the EU accession negotiations are progressing, and new 
chapters are opened. It is known that the overall pace of negotiations with the EU will continue 
to depend on Serbia's progress in reforms in the rule of law and in the normalisation of the 
relations with *Kosovo. 
Moreover, Transparency International reports in 2018 that Serbia is ranked on 87th place, with 
a score of 39 (Transparency International, 2018, p.1). As the report states, this score of Serbia 
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is the same as it was in 2012 and there have been no significant changes for over ten years. 
Reference to corruption in diverse areas has been noted in other reports on Serbia as well (e.g. 
GRECO, 2018; SELDI, 2016).  Corruption has also been identified as a major problem in 
Serbian political circles, and many of the democratic parties have been known to engage in 
questionable practices ranging from embezzlement to involvement in organized crime 
(Miljković and Hoare, 2005).  
Furthermore, strong influence of the mafia is becoming increasingly visible in a number of 
areas, such as sports, judiciary, police, media (Prelevic, 2018). News reports on murders 
among members of criminal networks on a weekly basis causes additional concern. Reports 
indicate that a significant number of members of criminal networks have been killed in the 
period between 2012 and 2018. For instance, the Black Book developed by a joint project of 
KRIK and Radio Free Europe is a database of the killings carried out in the period 2012-2018 
in the territory of Serbia and Montenegro, which have the characteristics of mafia liquidations 
(KRIK, 2018). The was created with the aim to point out the frequency of this phenomenon 
and the fact that the safety of citizens is endangered as it often comes to the calculation in the 
middle of the day and in public places. Journalists were asked for information on what the 
state undertook to clarify for each murder listed in the relevant institutions. The data is 
distressing - out of 123 murders, only 9 have been resolved, while the perpetrators are 
unknown in as many as 86 cases. According to a Belgrade lawyer Prelevic, less than 20% of 
perpetrators are prosecuted (Prelevic, 2018). 
Evident impact of organized crime and corruption in Serbia brings into question its future 
status as an EU member state. The identified emergence of the state capture phenomenon 
indicates that such socio-political dynamics represent a serious enduring problem.  Even 
though the concept of state capture incorporates most characteristics of corruption-related 
relations, it is important to understand its nature and the phenomena it is related to. 
 
3.4.2. State capture – definitions and key features – theoretical framework 
 
In an attempt to explain analogous social dynamic within various transition countries, the state 
capture theory by Joel Hellman in 1998 became part of the mainstream paradigm. The concept 
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of state capture was introduced to elucidate how the private sector infiltrates decision making 
and consequently runs the state.  
This concept enabled a wide array of applications, but it does not have a single definition. It 
is frequently used in different contexts and covers various types of phenomena. Essentially, 
the concept of a "captured state" relates to the question: how to discover in what manner the 
power is acquired in a society, how this power is abused. This query refers to potentially 
unlimited power that utilises the whole state to fulfil its needs (Hadzic, 2018).  
The concept of state capture mainly explains various phenomena arising in different states, 
referring to the establishment of control of the institutional capacity of the executive power 
by political parties aimed at extracting corruption rents, or influence on legislative power by 
business sector entities (bribing state officials) aimed at obtaining privileged status or 
preferential treatment (Heliman et al., 2000). In addition, state capture is also used when 
referring to influence of mafia over the state (Fazekas, and Tóth, 2016; Felbab-Brown, 2011; 
Leitner and Meissner, 2017; Maharaj, 2017). 
Different applications of the concept of state capture all indicate a set of common features of 
the phenomena described i.e. deviant relations between the state actors, the political networks 
and private entities, hence the key participants in the state capture process (SELDI, 2017) The 
use of the term deviant suggests that the concept of state capture explains a deviation from 
the regular form of relations between these actors. Some authors suggest that such definition 
would be most appropriate for the states in which the commonly accepted normative ideal is 
that of a liberal social order in combination with a neo-liberal economic model (Southeast 
Europe Leadership for Development and Integrity - SELDI, 2017).  
This may be perceived as a normative definition, as it refers to assumed predefined norms 
establishing legitimate relations between the key actors in the state i.e. legitimacy of 
government established through general elections; non-monopolistic economy; neutral state 
administration to the different interests in society; the political parties do not undermine the 
structure of the economy or the neutrality of the administration (SELDI, 2017). World bank 
utilises the definition proposed by Hellman, Jones and Kaufmann (2000) which distinguishes 
between three types of relationships marked by deviant relations of the private sector and the 
state: a) state capture, defined as shaping the basic rules (i.e. laws, regulations) through illicit 
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and non-transparent private payments to public officials; b) influence, defined as the firm's 
capacity to impact the formation of the basic rules without necessary resorting to private  
payments to public officials (as a result of ownership ties to the state and repeated interactions 
with state officials) and c) administrative corruption, which is defined as private payments to 
public officials to hinder the implementation of official rules and policies (Hellman, Jones 
and Kaufmann, 2000).  
A definition of state capture proposed by the Centre for the Study of Democracy combines 
different forms of corruption which have a single objective: to secure wholesale (by default) 
and long term privileges to captors by exploiting the power of government for private benefit. 
According to the Centre for the Study of Democracy, state capture usually involves the 
following features: a) realization through corruption transactions and mechanisms; b) state 
capture schemes do not include large groups, but refer to collective actors, including 
networks, who have high leveraging power, control substantial resources and have influence 
capacity, and c) state capture is systematic and not an ad hoc action (Centre for the study of 
democracy, SELDI, 2016). 
Along with the definition, the Centre for the Study of Democracy (Centre for the study of 
democracy, SELDI, 2016) proposed an interesting model of the key elements of state capture. 
The first element refers the actors, which mainly involve private entities, network of the state 
institutions, and political parties/networks. The actors all have the capacity to be the captors, 
pending the type of relationship developed. The second element is the results, referring to the 
privileges and status the captor obtains (e.g. the ability to enjoy undue advantages and extract 
corruption rents). In case of private entities as captors, the results vary, and may refer to 
obtaining priority of the captor’s rather than the public interest, developing monopoly, and 
the like. For state institutions as captors, the result may involve the ability to extract corruption 
rents or seizure public resources.  
The final element refers to state capture mechanisms, and involves a set of different methods 
used by captors, such as a) lobbying for legislation, or influencing public policies, which 
ensures exemption from prosecution, market advantage or economic policy, budget 
allocations; b) political corruption aimed at influencing the executive, or the legislative or 
preferential access to the judiciary as well as judiciary corruption; c) institutional corruption: 
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bribing civil servants in public institutions to enable the protection of captors’ interests, and 
d) corruption in public procurement (privileged access to public resources) 
The proposed model offers a valuable picture of the key elements of state capture across 
states. However, when observing the forms of state capture in transition countries, there seem 
to exist additional dynamics, which may be attributed to specific development contexts (e.g. 
transition), as well as to distinctive societal factors. Some authors make a distinction between 
administrative corruption and state capture, arguing that state capture (perpetrated by the 
private sector through bribes aimed at altering the rules or by politicians controlling market 
entry) is the problem in transition countries (Hellman and Kaufman, 2001; Wallis, 2010). 
Explorations on post-socialist states have indicated that they do not comply with conventional 
notion of the state capture. Rather, as Ganev (2007, p.3) supports “behind such fluctuations 
lies a dynamic autonomously generated within the state domain itself”. It is argued that a 
number of inherited and new pathologies typical for transition states, along with the interplay 
of broader political forces and larger social constituencies, account for the sudden fluctuations 
of stateness (Ganev, 2013). Ganev perceives this as: 
The unique institutional legacy of state socialism, the unusual structure of incentives 
facing powerful elites, and the peculiar dynamics unleashed when fundamental social 
relations, related to the collecting, managing, and distribution of resources were 
radically altered. 
 (Ganev, 2007, p.2). 
In other words: 
The historical distinctiveness of the behaviour of successful predatory elites in post- 
Communism is that they have had an incentive to behave as state breakers, not state 
makers. 
(Ganev, 2007, p.96).  
It could therefore be argued that a state capture phenomenon does not provide sufficiently 
clear framework for examining the corruption issue in transition states (Bowser, 2003). 
According to Pesic (2007), from the point of view of system theory, state capture is caused 
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by a weak functional differentiation within the social system. Boundaries between the 
subsystems do not exist or are porous, hence power and goods from the economic sub-system 
are convertible for influence and goods from the political sub-system and vice versa, 
depending on where the dominant power of the social system lies. Pesic maintains that 
dominant power in Serbia remains located within the political system. She argues that such 
collusion enables an oligarchic social structure in Serbia that undermines effective institution-
building and the rule of law (Pesic, 2007). 
Serbia is surely not a single transition state in the region facing these problems. Reports 
indicate that in a number of South European states the phenomenon of corruption impacts the 
quality of public governance as a whole, as it is not limited to individual acts of bribery or 
minor offences (Centre for the study of democracy, SELDI, 2016).  
In 2016, SELDI monitored corruption activities in the region in Albania, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Kosovo*, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 
Montenegro, Serbia and Turkey. The 2016 findings indicated that the overall level of 
corruption is sufficiently high for it to be of serious concern to the stakeholders, even though 
there are considerable differences between the most and least corrupt countries. The more 
tangible reductions were identified in countries under more EU scrutiny but also with fairly 
high levels of corruption pressure, such as Bulgaria or Montenegro. Nonetheless, these small 
improvements have been insufficient, as on average, corruption pressure is 25.9 % – which is 
solely a percentage decline since 2014, when the regional mean was 27.1 %.  
Moreover, Hungary has become one of the politically captured states in the region (Agh, 
2016; Bozoki, 2011; Fazekas et al., 2016). The study analysed the country to explore business 
– political networks that lead to state capture and developed a new conceptual and analytical 
framework for assessing state capture based on micro-level contractual networks in public 
procurement. A study on state capture in Poland by Alwasiak et al. (2012) found that the EU 
accession did not prevent state capture in Poland. The results of the study provided an insight 
into the reasons when state capture occurs in a post-transition country, using an original 
sample of 1.363 legal acts that were passed in Poland in the years 1990–2011. The study 
demonstrated that in Poland the majority of legal acts were passed with the aim to satisfy the 
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interest of particular groups hence that state capture is accompanied by regulatory capture and 
regulatory opportunism.  
Despite the fact that state capture, corruption and organized crime are pervasive problems 
across transition countries, there is little and fragmented evidence to support the 
understanding of their connectedness. Previous theoretical investigations mainly focused on 
the influence of the private sector and state institutions or corruption per se and largely 
ignored the interplay between criminal networks and state actors/legitimate networks.  
 
3.4.3. State capture and/or crooked states – deviant state functioning as a point of arbitrage 
enabling criminal networks operations 
 
As discussed above, symbiotic links between state institutions and the private sector are 
referred to as a phenomenon of state capture. Nevertheless, the private sector per se may be 
comprised of various licit and illicit actors, hence influencing the character of the state 
capture. That is, a state may be captured as a result of systematic and/or administrative 
corruption, but it can also be captured by criminal networks. Such symbiosis with criminal 
actors may certainly have a much greater impact on governance and state functioning. This is 
of particular concern, given that it is acknowledged that organized crime and corruption are 
not marginal issues, but rather central governance problems worldwide. As Cockayne 
suggests: 
These are no longer two distinct worlds – an upperworld and an underworld, but a single 
strategic space in which state, criminal and other actors compete to govern. 
 Cockayne (2016, p.8) 
Despite a variety of well-based definitions, observing the state capture concept solely through 
normative perspective seams too simplistic, as it does not offer an explanation of the 
mechanisms of state capture in different states or the dynamics of captured relationships. 
Acknowledging that political corruption and state capture by criminal networks are common 
features of countries affected by high levels of organised crime, it is of concern to identify the 
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various ways in which various dimensions of state functioning may be viewed as causes of 
state capture and/or consequences of crooked institutions. 
The deviations from the general model of state capture may vary across states and it is 
considered that the forms and types of state capture are determined by the captors and their 
relative power (SELDI, 2017). Hence the active role of the involved actors (captors) appears 
to be a key factor determining the degree of state capture. The captors’ objective is to achieve 
sustained advantage in a certain sphere, but it is important to take into account the diversity 
of the captors and their roles. For example, organized criminal groups are one among a 
number of actors of the illegal economy – including corrupt public officials or contractors 
with specialised expertise – and illicit financial flows can be generated by both legal and 
illegal activities (Bisogno, 2016). 
There is a perception that manifestation of organized crime usually requires certain correlation 
with the state structures and the exercise of a certain influence in the political and financial 
structures31. Systematic corruption and associated criminal networks have been consistently 
closely linked to governance mechanisms involving high level officials in the executive, 
judiciary and the legislative branches (Antonopoulos, 2008; Block and Chambliss, 1981; 
Chambliss, 1978; Chevrier, 2004; Di Nicola and Zoffi, 2004; Kleemans and van de Bunt, 
2003; McIllwain, 2004; Middleton and Levi, 2004). According to Shelley, 
compartmentalizing phenomena of corruption and organized crime limits the capacity to 
scrutinize and address the diverse forms of transnational crime (Shelley, 2005).  
The association of the growth of organized crime and public sector corruption has been 
confirmed in a study that used qualitative and quantitative data analysis in a large sample of 
countries (Buscaglia and van Dijk, 2003). A composite index of organised crime utilized in 
the study included indicators of key activities (trafficking in humans, weapons, vehicles, 
cigarettes and fraud) and secondary factors (costs for businesses, the informal economy extent 
proportional to GDP, money laundering and violence). Overall, the results of this study 
indicated that there is greater prevalence of organised crime in countries characterized by 
                                                             
31 Block and Chambliss (1981) proposed the organizing crime perspective, highlighting the existence of consensus 
of legitimate actors in different criminal settings, identifiable through their involvement in corruption, money 
laundering and the like. 
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weak rule of law, monopolistic practices and lack of justice efficiency. Moreover, 
questionable independence of the judiciary and increased political interference in the 
appointment of civil servants was positively related with higher levels of organised criminal 
activity.   
This is consistent with the results reported by Lyman and Potter (2000) who illustrated the 
diversity and magnitude of legitimate actors’ roles in the context of illegal drug trafficking, 
arguing that the role of judges, prosecutors, law enforcement and other officials is of major 
importance for the functioning of the drug trafficking groups. Similarly, a case study utilizing 
electronic surveillance data from the joint investigation Project Caviar reported a significant 
impact of legitimate actors in illegal drug trafficking group (Morselli and Guguere, 2006). 
The focus of the examination was the method and the extent to which such participants help 
structure the criminal network.  
Similarly, a study by van Dijk (2007) demonstrated that high levels of corruption and money 
laundering combined with black market economy strongly correlated to the Organised Crime 
Perception Index. The results also demonstrated that organised crime prevalence is greater in 
countries with weak rule of law, low justice integrity and lack of responsible institutions. 
Certainly, the methods to penetrate governmental structures and influence elected officials 
differ, ranging from bribery, financial contributions to political campaigns of strategic 
candidates or joint investment opportunities. Nevertheless, corruption of state officials is not 
solely based on bribery, but may assume many different forms of support (Shelley, 2005). 
This notion is supported by investigations on drug trafficking groups in Serbia who were 
provided falsified documents by officials in several SEE states (Vasić, and Tagirov, 2005). 
Pervasive corruption in a society indicates that the state is functioning poorly (Rose-
Ackerman 1997), and that the leadership has failed (Hope and Chikulo 1999).  
Cohen argued that transitional states are usually characterized by two types of corruption: 
state capture, involving illicit payments made by individuals to public officials aimed at 
influencing court decisions or using various rules and procedures, and administrative 
corruption, which involves private payments aimed at obtaining favourable treatment (Cohen, 
2003). Empirical research focusing on the link between corruption and organised crime in 
transition countries also emphasize the interdependent nature of these phenomena 
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(Michaletos, 2007; Nikolic-Ristanovic, 2004). Previous research by Serbian authors 
suggested strong linkages between organised crime and public sector corruption, with crime 
networks greatly relying on corruption to ensure the protection from law enforcement efforts, 
facilitate money laundering and ensure legal investments based on illicit trade (Nikolic-
Ristanovic, 2004; Trifunovic, 2007). In this sense, Prelevic (2018) suggests that “discovering 
perpetrators costs the mafia, but not discovering costs the state and someone is paying for 
that”. 
In addition, some of these networks have managed to act ‘against the state’, sending a message 
of their achieved power both to society and state officials. There are a number of examples of 
actions undertaken against the state in Serbia’s recent past. The murder of Prime Minister 
Djindjic in 2003, which was precedential by a strike of the special operations unit, certainly 
represents one of the most serious examples. A series of political murders during the 90s, 
including murders of journalists, has also been associated with the main criminal groups 
(Anastasijevic, 2006).  
A decade ago, Warburto (2007) suggested that previous approaches are insufficient to provide 
deeper knowledge on why and how corruption occurs and are therefore unable to prevent or 
address it. The author duly noted that corruption represents a complex, multi factorial 
phenomenon, closely associated to the fundamental complexity of human social relations. 
This is consistent with the previous research by Della Porta which indicated that for corruption 
to occur, the overall system must be susceptible for such illicit activity. Examining empirical 
evidence on the widespread existence of such networks in Italy, Della Porta (1999) 
emphasized that corrupt actors must exchange a range of favours in order to protect 
themselves within the system, referring to this scheme as a market of corrupt exchanges. 
The interaction between criminal groups and the state, regularly accompanied by corruption 
of public authorities and institutions, stems from the efforts of organized criminal groups to 
govern the markets and maximize opportunities for rent-extraction, rather than solely 
operating within the given set of rules (Cockayne and Roth, 2017). Chayes argues that 
corruption produces a demand for protection because the actors in this exchange do not know 
for sure if the other party will deliver what was promised (Chayes, 2015). Johnston (2015) 
describes these dynamics by suggesting that oligarchic gains are insecure due to rapid changes 
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and absence of the state to enforce contracts or defend property, so violence becomes a 
rational resort. 
Overall, these diverse perceptions of the links between the state actors and criminal networks 
all indicate that there are paths through which these apparently different groups collaborate 
with an aim to secure profits. The extent to which these paths are rooted in a society varies 
across states and these variations are described below. 
 
3.4.3.1. A spectrum of states affected by crime  
 
The attributes of the states affected by organized crime and corruption or the nexus between 
an upperworld and an underworld vary to a great extent. That is, most states are not fully 
criminalized or captured, but fall somewhere in between the two extremes of the spectrum. 
This brings into question the reference to all these similar situations of diverse countries as 
captured states, consequently resulting in a number of similar terms in the literature describing 
such dynamics. However, despite similarities, various terms in fact describe different place 
of a state on a continuum, pending the extent of a failure of governance.  
 
The diversification among states affected by organized crime ranges from the states that have 
become fully functioning criminal enterprises to failing states that are inherently susceptible 
to organized criminal organizations. The states which can be considered criminal enterprises 
also differ. For instance, in some states, corruption can become a factor when the state chooses 
to legalize private protection and hand over a part of its monopoly over the legitimate use of 
violence to the mafia. Such states are often regarded as predatory states. The case study on 
Zimbabwe by Schuma (2018) argues that the Zimbabwean state exhibits more predatory 
characteristics than other forms of state conceptualisation As Schuma suggests, the predatory 
state is characterised by weak bureaucratic capacity and poor institutionalisation, enabling the 
ruling elite unconstrained access to and abuse of state power for personal gain. Further to a 
detailed exploration of Zimbabwe situation, this study offers a conceptualization of main 
features of a predatory state such as: 1) predatory shift is linked to the changing structure of 
the economy, away from the significance of the manufacturing sector to the post-
independence dominance of resource-based extraction, 2)  deficiency of production strategies, 
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whereby the main aim of policy is to channel rents to ruling elite 3) the military–political elite 
extracts the benefits of each sector. 
 
In relation to this, authors suggest that even though a state monopoly on violence held by the 
military and police is vital for public order and crime suppression,  it can be too strong 
(Davenport, 2007; Fukuyama, 2005;). In the absence of societal forces to control the state 
powers, repression and thus popular de-legitimation and destabilization of democracy are 
likely results. There are also models that have been applied to the subject – in particular the 
concept of a shadow state as a conception of warlord run states (Reno, 1998) that may be 
applicable in the South African context (Bhorat et al., 2017). 
 
It appears that fragile and conflict-affected states represent vulnerable places and opportune 
environment for operation for transnational criminal networks, such as Latin American drug 
trafficking groups or criminal organisations in West Africa, located on the large trans-
continental smuggling and trafficking routes. A study by Ellis and Shaw (2015) found that in 
almost all cases, some elements of the state were involved, i.e. as a defining element in 
protection markets, either as a direct participant, facilitator, or regulator. The authors referred 
to this as an erosion of the “frontiers between politics, crime and business” (Ellis and Shaw, 
2015, p. 511), highlighting that, in Africa the growth of organized crime is primarily a result 
of the willingness of politicians to envisage relationships with professional criminals. 
 
Beyond predatory states, the extent of failure of governance differs in the context of the 
remaining capacity of state structures to keep their own power. For instance, a wide range of 
countries experiencing vastly different types of governance problems or periods of instability 
are often referred to by as fragile states (Kaplan, 2012). Despite similarities with captured 
states, it may be argued that fragile states experience additional problems. According to 
Kaplan (2012), these states differ in the degree of social cohesion and political identity 
fragmentation, as well as the level of government capacity. Kaplan argues that in order to be 
characterized as fragile, states need to cumulatively fulfil two conditions i.e. to lack an 
effective government and be socio-politically divided (by ethnicity, religion and the like). 
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Following exploration of state fragility in Arab states after Arab spring, Kaplan argues that 
structural conditions do not change easily, hence influence state fragility over time. 
 
In that sense, captured states significantly differ from a wide array of the so called “failed 
states”. This difference lies in the fact that the rule of law may be corrupted by private as well 
as criminal interests, influencing  some areas of social, economic and political life,  which 
results in a state becoming ‘crooked’ or captured. On the other hand, fragile states, due to 
unclear sovereignty dimension, appear to not ‘fail’ additionally as a result of stressors such as 
corruption. In such states, public governance systems are governed by ‘crooked’ actors rather 
than state actors. Despite these differences, most of the states characterized by failure of 
governance experience utilisation of public resources and institutions to serve private 
interests, often closely linked with criminal networks or the mafia.. 
 
Different forms of collusion between states and criminal groups are often described as a 
‘mafia state’. As reported by Welch (2012), this concept refers to states in which institutions, 
intelligence services, police and officials are involved in a range of criminal activities, such 
as drug, arms, and human trafficking. Such states depend on profits from crime and have 
strong bonds between the licit and illicit worlds, such as North Korea, Guinea-Bissau, 
Ukraine, Venezuela, and Myanmar. 
 
However, the term mafia state may be oversimplified, given that it does not adequately reflect 
the broad spectrum of criminal network-state relationships, or ecologies, that exist in the real 
world (Welch, 2012).  Hence it is possible to distinguish between criminalized states and 
captured states on the basis of their operational and transactional relationship with criminal 
networks.  
Criminalized states have institutionalized, state-sponsored criminal networks, which are 
either actively or passively supported by the highest levels of leadership. At the other 
end of the spectrum, captured states are cooped or directly challenged by criminal 
organizations that largely function outside of state auspices.  
(Welch, 2012, p.2).  
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This embeddedness of organised criminal activities and actors in the very fabric of the 
economy, the state and society has been entitled by concepts such as criminal governance 
(Arias, 2006), co-opted state reconfiguration (Garay-Salamanca and Salcedo-Albarán, 2012) 
and crimilegality (Schultze-Kraft, 2019), and emergence of protection markets (Ellis and 
Shaw, 2015).  
 
Reference to criminal states also appears in studies on transition states. According to Ivanova 
(2010, p. 4), the notion of a “criminal state” refers to: 
A state run by false elites comprising former nomenklatura members and current 
oligarchs, who profess democratic values while colluding with criminal elements in 
order to drain the public domain of its assets. 
(Ivanova, 2010, p. 4) 
 
In criminal states, corruption seen as the inefficiency of the state links to the initial economic 
model of organized crime, whereby the mafia supplies a service the state cannot offer. In 
Varese’s words: 
The mafia banks on the inefficiency of the state in supplying efficient protection to legal 
transactions: the more confused the legal framework of a country, the more incompetent 
the police, the more inefficient the courts, the more the mafia will thrive. 
(Varese, 2010, p.5).  
 
In assessing the position of Serbia on a spectrum of states affected by crime, it appears it is 
closest to the point referred to as a captured state, as noted in a number of reports presented 
above. Nevertheless, it is interesting to examine whether the state capture is an isolated 
phenomenon in Serbia or it is a result of crooked institutions.  
 
3.4.3.2. The underlying causes of state capture – beyond organised crime networks 
 
Certainly, the recurrent reference to organized crime and corruption as some of the key factors 
hindering Serbia’s accession to the EU, makes these phenomena the main underlying causes 
of such a position. Nevertheless, these phenomena are not an isolated issue arising per se in a 
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given country. The above review indicates that the current state of play in Serbia characterized 
as ‘state capture’ may have principally resulted from several intertwined factors briefly 
discussed below. 
 
Accession process in Serbia seems to be qualified by major particularities susceptible to 
corruption and organized crime, potentially implying strong linkages of this phenomenon with 
the process of transition. The interrelation of transition and organized crime has rarely been 
examined, but available knowledge on this topic suggests non-negligible ties. That is, as a 
consequence of the process of transition, all former state assets have been extracted and stored 
in the public domain, loosely monitored by politicians. In addition, the fragmentary process 
of legislative reforms creates opportunities for the legalization and even institutionalization 
of criminal practices (Ganev, 2007).  
 
Moreover, privatization of the state domain, gave rise to development of new elites, 
comprised both by traditional criminals, as well as formally legal actors interested in personal 
profit. Such process, coupled with a pertinent influence of the social context, resulted in 
development of a new form of criminal entrepreneurship and the emergence of resilient 
criminal networks. For instance, in Serbia, the large profits generated by drugs and/or arms 
trade during conflicts, along with the privatization proceeds at the beginning of transition, 
made criminal networks powerful actors who exert influence on politics and business. As a 
result, they have been able to penetrate the highest spheres of government, impact the political 
agenda and develop close relationships with diverse circles of power, hindering law 
enforcement investigations. Concurrently, the level of citizens’ poverty has significantly 
increased. 
 
The UN’s Report on Crime and its Impact on the Balkans, stated that unemployment and 
income inequality are by no coincidence indicated as the chief reasons for corruption and 
organized crime (2008). The socioeconomic situation in the region and Serbia in particular 
remains rather difficult nowadays. The rates of unemployment and average income data, 
along with major social differences, indicate the need for caution given that swift financial 
profit generated through criminal activities creates important incentives for engagement in 
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various criminal groups. These profits are subsequently invested in legal activities, 
privatization and the like, increasing money laundering in transition countries (UNODC, 
201532). Poverty and corruption are often rooted in the malfunction of governments in 
complying with sound public affairs management criteria (Hofer 2011). A combination of 
these factors has created incentives for a critical mass of actors who act in the same corrupt 
way. In the context of affected social bonds coupled with sophisticated interaction methods 
developed by criminal networks, it appears difficult to destabilize such networks. Therefore, 
similar to former Soviet Union states, mafia in Serbia is not conventional. It involves the 
traditional criminal groups but also the newly developed criminal networks based on a 
criminal alliance of politicians, oligarchs and ‘transition winners’ focused on exhausting 
formerly state-owned assets. 
The impact of EU accession has also been perceived as a negative factor for institutional 
functioning due to various reasons. Authors have maintained that legislation quality 
deteriorated due to the instrumentalised and executive-driven domestic reforms, coupled with 
international donor/expert driven reforms, which all resulted in numerous laws incoherent 
with the domestic legal framework. 
 
One of the key studies in this regard is a comparative case study of Serbia and other South 
East European countries by Mendelski who argues that the EU’s power had pathological 
effects. Mendelski (2015) analysed the effects of EU reforms on the rule of law by examining 
de jure and de facto rule of law, as two components of the multi-dimensional concept of rule 
of law and its elements. According to Mendelski, there are several Europeanisation problems 
that undermine rule of law and cause pathologies. He suggests that the EU reform approach 
is based on a quantitative “the more the better” concept (e.g. number of laws introduced, 
number of verdicts) and not on the quality of the reforms (Mendelski, 2016). The new laws 
                                                             
32 These profits account for important proportion of the GDP in small transit countries, while in the European 
destination states the proportion of the GDP is minor. A recent UNODC study published data showing that the 
illicit proceeds of opiates trafficking through the Balkan route were approximately $28 billion per year. Almost 
half of those profits were generated in France, Germany, Italy and United Kingdom. However, profits in those 
countries accounted for a significantly smaller proportion of GDP (0.07-0.19 per cent) than in countries with a 
relatively small GDP, such as Albania (2.60 per cent of GDP), Iran (Islamic Republic of) (1.66 per cent) and 
Bulgaria (1.22 per cent) These profits account for important proportion of the GDP in small transit countries, 
while in the European destination states the proportion of the GDP is minor 
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have been formally adopted but not implemented in practice, due to significant resistance of 
domestic players who were against these reforms, as well as high financial costs (Mendelski, 
2015, p.351). Problems with legislation also involved conflicting and incoherent rules, 
including lack of neutrality, which implies they were aimed “to fulfil particular interest of 
influential captors” (Mendelski, 2015, p. 354). 
 
Moreover, Mendelski implies that EU reforms caused the politicisation of judicial structures, 
reflected through abuse of the new and old judiciary bodies and institutions (e.g. anti-
corruption agencies, judicial councils and the like), captured by ‘change actors’ aimed at 
advancing their own interests (Mendelski, 2016, p.352-353). Finally, Mendelski notes that the 
Union supported domestic reformers who were pro-European, regardless if they were 
controversial politicians that behaved undemocratically. 
 
The interpretations offered by Mendelski with regard to the judiciary are undeniably 
applicable in Serbia. Despite numerous reforms of the judiciary from 2000 up to date, this 
field is still considered ineffective and lacking independence. Hiber and Begović (2006) argue 
that the reforms in the judiciary have been unsuccessful due to the personal interest of judges, 
politicians and powerful elites who wanted to keep their influence, while external EU impact 
was somewhat limited.  According to them: 
 
One of the puzzling alliances is the one between judges feared to be removed from the 
office, seeking no change and political parties/executive government”, who were not 
interested in real changes, as they wanted to retain effective control over the judiciary. 
(Hiber and Begović, 2006, p.3). 
 
Indications of such interest-based mutual relations can be found in several aspects of 
functioning of the judiciary. For instance, the composition of the High Judicial Council and 
State Prosecutorial Council remains a problem, despite numerous recommendations for its 
amendments. Even nowadays, common critiques refer to corruption in the judiciary, reflected 
in making biased decisions that suite the executive or legislative power, in order to be 
promoted to higher positions or to be given some material advantages (Hiber and Begović, 
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2006, p.8).  Such party-specific inclinations of judges play an important role in determining 
who will be appointed, and there are reports of political interference in the work of prosecutors 
and judges (Markovic, 2008). Problems with the judiciary also include the low level of 
expertise among judges in issues related to EU integration, and a big backlog of cases, as well 
as judges’ perception of independence, often seen as their own privilege, rather than as a right 
of citizens in a democratic state based on the rule of law (Eriksen and Kalleberg, 2009). 
 
Overall, these potential contributing factors indicate that the stalled EU accession and in fact 
normalisation of state functioning may have been affected by any and/or all these dynamics. 
Nevertheless, the references to corruption in the judiciary and lack of judicial independence 
seem to indicate the absence of the rule of law and potentially fertile ground for enduring 
informal exchanges among state and non-state actors, enabling impunity for criminal offences 
and strengthening the impact of criminal networks, finally leading to state capture in the field 
of crime control. 
 
3.4.4. Conclusions - the importance of identifying loopholes and/or vulnerabilities enabling 
state capture in the field of crime control in Serbia 
 
Following the above review of the democratic transition and the related EU accession process, 
and taking into account its identified obstacles, it appears that Serbia is a country trapped in 
a state of perpetual conversion. Relevant assessments performed by scholars, the EU and 
international organizations, indicate there is evidence that despite long lasting 
democratization, enduring problems are present.  
The EU Progress reports (2013 - 2018) on Serbia recurrently point to corruption as a major 
challenge, typically embedded in the state. The fact that institutions and the power of the state 
are being used by special interest groups to supplement their particular interests rather than 
the public good, represents an important backdrop to understanding the nature, scope and 
challenges of corruption in Serbia. 
The structural character of corruption in Serbia shows that the political and economic elites 
developed an informal system to protect their interests (Pesic, 2007). Concurrently, organized 
87 
 
criminal networks in synergies with state actors infiltrate in the system through the “loopholes 
offered by corruption” (Cockayne and Roth, 2017, p.8).  Bresson (1999) previously suggested 
that an institutionalized model of corrupt networks involves informal social exchanges, within 
which corruption becomes an extension of social legal networks and utilizes a range of 
personal interests to maintain its function in case of potential socio-political change. 
Cockayne (2016) refers to these dynamics as engagement in arbitrage. Considering that 
organized crime reduces the gap between the ‘upperworld’ and ‘underworld’ (Cockayne, 
2016; Van Duyne, 2003), it is particularly important to identify the mechanisms through 
which state capture becomes institutionalized. 
Moreover, as concluded in the framework of the discussion on the topic of "The state capture 
- how to prevent further collapse of institutions” (Belgrade Centre for Security Policy, 2018), 
there are several channels for the destruction of institutions, and the current legislative 
framework of Serbia often allows this. The state often does not respect its legal obligations, 
which is one of the methods of abuse and/or capture and a good way to seize power from 
institutions with an aim of strengthening uncontrolled political power. In this sense, Prelevic 
(2018) argued that discovering perpetrators costs the mafia, but not discovering costs the state 
and someone is paying for that. Hadzic maintained that in the captured state it is always a 
matter of a political-economic-criminal power that works to replace public needs with private 
ones. 
However, literature on state capture offers little explanation about the process through which 
the state becomes captured. Despite the lack of reliable quantitative measurements which 
hinder the development of analytical models to explore the actual links between organized 
crime and corruption, the continuous association to their existence implies the need for 
different conceptualization of the interplay of these phenomena. A study by Cockayne and 
Roth (2017) offers such a conceptualization, exploring the impact that organized crime and 
corruption have on the strategic environment in which they operate. Under the concept of 
criminal governance, Cockayne and Roth explore under what conditions and in which 
locations illicit activities may emerge and how is that associated with the activities of states 
worldwide. Cockayne and Roth explore a wide range of potential vulnerabilities that may 
emerge by 2050, as well as methods how these vulnerabilities will create new opportunities 
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for illicit activity and protection, and consequently lead to criminalized or crooked 
governance. 
Identification of such vulnerabilities may have important implications for broader patterns of 
governance. The relevance of identification of potential vulnerabilities lies in the fact that 
actions of states and their institutional capacity influences the methods used by the criminal 
actors to direct criminal flows and develop and/or sustain criminal markets. Weakness of the 
state may generate greater vulnerability of the political system to withhold challenges. Hence 
for states trapped within a stalled transition, lack of institutional accountability causes 
insecurity about how to proceed. According to Savona (2014, p.2) focusing on exploration of 
illegal markets has the advantage of understanding ´where the opportunities for organized 
crime lie´. Such activities can vary across countries and understanding their functioning is 
key to assess how to reduce opportunities for organized criminal groups, also because they 
can be subject to sudden changes, as a consequence of market shifts and regulatory changes 
(Bullock, Clarke, and Tilley, 2010). Following this line of inquiry, the aforementioned study 
by Cockayne and  Roth (2017) explored how different developmental changes will create new 
opportunities to provide protection and extract criminal rents with an aim to identify how 
these opportunities could create space for criminal actors to exert governmental power. 
Likewise, de Boer and Bosetti (2015) also highlight the importance of exploring criminal 
opportunities. 
Even though recent studies conceptualize state capture as a networked phenomenon, their 
effects remain limited, as they do not identify the specific vulnerabilities in a given state that 
enable capturing. In addition, the notion of state capture is referred to without specifying the 
particular elements of the state being captured. Due to a network structure, the criminal groups 
are well-positioned to exploit the opportunities created by such state vulnerabilities.  Even 
though it is always possible to establish a one-off contact to undertake illegal activity, 
adequate positioning reflected in the long-term relations with the state structures may provide 
criminal networks with sustainability and decreased risk. Cockayne argues that those 
opportunities commonly arise:  
At the points of arbitrage, the ‘gates’ between realms, markets or communities governed 
by different actors. This conceptualization offers an important tool for crime 
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suppression: at border crossings; at the boundaries between different markets or 
jurisdictions, where smuggling networks can benefit from price arbitrage; at the legal 
and financial boundaries between different tax and regulatory jurisdictions; at the 
boundary between the legal and the illegal.  
(Cockayne (2016, p.8) 
Potential identification and/or mapping of these points of arbitrage in actual states could 
significantly contribute to disruption of state capture networks and increase the effectiveness 
of crime suppression efforts. Taking into account the possibilities to alter different dimensions 
of the state systems, with an aim to advance system functioning in certain field, it is vital to 
detect whether and how the specific loopholes can be identified in a particular state system.  
3.5. Conclusions 
 
Contemporary investigations consistently indicate that a number of states are characterized 
by strong interdependent links between organised crime, politics and the public sector (Garay 
and Villaveces, 2009; Fazekas, and Tóth, 2017; Felbab-Brown, 2011; Leitner and Meissner, 
2017 Maharaj, 2017;  Prelevic, 2018; Schultze-Kraft, 2016; SOCTA, 2017; Varese 2010; 
Williams, 2001), resulting in the emergence of a symbiosis between legitimate actors and 
criminal networks, which facilitates different forms of crime. Major effects of this form of 
symbiosis between the state and criminal organisations foster criminal activities and threaten 
social cohesion. Such a symbiosis is often described by the use of various (di)similar concepts 
such as state capture or crooked governance, all placed on a certain point of  a continuum of 
‘failure of governance’. 
Serbia has recently been entitled a captured state. Several characteristics attributable to 
captured states in the literature can be identified in Serbia as well, including party dominance 
in the state; state-criminal network relations shaped by patronage and state - business relations 
shaped by supremacy. 
With an aim to discover the underlying causes of state capture in Serbia, several processes 
associated with its development have been described. It appears that in Serbia, similar to a 
number of other transitioning states, the period of democratic transition has led to 
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development of alliances between the state officials, criminal groups, a new elite symbolised 
in former war profiteers and new black market actors arising from privatization of diverse 
former state assets (factories, football clubs, public companies). Concurrently, the old 
(socialist) elites attempted to preserve their power by infiltrating into a new private sector. 
Equivalent to other states undergoing democratic transition, Serbia has also been 
characterised as a state wedged by systemic corruption. It can be argued that the absence of 
lustration following democratic changes in 2000 enabled infiltration of the former elites and 
war profiteers into institutions and created a fertile ground for extension of criminal alliances 
established during the 90s.  
Systemic corruption has also been associated with informal constraints arising from the codes 
of conduct and traditions (North, 1990) and unique cultural, historical and economic 
circumstances of each country (Besley, Dewatripont, and Guriev, 2010). North perceived the 
transformation of institutions as a complex process given that the changes at the margin can 
be a consequence of changes in rules, in informal constraints, and in kinds and effectiveness 
of enforcement (North, 1990). This reference to informal constraints in the form of special 
social links between individuals across diverse institutions may facilitate the understanding 
of the lack of changes in the new institutional settings following democratic transition and 
demonstrate the impact of social networks. The informal links among individuals in state 
institutions may actually indicate the phenomenon of institutional pluralism proposed by 
Besley, Dewatripont, and Guriev (2010).  
The process of democratic transition in Serbia was followed by the start of accession 
negotiations with the European Union. Even though the recent opening of official negotiations 
has been perceived as a sign of an extent of improvement, relevant reports and studies 
continue to indicate the enduring presence of systemic corruption and links with organised 
crime. A question arises whether criminal networks have managed to adapt to new conditions, 
or the favourable environment for criminal networks functioning in Serbia has not altered 
despite European integration activities.   
Attempting to explain to stalled Europeanisation process, Mendelski (2015) labelled the EU 
integration-related reforms as a pathological reform approach which had further reinforced 
the existing systemic pathologies. He argues that: 
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The EU supported or cooperated with clientelistic and corrupt elites or even with 
members of governments that collaborated or were part of organized crime. 
 (Mendelski, 2015, p.337). 
As discussed above, he identified a number of methods used to this end, including adoption 
of laws under urgent procedures, misuse of newly established independent bodies, politisation 
of institutions, as well as cooperation with criminal groups. In the case of Serbia, recent 
debates denote that there is merely a proclaimed political will to join the EU, without effective 
implementation of accession related reforms. 
This is of concern as the strengths and weaknesses of the state greatly impact the form, 
function, and strategy of the illicit networks. The discussed links with organized criminal 
networks in Serbia and visible evidence of their retained power, illustrated through criminal 
murders on a weekly basis, raises important questions about the state of play of governance 
in the country and the functioning of its crime control system. Recent conceptualisations 
support that efforts to understand and supress transnational crime must take into account the 
interaction between the unique ecologies of states and illicit networks. In this sense, the 
networked concept of state capture offers a vital tool to address the linkages of organised 
criminal groups with the state. Given the evidence that non-state actors seek to exploit 
different “realms”  (Cockayne, 2017, p.8), such as geographical, functional, social, economic, 
and legal gaps, efforts should be made to map these spots or gaps and design effective 
transformation strategies.  
 
This study explores the area of organized crime suppression, as it appears to be one of the 
most affected sectors of state capture, through which large financial resources and influence 
are generated and redirected for private profit of a small group of networked individuals. 
Building on Cockayne’s conceptualization of specific field of state actions as ‘domains’ and 
‘points of arbitrage’, this study attempts to identify these domains in the Serbian crime control 
system i.e. the state response network, with an aim to trace the key vulnerabilities enabling 
criminal networks functioning. Identifying and mapping these domains suitable for criminal 
illicit networks is a critical precondition to formulating effective law enforcement and other 
policy responses. 
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Chapter IV Methodology 
   
4.1. Introduction 
 
This research explores the effectiveness of the crime control system in Serbia in light of potential 
state capture in the period of EU accession. Given the specificities of studying the phenomenon 
of state capture, a combination of qualitative and quantitative approach is implemented in this 
research with an aim to increase the validity and reliability of the findings.  That is, the inferences 
drawn through the content analysis are additionally explored by implementation of the Social 
Network Analysis. The rationale for this approach lies in the intention to confirm the conclusions 
arising from the written sources and interviews, in order to reduce any potential bias. Given the 
feature of social network analysis to quantitatively examine data sets, this approach is utilised to 
confirm or reject the findings.  
Previous Chapters reviewed relevant evidence underlying this study. This Chapter consists of 
several sections. Following this introductory segment, in the second section, the aim of the 
research, conceptualization and the research questions are presented. In the third section, the 
selected research design and methodological issues are discussed. The fourth section involves 
detailed description of analytic procedures implemented. This is followed by the fifth section 
consisted of summary of methodological steps. The sixth section contains ethical considerations. 
This Chapter elucidates the motives for combination of two methodological approaches, the 
content analysis and social network analysis; and specifies how they were implemented. 
 
4.2. Research questions and conceptualisation 
 
Modern policies and significant socio-political efforts resulted in Serbia‘s status of an EU 
candidate country. Building on these successes and the ongoing legislative and institutional 
reforms, it is of concern to address the remaining obstacles that may hinder future prospects of 
the state.  As a candidate country, Serbia has been implementing extensive reforms associated 
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with EU accession for a number of years. However, its progress towards becoming the EU 
member state remains slow. The reasons for this are associated with a number of diverse factors, 
ranging from broader political dynamics to concrete obstacles.  
As discussed above, different reports indicate that one of the key obstacles to EU membership 
remains insufficient progress in the fight against organised crime (Progress reports 2015, 2016, 
2018). Considering the evidence that Serbia lies on the Balkan route (as discussed in Chapter II), 
as one of the key paths in international drug trafficking, reference to enduring organised crime 
remains a concern. 
Despite sufficient evidence indicating the significant impact of organised crime in Serbia 
(discussed in Chapter II), its influence on the process of Europeanisation of Serbia has not yet 
been examined. Several descriptive studies addressed the general influence and nature of 
organised crime in Serbia, but none of those studies examined its impact in the context of 
continuous efforts of the state institutions in suppressing this international threat. 
Concurrently, the concept of state capture is increasingly referred to in the literature and 
international documents with regard to deficiency of EU accession progress of the Western 
Balkans states. In a recent communication (cited in Chapter III), the European Commission 
argues that Western Balkan countries show elements of state capture coupled with links with 
organized crime and corruption. 
Even though the phenomenon of state capture is frequently used in discussions on Western 
Balkans, there is too little literature focusing on comprehensive understanding of its nature and 
roots. Perry and Keil note that there is a lack of “robust literature on state capture in the region” 
(Perry and Keil, 2018, p. 2). Following this line of opinion, this research attempts to add to 
contemporary literature on state capture by exploring organised crime related state capture in 
Serbia, as one of the Western Balkan countries that aspires to join the EU. State capture is 
explored in the field of crime control, without implications of the entire country being captured. 
The aim of this research is to add to prior studies by exploring the phenomenon of state capture 
as a result of embeddedness of organised criminal networks in a country undergoing EU 
accession. This is performed through examination of the effectiveness of state institutions in 
suppressing organised crime and drug trafficking in an attempt to identify potential structural 
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holes that hinder the results of such efforts. The network based model offers quantification of 
these identified issues which may be attributed to potential state capture. 
More precisely, the effectiveness of state actions undertaken to address organized crime and in 
particular drug trafficking are examined, in order to identify whether there are some institutions 
or certain aspects of their functioning that may have the ability to hamper such efforts. This is 
scrutinized with a view to stalled transition and EU accession of Serbia, given that efficient 
suppression of organised crime is one of the key factors related to accession. 
In order to gain a comprehensive understanding, this exploration relies on indications of certain 
structural and social difficulties in Serbia, which are also found in other transitional states to a 
similar extent.  The objectives of the study are: 
a) Examine whether stalled democratic transition and EU accession of Serbia are associated 
with endurance of organised crime; 
b) Explore the magnitude of organised crime in Serbia, in particular with regard to drug 
trafficking networks; 
c) Investigate the network of state institutions (state response network) designed to combat 
organised crime and drug trafficking; 
d) Explore the extent to which the network is distorted by signs/symptoms of state capture; 
and 
e) Provide recommendations for improvement of multidisciplinary and inter-sectoral 
cooperation in suppressing organised crime and drug trafficking. 
 
Within this framework, the main research question is: 
Does the extent of organised crime in Serbia, as a country undergoing EU accession, indicate 
state capture in the field of crime control? 
In order to respond to this extensive research question, several sub-questions are developed: 
1. To what extent can stalled transition and EU accession be attributed to the level of 
organised crime? 
2. What is the extent of organised crime and drug trafficking in Serbia? 
3. What are the structural holes that enable organised criminal networks to engage in drug 
trafficking in Serbia? 
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4. Do, and if so, how do these structural holes indicate a phenomenon of state capture? 
 
4.3. Methods of analysis 
 
4.3.1. Justification of the method 
 
Research in social science habitually distinguishes two dominant paradigms, initially labelled as 
naturalistic and rationalistic (Guba, 1978), and nowadays referred to as quantitative research or 
positivism and qualitative research or phenomenology (Bryman, 1988). The term paradigm 
comes from ancient Greek word aetiology, meaning pattern (in Modern Greek αιτία - cause). 
The term paradigm is utilised to describe a researcher’s ‘worldview’ (Mackenzie and Knipe, 
2006). Lather (1991) suggested that a research paradigm inherently reflects researchers’ beliefs 
and principles that shape the way they perceive the world. Denzin and Lincoln (2000) viewed 
paradigms as human constructions, which provide beliefs that influence researchers in a 
particular discipline, and define their philosophical orientation that influences choice of 
methodology.  
Bryman (1988) maintained that positivism infers objective measurement of the social 
phenomena rather than subjective inferences through sensation, intuition and reflection. The 
strength of such approach refers to the ability to limit researchers’ bias, ensure objectivity and 
neutral stance and apply well established statistical methods that provide reliability and validity 
to assess measurement errors (Bryman, 1988). Such an approach enables collection of a large 
amount of data, easily comparable information and a greater opportunity for the researcher to 
retain control of the research process (Bailey, 2008; Neuman, 2011; Punch, 2013).  
Quantitative research derives from the scientific method used in the physical sciences (Cormack, 
1991). It is described by the terms empiricism (Leach, 1990) and positivism (Duffy, 1985). This 
research approach is an objective, formal systematic process in which numerical data findings 
are utilized to describe, test and examine cause and affect relationships (Burns and Grove, 1987).  
Quantitative research is characterized by the investigators’ detached, neutral stance (Duffy, 
1985; Bryman, 1988). Data is commonly standardized and abstracted from real-life contexts 
(Mason, 2002). The strength of such approach refers to the ability to limit the potential 
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researchers’ bias and ensure objectivity and enable de-contextualisation. Quantitative 
methodologies test theory deductively from existing knowledge, by developing 
hypothesized relationships and proposed outcomes (Cormack, 1991). Typical methods utilised 
in quantitative research involve surveys, questionnaires, random sampling. 
On the contrary, qualitative research is exploratory in nature (Monette et al., 2010; Anfara and 
Mertz, 2006) and contributes to an understanding of the human condition in different contexts. 
It allows for the discovery of unexpected social patterns and yields “grounded” theory (Maruna, 
2002). It facilitates understanding of social processes and allows for complexity and contextual 
factors (Monette et al., 2010; Punch, 2013). This approach enables the researcher to constitute 
compelling arguments about how things work in particular contexts (Mason, 2002, p.1; emphasis 
in the original). Mason (2002) maintained that qualitative research may produce well-established 
evidence across diverse contexts. Qualitative approach is guided by ideas, perspectives or 
hunches concerning the subject investigated.  It provides the possibility to explore the empirical 
world from the perspective of the subject, not the researcher (Duffy, 1987).  Moreover, the 
qualitative approach allows for a holistic analysis and an in-depth understanding of social 
phenomena, perceptions and behaviours of individuals or groups with regard to a research 
problem (Bryman, 1988; Monette et al., 2010). This approach is therefore valuable, given that 
the objectivity of quantitative methods cannot be achieved when studying social relationships, 
as social phenomena are not repetitive as laboratory setting conditions.  
Qualitative research differs from qualitative approaches as it develops theory inductively. In 
qualitative research, diverse methods of analysis are utilised, such as grounded theory, content 
analysis, phenomenology, hermeneutics, ethnography (Burnard, 1995; Cooksey and McDonald, 
2011; Punch, 2013). The methods used in qualitative approaches enable data generation which 
is flexible and sensitive to the social context from which the data arise (Mason, 2002). An 
essential part of qualitative research is a reliance on the researcher's self-reflection (Burnard, 
1995). Therefore, it is necessary that the researcher reflects on his/her pre-understanding, 
throughout the research process in order to decrease any bias (Elo et al., 2014; Long and Johnson, 
2000).  
The main sources and procedures implemented in qualitative methods involve interviews, 
document analyses, descriptive statistics, focus groups, observations (Yamagata-Lynch, 2010). 
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Regardless the method of analysis used, the process involves a reduction of the volume of text 
collected in an effort to understand it, as well as identification of themes, categories and groups 
to facilitate the analysis. In implementing qualitative approaches, it is expected to produce 
sufficiently generalised explanations or arguments, or provide wider reasoning (Mason, 2002).  
There are limitations inherent to qualitative approaches which may have caused the prevalence 
of quantitative methodologies in social sciences. These limitations involve a longer duration of 
qualitative research, the need to sufficiently clarify the goals during design phases of the research 
and lack of available software opportunities to facilitate the analysis. 
With an aim to address the shortcomings of these dominant approaches, a new paradigm labelled 
post-positivism was developed in social science. The main concept of post-positivism is that a 
mixed paradigm which balances positivist and interpretivist approaches is more suitable to 
explore social phenomena, as there is no absolute truth (Deluca, Gallivan and Kock, 2008; Guba 
and Lincoln, 1994; Phillips and Burbules, 2000). It acknowledges limits to any research and thus 
strives for constant reflexive approach by the researcher. This approach does not deny the need 
for evidence but insists on the narratives and awareness of the complexity of meanings, 
philosophical, comparative or historical perspectives (Ryan, 2006).Therefore, post-positivism 
research opts for multidimensional perspectives and the use of multiple methods (Fischer, 1998; 
Guba, 1990), endorsing in this way the triangulation of qualitative and quantitative methods. 
Hence contemporary research indicates that these different paradigms may have a conflicting 
role, but they may also be used simultaneously or sequentially and complement each other, which 
is commonly referred to as mixed method approach (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2003). Mixed 
methods refer to the application of two or more quantitative and/or qualitative strategies in a 
single research (Morse, 2003). According to Johnson et al. (2007), in mixed methods research a 
researcher combines elements of qualitative and quantitative research approaches (e. g., use of 
qualitative and quantitative viewpoints, data collection, analysis) for the broad purposes of 
breadth and depth of understanding and corroboration (Johnson et al. 2007, p. 123). 
Greene et al. (1989) identified different purposes of methods combination, such as: expansion, 
which increases the scope of the inquiry; clarification, used for interpretation of the results of 
one method with the results of the other; triangulation, which enables convergence of the results 
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from different methods on the same theme; development of one method on the basis of the results 
of the other; and initiation, enabling emergence of new perspectives 
Research utilizing mixed methods commonly has an overall ‘theoretical drive’ (Morse and 
Niehaus, 2009).  The theoretical drive may be primarily qualitative or inductive or quantitative 
or deductive, which is reflected in the ‘core’ component, whereas the accompanying component 
is referred to as ‘supplemental’.  The core component requires rigorous implementation and is 
expected to be able to stand on its own. This choice, according to Morse and Niehaus (2009), is 
indicated in writing i.e. the core component is written in capital letters, while the supplemental 
is written in lowercase letters (e.g. QUAL → quan design). Authors support that mixed methods 
design includes a set of different options: timing of the application of different methods (parallel, 
sequential or embedded); the emphasis on the different methods (equal or dominant); focus on 
the same phenomenon or its parts (Creswell and Plano Clark 2011; Leech and Onwuegbuzie, 
2009).  
In the field of criminology, a number of authors discussed the division of qualitative and 
quantitative approaches (Kleck, Tark, and Bellows 2006; Pratt 2010). Mixed methods are 
broadly used in social science. In a review on implementation of mixed methods, Maruna (2010) 
discusses its implementation in criminological research. Maruna shares the standpoint that in a 
very real sense, all criminological research is mixed methods research, however acknowledging 
that is still under-utilised (e.g. Gainey, Steen, and Engen, 2005; Logan, Shannon, and Walker, 
2005; Kraska, Bussard, and Brent 2010; Thaler, 2012). Usually, the rationale for mixed method 
implementation and data triangulation is to increase data quality or validity of measures and 
consequently the results. Maruna argued that such combinations often represent ‘hybrid models’ 
i.e. involve two simultaneous studies looking at the same research question, while an authentic 
version of mixed method research entails the combination of different methodological 
approaches at different stages of the research process. Such models involve qualitative data 
collection techniques (e.g. open-ended interviews, documentary analysis) followed by 
simultaneous qualitative and quantitative data analysis (Maruna, 2002). Johnson and 
Onwuegbuzie (2004) maintain that mixed methods research should “attempt to fit together the 
insights provided by qualitative and quantitative research into a workable solution” (2004, p. 16).  
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The philosophical stance adopted in this research falls broadly under the concept of pragmatism. 
Furthermore, the research implements a multi-level exploration of the studied phenomena, and 
particularly takes into account the influence and interrelationship between the individuals and 
the organizations. Hence, the ontology of this research overall leans on critical realism. The 
research is based on objective structures and causal mechanisms, integrating different 
perspectives to help interpret the data (Novikov and Novikov, 2013). 
The research utilizes mixed method i.e. a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods to 
respond to the research questions. Mixed method is applied as it enables contextual 
understanding and due to its potential to complement the strengths of different methods utilised 
(Onwuegbuzie and Leech, 2006). When applying more than one method, it is important to 
recognize the primary theoretical paradigm, quantitative (deductive) or qualitative (inductive), 
and follow its methodological assumptions (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2003). Moreover, mixed 
methods research requires careful integration of the methods, as well as a decision on the point 
of their integration. Morse and Niehaus (2009) discuss two possible points of integration: in the 
results or in the analytical part. According to Morse and Niehaus (2009), if there is an analytical 
point of integration, the qualitative component is the first analytical stage, which is subsequently 
followed by a second analytical stage, whereby the identified themes are quantitized. In this 
research, mixed methods are implemented sequentially. That is, this research combines inductive 
and deductive logic in the following manner: qualitative approach is applied primarily (the 
primary theoretical paradigm or component) and is subsequently followed by quantitative testing 
of the results. Hence, data triangulation is applied here to corroborate data about the same 
phenomenon. The choice between quantitative or qualitative methods has been made on the basis 
of the area of research and the nature of research aims and objectives. This research focuses on 
exploring the potential state capture in Serbia that can be attributed to criminal networks 
functioning. In order to explore this phenomenon, the research relies on the specific social 
context (applicable in other, similar social contexts as well), and carefully examines the reality 
behind relevant facts.  
In addition, an exploration of social phenomena such as state capture and criminal networks 
requires taking into account relationships among different actors, as well as subjective meanings 
and perceptions. Nevertheless, the investigated phenomena are also monitored through objective, 
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measurable criteria worldwide. This is an important aspect of the research, given that it does not 
rely solely on the individual perceptions of the participants. 
Hence, this research combines quantitative methods with the qualitative, in order to enable a 
more in-depth understanding of the studied phenomenon. Aiming to avoid misconceptions and 
base conclusions solely on the participants’ perceptions obtained through the interviews, the 
quantitative method is subsequently applied to confirm or reject research findings. The 
quantitative method is used in this research to increase reliability and validity of the results, but 
also to enable generalisation of the findings. Literature shows that due to a high level of 
standardisation of quantitative methods, it is easy to make comparisons of findings (Cooksey and 
McDonald, 2011; Novikov and Novikov, 2013). The implications of this research philosophy on 
the research strategy, the choice of data collection methods and the selection of analyses are 
explained in detail below.  
In this research, a relatively small/mid-size, purposely selected sample is utilised. From among 
the qualitative data collection methods, this research utilised interviews, with open-ended 
questions and in depth interviews, focus groups, as well as comprehensive desk review of 
available data relevant for the aim of the research (journals, statistics, official institutions’ 
reports, international organisations reports.  Researchers can appeal to diverse sources of 
knowledge, such as intuitive knowledge, authoritative knowledge, logical knowledge, and 
empirical knowledge. Given that this research relies on data gathered from interviews conducted 
with state officials, leaders in organisations, official documents, its epistemology is grounded on 
authoritative knowledge. Data obtained through qualitative methods were subsequently analysed 
by implementing content analysis, to develop concepts that can be used to develop a network-
based measure of potential state capture. 
The information gained through content analysis is used to quantitatively explore the 
effectiveness of state response network in light of potential state capture in the period of EU 
accession. That is, the inferences drawn through qualitative method (content analysis) are 
additionally explored by implementation of quantitative method (social network analysis) with 
an aim to increase the reliability of the findings.  
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4.3.2. Rationale for the selection of analysis  
 
This research utilises a combination of two analytical approaches, Content analysis and Social 
Network Analysis, with an aim to increase validity and reliability of the findings, as well as to 
confirm the identified patterns of the relationships and effectively respond to the research 
questions. Concurrently, the study draws on multiple methods of data collection, data sources 
and software application. This form of data triangulation is deployed to enhance the validity, 
interpretability and generalisation of research findings (Robson, 2000). 
4.3.2.1. Content analysis 
 
Content analysis involves an approach to quantify qualitative information by systematically 
categorising and comparing items of information (collected in interviews, open ended questions, 
documents, focus groups) for the purpose of summarising them. Qualitative content analysis 
enables researchers to understand social reality in a subjective but scientific manner. This 
approach enables transformation of a large set of raw data into usable evidence through data 
reduction methods. Krippendorff (2004) defined content analysis as a research technique utilised 
for developing replicable and valid inferences from a text to the contexts of their use. Content 
analysis represents a method of analysing verbal, written, or visual communication messages 
(Cole, 1988). Similarly, Downe-Wambolt (1992) refers to content analysis as: 
A research method that provides a systematic and objective means to make valid inferences 
from verbal, visual, or written data in order to describe and quantify specific phenomena. 
 (Downe-Wambolt, 1992, p.314).  
This approach was used in sociology, psychology, journalism, and communication studies, while 
nowadays its application has an increasing trend in analysing documents (Neundorf 2002). This 
research method provides a systematic and objective means to unfold and quantify social 
phenomena (Downe-Wamboldt 1992; Krippendorff, 1980; Sandelowski, 1995) and allows the 
researcher to test theoretical issues to boost understanding of the data. In the study of crime and 
justice, the initial purpose of content analysis has evolved from identifying the prevalence of the 
topic or studied terms into revealing the contextual /cultural frames. The results obtained through 
content analysis, provide evidence that allows for a more critical appraisal of how crime and 
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justice are socially constructed. Hence the goal of the content analysis is to link the results to the 
context in which they were produced (Downe-Wambolt, 1992).  
The literature suggests that in implementing content analysis, several important questions need 
to be initially responded. According to Mason (2002) these questions involve e.g. what is the 
nature of the phenomena investigated;  what might represent knowledge or evidence of the 
investigated phenomena; are research questions coherent and consistent with each other; do they 
add up to a sensible whole; and do they make probable, intellectually interesting responses or 
arguments? Moreover, ethical issues related to potential bias need to be taken into account.  
There are two main and complementary approaches to conducting content analysis. In 
quantitative forms of content analysis, researchers code and count the occurrence of elements 
designated by the researcher prior to the study (e.g., the number of times a violent act occurs). 
In qualitative forms of content analysis, the researcher focuses on the narrative, using an open-
ended protocol to record information. Both approaches reveal overlapping concepts relevant for 
understanding ideas about crime. 
Content analysis is a useful tool for analysing text, as it enables the researcher to filter words 
into fewer content-related categories to facilitate the analysis, thus obtaining condensed and 
broad description of the phenomenon. The concepts and categories developed in the content 
analysis which describe the social phenomena are often utilised to develop a model, conceptual 
system, or categories. This feature of the content analysis enables the use of the categories for 
further analysis i.e., the subsequent implementation of social network analysis in this research. 
Content analysis was selected as an appropriate analysis method to enable interpretation of the 
findings and identify the key variables for the social network analysis. This method was viewed 
as an adequate tool to summarize the findings given the amount of data collected and the diversity 
of sources, in particular the written sources. This research implements a deductive content 
analysis, given that the structure of analysis is operationalised on the basis of previous knowledge 
and the purpose of the study (Kynga¨ s and Vanhanen 1999), on the basis of literature review, 
contemporary theories and standards (Hsieh and Shannon 2005; Sandelowski 1995; Polit and 
Beck 2004). To this end, a categorization model was developed for the purpose of this research 
and data was coded in line with the categories. This process in explained in detail below in 
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analytic procedure. The results and conclusions resulting from the content analysis were utilised 
to group the information and conduct social network analysis. 
4.3.2.2. Social network analysis 
 
Social network analysis as a methodological approach enables a combination of quantitative, 
mathematical techniques, with qualitative in-depth analysis of data. By visualising the networks, 
it provides additional tools for understanding social relations, positioning particular actors and 
identifying important features of their relations. 
Given the difficulties to adequately describe social relations through statistical measurements, 
implementation of an essentially diverse approach that allows for a more a process-oriented, 
holistic understanding of the investigated phenomenon is necessary (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994). 
This is primarily due to the inherent difficulties to measure complex social ties among actors 
through existing statistical models (Latour, 1997; Marsden, 1990).  
Such perceptions have been previously supported by Marx (1857), who argued that society is 
not solely an aggregate of individuals but rather the sum of their inter-relations. Similarly, 
Durkheim (1965) argued that it is the number of individuals bounded by the same form of 
relationship that is important and not the actual number of persons. Analogous philosophical 
stance was held by Bruno Latour who considered that such view of “the social” has been 
proposed by the father of Actor Network Theory, Gabriel Tarde. Tarde has introduced the 
concept of ‘monads’, as main elements of the universe, essentially free from the final goal or 
telos (Latour, 1997). He developed the concept of these units to indicate that micro elements tend 
to be crucial for understanding the phenomenon as a whole. Tarde’s theory proposes that smallest 
entities pose more difference, complexity and specificity than their observable sum. Likewise, 
the society is not more complex symbolic entity of single monads, but it is these individual units 
that form the basis of the social phenomena. In contrast to Durkheim who perceived society as a 
cause, Tarde proposes that it is merely a consequence of monads’ differentiation (Latour, 1997).  
This insight into the role of the social actors in the society as a whole, i.e. in the social networks, 
offers an important theoretical background to the study of particular social ties.   
Following this line of opinion, Wasserman and Faust (1994) suggested that the concept of social 
network represents a social structure consisted of the entities and relationships among them. 
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Entities may form pairs or larger groups (dyads, triads), while such larger entities may form other 
groups, subgroups, organizations or networks (Wasserman and Faust, 1994). Social networks 
have been defined as a compilation of entities (e.g., people, groups, organizations) that are 
connected through social ties in which a variety of resources are exchanged (v an der Hulst, R. 
C., 2009).  
The origins of social network analysis are traced in sociology, social psychology and 
anthropology (Latour, 1987, 1988; Williams, 2001). Essentially, this approach allows the 
analysis of transnational crime as a basic issue of human organisation.  It brings into 
consideration the concepts of actor-network theory, as well as the sociology of Gabriel Tarde 
and Bruno Latour to the study of organised crime. That is, a specific social activity (organised 
crime, drug trafficking) can be explored on the basis of profound implications for how societies 
function, what holds them together or drives them apart (Latour, 2003; Tarde, 1969).  Finally, it 
can be used to investigate what ‘criminal activities’ tell us about how people organise themselves 
in conditions of rapid social transformations or government inefficiency. Commonly, different 
variations of the social network analysis adopt the notion that human behaviour or social 
processes can be explained only through mutual interaction rather than through categorical 
properties and norms of individual actors (Klerks, 2001). According to Wasserman and Faust 
(1994), social network analysis examines the patterns of relationships among social actors, rather 
than concentrating on regularities in personal characteristics.  
The distinction among quantitative and qualitative models of data analysis has been questioned 
by the progress achieved in social network analysis. The mapping of social relations performed 
in contemporary research applying social network analysis has upgraded the capacity to denote 
the concept of the network and describe key elements of the social structure (Turner, 1991; 
Wellman and Berkowitz, 1988). As social network actors are concrete and observable, both as 
individuals or groups, the relationships of interest to a researcher are mainly social ties, binding 
or linking together and discriminating specific entities or single actors, rather than establishing 
statistical relationships or examining the phenomenon as a whole. In this line, a number of 
authors support that inductive modelling strategies of network analyses are incompatible with 
principles of statistical methods (Emirbayer, 1997).  
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Nevertheless, in order to enable more valid and reliable conclusions, general linear model has 
been significantly extended to capture and sculpt the likelihood of relationships among actors, 
particularly taking into account the specific patterns of dependence within social relationships 
(Williams, 1998). This notion lies in the assumption that individuals are by nature social and 
their actions have meaning solely in a social context (Klerks, 2001). In this line, the term ‘actor-
network’ has aroused to assist in establishing comprehensible boundaries between actors of the 
network and their connections i.e. between agency and structure (Latour, 2003). This is 
particularly important since data utilized in social network analysis are derived from the actors 
who are engaged in the network, implying discursive framing and cultural embedment of social 
networks (Bearman and Stovel, 2000). Research implementing social network analysis usually 
involves data collection by taking surveys from all actors of the social network, often containing 
questions about the origin and nature of their mutual social relationships (Hanneman and Riddle, 
2005). 
Social network analysis has been implemented in studying different sectors, including 
organisations, business structures, as well as criminal networks. Usually, this methodological 
approach was implemented to detect relationships between individuals in various fields e.g. 
organisational studies (Castilla, 2005; Ward, Stovel and Sacks, 2011), facebook/twitter 
interaction (Bakshy et al., 2011), scientific collaboration (De Stefano, Giordano and Vitale, 
2011; Milovančevic, Misic and Protic, 2018). In the field of political science, social network 
analysis has also been implemented to study a variety of relations. For instance, it was used to 
measure countries’ participation in international organisations (Hafner-Burton, Kahler, and 
Montgomery 2009), international security networks (Maoz, 2009), intergovernmental 
organizations (Cao, 2009), international institutions (Böhmelt and Spilker, 2016) or institutional 
networks (Chaffin, Garmestani, Gosnell and Craig, 2015).   
The implementation of social network analysis reaches its peak in the field of organised crime 
research.  It is considered that the utilisation of social network analysis to study organized crime 
was introduced by Sparrow (1991). In terms of scientific research on criminal organizations, it 
has been applied to study networks’ structure, methods of functioning, and interconnectedness 
of the key players. This approach results from the common standpoint of contemporary authors 
that drug trafficking groups function as social networks cellular in structure (Ayling, 2009; 
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Boivin, 2014; Gimenez-Salinas Framis, 2014; Lauprechta et al., 2016; Malm, Bichler, 
and Morselli, 2015; Morselli, 2006; Morselli et al., 2007; Morselli, 2009; Shelley, 2002; von 
Lampe, 2006; Spiro, Acton, and Butts, 2013; Williams, 2001; Walther, 2015).  
As social network analysis enables mathematical calculations which facilitate deeper 
understanding of criminal network data, it has been used in a number of studies focusing on 
different forms of organised crime. Contemporary authors implemented this methodological 
approach to study drug trafficking (Bright et al., 2012; Calderoni, 2012), human trafficking 
(Campana, 2015; Mancuso, 2014; Morselli and Savoie-Gargiso, 2014), organised criminal 
networks (Calderoni and Piccardi, 2014; Campana and Varese, 2013; Papachristos and Smith, 
2014; Varese, 2013). Furthermore, this approach is often implemented in law enforcement 
investigations as a valuable tool able to provide data regarding individual members of illicit drug 
networks, the relationships among these actors, as well as potential network weaknesses (e.g. 
Calderoni, 2014; Morselli, 2009, Papachristos and Smith, 2014). A number of studies used social 
network analysis to explore the structure of criminal networks, the features of criminal networks 
such as adaptation and resilience and identify key players (e.g. Bright and Delany, 2013; 
Bouchard, 2013; Calderoni, 2014; Malm and Bichler, 2011; Morselli, 2009, Natarjan, 2006; 
Papachristos and Smith, 2014).  
Given the understanding that organised criminal groups function as networks of cells, they are 
increasingly investigated by the application of social and/or criminal network analysis (Gunnell, 
Hillier and Blakeborough, 2016; Seidler and Adderlay, 2013; Tayebi, and Glässer, 2016). In a 
review by Morselli (2014), studies applying a network approach to investigate a number of 
criminal phenomena are assembled, including: drug co-arrest network (Iwanski and Frank, 
2014), drug trafficking (Boivin, 2014; Gimenez-Salinas Framis, 2014), cybercrime (Decary-
Hetu, 2014; Dupont, 2014) homophily effects among co-offenders (Van Mastrigt and 
Carrington, 2014), the core membership of a youth gang (Bouchard and Konarski, 2014). A 
network approach inherently involves different forms of mapping. In addition to mapping, social 
network analysis enables visualisation of the mapped networks through graphs thus contributing 
to determination of relevant topologies. 
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Social network analysis utilises different metrics (e.g. centrality, density) to analyse the given 
data sets.  Roberts and Everton (2011) suggested that in order to fully understand network 
structure it is necessary to understand all of its three levels: the system level, the level of 
subgroups and the individual level. Social network analysis offers distinct algorithms to study 
these different levels of network structure. Authors maintain that it is essential to understand the 
overall network topology in order to interpret features of subgroups and individual positioning 
within networks (e.g. Baker and Faulkner, 1993; Morselli, 2009; Robins, 2015). Moreover, in 
Campana (2016), evidence is offered that social networks arising from this analysis: 
Are not based on a priori structures, rather they are developed on the grounds of the 
evidence collected in a relational way (Campana and Varese 2012; Morselli, 2009; Varese, 
2010).  
(cited in Campana, 2016, p.4) 
Along with its positive features, authors have also discussed certain inherent limitations of the 
social network analysis. For instance, contemporary literature debates33 whether the potential of 
missing data as an inherent feature of social network analysis significantly limits the validity of 
the results. Nevertheless, it appears that the results are not affected by the missing data. For 
instance, while exploring the effects of missing data in networks developed on the basis of 
wiretap data, Campana and Varese (2012) and Berlusconi (2013) found that betweenness and 
degree centrality remain robust despite missing data. Similarly, Xu and Chen (2007) did not 
determine relevant changes in network properties when removing known links or adding missing 
links. These debates appear to be more relevant for large networks or studies on criminal 
networks in particular.  
Finally, it has been suggested that social network analysis is most valuable when it is 
implemented on the basis of theory-driven research questions (Varese, 2010; Campana 2015) 
and that advanced results are obtained when structural measures are combined with qualitative 
data (Campana, 2015). 
To summarise, social network analysis allows for the examination of group structure in terms of 
                                                             
33 For a review, see Campana, 2016. 
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consistent patterns of interactions between individuals, as well as the elucidation of subgroups. 
The relevant literature on social network analysis, discussed above, indicates that this approach 
has been used to analyse diverse organisational settings. For instance, it was implemented to 
explore organizational structure and change (McGrath and Krackhardt, 2003) the structure of 
scientific collaborations (Barabasi et al., 2002; De Stefano, Giordano and Vitale, 2011; 
Milovančevic, Misic and Protic, 2018).   
Research implementing social network analysis has shown several important features of 
organisational and/or institutional networks, which are relevant for this research. For instance, 
studies have indicated that most organisational networks have a small world property (Barabasi 
et al., 2002; Watts, 1999) and display a higher degree of clustering than random networks (Watts, 
1999; Watts and Strogatz, 1998). In addition, centrality measures, density coefficients and 
core/periphery indicators contain important information about the nature of the network and the 
potential influence certain actors have on the social structure of the network (Hanneman and 
Riddle, 2005). This potential of social network analysis was particularly taken into account for 
the purpose of conducting this research. 
 
4.3.2.3. Implications for this research 
 
Given the inherent complexity of exploring the phenomenon of state capture which is central to 
this research, a combination of two methodological approaches was implemented to increase the 
reliability of the findings. The conclusions drawn from content analysis were used to map the 
state response network and its main problems or gaps in the functioning, in light of potential state 
capture in the period of EU accession. These conclusions were subsequently analysed by social 
network analysis to identify the key structural holes hindering the effectiveness of state response 
network. Therefore, the results are presented in two separate sub-sections of the Chapter V, 
namely the results of content analysis (Chapter V, Part I.) and the results of social network 
analysis (Chapter V, Part II.).  
To summarise, data triangulation is used in this research to enable a comprehensive 
understanding of the phenomenon of state capture. As discussed above, a number of authors have 
suggested the existence of  inter-relation of democratic transition and EU accession with state 
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capture phenomenon, discussed in detail in Chapter III,  mainly on the basis of descriptive studies 
(Fazekas and Tóth, 2014; Ivanova, 2010; Mendelski, 2015; Perry and Keil, 2018; Volkov, 2002). 
Most of these studies focused on available statistical data and interviews with relevant 
stakeholders, but have rarely used quantitative methodologies to confirm such conclusions. To 
this end, the principal feature of this research adding to this topic is the implementation of 
quantitative method (usually used for other types of studies) to verify the accuracy of the 
conclusions arising from the qualitative methodology used. 
In addition, a number of studies implemented social network analysis to study relations between 
countries or institutions e.g. exploring countries’ participation in international organisations 
(Hafner-Burton, Kahler, and Montgomery 2009), international security networks (Maoz, 2009), 
intergovernmental organizations (Cao, 2009), international institutions (Böhmelt and Spilker, 
2016) or institutional networks (Chaffin, Garmestani, Gosnell and Craig, 2015).  However, these 
studies focused solely on determination of the networks between grouped subjects (i.e. states, 
institutions), mainly in terms of detecting the existence or absence of a relationship.  
Concurrently, a vast number of studies have addressed the concept of criminal networks by 
implementing quantitative methodology (social network analysis),  mainly focusing on their 
internal organization (Boivin, 2014; Gimenez-Salinas Framis, 2014; Lauprechta et al., 2016; 
Morselli, 2009; Walther, 2015), functioning methods (Decary-Hetu, 2014; Dupont, 2014; Garay 
and Villaveces, 2009; Morseli, 2009; Spiro, Acton, and Butts, 2013),  or characteristics (Allum 
and Gilmour 2012 Shelley, 2002; von Lampe, 2006; Williams, 2001).  These studies significantly 
contributed to the knowledge on contemporary criminal networks and advanced understanding 
of their operation. This research does not explore the criminal networks, but utilises this method 
to explore the network of state institutions designed to address organised crime. 
However, the studies on democratic transition, EU accession or those on criminal networks have 
not explored the interaction of these processes or studied them as intertwined issues contributing 
to state capture phenomenon. The available knowledge on state capture has been so far marked 
by highly structured studies performed by international organizations, mainly on the basis of 
economic criteria (European Commission Progress reports; World Bank; Centre for the Study of 
Democracy), usually in relation to corruption and its effects on economy, or only in a handful of 
studies focusing on corruption in particular states (e.g. Latin America, Hungary). Several studies 
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examined state capture in post-socialist states, mainly in a descriptive manner, but they did not 
focus on the former Yugoslavia as a particular case of post-socialist and a post-war transitional 
state. A recent GRASP report (GRASP, 2019) examined state capture risk in the Western Balkan 
countries; however, the methodology implemented is not sufficiently clear. In addition, it covers 
a number of fields in a single analysis thus decreasing the potential to clarify how the numerical 
inferences of the capture risk were obtained. 
Concurrently, studies on state capture utilise different methodologies (e.g. Innes, 2014; Levitsky 
and Way, 2016; Kleibrink, 2015; Keil, 2018) and commonly cover different aspects of capturing. 
For instance, in a study on state capture in Montenegro, Serbia, Republic of North Macedonia 
and *Kosovo, Keil (2018) utilised the following indicators of capture: democratisation, 
separation of powers, bureaucracies and independent agencies, civil society, media and policy-
making. The study of Keil focuses on political capture i.e. the capture of a state by political elites 
and neo-authoritarian regimes and appears to be implementing well selected indicators. 
However, despite the good indicator framework, it is difficult to neutrally measure or quantify 
these factors do to inherent political bias of the sources. 
 
Building on the knowledge acquired through previous research, this research is unique in terms 
of utilization of quantitative method for examination of the extent of state capture in relation to 
state actions in suppressing criminal networks. Commonly applied for mapping criminal 
networks, this approach is deployed in an innovative manner to map the state institutions’ 
network designed to address drug trafficking groups in an effort to explore whether this is linked 
to conclusions regarding state capture in Serbia. 
 
Given the focus of the study on the extent of state capture that may be attributed to the 
functioning of organised criminal networks, the application of social network analysis can 
provide a deeper insight on the patterns of relationships among state institutions conceptualized 
as social actors, in the framework of a ‘state response network’ (as a micro society). 
This research utilizes social network analysis in an innovative manner, as it will be applied to 
institutions rather than individuals. Moreover, this research does not measure the mere existence 
of relations between institutions, but the actual interaction measured through their jurisdiction. 
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The literature increasingly shows that institutions do not exist in isolation, but commonly interact 
with each other, thus inducing influence and mutually affecting institutions’ performance 
(Böhmelt and Spilker, 2016). Therefore, state institutions are viewed as ‘nodes’, integrated into 
a ‘state response network’, as the ‘mirror’ designed to address the trafficking groups. This 
enables the author to explore the links between institutions (edges), identify the strengths 
between them and detect potential obstacles to their cooperation and effectiveness.  
 
Through innovative conceptualization of the state institutions as ‘actors’ or ‘nodes’ of the 
network and triangulation of data sources, this study produces a network map of the 
governmental bodies aimed at organised crime and drug trafficking suppression. The mapping 
of the institutions and role positioning within is used to expose the potential bonding mechanisms 
(Williams, 1998) that appear to be associated to peripheral actors (Granovetter, 1973) with loose 
relationships with other network nodes. However, these seemingly loose irrelevant nodes or 
communities may have, by the nature of their position, high brokerage capital to cooperate with 
organised crime/drug trafficking networks. That is, in case legitimate institutions would have 
high brokerage capital, they would be able to ensure a certain degree of protection from law 
enforcement activities (Williams, 1998) which can significantly hamper counter-network efforts 
and associated democratic transition and EU accession.  Adequate tools to identify such cliques 
are the key social network analysis concepts (such as betweenness centrality, degree centrality 
and density measures). Social network analysis enables exploration of the patterns of relationship 
to detect subgroups, identify central points and the strength of these links. This process enables 
identification of structural holes among institutions or obstacles to efficient cooperation. 
Concurrently, this method may indicate which institutions are least effective in addressing the 
problem of organised crime and drug trafficking, where they are structured within the network 
and whether this knowledge could be used to inform the system reform. 
 
This approach may offer important data regarding existing structural holes that have high 
potential to provide smooth functioning of illicit networks. This may put forward the importance 
of redesigning the system on the basis of additional, region–specific guidelines, beyond EU 
practices, as well as regional and international lessons learned.  
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4.3.3. Research design 
 
4.3.3.1. Sample description  
 
The sample included government officials from the main institutions in the field of combating 
organized crime and drug trafficking, as well as representatives of the relevant CSOs acting in 
the field. Sample size included approximately 65 participants. The author initially identified 
potential participants, primarily on the basis of their position. Some of the participants provided 
important insight on the topic, whereas others were discussing very limited matters in their 
jurisdiction, but helped to clarify certain aspects of the research. 
Due to the number of participants, they have been grouped into the key 6 categories to facilitate 
data analysis (Annex 1). 
The first ‘group’ (P1) involves individuals who are competent for the matters of organized crime 
suppression and drug trafficking in the relevant ministries (e.g. Ministry of Justice, Ministry of 
Interior, Ministry of Health), as well as those responsible for EU integration process (Ministry 
of Justice, Ministry of EU Integration);  
The second ‘group’ (P2) involves members of the judiciary engaged in cases of drug trafficking, 
organized crime and corruption, (e.g. judges and public prosecutors acting before the Special 
Court for Organized Crime, Appellate Court);  
The third ‘group’ (P3) involves correctional facilities administration and border officials.  
The fourth ‘group’ (P4) involves representatives of the key CSOs addressing the topic of 
concern.  
The fifth ‘group’ (P5) involves high level officials.  
The sixth ‘group’ (P6) involves media representatives covering topic of organised crime and 
drug trafficking. 
Each participant was subsequently coded by using the mark of one’s group and adding a number 
(e.g. P1.6, P5. 3.) 
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Given the diversity of the functions they perform and consequently specific knowledge about a 
certain topic, it should be mentioned that not all participants were asked to answer the same 
questions. For instance, the prosecutors and the judges had separate interview questions; 
likewise, the representatives of institutions engaged in prevention of drug misuse were asked 
separate questions. These different interview questions are provided in the Annex 2.  In addition, 
despite the same interview questions delivered to each participant, the focus of the conversation 
was different, pending on the importance the participants were giving to a specific field covered 
by the questions. Overall, it could be noted that the members of the law enforcement had very 
brief responses and were focused solely on the actual interview question, whereas the members 
of the prosecution and the judiciary engaged into a wider discussion. Overall, it can be noted that 
the participants discussed pretty honestly about the deficiencies in the system. Most of them were 
regretful about the situation in this field, while there were some participants who do not believe 
that there are any problems in the functioning of state institutions.  
Figure IV.1: Participants affiliation  
 
 
The participants were selected on the basis of their position and competences, or the researcher 
was referred to some participants who could provide important insight on the topic and clarify 
certain aspects of the research. During the process, some participants indicated other important 
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‘actors’ who have not been previously identified (snowball effect).  This technique is considered 
a complementary strategy to obtain more comprehensive data on a specific issue. The individuals 
who have already been selected to participate in the study were asked directly to suggest others 
they believe might have important info for this research, or they suggested colleagues who they 
consider more appropriate or more knowledgeable to discuss a particular issue. 
Additionally, certain interviewees indirectly referred to other colleagues who might have 
important information for this study. All subsequently identified individuals who are expected 
to provide relevant data for the research were followed up. This method has been repeated until 
sufficient information was obtained, data gaps were covered and the sample size was found 
appropriate. These multiple referrals (as expected) were of particular importance to identify those 
working in the field (border police, airport controls).  
Hence, although it was initially planned to conduct about 40 interviews, the sample size included 
a total of 65 participants. An increased sample size was mainly the result of a number of changes 
in the state institutions throughout the duration of this study, as well as the snowball effect, hence 
it was decided to extend the sample and include additional participants. The changes of specific 
individuals responsible for concrete matters in the relevant institutions were mainly the result of 
several election circles, which resulted in numerous changes of the key political functions, as 
well as heads of the sectors. The final sample size was determined based on informational needs 
in order to respond to each research question with sufficient confidence (Fridlund and Hildingh, 
2004; Patton, 2002). The responses of the participants are provided and discussed in detail below, 
under the results of the content analysis. 
The author took account of the fact that snowball effect may also result in a specific form of 
‘biased recommendations’, considering that individuals often tend to suggest those with similar 
standpoints or political attitudes. In that sense, the information or opinions obtained in this way 
might not apply to the wider group of individuals engaged in suppression of drug trafficking or 
be less objective. In order to address this, the author attempted to reach different groups of 
professionals, follow up on multiple referrals and perform careful participant selection. Finally, 
the author gave her best to avoid personal bias in the contact with the selected participants, as 
well as in mapping the conversation. Throughout the course of this study, the key principles 
guiding the research involved voluntary participation, no harm or deception to participants; 
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anonymity and confidentiality; reporting research findings and political considerations (Hayden, 
2009). 
Initial contact has been established with the potential participants personally, through email or 
by phone. These written forms were accompanied by an official letter ‘Study Info Sheet’ (Annex 
3). Along with the Study Info Sheet, in each case the author personally explained the research 
purpose, objectives and planned methodology. Since the majority of the potential participants 
involved individuals who perform high-level functions, it was expected that some might not 
actually sign the Consent Form, but may verbally consent to participate. In elite interviews, 
requiring written consent may at times be inappropriate. The person may implicitly give consent 
by agreeing to participate in the interview. Therefore, in order to avoid misunderstandings, each 
potential participant was provided with the Study Info Sheet and asked to confirm that he/she 
has read through it. This was noted prior to each interview and entered as a written author’s note 
in the interview records. 
4.3.3.2. Assessment procedure 
 
Data collection was performed in several phases. Each parliamentary elections cycle resulted in 
several months of delay (campaign, inability to arrange meetings, lack of heads of sectors in 
institutions due to changes). The data collection phases were organized in the following manner:  
 The first phase was performed from September 2013 to February 2014 (elections were held in 
March 2014). 
 The second phase was performed in the period April 2015 - April 2016 (elections were held in 
April 2016, while the Government was established several months later). 
 The third phase September 2017 – May 2018 was designed as a follow up. 
 
The interviewing process took place mainly in public institutions in Serbia.  The majority of the 
selected institutions are based in Belgrade, while several interviews were made with the 
representatives of institutions located outside of Belgrade. Due to the sensitivity of the interview 
content and the position of the interviewees, potential participants were asked in advance to set 
the location of the meeting and appropriate time at their convenience. The interviews with CSO 
representatives were conducted in their official premises. The participants had the opportunity 
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to interact with the author and raise questions related to the study. During the interview, 
participants were approached in a respectful, flexible and neutral manner and have been provided 
the necessary time to consider their answers.  
Understanding and acknowledging participants’ competence and experience, they were invited 
to discuss the thematic areas in accordance with the interview protocol. The interview protocol 
was based on a pre-arranged set of questions corresponding to the particular participants’ 
position, responsibilities, knowledge and field experience. In order to ensure confidentiality and 
avoid desirable responses, the participants were informed that their responses will remain strictly 
confidential and will not be shared with third parties under any circumstances. Participants’ 
denial to answer certain questions or discuss specific themes was treated with respect. The 
approximate time of the interviews was approximately 40 – 70 minutes. In-depth interviews were 
also used with several participants, who had a valuable knowledge of the topic and were able to 
provide a number of clarifications on certain issues. 
Pilot assessment  
Pilot assessment was performed in the premises of the Ministry of Justice. The concept of the 
pilot assessment was to inspect whether there are some deficiencies in the interview protocol, or 
other potential obstacles, which could impact the later meetings with the participants. Given that 
the author already knew some of the participants in the pilot assessment, this proved to be a 
beneficial approach for several reasons. The pilot assessment indicated that the time calculated 
for the meetings should not be perceived as a definite timeline, given the possibility that some 
individuals might speak in more detail, or have a need to speak more about various interrelated 
issues. Moreover, during the pilot assessment, some participants had emergent calls related to 
their tasks and had to leave the interview. The author was waiting for these participants to return 
and continue with the interview. The feedback arising from this process was useful in terms of 
modifying the timeframe of future interviews, provision of additional information about purpose 
of the interview and description of the interview questions. 
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4.3.4. Sources of data collection and interview protocol 
 
The data used in this research involve the written sources and the interview data. A variety of 
written sources was utilised, collected through a comprehensive desk review, as well as official 
information obtained from relevant institutions. 
Among the official sources, the following was used in the study: statistical data from the judiciary 
(court, prosecutors’ offices), police statistics, trial reports from Special Court on Organized 
Crime in drug trafficking and organized crime cases; data on the outcomes of court proceedings 
in drug trafficking and organized crime cases; Anti-corruption Agency reports and statistical 
data. 
The comprehensive desk review involved the following: a) reports of international organizations 
(European Commission, Council of Europe, Transparency International); b) annual CSOs’ 
reports on drug trade, organized crime and money laundering; c) mainstream journal and 
newspaper articles by prominent authors in printed and online media, d) published literature.  In 
addition, one film od drug trafficking networks in Serbia was also used, as it provides an 
important videotaped insight on the functioning of organized crime in Serbia. These multiple 
sources were subsequently analysed in order to map the existing knowledge on drug trafficking 
in Serbia and the results of state action in this regard.  
In addition, some information was received from the institutions on the basis of the Law on Free 
Access to Information of Public Importance, which regulates citizens’ rights to access 
information of public importance held by public authority bodies. In line with this Law, public 
authorities are obliged to provide access to relevant information contained in a document in their 
possession, without any form of compensation. 
Multiple interviews were conducted with state officials, civil servants in relevant institutions, the 
judiciary and civil society organizations. The purpose of the interviews was to obtain more 
comprehensive knowledge on the work of institutions engaged in drug trafficking suppression. 
Elite interviewing was used for data collection. Interviews were conducted in Serbian language.  
Both semi-structured and in-depth interviews were utilized to collect data from the participants. 
Most of the interviews were semi-structured, formulated on the basis of research questions and 
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official data from the judicial institutions, law enforcement agencies and international 
organizations’ reports. Additionally, certain questions from the International Narcotics Control 
Board Questionnaire were utilized and modified to provide technical data regarding the 
implementation of the ratified conventions related to drug trafficking. In-depth interviews were 
used with several participants, given that this form of interview can provide more in-depth 
knowledge, allowing the researcher to deepen the discussion on the key issues. 
Interview protocol was designed in a manner that allows for a focus on the specific topic with a 
particular participant. Considering that the majority of the participants perform official duties, in 
order to avoid imposing on their time schedule and use the time effectively, the field-related 
questions were raised with each participant.  The questions are grouped in accordance with the 
‘type of participants’ (groups of participants explained above under ....) and were used 
accordingly. 
In order to form the interview questions in the most appropriate manner, the author considered 
important to learn how the state efforts to suppress drug trafficking actually work in practice. In 
line with this, the author participated in several trainings during 2011 and 2012 organized for the 
Ministry of Interior, including staff engaged in organized crime and drug/human trafficking 
suppression. This was particularly important experience as it provided a greater insight regarding 
the issues they face in everyday functioning. Also, these training sessions involved group 
exercises on specific case studies related to illicit drug trade, links with other types of organized 
crime, particular techniques utilized in the fieldwork, and the like.  
4.4. Analytic procedure 
 
4.4.1. Content analysis – Analytic procedure  
 
4.4.1.1. Sampling frame  
 
In order to determine the boundaries of the content analysis, given the vast data collected during 
the interviews, the aim of the research and its objectives were utilised. The purpose of using these 
‘limits’ was to avoid being too broad, hence excluding irrelevant information which does not 
focus on the subject of the study. Given that the main aim of this study is to explore how 
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organised networks in Serbia, as a state undergoing democratic transition and EU accession, 
impact  crime control and lead to potential state capture, the focus of the content analysis was on 
all aspects of the data that can contribute to meeting this aim. Therefore, this ‘unexplored 
dilemma’ was an umbrella of the focus of the content analysis. 
 
The decision on the sampling frame also involved the determination of the time period to be 
included. This choice was made on the basis of the study aim and objectives. The data covering 
the period from 1990 to 2018 have been included, when it comes to written sources, whereas the 
period from 2000 to 2018 was included in the interview discussions. Court and other judiciary 
statistics mainly involve the period from 2012 to 2018, due to the relevance of data.  The types 
of written sources have been selected in a manner that enables reasonable representation of the 
data. Namely diverse forms of written sources were used to avoid potential bias (newspapers, 
articles by different authors), official institutional statistics, relevant EU reports and other 
international reports on Serbia. 
 
4.4.1.2. Preparation of data and categorisation  
 
As described above, the study utilised a variety of written sources and the interviews for the 
purpose of data collection. Data was collected by a comprehensive desk review (official reports, 
media articles, statistics) and collection of written material from relevant institutions, as well as 
multiple interviews (semi-structured and in-depth interviews) with state officials, civil servants 
in relevant institutions, and the judiciary. These multiple sources were analysed in order to gain 
more in-depth knowledge, map the existing ‘state response’ network developed to fight against 
drug trafficking in Serbia and assess the results of state action in this regard. In light of the 
exploration of the potential state capture referred to in numerous assessments, particular attention 
was given to issues linked to such conclusions. 
 
The collected data were diverse due to the variety of sources. Some interviews were transcribed, 
while other interviews that were not audio taped involved transcription (by the researcher) of the 
main verbalizations. Concurrently, the researcher has transcribed observations during the 
interviews, mainly as a form of reminder of the whole setting, body language and so on. Prior to 
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initiating data preparation for the analysis, the material obtained through the interviews and the 
written material collected have been re-read to get a general understanding of what the collected 
data is talking about. This process enabled the researcher to comprehend the main points or ideas 
arising from the information collected.  
 
Implementation of the content analysis involves several steps. The first step refers to 
development of recording units. This process implies classifying the content into themes based 
on the objectives of the study. Content analysis theory proposes that the themes can be certain 
phrases, sentences or a single word (Berg, 2001). Themes are usually ideas or concepts relevant 
for the study. Themes entail an overall concept of an underlying meaning on an interpretative 
latent level. The utilisation of themes enables reflection as to how the study findings correspond 
to the literature and evidence based policies and whether the results are reasonable and logical.  
To further specify the exact themes of the analysis, the researcher applied the objectives of the 
study as a form of ‘test’ whether concrete information contributes to meeting these objectives.  
In practice, this means that any information obtained during the interviews or collected in the 
written sources that does not contribute to additional knowledge on the operation of the state 
‘response network’ designed to combat drug trafficking or the extent to which the network is 
distorted by diverse socio-political factors and methods of social interaction, contributing to state 
capture, has not been included or coded. Such information, referred to as “dross” (Bengtsson, 
2016; Bernard, 1995) has not been analysed. Data elucidating the functioning of criminal 
networks in Serbia in the context of the potential state capture were coded and included in the 
analysis. Likewise, information that does not add to the existing knowledge on actions in 
suppressing drug trafficking and its effects on the EU accession process, was classified as 
“dross”. During the analysis process, this testing of the significance of data was performed by 
writing down research aim and questions on a paper so it can be observed to keep the focus, 
using specific colours for a code and writing coloured notes in the margins, enabling the 
researcher to stay on track during analysis. 
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Figure IV.2. Example of analysis resulting in higher levels of abstraction  
 
 
 
 
 
There are 4 key themes formulated for the purpose of performing content analysis of data: 
1. Stalled democratization/EU processes due to organised crime - corresponding to the RQ 
1 To what extent can stalled transition and state capture be attributed to the level of 
organised crime? 
2. Organised crime networks - corresponding to the RQ 2 What is the extent of organised 
crime and drug trafficking in Serbia? 
3. Effectiveness of state response network addressing organised crime - corresponding to 
the RQ 3 What are the structural holes that enable endurance of organised crime in 
Serbia? 
4. Serbia as a captured state - corresponding to the RQ 4 Do, and if so, how do these 
structural holes indicate state capture in Serbia? 
 
The second step involves definition of sub-themes/categories. Therefore, to facilitate the content 
analysis of data, along with these themes, additional sub-themes were formulated (explained in 
detail in the Table IV.1). Theory supports that the concept of sub-themes or categories answers 
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questions such as who, what, when, or where, namely describes the main content (Berg, 
2001).The grouping of the collected data into sub-themes was performed on the basis of the 
primary data, theories on similar topic and European standards. This process involved initial/pilot 
division of data into themes, and careful consideration of the data to be grouped into specific 
sub-themes or categories that explain in detail or form a part of the concrete theme.  
The existing knowledge of each topic, based on legislative principles, EU standards and available 
assessments of the specific field, were utilised to group data under a certain sub-theme. Authors 
suggest that subject to the study’s aim and quality of the collected data, it is possible to formulate 
sub-themes or categories at the highest level of abstraction sufficient for reporting on the results, 
or develop themes (Berg, 2001; Elo and Kyngäs 2007). Hence the sub-themes represent the 
smaller units of the concrete theme. Sub-categories are often referred to as the sub-themes 
(Graneheim and Lundman, 2004). Authors hold that themes and sub-themes need to be internally 
homogeneous and externally heterogeneous hence that grouped data should not fit into more than 
one category (Krippendorff, 2004). Given the use of a deductive approach in this study, the role 
of the introduction of themes and sub-themes was to link the interpretations with the existing 
theories in order to draw inferences.  
The sub-themes developed for the purpose of this study, still represent a broad group of data, 
conceptualized as the key set of words/concepts elucidating the concrete theme. The following 
sub-themes were developed:  
Sub-theme 1: Democratic transition; EU accession 
Sub-theme 2:  Balkan route and Serbia’s role; Drug trafficking related events 
Sub-theme 3: Institutional framework; legislative framework 
Sub-theme 4: Spheres of state capture; Indications of state capture arising from criminal 
networks 
The third step involves the abstraction of raw data and categorisation. A detailed categorisation 
used for content analysis is presented in the Table IV.2 below. Given the amount of information 
a participant is sharing in the form of numerous sentences, those phrases or key words that most 
fit the main criteria for inclusion were extracted into smaller parts i.e. the meaning units. 
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Likewise, the written material used also entails a number of paragraphs relevant for the study, 
whereby certain key phrases and words needed to be extracted and the choice of content made.  
In selecting the content that will be used as the “meaning units” and subsequent categories, the 
key guiding principles were the aim of the study and the research questions. Hence the choice of 
content was clearly defined and justified by the aims of the study and the research questions, 
throughout the whole analysis.  
Analysis of the collected data was performed by dividing it into smaller units in the following 
manner. Meaning units represent the smallest units, obtained during data collection, which entail 
information necessary for the research. These meaning units are presented in the form of 
sentences, phrases or paragraphs. They originate from the transcribed interviews and the written 
material collected. 
Identification of the meaning units involved an assessment whether all aspects of the content are 
included in relation to the aim of the study and the research questions. The data from the written 
sources, identified as meaning units relevant for the study, were marked by coloured pencils in 
different colours in order to distinguish the most important information from the less significant. 
Once the main meaning units were included, the process of re-reading was performed to check 
whether additional paragraphs or phrases should be included. For the information obtained 
through the interviews, the key points of the discussion were marked, and some characteristic 
sentences were used to define the meaning units. The following extracts represent examples of 
how the raw data was then broken down into key themes: 
"The Skaljarski klan is a Montenegrin criminal group which is in conflict with the Kavacki klan, but they are 
only parts of larger criminal groups that operate in both Serbia and the territory of the former Yugoslavia. 
(P2.9) 
Key theme: Organised crime networks 
"The profit earned by smuggling cocaine is often placed in legal business by criminals, by paying politicians, 
directors of public companies and other officials. For example, they buy failed businesses, build buildings 
and business complexes. In this way, they damage the financial system in Serbia” (P2.7)  
Key theme: State capture 
"The dominance of the black market of narcotics is still the main reason for the criminals' war” (P2.4) 
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Key theme: Organised crime networks 
“Balkan criminal groups are linked to international narcotics cartels". 
Key theme: Organised crime networks 
“It is very frustrating for me to judge in such circumstances...the members of the court panel oppose any 
decision to convict this person despite strong evidence and testimonies... it is like they perceive that the court 
should act to the benefit of the defendant even for highly positioned traffickers who are accused...” (P2.1) 
Key theme: Effectiveness of state response network addressing organised crime 
“Only the political elites here have achieved the right to autonomy and independence. Nobody else did. 
Governing outside from the institutions has become practice in Serbia, from the 90s until today. And when 
you have extra-institutional power, it is usually performed with the help of the secret services” (P1.18). 
Key theme: State capture 
“Our judiciary is very bad, as a consequence of decades of abuse of democracy by the political elites. The 
judicial reforms resulted solely on replacements of judges on the basis of political criteria, personal revenge 
or the criteria of closed social groups. The level of corruption remained the same but the number of obedient 
and incompetent judges increased” (P2.10). 
Key theme: State capture 
“Accession is currently on hold...it has a set of issues surrounding it, such as migration, terrorism, euro 
scepticism, relations with Russia... but it seems Brussels is unconsciously hindering the process... the process 
is there, but there is no political will...” (P1.26) 
Key theme: Stalled transition and EU accession 
“I think Serbia will never enter the EU... The fact is that the EU does not want to accept the Western Balkan 
states, because the EU is not anymore what it used to be or what it could have been” (P1. 11) 
Key theme: Stalled transition and EU accession 
These meaning units were further condensed to form shorter phrases, without losing the sense of 
the content, to facilitate the analysis. Summarized or condensed meaning units were developed 
by using the key words from the meaning units that are mostly associated with the aim of the 
study and the research questions i.e. with different focus of the study. Determination of the 
summarized meaning units implies reduction of the number of words without losing the content 
of the unit (Graneheim and Lundman, 2004). This process facilitates further grouping of data 
125 
 
and subsequently the analysis.  For instance, war between criminal groups; member of a group 
killed; Balkan criminal groups; implementation is lacking; not in our jurisdiction; sentenced 
below legal minimum; still no final judgement. 
In order to perform latent content analysis, it was necessary to further minimize the number of 
words used and extract the logic of data i.e. group the data into specific units of analysis (similar 
terms used: content area Graneheim and Lundman, 2004; or domains Patton, 2002). The aim of 
the study and the research questions were used as the key guiding principle in defining the units 
of analysis. Each unit of analysis implies a different focus of the study.  For example, trial 
postponed; amount of drugs found; car exploded; killed member of...; perpetrator known to 
police; no progress in the field; law track record on. 
Finally, in order to perform the analysis, the final step was coding. The formulation of codes for 
each unit of analysis was performed. All the transcribed interviews and each written document 
or a part of the document was systematically examined, categorized as explained above and 
coded.  Coding of all the data was performed by using specific key words from the condensed 
meaning units and/or unit of analysis, in order to closely associate the meanings and simplify the 
coding process. Such labelling of the data was referred to by Strauss and Corbin as 
conceptualising data by identifying and giving “each discrete incident, idea or event, a name … 
that stands for or represents a phenomenon” (Strauss and Corbin, 1990, p. 63).   
Pre-testing of the coding scheme on several samples was performed. The coding list was 
developed with explanations of the codes to secure reliability (Morse and Richards, 2002). The 
coding of these samples was discussed with a colleague in order to check the level of consistency. 
For example, CG (group of XY), D (drugs), R (route), MIN (ministry of..), IMPL 
(implementation), COO (cooperation), EUTR (track record in accession related field as 
measured by the European Commission).  
Line-by-line coding was performed through careful examination of the data, taking into account, 
throughout the whole process, the key research questions and the themes. The following steps in 
the process involved pre-testing of the coding scheme and follow up (revision of coding scheme). 
Subsequently, coding full sample was performed. 
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As discussed above, the phrases from the interviews were grouped under the themes to reflect 
the participants’ statements about the given questions. Inferences were drawn on the basis of 
sub-themes and units of analysis that were generated for the purpose of the analysis. The 
consistency of the coding employed was assessed in order to weigh the data set validity and 
reliability. The analysis involved an exploration of different dimensions of the collected data 
with an aim to uncover the patterns relevant for the study.  
The implied meanings were analysed by the author in order to draw authentic conclusions. Given 
that the author has extensive knowledge of the topic, both through educational activities, as well 
as the working experience in state institutions with public officials, it was important to capture 
these implied meanings in order to obtain innovative comprehension of the topics.  
To present the results, it was decided to discuss the conclusions under the themes, with reference 
to the sub-themes, to adequately address the research questions. In addition, this approach 
enables the reader to understand the interpretations. The conclusions arising from the results are 
supported in the discussion with available theories, standards in the field and citations from the 
interviews i.e. meaning units.  
The results and conclusions under the themes and sub-themes were utilised to group the 
information and conduct social network analysis, described in detail in the Table IV.2 below. On 
the basis of this comprehensive set of data, the following matters were explored: 
a) Symptoms  of stalled democratic transition and EU accession of Serbia and their 
association with endurance of organised crime; 
b) The scale of organised crime in Serbia, in particular with regard to drug trafficking 
networks. Data on mafia related murders, car explosions, current trials on drug trafficking 
and seizures of drugs were particularly taken into account; 
c) The network of state institutions (state response network) designed to combat organised 
crime and drug trafficking was identified and investigated in detail; The effectiveness of 
the work of state institutions was addressed and this data was linked  with loopholes 
identified in the perceptions/views of the participants and/or referred to in official reports; 
d) The extent to which the state response network is distorted by signs/symptoms of state 
capture was analysed. 
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As described previously, content analysis was selected as an appropriate analysis method to 
enable interpretation of the findings and identify the key variables for the social network analysis. 
Implementation of social network analysis is described below. 
 
4.4.2. Social network analysis - Analytic procedure 
 
4.4.2.1. Categorisation for social network analysis  
 
Exploration of the associations among interdependent individuals/groups in social and 
geographic space is performed on the basis of several key concepts. For instance, node refers to 
subjects or sample elements that are not mutually independent. Determining how central a node 
in the network is can give information about how important role it plays in the network (Borgatti 
and Evereett, 2006). The institutions have been conceptualized as nodes with an aim to explore 
the identified institutional network. Visualisation of the network of state institutions is provided 
in Chapter IV (see Graph V.1 and Graph V.2).  
 
Relationships among nodes are valued in line with the nature of social ties (tie strength). These 
ties between nodes represent edges, which may be directed (in single direction) or undirected 
(free), weighted or un-weighted.  In weighted edges, the connection includes a measure of 
strength (Hanneman and Riddle, 2005; Wasserman and Faust, 1994). Moreover, the concept of 
cliques is used to determine what kind of ties or exchange patterns might be performed in the 
network, as well as bridges between subgroups which play an essential role in recruitment of 
resources and information exchange (Hanneman, 2001).  
 
The nature and strength of these inter-relations is calculated by specific measures. Degree 
centrality represents a measure of the extent of connections an individual has with other nodes. 
It is particularly useful in determining the level of activity of network members (Xu et al., 2004). 
This measure may be prone to bias, since it can be affected by the amount and source of 
information collected about particular individuals (e.g. law enforcement investigation). 
Betweenness centrality measures “the extent to which a particular node lies between other nodes 
in a network or group” (Borgatti, Everett, and Johnson, 2013; Xu et al., 2004), that is, it calculates 
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the number of contacts within a network associated with a particular node. Research indicates 
that high betweenness centrality may imply that a particular individual plays an important role 
in the network (gatekeeper, broker, responsible for the flow of information, drugs). This concept 
is applied to determine the role of a specific institution in the network of state institutions. 
 
Betweenness centrality can assist in identifying actors who have a key role in the network, even 
though they are not so visible when measured by the degree centrality.  The significance of this 
measure lies in its ability to capture the role of particular actors who often represent key channels 
of data. Freeman’s (1979) betweenness centrality measures positional importance by estimating 
the probability that a given actor lies between pairs of others in the network. Actors with high 
betweenness centrality scores (referred to as “brokers”) can have rapid and significant influence 
on the entire network, either facilitating the flow or exchange or inhibiting progress by acting as 
a bottleneck (Wasserman and Faust, 1994). These individuals tend to be seen as leaders by others 
in the network (Mullen, Johnson and Salas, 1991). Closeness centrality measures proximity 
among nodes in the network. It reflects direct and indirect connections among the network nodes 
and is manly utilized by law enforcement agencies (Borgatti and Everett, 2006; Xu et al., 2004). 
Eigenvector Centrality measures influence of a node based on the number of links it has to other 
nodes within the network, but also takes into account how well connected a  particular node is, 
and how many links and connections it has. This measure has the potential to identify nodes with 
influence over the whole network and not only those directly connected to it. Network cohesion 
is assessed by distance measures and density coefficients. A distance measure indicates the 
average number of ties between all accessible members of the network. The density measure 
(coefficients range from 0 to 1) indicates the degree of interconnectedness or organization of a 
group. Finally, the network's diameter indicates the maximum path length (number of steps) 
between the two actors in the network. 
 
4.4.2.2. Specifying the network questions  
 
As discussed in Chapter III, the concept of state capture relevant for this research refers to the 
inferences of links of state institutions with organised crime, mutual interests and corruption at 
various/all levels of state governance leading to decreased effectiveness of state actions aimed at 
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suppressing organised crime.  Social network analysis allows for the examination of group 
structure in terms of consistent patterns of interactions between individuals, as well as the 
elucidation of subgroups between network nodes. This feature of social network analysis is 
valuable for this research, given that it conceptualizes the network as a group of institutions 
(nodes) and aims to analyse the links between them in relation to identified problems in 
functioning. Hence it aims to analyse the institutional network, identify gaps and communities, 
the dynamics across the network, and draw conclusions with regard to potential state capture.  
 
With an aim to respond to the main research question, the two research sub-questions were 
additionally analysed by using Social network analysis. These questions are the following: 
 
RQ3. What are the structural holes that enable organised crime networks to engage in drug 
trafficking in Serbia? 
RQ4. Do, and if so, how do these structural holes indicate a phenomenon of state capture? 
 
In order to implement social network analysis, it was necessary to develop specific network 
questions that would assist in responding to these two research questions. This was performed in 
order to decide what will social network analysis measure. The following network questions 
were developed: 
1. In order to see is the state response network sufficiently connected: 
-What are the basic characteristics of the network in terms of density and connectivity? 
-What are the average distance and diameter of the network? 
2. In order to see which issues i.e. ‘structural holes’ are central to the network and to which 
institutions they are associated? 
-Which institutions are central per different metrics? 
-Which institutions are the core of the network? 
3. In order to see which institution may appear as brokers: 
-Do some institutions represent bridges in the network? 
4. In order to see the most significant problems: 
-What is the largest weight of the relations among the issues? 
5. In order to see do institutions share responsibility for specific problems: 
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-Can any communities/clusters grouped around specific issues i.e. ‘structural holes’ be 
determined? 
6. In order to see how is the network connected in regards to other networks: 
-Does the network show the characteristics of a small world? 
 
The final network was analysed using methods and metrics for analysing social networks and 
visualized using the Gephi software package (Bastian, Heymann, and Jacomy, 2009). Gephi was 
also used to calculate basic metrics. Gephy software package was used due to its advanced 
features. The UCINET software package is not attainable by individual authors, and it is not 
particularly user friendly. Where appropriate, the weight variation of metrics was taken into 
account. For network clustering, the Louvain method was used in the Gephi tool which is based 
on the maximization of modularity. 
 
4.4.2.3. Coding the data for social network analysis 
 
As explained above, the Content analysis was used to enable interpretation of the findings and 
identify the key variables for the Social network analysis. This method was implemented as an 
adequate tool to summarize the findings given the amount of data collected and the diversity of 
sources, in particular the written sources.  
 
Gathering complete network information about the state response network, i.e. the network of 
state institutions responsible for suppressing organised crime and drug trafficking, involved 
multiple data collection strategies. As described above, data was collected by a comprehensive 
desk review (official reports, media articles, statistics) and collection of written material from 
relevant institutions, as well as multiple interviews (semi-structured and in-depth interviews) 
with state officials, civil servants in relevant institutions, the judiciary and civil society. These 
multiple sources were analysed in order to gain more in-depth knowledge, map the existing ‘state 
response’ network developed to fight against drug trafficking in Serbia and assess the results of 
state action in this regard. 
 
Originally, this implied the mapping of the state response network or the identification of all the 
institutions responsible for the fight organised crime and drug trafficking in Serbia. The concept 
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‘state response network’ was developed for the purpose of this research, as a common label for 
all the mapped institutions responsible for the fight organised crime and drug trafficking. An 
overall appraisal of the key institutions and relevant legislative framework was provided in the 
Chapter III. The institutions of the state response network were coded for the implementation of 
SNA, as presented in the table below. 
 
 
Table IV.1. Codes of the institutions in the state response network 
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Furthermore, content analysis implementation enabled the identification of the ‘structural holes’ 
or issues identified in the functioning of the state response network.  The issues are labelled 
‘units of analysis’ and explained in detail above (under 3.4.1.2). The units of analysis identified 
by content analysis were further used to code data for Social network analysis, in order to 
quantitatively confirm or reject the findings. The following units of analysis were identified: 
 
Table IV.2: Key themes, sub-themes and units of analysis 
Key themes Sub-themes Unit of analysis 
Stalled 
democratization/EU 
processes due to organised 
crime  
Democratic 
transition; 
 
EU accession 
I Stalled transition attributed to the level of 
organised crime 
 Assessments of transition 
 Assessments of democratisation 
II Stalled EU accession attributed to the level of 
organised crime 
 EU assessments of progress in the fight against 
organised crime, drug trafficking and corruption 
 Track record in suppressing OC 
Extent of organised crime 
networks 
Balkan route and 
Serbia’s role; 
 
Drug trafficking 
related events 
 
 Trends in drug trafficking 
 Links with other crimes 
 Trends in drug use 
 Drug seizures  
 War between criminal groups 
 Geographic scope of the activity 
 Organisational model of criminal networks 
Effectiveness of state 
response network 
addressing organised 
crime 
Institutional 
framework 
 
Legislative 
framework 
 
1 Investigation & prosecution 
 operational capacities (number, trainings, 
relationships,)     
 multi-disciplinary teems  
 mapping of OC/DT networks 
 information exchange (secure platform, 
databases, intelligence exchange 
 internal control 
 reliance on secret service 
 border control 
 infiltration 
2 Role of the court 
 trial (expertise, relationships in court panel, 
decision making, judging to benefit of def....) 
 appeal proceedings 
 case law 
 sentencing policy 
 independence/political influence 
 training 
3 Financial investigation 
 identification of financial assets from crime 
 sectors vulnerable for corruption 
 management of seized assets 
 specialisation 
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 anti-money laundering 
4 Seizure and destruction of drugs 
 destruction issues 
 where drugs are kept 
5 Legal framework 
 drafting of laws 
 implementation of laws 
 strategic framework 
6 Prevention of drug misuse 
 precursors production  
 trade 
 treatment 
 research 
Serbia as a captured state Spheres of state 
capture 
 
Indications of state 
capture arising from 
criminal networks 
1 Investigation & prosecution 
2 Role of the court 
3 Financial investigation 
4 Seizure and destruction of drugs 
5 Legal framework 
6 Prevention of drug misuse 
 
The results of the content analysis were used as a starting point for the social network analysis. 
Namely, the themes were used as key issues under investigation (to determine relations relevant 
for these research questions). The identified units of analysis (i.e. the key issues mentioned by 
the interviewees or in official documents) or structural holes were subsequently used as the key 
criterion for the development of the ID of issues (label of the issues) for the Social network 
analysis. Initially, the frequency of units of analysis was used to develop a scale of 1-5 in order 
to prepare the data sets for performing Social network analysis. The Table Scaling of issues 1 
(Annex 4) includes all the scaled units of analysis.  
 
Table IV.3.  Scaling of issues 1 
Node I Node II Scale 
MOI 1 
investigation 
PORGCRIM 1 
investigation 
5 
MOI 1 
investigation 
CP 1 
investigation 
2 
MOI 1 
investigation 
PD 1 
investigation 
2 
MOI 1 
investigation 
SBPOK 1 
investigation 
2 
MOI 2  
prosecution 
PORGCRIM 2 
prosecution 
3 
MOI 2  
prosecution 
CP 2 
prosecution 
2 
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MOI 2  
prosecution 
PD 2 
prosecution 
2 
MOI 2  
prosecution 
SBPOK 2  
prosecution 
2 
MOI 3 
cooperation 
PORGCRIM 3 
cooperation 
4 
MOI 3 
cooperation 
BIA 3 
cooperation 
1 
MOI 6 
Mapping of OC/DT networks 
PORGCRIM 6 
Mapping of OC/DT networks 
5 
MOI 6 
Mapping of OC/DT networks 
BIA 6 
Mapping of OC/DT networks 
5 
MOI 6 
Mapping of OC/DT networks 
VBA 6 
Mapping of OC/DT networks 
5 
CORGCRIM 28 
relationships in court panel 
APPELC 28 
relationships in court panel 
4 
CORGCRIM 29 
case law 
APELLC 29 
case law 
5 
CORGCRIM 28 
relationships in court panel 
APPELC 28 
relationships in court panel 
4 
 
 
 
 
4.4.2.4. Implementing SNA – developing a network based model of a state response network  
 
Based on the initial set of data, a network of institutions was modelled according to social 
networks. Institutions represent the nodes of the network, and a connection is established if two 
institutions were involved in addressing a particular problem. The modelled network obtained is 
non-directional and weighted.  
 
Initially, the network was modelled in accordance with the institutional domain of action (legally 
prescribed jurisdiction) in relation to a particular unit of analysis i.e. the problems associated 
with the particular institution. While ‘hard law’ clearly separates the jurisdictions, the ‘soft law’ 
distributes responsibility between institutions that are connected through direct or indirect links. 
This analysis therefore contributes to quantitative determination of critical systematic difficulties 
and inadequate practices in the state response network fighting organised crime and drug 
trafficking. 
 
Subsequently, to assess the relations among institutions in the case of particular problems 
identified, the network metrics were utilised. This was followed by an in-depth analysis of the 
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identified communities with an aim to determine which institutions are responsible for the 
identified problems. In this way, the map of structural holes was obtained, indicating their 
significance as well as their locations across the state response network. Further analysis (SNA) 
demonstrated which particular elements of each of these structural holes are the most significant. 
Detailed analysis is provided in Chapter V. 
 
 
4.5. Summary of methodological steps  
 
To summarise, the methodological steps undertaken were the following:  
I. Data collection involved written sources and interviews with relevant stakeholders, 
including:  
a) data on organised crime and drug trafficking networks in Serbia, data describing the 
impact of the Balkan route in international illicit drug trade; review of the extent and nature 
of drug trafficking in Serbia;  
b) identification of concrete actions of state institutions aimed at suppressing drug 
trafficking (jurisdiction pursuant to laws, cooperation prescribed by laws); data on the 
effects of state actions (statistics, official reports of the institutions, international reports) 
II. Collected data (written sources and interviews) were analysed by implementation of  
Content analysis: 
a) Content analysis was used to enable interpretation of the findings and identify the key 
variables for the social network analysis. This method was implemented as an adequate 
tool to summarize the findings given the amount of data collected and the diversity of 
sources, in particular the written sources 
b) The units of analysis identified by content analysis were further used to code data for 
Social network analysis, in order to quantitatively confirm or reject the findings. 
III. Social network analysis implementation: 
a) State institutions were conceptualized as ‘nodes’, to develop a state response network; 
b) State response network was then fed with relevant information on jurisdiction  
c) The nodes involved state response network with regard to identified issues or problems 
in functioning, pursuant to jurisdiction of each institution 
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d) Relations of the state response network were then examined with regard to identified 
issues. 
 
With an aim to elucidate what has been performed prior to presenting the results, it is valuable 
to reiterate the basic steps undertaken. Each of these steps is explained in detail in this Chapter. 
I Phase: 
1. Data collection 
2. Performing Content analysis - identifying main themes, subthemes, units of analysis, 
coding and analysing data (see in detail 3.4.1..) 
II Phase: 
3. Specifying the network questions  
4. Coding the data for SNA  
5. Implementing SNA – developing a network based model of a state response network  
6. Drawing conclusions 
 
 
4.6. Ethical considerations 
 
The study received ethics approval from the University of Sheffield, School of Law, on 17 th 
July 2013 (Annex 5).  
 
4.6.1. Access  
 
The process of gaining access in a type of research that requires official state data is usually 
pretty difficult in Serbia. Due to the general lack of scientific research in practice, the Serbian 
institutions are often reluctant to provide access to independent researchers. Nevertheless, due to 
previous personal acquaintances with a number of representatives of the relevant institutions, I 
discussed the idea of conducting this research on several occasions. It was my belief that 
informing specific individuals about the research may contribute to more smooth access approval 
once requested. Furthermore, during the research, I started working as a consultant for Access to 
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Justice on a project at the Ministry of Justice. Through my work, I came in contact with a number 
of officials and participated in numerous expert meetings. This provided me the opportunity to 
discuss potential access in the key institutions, and to initially request some of the interviews.  
 
It is important to note that this position of an independent consultant assisted me in retaining an 
autonomous stance, given that I was not an employee of the Ministry. The consultants were hired 
through a project to undertake independent research in different topics. Given that my research 
subject is not associated with the job performed, it was feeling at ease to undertake interviews 
with relevant officials, without impacting my current position or the research itself. 
 
4.6.2. Informed consent 
 
At the outset of the research, all the potential participants were provided with an overall concept 
of the research, during the initial discussions on the possibility to participate in the interviews. 
Subsequently, separate meetings have been scheduled, whereby the potential participants were 
informed about the purpose and aims of this study, including their right to not participate or to 
withdraw at any time. The potential participants were provided with the Study Information Sheet, 
containing relevant data about the research i.e. the purpose, aims of the research, methodology 
and data of the researcher. Information Sheet also contained information on confidentiality, 
anonymisation and dissemination of the results. Potential participants were clearly informed that 
any identifying data or information they revealed would be confidential, anonymized and safely 
kept. The implementation of the research procedure has been conducted by this author. 
 
4.6.3. Confidentiality 
 
Due to the specific nature of the participants and the positions they hold, anonymity and 
confidentiality has been particularly emphasized in this research. Elite interviewing requires 
particular attention with regards to data protection and anonymity issues. To this end, personal 
data protection rules have been fully implemented. In order to protect participants’ 
confidentiality, they are referred to by pseudonyms and all identifying data has been altered, 
protected and safely kept. Research related forms or data were not shared with unauthorised 
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individuals and following the finalization of the study will be archived for five years following 
PhD completion and subsequently destroyed. Any data, written or oral, remained confidential.  
 
Confidentiality of personal and other important data has been ensured in each case. All 
information obtained during the study is anonymous, i.e. any identifying data and other personal 
information have been protected by coding and will not be disclosed at any time.  All the 
participants have been informed that their participation is voluntary, and they can decline 
participation or withdraw at any time. All research related documents ensure personal data 
protection of the participants and, to a certain extent the institutions, given that they are 
mentioned by a grouped label (e.g. repression institution). 
 
Individual participants are not referenced in this thesis and will not be referenced in any report 
or publication related to the study. Considering that the majority of the participants perform 
official duties, their exact position was not disclosed as this would clearly indicate the person’s 
identity. In these situations, reference to the institution as a source was made without disclosing 
the specific function that the person performs. Therefore, only coded names will be used in any 
written material (records, transcripts, quotations) to ensure that contextual information does not 
immediately imply the source’s identity. The only names utilised refer the names mentioned in 
the media as a part of the mafia war, given that they are already publicly available. Also, several 
public figures are cited, again in the case their statements were already published.  
 
As assured in the process of obtaining Ethics approval, that in case of unexpected data indicating 
criminal implications, such information will remain confidential and will not be taken into 
consideration, I hereby declare that no such information was obtained or discussed during the 
study. In addition, given that the interest of the researcher was to document relationships rather 
than generate a record of criminal activities, identifying data of individuals convicted for criminal 
offences was not collected. Only anonymised court decisions and prosecutors data were utilized.  
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4.6.4. Strengths and limitations 
 
There are several strengths of this research that should be noted. Similar to other authors’ 
experiences, the access to this type of data often depends upon trust and prior relationships or 
acquaintances with representatives of relevant law enforcement agencies, criminal justice 
institutions and professionals. As I explained above, I was in a position to gain access to 
important material and official interviews, which certainly contributed to the quality and 
reliability of data collected. It also contributed to the level of openness in the discussions. 
Moreover, there are some strengths related to the qualitative method per se, such as low 
constraints, comprehensiveness and sufficient detail. Finally, an important quality of this 
research refers to the innovative implementation of Social Network Analysis to detect 
measurable indicators of state capture in the filed of crime control, which can be used in practice. 
 
With regard to research limitations, there are primarily certain constraints that refer to the 
research area of state capture. This phenomenon is insufficiently clear and thus difficult to 
explore, due to its inherent covertness. Moreover, the suppression of organized crime is also a 
topic which is per se difficult to explore, as there is a lack of reliable data and sufficient 
reluctance from the official institutions to share valuable information. Further, the explored 
capture of the crime control system refers to the criminal networks as potential captors, which 
are secret entities by their nature. Any information about their functioning is commonly obtained 
only once they are identified. Therefore, the available information refers only to those cases that 
have been traced or reported to the relevant law enforcement agencies or the media. When this 
inherent secrecy of criminal networks is combined with an effort to explore state capture, which 
is a delicate phenomenon, it is even more difficult to draw objective conclusions. This research 
did not engage in exploration of the criminal network as entities, but rather analysed their 
potential to act as the captors of the crime control system. Given the fact that there might be other 
groups or individuals who may also have the capacity to capture a given element of the state, it 
is important to note this limitation.   
 
To address these inherent difficulties in studying state capture, I utilised data triangulation and 
combined a number of different sources to collect representative data and retain neutral stance. 
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Aiming to address limitations inherent to qualitative methods, i.e. poor internal reliability and/or 
poor generalisation, I implemented a form of quantitative method, the Social Network Analysis. 
It is also frequently perceived that qualitative data is rarely integrated. In order to address this 
potential limit, I have developed a scheme indicating each step undertaken in the analysis, 
including the development of key concepts ad themes which were subsequently measured by 
social network analysis. I believe that this approach facilitates understanding by third persons 
who may not familiar with the specific topic, or who might wish to repeat similar inquiries using 
this methodology. Finally, it can be found in the literature that qualitative methodology ‘only 
seems easy’. I must recognize that this is true, given that the analysis requires a lot of time to 
explain the exact undertaken steps in order to clarify what was done. Finally, there was a delay 
in accessing criminal justice data, common for the state administration and the judiciary. The 
same stands for the interviews with relevant state officials. Nevertheless, the ‘time gap’ was used 
during the research process to collect other data. 
 
4.6.5. Assessors Competency, Training and Supervision  
 
The implementation of the assessment procedure was conducted by this author, supervised by 
several faculty members, Dr Paul Knepper (until 2017), Dr Mark Brown and Dr Alexandra 
Prodromidou (starting from 2018). I have several years of experience of working in state 
institutions, cooperating and exchanging sensitive data with official representatives of state 
institutions and coordinating reporting of the state institutions in the process of implementation 
of the Chapter 23 Judiciary and Fundamental rights, as a part of the EU-Serbia negotiation 
process. In addition, I have previous experience in conducting interviews with public officials 
and relevant stakeholders, as well as specialization in legal matters related to the field of the 
study.  I have a LLM in Law and MA in International Relations and I am therefore familiar with 
the legal issues covered by the study, as well as a broader international perspective of various 
phenomena. Finally, I undertook training in implementation of Social network analysis during 
2017. 
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Chapter V Results and Discussion 
 
5.1. Summary and key research findings 
 
There are two key and connected developments in the literature that have prompted the work in 
this research.  
The first development refers to a growing interest in the phenomenon of state capture, 
particularly in the literature on a spectrum of states affected by crime (Cockayne and Roth, 2017; 
Chayes, 2015; de Boer and Bosetti, 2015; Ellis and Shaw, 2015; Ganev, 2007; Savona, 2014; 
Welch, 2012) and the captured states in the EU accession process (Perry and Keil, 2018; Popikij, 
2018; Priebe, 2018; Weber, 2017). As described in Chapter III, literature on state capture offers 
little explanation about the process through which the state becomes captured. It is still not 
unambiguously clear what this concept implies and how can it be clearly differentiated from 
corruption or the concept of “failed states”. Acknowledging that these phenomena may be inter-
related, Priebe (2018) suggests that the concept of state capture points to “systemic” 
shortcomings in the functioning of the state. Similarly, Savona (2014, p.2) argues that 
understanding ´where the opportunities for organized crime lie´ may result from an exploration 
of illegal markets. Following this line of inquiry, Cockayne and Roth (2017, 10.) suggest that 
exploitation of these opportunities or “vulnerabilities” consequently leads to criminalized or 
‘crooked’ governance.  
Therefore, in the context of EU accession, identification of such vulnerabilities in particular 
states may have important implications for broader patterns of governance. Given that the 
accession processes should act as a countervailing force to the capture routes, identification of 
candidate countries’ vulnerabilities may assist in addressing these obstacles which cause 
significant delays.  
The second development concerns the focus of the research in the field of organised crime on 
criminal networks (Fazekas and Tóth, 2017; Felbab-Brown, 2011; Garay and Villaveces, 2009; 
Leitner and Meissner, 2017; Maharaj, 2017; Schultze-Kraft, 2016; SOCTA, 2017; Varese 2010; 
Williams, 2001). Networks have been important as an alternative model of criminal groups’ 
organizational structures, but they are particularly important in this research given that thinking 
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about networked relationships allows a better view of the penetration of criminal groups into the 
state apparatus, and hence of the modus operandi by which criminal networks come to ‘capture’ 
the state and to emasculate those crime control apparatuses targeting them. As discussed in 
Chapter III,  research consistently indicates that a number of states are characterized by a form 
of symbiosis between the state and criminal organisations, resulting from close ties between 
organised crime, politics and the public sector (Bruinsma and Bernasco, 2004; De Boer and 
Bosetti, 2017; Morselli, 2006; Vergara, 2012). Such a symbiosis is often described by the use of 
various (di)similar concepts such as state capture, criminal states or crooked governance, all 
placed on a certain point of  a continuum of ‘failure of governance’. 
Given the inherent complexity of exploring the phenomenon of state capture which is central to 
this research, a combination of two methodological approaches was implemented (Chapter IV). 
Firstly, a content analysis of narrative qualitative data drawn from a variety of sources, including 
the extant published literature and interviews with key stakeholders and informants within Serbia 
was implemented to identify the key gaps in the functioning of the state institutions responsible 
for the fight against organised crime. Following this, these data were reduced further into a form 
suitable for Social Network Analysis, to enable mapping and identification of indicators of state 
capture. This innovative approach applied in this research builds on the idea of loopholes or 
“points of arbitrage” offered by Cockayne (2016, p. 8) and it adds to this approach by identifying 
the specific ‘vulnerabilities’ in a given state that enable capturing. Identification and/or mapping 
of these points of arbitrage or state vulnerabilities in Serbia may significantly contribute to 
disruption of state capture networks and increase the effectiveness of crime suppression efforts. 
The main research question for this study, and then its sub-questions, aimed to address this 
question and step through its logical parts in detail. To recap: 
Primary research question: 
Does the extent of organised criminal networks in Serbia as a country undergoing EU accession, 
indicate state capture in the field of crime control? 
Sub-questions: 
1. To what extent can stalled transition and EU accession be attributed to the level of 
organised crime? 
2. What is the extent of drug trafficking in Serbia? 
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3. What are the structural holes that enable organised crime networks to engage in drug 
trafficking in Serbia? 
4. Do, and if so, how do these structural holes indicate a phenomenon of state capture? 
 
The logic of this analysis, also described in full detail in Chapter IV, is shown in Figure V.1 
which illustrates the sequential analytical approach adopted. 
 
Figure V. 1: Logic flow diagram of the analysis 
 
 
Note: CA = content analysis; SNA = social network analysis; RQ = research questions 
 
 
To further recap the key methodological steps and to preface the results of analysis that will be 
described below, the narrative qualitative data were reduced through content analysis to identify 
key themes associated with each of the sub-question. These are summarised in Table IV 1 below. 
In the language of analysis, these are therefore the key themes, sub-themes and units of analysis. 
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Table V.1. Key themes, sub-themes and units of analysis   
Key themes Sub-themes Unit of analysis 
Stalled 
democratization/EU 
processes due to organised 
crime  
Democratic 
transition; 
 
EU accession 
I Stalled transition attributed to the level of 
organised crime 
Assessments of transition 
Assessments of democratisation 
II Stalled EU accession attributed to the level of 
organised crime 
EU assessments of progress in the fight against 
organised crime, drug trafficking and corruption 
Track record in suppressing OC 
Extent of organised crime 
networks 
Balkan route and 
Serbia’s role; 
 
Drug trafficking 
related events 
 
 1 Trends in drug trafficking 
 2 Links with other crimes 
 3 Trends in drug use 
 4 Drug seizures  
 5 War between criminal groups 
 6 Geographic scope of the activity 
 7 Organisational model of criminal networks 
Effectiveness of state 
response network 
addressing organised 
crime 
Institutional 
framework 
 
Legislative 
framework 
 
1 Investigation & prosecution 
 operational capacities (number, trainings, 
relationships,)     
 multi-disciplinary teems  
 mapping of OC/DT networks 
 information exchange (secure platform, databases, 
intelligence exchange 
 internal control 
 reliance on secret service 
 border control 
 infiltration 
2 Role of the court 
 trial (expertise, relationships in court panel, decision 
making, judging to benefit of def....) 
 appeal proceedings 
 case law 
 sentencing policy 
 independence/political influence 
 training 
3 Financial investigation 
 identification of financial assets from crime 
 sectors vulnerable for corruption 
 management of seized assets 
 specialisation 
 anti-money laundering 
4 Seizure and destruction of drugs 
 destruction issues 
 where drugs are kept 
5 Legal framework 
 drafting of laws 
 implementation of laws 
 strategic framework 
6 Prevention of drug misuse 
 precursors production  
 trade 
 treatment 
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 research 
Serbia as a captured state Spheres of state 
capture 
 
Indications of 
state capture 
arising from 
criminal 
networks 
1 Investigation & prosecution 
2 Role of the court 
3 Financial investigation 
4 Seizure and destruction of drugs 
5 Legal framework 
6 Prevention of drug misuse 
 
 
 
 
Part I:  FINDINGS OF THE CONTENT ANALYSIS AND 
DISCUSSION  
 
5.2. The extent to which stalled transition and EU accession can be attributed to the 
level of organised crime      
  
As reviewed in Chapter III, the process of transition involves, inter alia, macroeconomic 
stabilization, as well as accompanying legal and institutional reforms, aimed at establishing the 
rule of law. Despite its turbulent past, Serbia today is a stable country with a democratic regime. 
However, nearly twenty years after the onset of transition process, Serbia continues to implement 
various rule of law reforms in an attempt to reach international standards. This overly long reform 
process has been subject to diverse interpretations discussed above, but it essentially generates a 
question whether the country has in fact transited and if not, what are the causes of this delay?  
 
The process of democratic transition in Serbia is strongly intertwined with the process of EU 
accession. Therefore, as explained in Chapter IV, this research strongly relied on various 
international and EU assessments regarding transition and accession progress of Serbia. 
 
Firstly, it is necessary to conclude whether the transition of Serbia and its EU accession are in 
fact stalled? To outline briefly, stalled transition is viewed as a prolonged process of institution 
building and democratic awareness development, whereas a delayed EU accession mainly refers 
to a long-lasting process often hampered by various political motives, as well as lack of 
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measurable achievements of the set goals that would indicate a state’s readiness for accession.  
This question was mainly addressed through the official documents, usually international reports 
measuring progress of Serbia in the EU integration processes. During the interviews, a significant 
number of participants referred to stalled transition and EU accession in particular, as largely 
important issues hindering country’s development. Similarly, mainstream media covering the 
topic of organised crime and drug trafficking often link these phenomena with the stalled 
transition of the state and a delayed EU accession process. Links with organised crime have been 
discussed in this sense and assessed by most of participants as one of the key factors for these 
prolonged processes. Hence, the results presented involve a combination of the reports and 
interviews.  
 
Following a comprehensive content analysis, the findings of this research confirm that stalled 
transition and EU accession are strongly associated with the level of organised crime. Based on 
an in-depth analysis of international reports on Serbia, the research findings identified the 
following key factors related to stalled transition and EU accession: 
- insufficient preparedness to fight organised crime; 
- insufficient preparedness to fight drug trafficking; 
- low track record in investigation, prosecution and final convictions in organised crime 
and high level corruption cases;  
- lack of investigation of wider criminal networks; 
- scarce financial investigations; and 
- deficient freezing and confiscation of assets derived from crime. 
 
Through an additional social network analysis, the elements of these factors have been confirmed 
and are discussed in detail under research questions 3 and 4. These are certainly not the only 
factors mentioned in the EU Progress reports, but evidently represent long lasting problems 
relevant for the field of this research. Their reoccurrence and almost the same wording utilised 
year after a year indicate that these issues entail endemic problems.  The key findings are 
presented through the following sections:  
1. Stalled transition attributed to the level of organised crime; 
2. Stalled EU accession attributed to the level of organised crime. 
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5.2.1. Stalled transition attributed to the level of organised crime  
 
  
There are a number of methods to evaluate the level of democracy in a given state, ranging from 
political views, diverse objective or less objective international reports, as well as shadow reports 
of the civil society and experts’ opinions. In order to maintain a neutral stance, this research 
relied on recognised and relatively unbiased (e.g., technocratic) international reports, however 
also citing some of the relevant global reports that contain important criticism. For instance, if 
we understand the Council of Europe (CoE) reports as sufficiently professional, neutral and 
commonly least politicised, the CoE reports indicate relevant assessments of the state of 
democracy across member countries.  
 
The findings of this research show that pertinent reports of Group of States against Corruption 
(hereinafter: GRECO), Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering 
Measures and the Financing of Terrorist (hereinafter: MONEYVAL), the Financial Action Task 
Force (hereinafter: FATF) and the Venice Commission, taken together, all point to the issues 
identified in this research as the key factors contributing to stalled transition and EU accession. 
 
For instance, GRECO Report (2018) states that no significant progress of Serbia has been 
identified in the field of anti-corruption34. As key obstacles, lack of transparency of the legislative 
process, the rules on conflicts of interest that apply to members of parliament, judges and 
prosecutors, the procedures for the recruitment and promotion of judges and court presidents, 
and the procedures for the recruitment and promotion of public prosecutors are listed. In its 2018 
report, FATF, places Serbia on the "black" list, among 11 high risk countries35 in the field of 
money laundering and financing of terrorist organizations. The key deficiencies of the system 
referred to in the FATF report involve lack of supervision of designated non-financial businesses 
and professions, politically exposed persons, wire transfers and high-risk jurisdictions. 
 
                                                             
34 More specifically, recommendations i, iv, v, vii, viii, x and xi have been partly implemented and 
recommendations ii, iii, vi, ix, xii and xiii have not been implemented. Available at:  
35 North Korea, Ethiopia, Syria, Iraq, Iran, Sri Lanka, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Yemen and Vanuatu 
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There is a strong increasingly evident lack of transparency in using public resources...... The consequence of 
this is the assessment of Serbia on the FATF List... from among 11 countries, Serbia is the only state in 
Europe that is on the list.....” 
 
 (Commissioner for the Protection of Personal Data and Access to Information of Public 
Importance, cited in Vreme, 2018, p. 22) 
 
The MONEYVAL Report in 2016 identifies high exposure to cross-border illicit flows in Serbia 
and states that organised criminal groups trafficking drugs and human beings pose a major money 
laundering threat. It is further stated that tax evasion and corruption generate substantial criminal 
proceeds, which are invested in real estate, valuable moveable property and securities. The 
misuse of domestic and offshore legal persons, together with multiple use of wire transfers, entail 
common money laundering methods.  
 
Another report, covering the field of the judiciary, which is not the focus of this research, is also 
relevant for the enquiry of stalled democratic transition. The Venice Commission has adopted a 
dozen opinions for Serbia relating to the judiciary36 between 2005 and 2014, analysing the 
country’s Constitution and subsequent legislation. The most relevant opinion today, given the 
process of Constitutional Amendments is the Opinion on the Constitution of Serbia, adopted by 
the Venice Commission in March 2007. The key recommendations of the Venice Commission 
are aimed at establishing an independent, fair and impartial judiciary, which is efficient and 
accountable and thus trusted by the citizens. As stated by the Venice Commission (2018), in 
order to achieve this 
It is crucial that the judiciary be committed to upholding the rule of law and be free from 
political pressure or bias.  
(CDL-AD 2018/011, p. 4).  
 
These evaluations of the judiciary are of major importance for this research, as this branch of 
state has the ultimate say in the processes scrutinised herein. The role of the judiciary is discussed 
in detail under research questions 3 and 4. 
 
                                                             
36 For an extensive review, see https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?country=53&year=all  
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Moreover, the collected data indicate that important public figures share a standpoint that the 
process of transition has not been finalised. Several citations are provided below. 
 
Western Balkan has become less democratic in the last several years, perhaps due to over-reliance on the EU 
or the expectations that the strength for changes and reform will come from the outside. 
 
(Florian Biber, coordinator of Balkans in Europe Policy Advisory Group, cited in Vreme, 22 Dec. 2016, p. 14) 
 
From our research we know that corruption and clientelism are metastasized in the society of Serbia and that 
they are nourished by different interests and fear. They destroy the institutions and swallow the resources 
that the country needs for development, and move them into narrow circles of political and economic elites. 
They increasingly abolish the possibility for citizens to realize their rights through the institutions of the state, 
without fear and blackmail, that they must be loyal to political elites. 
 
(Public letter of the Department of Sociology, University of Philosophy, 2019, cited in Insajder 22.01.2019) 
 
These assessments all point to a variety of problems in the field of the judiciary, anti-corruption 
and crime control. Given that democratic transition is fundamentally associated to the rule of 
law, identification of issues in its essential constituents certainly demonstrates that this process 
has not yet been finalised. 
 
The findings of this research are in line with these standpoints, given that issues in the essential 
constituents of the rule of law have been identified. Namely, identification of organised crime, 
corruption and money laundering in the reviewed evaluations of Serbia point to a set of problems 
in the field of crime control and the judiciary. These fields are inextricably associated to the rule 
of law and the state of democracy in a state. Therefore, these deficiencies of the system present 
a solid rationale for the prolonged transition in Serbia. Given that the notion of the rule of law is 
central in determining the degree of success in a transition, literature suggests that in the case of 
Serbia, there remains a lot of effort to be invested in reaching appropriate standards (Rakic 
Vodinelic, 2010; Kolakovic-Bojovic, 2018). It is interesting to see the association of these 
systemic shortcomings with the factors influencing delayed EU accession. 
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Moreover, various assessments of democratisation have also been taken into account. Even 
though this particular issue was not a subject of this research, it is important to provide a brief 
overview of the available assessments, given that a large amount of secondary data indicates 
certain drawbacks in this field.  
Serbia is a member of the Council of Europe and actively participates in its activities and 
assessments. The Council of Europe in this period particularly evaluated several fields that are 
relevant for this research. These evaluations are presented in the reports of the GRECO37 (2018), 
discussed above and the Venice Commission38. As the above citations from these reports 
demonstrate, they are moderately negative, and provide recommendations for improvement in 
the given fields.  
Nevertheless, other international reports are more adverse to a certain extent and the fragments 
of these reports are provided below. For instance, in the Transition Countries report, the Freedom 
House (2018), a non-governmental organization, states that Serbia's fundamental freedoms and 
democratic institutions continued to decline in 2017. This is the lowest estimate of democracy 
Serbia has received in the Freedom House report since 2003. 
Serbia is one of 73 countries of the world whose score on the British Economist's Index of 
Democracy (Euractiv, 2019) declined in relation to 2015, and the region of Eastern Europe as a 
whole has seen the largest decline since 2006 when this index was established. Now Serbia is 
64th on the list of 167 countries and 12 out of 28 countries in Eastern Europe (including the 
Baltic countries, Southeast and Central Europe), and, like most of the countries in the region and 
the EU, belongs to the category of ‘democracies with failures’, which means there are optional 
freedoms and basic rights are respected, although there are weaknesses in other aspects of 
democracy, such as media freedom, governance issues, insufficient political culture and low 
level of political participation. 
Taking into account these diverse assessments, it could be overall argued that Serbia nowadays 
has a democratic regime; however, its democracy is affected by the behaviour of key players in 
political life largely linked to clientelism and corruption, as discussed below. 
                                                             
37 A body of CoE responsible for anti-corruption 
38 A body of CoE responsible for the judiciary  
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A careful look at these reports shows that the research findings are fully in line with the identified 
deficiencies of the system. If these assessments are viewed jointly with global evaluations of 
democracy and media freedoms, it appears that stalled transition and EU accession are strongly 
confirmed. In particular, assessments of the transition processes are mainly linked with the 
principles of the rule of law, democracy, good governance and the respect of human rights 
standards, as specific values to be achieved. As reviewed above, democratic transition in Serbia 
was a process accompanying economic reforms, but it appears to be still ongoing while its effects 
are assessed in different ways. The notion of the rule of law is central in determining the degree 
of success in a democratic transition. In the case of Serbia, literature suggests that it is still 
necessary to strengthen the rule of law. The findings of this research strongly support such 
conclusions. 
 
 
5.2.2. Stalled EU accession attributed to the level of organised crime 
 
 
In order to respond to this question, a set of EU assessments of progress in the field of organised 
crime, drug trafficking ad corruption was utilised. This data was supplemented by reference to 
the topics obtained in the interviews. Unlike in previous enlargement phases, the EU membership 
today requires fulfilment of a set of conditions of democratic “standards”. While other 
democratizing countries throughout the world were seeking to integrate their politics and 
economy within the larger global market, the position of candidate countries today is unique as 
they are obligated to conform to an additional set of rules in order to meet the requirements for 
EU membership.  
It is therefore important to note that the EU has changed the methods to monitor progress starting 
from 2014. Therefore, the progress of candidate countries in the process of EU accession is 
nowadays measured by more comprehensive reports, organised per clear indicators. The findings 
of this research are presented by using similar criteria. 
In order to monitor the progress of candidate countries, the EU utilises a variety of specific tools, 
such as the annual progress reports. peer-review missions, rule of law advisory/expert missions 
and enhanced monitoring of reforms. By making these reports available to the relevant state 
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actors, the EU attempts to assist them in addressing the key obstacles in the given field to foster 
implementation of the accession related criteria. In these tools, a specific “EU wording” is 
utilised, for instance, to assert that there is no progress in a certain field, or that the field remains 
problematic. In this line, based on the new EU assessment methodology, most countries have 
only “some level of preparation” in the areas of the rule of law, including functioning of the 
judiciary, fight against organised crime and fight against corruption.  The following findings 
were identified with regard to EU assessments of the progress of Serbia: 
 
Corruption remains prevalent in many areas and remains a serious problem. The ratio of convictions to 
indictments is low. 
(Progress report 2014, p.2) 
Serbia has some level of preparation in the fight against organised crime. Serbia has partially fulfilled last 
year’s recommendations... Efforts to investigate wider criminal networks and to process money laundering 
cases still need to be stepped up. 
(Progress report 2015, p. 15 and 2016, p. 17) 
Serbia is a transit country for illegal migration and the smuggling of drugs, firearms and other commodities. 
Combating these phenomena and establishing appropriate border management, including management of 
‘green’ borders, needs to be further strengthened.  
(Progress report 2018, p. 38): 
Serbia has some level of preparation in the fight against corruption...However, corruption remains 
widespread and strong political impetus has yet to translate into sustained results.  
(Progress report 2015, p.4) 
The operational capacity of relevant institutions remains uneven and law enforcement and judicial authorities 
still need to prove that they can pro-actively investigate, prosecute and try all high-level corruption cases in 
an unbiased and operationally independent manner. There is as yet no measurable impact of anti-corruption 
reforms. 
 (Progress report in 2018, p.4) 
 
Overall, in its progress reports, the EC identified various shortcomings related to the fight against 
organised crime, including inter alia, lack of intelligence-led investigations aimed at dismantling 
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networks involved in organised crime and money laundering, lack of secure platform to exchange 
intelligence between law enforcement agencies, the need to reinforce independence of the 
internal control sector of the police. In view of the potential accession of Serbia, these are all 
rather serious issues.  
The participants also referred to endurance of organised crime as an important factor hindering 
progress in EU accession. An interesting statement is provided below: 
Imagine if the EU would actually accept Serbia as a member state... that would be like if you were dating a 
girl 20 years ago, who was normal back then... but the next 20 years she has been doing drugs, working as a 
prostitute... And then you meet her and marry her.  
(A participant from a state institution, P1.3) 
If you look at the court decisions, it is clear that the EU will never accept us… most of the criminals are 
never found guilty, or they never actually go to prison (P1.16) 
The convicted drug traffickers appear in football games among key club supporters…the media publish such 
photos and nothing happens… the EU is monitoring all of this, what kind of image are we sending as a 
country… (P4.5). 
The shortcomings presented above appear in almost identical wording in consecutive reports of 
the European Commission. A detailed comparison of these shortcomings and linked 
recommendations of the EC is perhaps the best indicator of the lack of progress during time. This 
certainly raises questions as to the key underlying reasons for such situation. 
It could be argued that this process has been delayed as a consequence of incomplete democratic 
transition in Serbia. As discussed above, similar obstacles to finalisation of transition are noticed. 
In that context, it cannot be expected that a state which has not effectively transited into 
democracy would be swift in implementation of the EU reforms. 
Others perceive that the problem of overly prolonged accession of Western Balkan states is 
associated with the lack of political will within the EU itself. For instance:  
Accession is currently on hold...it has a set of issues surrounding it, such as migration, terrorism, euro 
scepticism, relations with Russia... but it seems Brussels is unconsciously hindering the process... the process 
is there, but there is no political will. 
(Florian Biber, coordinator of Balkans in Europe Policy Advisory Group, cited in Vreme, 22 Dec. 2016, p. 22 ) 
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The Enlargement Strategy is going very slow... the reports are being produced, but the rule of law remains a 
challenge. 
 (Ervan Fuere, researcher, Centre for studying EU policies, Brussels, in Vreme 18 October, 2018) 
 
I think Serbia will never enter the EU... The fact is that the EU does not want to accept the Western Balkan 
states, because the EU is not anymore what it used to be or what it could have been. 
(Vladeta Jankovic, professor, cited in Vreme 5 July 2018) 
 
The only time the key politicians from the region were invited to sit together at a table with the EU politicians 
was in 2015 when the topic was the migrant crisis and the Balkan route... not before, and never after. 
(Sonja Liht, Fund for Political Excellence, in Vreme 18 October 2018) 
 
On the contrary, there are perceptions that the problem is in the EU approach. Some authors 
maintain that the EU policy towards candidate countries has not been effective do to the use of 
conditionality. For instance, Mendelski (2015) suggests that the effects of reforms depend on the 
interplay between domestic conditions and the EU reform approach. In this context, progress of 
Serbia in the field of rule of law appears to be strongly affected by domestic conditions. 
Commission’s Progress report 201739 on Serbia identifies several internal constraints to the 
implementation of good governance principles, such as corruption, organized crime, lack of 
independence, transparency and accountability in key institutions. It could be argued that Serbia 
adopted some legislative changes as a result of conditionality, but has not been able to implement 
them, thus facing continuous low track record. 
  
Moreover, the effects of the process of enlargement are heavily debated in political and academic 
discourse at the level of EU, particularly with respect to the rule of law. Therefore, Serbia as a 
candidate country will be particularly monitored with respect to a tangible progress under 
Chapter 23, which will not be measured by the number of amended laws, but recorded by the 
track record in their implementation. The term track record is usually used to measure the 
relevant data requested by the European Commission for the purposes of progress assessment. 
                                                             
39 See also the EC Progress Report 2016. The Report indicates a lack in judicial independence and impartiality as 
well as the pathology of politicisation of judicial structures. This signposts that judges’ accountability is not 
ensured in practice and that the pathology of lack of enforcement of law continues to exist. The Report states that 
corruption is still highly present and without progress compared to previous years, which indicates the existence 
of corruption in the judiciary. 
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The review of the specific Track Record Tables on organised crime and high-level corruption 
cases, performed as a part of data analysis, clearly indicates the reasons for EU assessments 
provided below.  A brief review of the findings related to perceptions of the EU in this regard is 
presented: 
The number of final convictions in the fight against organised crime remains low compared to the estimated 
value of the criminal market of the region. 
(Progress reports 2015, p.15, 2016, p.17 - identical wording)  
Serbia should in particular: a) establish a convincing track record of investigation, prosecution, and 
convictions in organised crime cases, including money laundering, based on proactive investigations, and 
establish an initial track record of freezing and confiscating criminal assets. 
(Progress report 2018, p.31) 
 
The lack of secure storage of seized drugs and drug precursors prior to destruction remains an issue of 
concern. An appropriate process for the destruction of precursors has yet to be set up. 
(Progress report 2018, p.40) 
Very few persons were convicted for third party laundering, despite the existence of organised criminality. 
No stand-alone money laundering convictions have been achieved. 
(MONEYVAL, 2016, p.7). 
 
The data on track record in each of the inspected fields does not indicate satisfactory performance 
of the criminal justice system. The questions that arise in this regard refer to the reasons for such 
state of play. That is, if the EU perspective is a goal that Serbia strives to, why isn’t more effort 
invested into reaching these goals? It may be that the criminal justice system lacks capacity to 
finalise this type of cases or the system might be captured, hence preventing positive track record. 
The recently published GRASP report (2019) indicates that capture risk of the Serbian criminal 
justice system is much lower than in other candidate countries. Nevertheless, the assessments of 
the GRASP report relied on broad indicators, such as adopted laws and total number of resolved 
cases before the courts (although recognising the lack of comparability of different statistics 
across institutions) and without clear methodological explanation of the values attributed to 
certain indicators. The GRASP report shows that regulatory framework for addressing corruption 
and capture risks through the criminal justice instrument is in place. However, the Capture Risk 
Index provided in the report suggests high capture risk, due to biased approach in detection, 
investigation, prosecution and sentencing of corruption. 
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Figure V. 2: Capture Risk Index developed in the GRASP Report 
 
 
Source: GRASP Report - Governance Risks Assessment Project in Western Balkans 
 
 
The low track record in cases of organised crime and corruption is a fact. However, a number of 
reasons may be attributed to such condition. There are some objective reasons for this perceived 
lack of efficiency of the criminal justice system in this particular field. One of those reasons is 
certainly lack of premises in the Special Court for Organised Crime, even though they work 
double shifts, which causes practical obstacles to maintain multiple trials simultaneously. 
Concurrently, most interviewees referred to the lack of efficiency in the judiciary, lack of 
accountability, inadequate evidence provided by the law enforcement and a set of similar 
explanations, commonly offered by different groups of state officials. Illustrative examples are 
provided below. 
 
Procedural laws enable a set of options to postpone hearings indefinitely, and the lawyers take advantage of 
this. (A judge, P2.1) 
Sometimes they blame us, but the prosecution does not always have good evidence. (A judge, P2.20) 
We try to suggest as many plea agreements as possible. (A repression institution representative, P2.7) 
There is no space for other proceedings, we don’t have other court rooms... if they want more, they need to 
provide additional space and staff. (A judge, P2. 23) 
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The prosecution is over-burdened with tasks, and we don’t have sufficient staff. (A repression institution 
representative, P2.18) 
 
Nevertheless, the extent of the lack of efficiency of the criminal justice system may also be 
attributed to state capture, as no sufficiently clear justifications are provided. Thus, what these 
data suggest is that a dimension of state capture lies in a certain drawing the energy out of state 
institutions that, while on paper are perhaps not ideal or fully ‘transformed’, nevertheless in 
practice appear to function with a level of inertia that cannot be explained by reasons of form 
alone. This is question of the dimensions of capture particularly important and is measured and 
discussed under research questions 3 and 4 further below.  
 
5.2.3. Conclusions 
 
It is important to note that on the basis of the literature review, it could be expected that stalled 
democratisation processes and prolonged European accession of a state would be marked by 
certain characteristics identified by most authors. To summarise the discussions in the Chapter 
III, it is a fact that economic transition in Serbia was significantly delayed when compared with 
other states in the region or other transition states. The reasons for this delay may be correctly 
associated with the conflicts in the region, international embargo, bombing and other particular 
features of the situation in Serbia in that period. However, despite these factors, a number of 
authors maintained that there are other dynamics that may influence the process of transition.  
 
This research question strived for determining whether stalled transition and EU accession can 
be attributed to the level of organised crime. As demonstrated through this presentation of results, 
deeply rooted problems of organised crime, endurance of criminal networks and wide-spread 
corruption represent some of the key issues hindering finalisation of transition and the EU 
progress of Serbia. 
 
The findings generated in this research show that democratic transition does take place in Serbia, 
but it is continuously obstructed by several key issues, such as organised crime, corruption, 
clientelism, and fragile institutions. As evidenced, the EU consecutively underlines these issues 
as key factors hampering progress. These findings are consistent with notions of some authors 
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who suggested that democratic transition is prolonged due to absence of a radical break with 
non-democratic heritage, corruption and crime (Stoiljkovic, 2012). 
 
Even though the EU constantly refers to these problems, it appears that this approach has not led 
to improved outcomes in the field of crime control in Serbia. The importance of the identified 
problems lies primarily in the fact that these are measurable fields of state action i.e. they are not 
political assessments. A considerably long interval of the same recommendations which are not 
fully implemented signposts that there are significant obstacles in a state, hindering achievements 
in this field.   
 
This may be due to an essential problem identified in Serbia, which is the implementation of the 
legal framework per se. That is, Serbian laws in this field have been assessed as adequate and 
overall aligned with the EU acquis. The question is therefore why implementation is lacking? To 
support the existence of this particular problem in Serbia, an excerpt from an arbitration case40 
against the Republic of Serbia is illustrative: 
 
In the Respondent’s view, the Claimants’ expectations in regard to the Veterinary Act were based on general 
legislative statements which can only give rise to reduced expectations. The Claimants could only have a 
very limited expectation that the Veterinary Act would be implemented and complied with simply because 
it had been enacted as law. (ICSID Case No. ARB/14/27) 
 
Hence the defence of the state rests upon a claim that the fact a law has been adopted doesn’t 
necessarily guarantee it would be implemented. Inconsistent implementation of laws can 
therefore be a possible explanation and one continually remarked upon in the external reviews. 
 
However, the reasons for endurance of these problems may also be attributed to the quality of 
institutions (Greif, 2006; Tridico, 2011). Tridico (2011) ascribed different levels of performance 
among transition countries, inter alia, to the quality of institutions, implementation of policies 
and strategies and control of corruption. Besley, Dewatripont, and Guriev (2010) held that 
effective transition is not possible without subsequent institutional changes, given that 
                                                             
40 International centre for settlement of investment disputes ICSID Case No. ARB/14/27 
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institutions represent the core of social and economic interactions. They consider that transition 
may be prolonged in case of absence of changes of the formal and informal institutions. 
 
In addition, the features contributing to stalled EU accession identified in this research may also 
be explained by reflecting on the consequences of the recent past in the Western Balkan region. 
That is, as thoroughly discussed in Chapter II, organised criminal networks in Serbia (and the 
region) were established during the conflicts in the 90s. These criminal networks originating 
from the period of the break up of Yugoslavia developed strong mutual bonds through the illegal 
firearms, oil and cigarettes smuggling. It is also well known that Yugoslavian political elites and 
security forces throughout the region actively participated and operationally supported these 
trafficking channels (e.g. Hajdinjak, 2002). Such symbiosis between state actors and criminal 
networks appears to have persisted even nowadays. This is in line with Popovic (2010), who 
perceived the causes of Serbia's epochal failure to undergo democratic transition process in the 
main political actors as a continuance of the previous political order, the dominant cultural 
patterns, and a refusal to recognize the criminal inheritance from the nineties. As this research 
shows, it appears that this criminal inheritance is deeply rooted into the system.  
 
As discussed in Chapter III, various models of cooperation of state actors and criminal networks 
continued after the peace has been established, through cross-border transactions based on 
bribery, suspicious privatization arrangements after the 2000, trading in influence, protection 
from law enforcement.  It could therefore be reliably explained that such prosperous business 
relations between state actors and criminal networks have never in fact been interrupted, hence 
maintaining organised crime alive. The process of transition has therefore theoretically 
strengthened organised criminal networks by giving them an opportunity to invest in legal 
business. As a result, this symbiosis today significantly hampers any efforts of normalisation. 
First implications of close collaboration between politicians and security forces with organized 
crime structures have been confirmed in Serbia in 2003 by the murder of the Prime Minister. The 
persons convicted for this murder were members of the main security forces and key criminal 
groups, who seemed to believe that they can act ‘against the state’. 
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Literature shows that symbiosis between state actors and organized crime during the process of 
creation of new states leads to permanent transformation of state interests into private ones and 
fosters the development of criminalised, corrupt and non-transparent societies (Ivanova, 2010; 
Grozdanic and Martinovic, 2012). 
 
Despite different ideas about the causes of long lasting transition, discussed in detail in Chapter 
III, it appears that a symbiosis between state actors and organised criminal networks, coupled 
with clientelism and grand systemic corruption leaves sufficient grey zones or loopholes 
(Cockayne and  Roth, 2017) for operations of organised crime. Beyond solely delaying the 
finalisation of transition, such failure of efficient crime control postpones the accession of Serbia 
into the EU for an indefinite period. 
 
In view of these conclusions, it is not surprising that there are views suggesting that the European 
strategy for the Western Balkans has been unsuccessful. In a text published in the «Südosteuropa 
Mitteilungen» (cited in Zougla, 2018) under the title "What is the cause of the EU's failure in the 
Western Balkans?”. Goodwill Stinacker, the former German Ambassador to Skopje and 
Podgorica, strongly criticizes the EU approach for “treatment” of the Western Balkans. He 
argues that "the analysis of the EU for the region is correct, but problem-solving prescriptions 
are wrong". Stinacker argues that there has been insufficient self-criticism on the part of the EU, 
while the solution to the problems in the Western Balkan countries is mainly sought by 
politicians who have been part of the problem for years. 
 
As discussed in the Chapter III, the critiques of the EU approach in the literature have also 
referred to negative effects of conditionality (e.g. Tocci, 2008). As Reinhard (2010) suggested, 
conditionality is a “top-down approach” which can only produce changes at the governmental 
level, while the key actors of a democratization process, such as civil society, the administration 
or judiciary at a local level cannot be reached. In terms of the discussion on the framework of 
“linkages and leverages”, it appears that the internal pressure has not been strong enough to foster 
democratization.  If this argument is considered together with Teitel’s (2014) perception that 
transition implies that the whole society experiences its own political, social and cultural 
reconstruction, it may be argued that a combination of these unfulfilled preconditions has also 
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contributed to stalled normalisation processes. Thus, a society without sufficient democratic 
awareness, along with the lack of transformation of the judiciary and absence of lustration, 
consequently cannot have adequate civic capacity to address deeply rooted issues such as 
corruption and crime. 
 
To summarise, the findings related to the first research question show that endurance of 
organised crime is associated with stalled democratic transition and consequently EU accession 
of Serbia. As has been illustrated, organised crime achieved this through a variety of perhaps 
only loosely connected strategies, such as political infiltration, strong links with security service 
and privatisation, that together had the effect of drawing the energy and momentum out of 
progressive change processes. These findings both support and are strongly supported by the 
extant literature and international reports. There are certainly other socio-political factors that 
have played a role in slowing down the transition processes, but the emphasis on this particular 
factor is present due to persistent reference to this problem throughout a number of years. Most 
of the factors identified under this research question will, further, be confirmed below in the 
social network analysis (see 5.3. and 5.4.) as significantly correlating to lack of effectiveness of 
state institutions in suppressing organised crime and drug trafficking. 
 
 
 
5.3. The extent of organised crime and drug trafficking in Serbia 
 
The findings resulting from the content analysis confirmed that there is a significant extent of 
organised crime and drug trafficking in Serbia. Given the diversity of the definitions and 
concepts of organised crime in the literature (discussed in detail in the Chapter II), a set of 
indicators of the existence of organised crime was used to obtain reliable results. This set of 
indicators was developed as a combination of an advanced analytical framework for defining the 
diversity of existing organized criminal groups developed by Bisogno (2016), and the specific 
units of analysis identified through content analysis in this research (see Table IV.1). The 
Bisogno framework proposes the following determinants of organised crime: a) 
local/national/international group, b) hierarchical/network model of group functioning, c) types 
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of illegal activities undertaken by the group: drugs/firearms/human trafficking, d) modus 
operandi: use of violence and/or intimidation, corruption of officials, and e) affiliation 
background: geographical origin/family/clan/nationality.  
 
Given the focus of the research question on drug trafficking, as the main source of income of 
criminal networks in Serbia, these determinants were combined with relevant units of analysis 
identified in this research: i.e. they were adapted to the situation in the studied state. Hence, the 
following indicators of organised crime used in this analysis involved:  
 
1. Trends in drug trafficking  and links with other crimes (types of illegal activities) 
2. Trends in drug use 
3. Drug seizures  
4. War between criminal groups 
5. Geographic scope of the activity (affiliation background) 
6. Organisational model of criminal networks (local/national/international group; models of 
group functioning, modus operandi) 
 
This framework is used here to present results under the research question 2 – ‘What is the extent 
of drug trafficking in Serbia?’ – and discuss these findings. Summarising first the conclusions of 
this analysis, the existence and operation of organised criminal networks in Serbia was confirmed 
in the analysis on the basis of all the 6 indicators. Each of the indicators is discussed below. 
 
5.3.1. Trends in trafficking and links with other crimes (types of illegal activities) 
  
The findings strongly support the existence of the Balkan route for trafficking of drugs. 
Organized drug trafficking represents the most common form of organized crime in Serbia. There 
are also important references with regard to the use of this route for illegal migration and other 
forms of illegal trafficking. The excerpts from the interviews are provided below: 
 
Please indicate the main trends in drug trafficking in recent years 
There is increased production and trade during the last years. (A repression institution representative, P2.5) 
There is a tendency towards exporting cannabis in other states. (A repression institution representative, 
P2.13) 
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There is increased production of cannabis and synthetic drugs. (A repression institution representative, 
P2.2) 
In addition to smuggling narcotics, Serbia has proved to be convenient for smuggling people because of its 
position, which happened in the previous years, when a migrant crisis arose. Nevertheless, due to the good 
work of the police, smugglers have recently begun to bypass Serbia. Our security services have managed to 
lift security to a higher level, but also to improve their rating on a world level, because our foreign 
counterparts consider us very successful, and we have excellent international cooperation with all the 
countries that are on the central Balkan route as we are. (A repression institution representative, P1.9) 
Is Serbia destination of illicit drugs trade 
Yes, usually opiates. (A repression institution representative, P2.2) 
Yes, for different types of drugs. (A civil society representative, P4. 4) 
It is fortunate that of all the drugs that pass through Serbia, a really small part remains in our country. (A 
judge, P2.8) 
 
Estimations in the literature that several tones of heroin per year are being smuggled through the 
Balkan route are supported by the findings in this research. Most participants from the repression 
institutions referred to similar volumes. Heroin from Afghanistan is transported through three 
routes - southern, central and eastern (as shown in the Graph II.1 in Chapter II). Evidence shows 
that Serbia is on the central route, whereas Presevo and a village Veliki Trnovac are marked as 
the main points for the entry of narcotics into Serbia.  
 
What regional links exist? Links to international drug trade 
Links were found many times with South America – diverse states, Netherlands, Spain, Greece.(A 
repression institution representative, P2.5) 
Cocaine is trafficked from the region of South America through this region, to Europe. (A repression 
institution representative, P2.6) 
Cannabis is trafficked from Albania, through Montenegro and Serbia into EU countries. (A repression 
institution representative, P2.11) 
Links are constant with Montenegro, Croatia, BiH... Also, *Kosovo is one of the key links. (A judge, P2.9) 
We found groups operating with Bulgaria, Macedonia, and Greece. (A repression institution representative, 
P2. 14) 
Heroin from Afghanistan arrives in Serbia, and goes further to Western Europe. Cocaine always comes from 
South America because it grows there. It arrives to Europe on ships, most often in Spain, which is the inbound 
port and most of the ships have to pass through their waters. Marijuana is the most widespread drug, and it 
mostly moves from Albania, so it travels through Montenegro, *Kosovo and Serbia. (A state institution 
representative, P1.7) 
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Nevertheless, the findings reveal certain changes on the drug trafficking Balkan route. It appears 
that the traditional central Balkan route, where Serbia belongs, is moving towards the east - 
specifically towards Bulgaria and Romania. Since the current large migration movements are 
taking place on the Central Balkan route, the route becomes less relevant for smuggling drugs.  
 
This research also shows that the main routes for smuggling drugs constantly change, with the 
more intensive use of new transport infrastructures. This may be a consequence of enhanced law 
enforcement efforts, due to the modification of the activities of the enforcement authorities, 
which is an explanation offered by Serbian repression institutions. It has been suggested that 
these efforts have caused a shift in trafficking routes, due to increased border controls and 
investigation efforts. On the contrary, there are viewpoints that this change in direction has 
resulted from the sporadic controls at the border of Romania and Bulgaria, which ensures an 
open road to EU countries as the ultimate destination of narcotics. This is consistent with the 
latest Europol reports, UNODC, and other international reports in this field, for example: 
 
The Balkan route remains the main entry route for the trafficking of heroin into the EU. (SOCTA, 2017, p, 
38) 
 
The “Balkan route” is the oldest route consisting of an overland trajectory that travels via the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, Turkey and South-Eastern Europe to Western and Central Europe. The “Northern Balkan 
route” is a relatively recent variant on the Balkan Route which transits the Caucasus and Black Sea rather 
than Turkey. (Europol, 2017, p.3) 
 
Opiates are trafficked either along the eastern branch of the Balkan route from Turkey to Bulgaria and then 
onwards to Romania and Hungary, or along the western branch of the Balkan route from Bulgaria to various 
western Balkan countries, and from there to countries in Western and Central Europe (UNODC, 2018, p. 16) 
 
 
The findings on the trends of drug trafficking indicated that most of the narcotics pass through 
the territory of Serbia. Drugs that are the subject of criminal activities of organized criminal 
groups are cannabis, heroin, cocaine and synthetic drugs. Results show that cannabis is the most 
widespread drug, trafficked from Albania, through Montenegro and Serbia into the EU countries. 
One of the key links for trafficking cannabis is *Kosovo, while links are also common with 
Montenegro, Croatia, and BiH. It further moves through Hungary towards other EU countries. 
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Cocaine constantly comes from South America through this region to Europe. This drug is 
trafficked on ships and it arrives to Europe, mainly in Spain41, which explains the frequent 
seizures of cocaine in that state. Cocaine trafficking links are also found with the Netherlands 
and Greece. Serbian repression institutions note that there are criminal groups engaged in drug 
trafficking operating with Bulgaria, Macedonia, and Greece. 
Participants supported that organized criminal groups from Serbia and the surrounding countries 
jointly take part in the smuggling of cocaine from South America into the European illegal 
market. Since the illegal cocaine market in Serbia is low and the selling price is high, criminal 
groups from Serbia are directing their activity towards other markets, primarily the European 
market. The participants in this research consider that this identified trend will continue with the 
constant change of the smuggling mode, using modern information technologies in 
communication and sophisticated hiding methods. These results imply that organised criminal 
groups from Serbia cooperate with criminal groups on both European and international level. In 
view of the discussions on structure of criminal organisations, it could be argued therefore that 
these groups externally function as ‘networks’, despite their internal organisation.   
Moreover, an unexpected result was traced, indicating that Serbia has also become a source of 
illicit drugs.  
Is Serbia a source of illicit drugs? Which drugs are produced? 
Yes, mainly of cannabis and synthetic drugs. (A repression institution representative, P2.2) 
Yes, particularly synthetic drugs. (A civil society representative, P4.3) 
Most groups produce cannabis. (A judge, P2.1) 
There was a case I had where we were searching for a lab of a suspect, and we could not locate it. After 
certain period, we actually caught him in his Audi, and that was the lab! He had several pots, and was 
producing synthetic drugs in his car. (A repression institution representative, P2.3) 
Is Serbia a source of precursor chemicals? 
I am not aware of that. (A judge, P2.9) 
It is difficult to assess, given that some of those materials are also used in legal purposes, production. We 
do not keep data that could confirm this. (A repression institution representative, P2.11) 
The December 2015 SOCTA identifies the production and trafficking of controlled psychoactive substances 
in Serbia as the most dominant and profitable form of organised crime. (Progress report, 2016, p. 73) 
                                                             
41 As explained by repression institutions’ representatives, Spain is the inbound port and most of the ships have to 
pass through their waters 
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The findings strongly support that cannabis and synthetic drugs are increasingly produced in 
Serbia. All the interviewees have provided data supporting this trend. This may be explained by 
the nature of breeding cannabis, which enables production in artificial and in natural conditions, 
and a suitable climate in Serbia.  
Moreover, production of synthetic drugs is a contemporary trend in the EU as well (Bretteville-
Jensen et al., 2017; EMCDDA, 2017). It appears that Serbian criminal networks have 
successfully “aligned” with these trends. The production of synthetic drugs and precursors in 
illegal laboratories is increasing and production of amphetamine and methamphetamine has been 
detected. This research revealed that organized criminal groups from Serbia are directing their 
activity on the production of synthetic drugs and precursors in Southeast Europe and Asia. The 
smuggling of synthetic drugs and precursors takes place on the Central Balkan route from West 
European to Eastern European and Asian countries and vice versa, and part of smuggled 
synthetic drugs and precursors remains in the illegal market in Serbia. This finding strongly 
correlates with the growth in use of synthetic drugs among young population, discussed below 
under 5.3.2. 
Concurrently, the findings, including relevant international reports, do not support that Serbia is 
a source of precursor chemicals. Given that not even a single participant referred to this, it seem 
that production of precursor chemicals is obviously not an issue at this moment.  
 
With regard to types of illegal activities performed by organised criminal networks in Serbia, the 
findings strongly support that drug trafficking is their key activity and the main source of income. 
If we look at the mafia related murders, all of the participants in these events are claimed to be 
‘known drug traffickers’. Moreover, almost all groups charged with organised crime offences 
before the Special Court for Organised Crime are engaged in drug trafficking.  
This finding is consistent with the first National Serious and Organized Crime Threat Assessment 
(SOCTA) undertaken in 2015 in Serbia, which identified and ranked the following fields of 
serious and organized crime: drugs, irregular migration, human trafficking, robbery, racketeering 
and extortion, motor vehicles smuggling, economic crime, money laundering, corruption and 
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cybercrime (SOCTA, Serbia 2015). The SOCTA report identified drug production and 
trafficking, as the main and most profitable form of crime in Serbia (SOCTA, Serbia 2015, p13). 
Is drug trafficking one of the key activities of organized groups active in the region? 
Yes, it is certainly the main one. (A judge, P2.12) 
Yes, although it is often combined with other criminal offences. (A repression institution representative, 
P2.7) 
Is drug trafficking related to other forms of organized crime (human trafficking, car smuggling, money 
laundering)? 
Yes, usually with multiple forms. (A judge, P2.1) 
Money laundering is often integral part, it is the way they keep the money by putting it in legal business. (A 
judge, P2.18) 
Yes, usually with all other types. (A repression institution representative, P2.2) 
 
Links with other types of organized crime have also been found in this research, such as human 
trafficking, car smuggling, extortion, corruption, money laundering, and so on. This implies that 
the groups have wide range of involvement in various forms of serious criminal offences. Given 
the association of this type of offences with violent crime, juvenile delinquency, as well as 
prostitution, property offences and other deviant behaviour, this type of crime causes 
implications in the field of security, as well as social and health care. Therefore, the consequences 
to the society are multiple, through increased security, public health, treatment and social care 
costs. Overall, these impressionistic data collected during interviews with key actors at various 
points in the Serbian state apparatus match to a great extent with international reports, indicating 
however greater significance of corruption and money laundering than suggested or ranked by 
national SOCTA (2015). The interviews also strongly indicate the involvement of criminal 
networks in multiple forms of crime. 
 
The research findings indicated that also there is internal trafficking in human beings in Serbia, 
with the prevailing forms involving sexual and labour exploitation. The participants maintained 
that abuses of the internet and social networks affect the emergence of new and more complex 
modes of trafficking in human beings and the effectiveness of its suppression. This may be 
explained in the context of a wide range of possibilities offered by the internet and social 
networks. That is, the networks offer diverse potentials in terms of communicating with victims 
and clients, recruiting victims, and creating victims’ addiction through blackmail and false trust. 
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The use of new technologies therefore prevents timely insights into the emergence of new modes 
of trafficking in human beings, and consequently law enforcement reactions. 
With regards to vehicle trafficking, foreign vehicles are mainly the subject of these criminal 
offenses in Serbia. Motor vehicles and motorcycles of great value are stolen in the countries of 
the European Union, and subsequently sold in Serbia and countries in the region with the use of 
forged documents (SOCTA, Serbia, 2015). Serbia is both a transit country and a destination for 
smuggled vehicles.  As stated by one of the participants: 
Members of organized criminal groups mainly specialize in theft of certain types of vehicles, and they work 
closely with criminal groups in the region; mostly the groups are often formed ad hoc. (A repression 
institution representative, P2.15) 
 
Serbia is a also transit country for the weapons smuggling to the EU member states, and to a 
lesser extent the country of origin, mainly with regard to firearms that remained from the wars 
the former Yugoslavia. As stated by the participants, the firearms from Turkey are restructured 
in illegal workshops in Macedonia and in the territory of *Kosovo, and subsequently smuggled 
through Serbia into Western Europe. Smuggling of weapons is performed by individuals and 
organized criminal groups, whose members are connected with criminal groups in the country 
and in the region. Some criminal groups are exclusively formed to acquire and smuggle weapons 
to a "known" buyer (SOCTA, Serbia, 2015). 
Moreover, research findings strongly supported that money laundering entails an integral part of 
activities of organised criminal groups. It is closely related to financial crime, manifested in 
various economic and financial areas. The interviewees suggested that this functions through 
networks with legitimate actors i.e. through external links established with experts in financial 
affairs. Money acquired through criminal activities is most often concentrated in the spheres 
where there are needs for fresh money and in which protective measures for identifying and 
preventing suspicious cash flows are less applicable. 
Prosecutors commonly state that they do not see any trace of money laundering, even when provided with 
information from investigative journalists, so they cease investigation (A civil society representative, P4.5) 
We monitor the acting of criminal groups and see that people who are connected with them open up 
businesses, have very large transactions that have arrived in the country, buy real estate, and so on. Money 
laundering functions in two ways. One option is the use of stolen money from Serbia from the budget, through 
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tenders or abuses in privatizations, exits the country and then returns as the investment back to Serbia. This 
often involves politicians. The second form is drug trafficking. (A journalist, P6.2) 
Money laundering became one of the key activities of organised criminal groups. In most cases I had, it is 
very difficult to prove the actual process through which the money is placed in legal business… it is mainly 
because they cooperate with financial professionals, so everything seams clean…( A repression institution 
representative, P4.3) 
Nobody really tries to trace the money… it is clear during the trial that they know their money is safe, they 
smile at me and look like they know they will go out soon and enjoy their profits (A judge, P2.19) 
 
Morselli and Giguere (2006) suggested that drug distribution networks include influential 
participants who appear to work in legitimate occupational settings. They concluded that those 
individuals responsible for financial activities are critical seeds in the networks, and they may be 
a key to understanding the opportunity structure of criminal enterprise. Similar conclusions arise 
in a study by Malm and Bichler (2013), but they found that self-launderers who were involved 
both in smuggling and financial transactions were the most highly ranked brokers in the network, 
hence leading to conclusion that money laundering may be ‘de-professionalizing’ due to 
technological developments in the financial sector. 
Areas with a large accumulation of capital, such as the real estate market, are especially 
vulnerable to the investment of "dirty" money. Money laundering poses an important risk of 
increasing the financial power of organized criminal groups operating in Serbia, in the region 
and at the international level. As demonstrated in the research, “dirty" money is invested in 
Serbia by using legal business structures. It appears that organised criminal groups have 
successfully adapted to the current changes, economic transition and development of the 
domestic and international financial system. 
 
5.3.2. Trends in substance misuse  
 
What this research has found is that there is a notable increase in substance misuse in Serbia. 
The identified trends in substance misuse entail an interesting finding of this research, even 
though this topic was utilised solely as an indicator of the presence of drug trafficking in the 
country. That is, the prevalence of substance misuse is a research topic per se and it was not the 
focus of this research. However, given the inter-relation of pervasive drug trafficking with 
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potential alterations of substance misuse trends, this was included as one of the important 
indicators. 
 
Would you say that drug misuse has increased during the last years 
Yes, especially among young population. (A civil society representative, P4.2) 
Yes, usually it is about cannabis and synthetic drugs. (A repression institution representative, P4.3) 
Young people increasingly use new psychoactive substances, not other drugs. (A civil society representative, 
P4.4) 
 
Yes, the prices are decreasing (A repression institution representative, P2.6) 
 
Does the law allow for small amount for personal use 
No. (A repression institution representative, P2.2) 
Depends, it is case-by-case basis. There is no unified practice. (A repression institution representative, P2.9) 
The law does not allow... the question is how that person will be evaluated.. (A repression institution 
representative, P2.7) 
Drug dealers are usually young 
This is a new trend unfortunately. Yes, they use minors because they cannot serve sentences. (A repression 
institution representative, P2.11) 
Yes, dealers use minors who are addicted. (A repression institution representative, P2.8) 
 
When this research was initiated, substance misuse was not a major problem in Serbia. The drugs 
passing through the country were mainly aimed for further trade abroad. Very little amounts 
stayed in the country, and the number of substance misusers was relatively low in comparison 
with the EU states. However, the findings of this research indicate that drug misuse has 
significantly increased during the last years, in particular among young population. Nevertheless, 
due to a lack of research (discussed below) and unclear statistics, there are no official data on 
drug misusers which may be considered relevant. The latest EMCDDA report in 2017 states that 
the most reliable estimate utilised involved the multiplier method which indicated that there were 
around 20 500 drug users in Serbia in 2013, while it is considered that most of them use opioids 
(EMCDDA, 2017, p.4.). In contrary, most of the interviewees, including civil society, suggested 
that the most common substances used are cannabis and what are termed ‘new psychoactive 
substances’ (hereinafter: NPS).  
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There may be several explanations of this state of play.  This trend may be associated with the 
fact that the country lies on the drug transit route which increases the availability. This 
contributes to extremely low prices of narcotics thus potentially increasing available to broad 
population.  
Also, the increased use could be a consequence of the upsurge of the production of cannabis and 
synthetic drugs. For instance, a repression institution representative stated that a search of an 
NPS lab finally resulted in arrest of a suspect who was producing synthetic drugs in several pots 
his car (P2.2). Similarly, a number of illegal labs have been discovered in the country. As already 
discussed under 4.3.1.1., Serbia nowadays represents both a transit and a source country for NPS. 
This is consistent with Europol data, which show that the vast majority of shipments of new 
fentanyl coming into Europe originate from chemical and pharmaceutical companies based in 
China, but production in illicit laboratories, including in Europe, has also been reported 
(European Drugs Report 2017).  
This growing trend in NPS misuse in Serbia is similar to the EU trends. Previously unknown 
NPS continue to appear on EU markets in large numbers. Since 2005, 620 new substances were 
detected in the EU for the first time (EMCDDA 2017, European Drugs Report 2017). Most NPS 
were initially not covered by international drug controls and include various substances such as 
synthetic cannabinoids, stimulants, opioids and benzodiazepines. The consumption of NPS 
entails significant risks to the health of users including lethal overdose. In 2015, the synthetic 
opioid acetyl-fentanyl was linked to 32 deaths in Europe (EMCDDA and Europol 2016, EU Drug 
Markets Report 2016). 
Substance misuse and crime are practically inseparable categories, as different operations related 
to the production, purchase, sale and possession of drugs constitute a criminal offense 
(Radulović, 2013). The link between abuse and drug addiction with criminal behaviour and 
subsequent sentences has been well documented (Belenko, Kimberley and Houser, 2012; 
Gillespie, 2005; Hakansson, 2009; Mumola and Karberg, 2006; Radulović, 2013). This 
connection often includes serious property and violent crimes (Fridell, Hesse, Jaeger, and 
Kuhlhorn 2008; Radulović, 2013). These links are in line with the information provided by 
Kovačević-Lepojević and Žunić Pavlović (2013), which refers to the availability of drugs to 
persons who are engaged in criminal activities. 
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Given the diverse discussions about the impression that the state has enabled trafficking of drugs 
during the conflicts in the 1990s, it may be argued that the consequences are visible at the present 
time. That is, a country which didn’t have significant levels of substance misuse currently faces 
a surprising growth of substance misuse. Hence statements about Serbia being solely a transit 
country can be seriously questioned today. This represents a particular problem, given the lack 
of available psychosocial therapies or community based treatment in the country.  
Moreover, research findings have recorded the lack of preparedness of medical staff to address 
addiction caused by NPS or the health consequences thereof. The participants coming from the 
civil society sector engaged in the field of substance misuse also referred to the need to increase 
the capacities of medical staff to treat NPS caused health issues. For instance: 
Following several NPS-caused deaths of minors in the summer of 2018, we decided to train security staff in 
the night clubs how to react in these situations and help the person in risk (A civil society representative, 
P4.3) 
We have started providing training to Red Cross personnel to teach them how to help juveniles in urgent 
medical conditions caused by the use of NPS. They always have a Red Cross desk at the open parties, but 
they do not know what to do with NPS overdose. (A civil society representative, P4.2) 
This information is particularly interesting, given that findings strongly indicate that it is the 
security staff in the night clubs who actually sell the drugs. Overall, given the lack of sufficient 
capacities to address the problem of increased substance misuse in Serbia, this represents an 
important topic requiring further research. 
 
5.3.3. Drug seizures 
 
As argued by one of the participants from the repression institutions: “All seizures of narcotic 
drugs that occur are significant” (P2.4). As the participant argued, even small seizures are 
important, because they take away drugs from organized groups, and consequently their money, 
and thus the power to hire new people.  
 
It is important to note that Serbia is a country in which several tons of drugs were found in the 
safe deposit box of the State Commercial Bank in 2001 (Vasic, 2001). This could have been an 
"export item", or it was destined for domestic sale. Both way, it was a major scandal and it 
conveyed questions with regards to the role of the state in supporting drug trafficking. Research 
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findings have indicated that drugs coming from Serbia are usually seized in the region. It is 
mainly cannabis, seized in Hungary and Austria. This research discovered that judges do not 
have information on seizures in other states. It is an interesting fact, as one could wonder what 
they actually know about trafficking operations in general and how they can conduct trials 
without such knowledge. 
 
With regards to drug seizures in the state, there is a variety of available data in the media and not 
much of verifiable data from the state institutions. The research findings have shown that some 
proceedings are in progress before the courts, involving major amounts (e.g. process against 
Darko Saric for 5.7 tons of cocaine42), while other cases suggest that the actual seizures are small 
quantities: i.e. perhaps personal use related. The EU reports also contain certain data on seizures, 
but usually in terms of cooperation of Serbian authorities with international partners. For 
instance:  
Serbia established good international and regional cooperation in the field of drugs, in particular with the 
2014 seizure of 168 kg of marijuana jointly with the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. (Progress 
report 2015, p.15). 
 
Good international and regional cooperation continued on drugs, in particular with the dismantling of an 
international drug smuggling chain which led to the seizure of 16 kilos of heroin at the border with Bulgaria 
in December. (Progress report 2016, p. 73). 
 
The anti-drug department of the police investigated a number of drug-related cases in 2017 in a fruitful 
cooperation with third countries’ police services, reaching important results and seizures. Serbian authorities 
confiscated 4 166 tons of drugs, mainly herbal cannabis (3 921 tonnes) but also 17.8 tonnes of heroin and 
12.7 tonnes of cocaine. (Progress report 2018, p. 40). 
 
 
An interesting finding is related to the role of illegal migration in drug trade. Research has traced 
evidence that there is a trend among migrants to pay for the transport by carrying certain amounts 
of drugs. These drugs are increasingly seized in the asylum centres.  
Illegal migration is associated with drug trade 
It may be, I am not aware. (A repression institution representative) 
Yes, we have information from asylum centres that they [the migrants] pay the transport by smuggling drugs. 
(A civil society representative) 
                                                             
42 For details, see https://www.krik.rs/tag/darko-saric/ 
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Yes, interesting amounts are found in asylum centres. (A repression institution representative) 
 
Interestingly, there is a different level of awareness among repression institutions about this 
trend. It appears that they do not have the same information, which indicates an absence of a 
state strategy in this regard. It might be that this trend is rather new and that it would be addressed 
by authorities in the forthcoming period.   
 
5.3.4. War between criminal groups 
 
The term ‘war between criminal groups’ was utilised as an indicator verifying the presence of 
organised crime in the country. This research found that there is an overarching war between 
organised criminal groups in Serbia, which has been lasting for several years and involves 
criminal groups engaged in drug trafficking. In fact, Serbia is experiencing a series of unresolved 
mafia murders, and they are constantly escalating.  
 
The findings clearly indicate that the war between various criminal groups from Serbia and 
Montenegro has been ongoing for several years in the territory of Serbia. The frequency of mafia 
murders, even in the middle of the day in the central Belgrade areas, has started to look like the 
period of 1990s. This fact concurrently supports the notion that internal structure of organised 
crime is hierarchical, despite external cooperation based on market needs; as findings presented 
below indicate, groups are often engaged in revenge for murders of their members and constantly 
clash over territory. 
 
Findings show that a significant number of members of criminal networks have been killed in 
the period between 2012 and 2018. For instance, the Black Book43 is a database of the killings 
carried out in the period 2012-2018 in the territory of Serbia and Montenegro, which have the 
characteristics of mafia liquidations. It was created with an aim to point to the frequency of this 
phenomenon and the fact that the safety of citizens is endangered, as murders often take place in 
                                                             
43 Available at: https://www.crnaknjiga.rs/ The database was developed by a joint project of KRIK and Radio Free 
Europe 
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the middle of the day and in public places. The data on state actions is distressing - out of 123 
murders, only 9 have been resolved, while the perpetrators are unknown in as many as 86 cases. 
According to a Belgrade lawyer Prelevic, less than 20% of perpetrators are prosecuted (Prelevic, 
2018). This Table of mafia related murders may best demonstrate the state of play. 
 
Table V. 2. Mafia related murders 
 
 
 
Source: KRIK, https://www.crnaknjiga.rs/ 
 
A brief list of the victims of this war, only in 2018, reflects the magnitude of the problem. The 
researcher collected various media reports on mafia-related murders throughout the period of 
this research. Below is solely a list of individuals who were allegedly murdered in mafia war, as 
reported by various media in 2018: 
 
“Sinisa Milic (45), Belgrade 
He was liquidated in a car explosion in downtown Belgrade. Unknown attackers placed an explosive beneath 
his "RAV 4 ", which exploded around 13pm while standing at a traffic light. The murdered allegedly was 
close to Luka Bojovic and Filip Korac. He was a member of the police of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and he 
worked in the Serbian police until 2009. 
Gorgija Darmanovic Gorg (58), Belgrade 
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A secret agent was killed, near the First Basic Court in New Belgrade, when the liquidators fired at him and 
fled on a scooter. 
Davorin Baltić (41), Belgrade  
A member of the "Kavacki clan" was killed in front of the building where he lived with his wife. 60 bullets 
were fired on him. 
Drago Bozovic (20), Belgrade 
He was killed in when gunmen shot him from the car on the go. 
Blazo Djurović (39), Belgrade 
He was shot with 10 to 15 bullets from an automatic rifle, at the moment when his BMW was leaving the 
garage. A few miles away, a lighted BMW X5 was found, in which an automatic rifle was also found. 
Dalibor Despotovic (37), Belgrade 
He was shot dead in front of his exchange office when he came out to throw the garbage. The attacker fired 
five bullets at him. He worked as a security of Slobodan Saranovic. 
Predrag Mitrovic Pereca (49), Belgrade 
Predrag Mitrovic was killed in front of his house, while returning from regular walks after serving house 
prison sentence. 
Vladimir Roganovic (31), Vienna 
Vladimir Roganovic, marked as a prominent member of the "Kavacki clan", was liquidated in Vienna 
Dragoslav Miloradovic Gale (44), Belgrade 
Godfather of Luka Bojovic, a former leader of the Zemun Clan, who is currently serving a prison sentence 
in Spain,was killed in front of a self-service laundry room. Unknown attackers used automatic weapons. 
Dragoje Trisic Trsa (44), Belgrade 
He was killed in front of the entrance to his building. He owned several capital outlets and was previously 
convicted on conditional sentence of drug trafficking.” 
(Collected media reports on mafia-related murders) 
 
The research findings show that a large number of murders took place in the war between the 
two criminal groups (or clans) namely the "Kavacki clan" and "Skaljarski clan", as well as in the 
clash between the group of Luka Bojovic and the group of Slobodan Saranovic. The war between 
these two criminal groups initiated in 2014 when 200kg of cocaine was stolen from an apartment 
in Valencia (Lekic, 201844).These numbers indicate very high activity of organised criminal 
                                                             
44 See more at https://www.vice.com/rs/article/vbpm7m/sve-sto-znamo-o-krvavom-sukobu-skaljarskog-i-
kavackog-klana 
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networks. Such trend can be explained in several ways. It is possible that the main motive for 
these assassinations is revenge, which could explain the murders between the group of Luka 
Bojovic (serving a sentence in Spain) and the group of Slobodan Saranovic (allegedly killed by 
the Bojovic group). Moreover, these murders might be a consequence of a fight about the drug 
dealing territory of the involved groups. 
  
However, recent developments in Serbia indicate that this war could be also associated with 
certain state structures that apparently support one of the groups. In January 2019, the state 
arrested 150 persons in a single day for organised crime related offenses. This was presented in 
the media as a major success of the state in fighting organised crime, and an increase in sentences 
in criminal legislation was announced as a future step (Blic, 2019; Rts, 2019). Nevertheless, the 
analysts covering the topic of organised crime have perceived this action as rather suspicious. 
There were claims that the state actually arrested the members of “Skaljarski clan” and other 
criminal groups’ members, but not even a single person from the “Kavacki clan” (N1, 2019). 
This was associated with the previous murder of an important member of “Kavacki clan” two 
years ago, after which the state also announced the war against mafia. That murder is an 
illustrative example of the inefficiency of the system and the links of sport hooligans and 
organised crime: 
 
The resolution of the case of murder of Aleksandar Stanković, called Sale Mutavi, was presented by the 
police as a great success. However, it is important to note that Stankovic never served a five-year sentence 
for drug trafficking. Although he was convicted as the head of a criminal group, the judges postponed his 
prison sentence 12 times, as he was not able to serve sentence allegedly due to poor health. At the same time, 
he appeared regularly at sports events and participated in fighting, while several of his men participated in 
securing presidential inauguration. After his assassination, the state officials proclaimed "war against mafia." 
Football club "Partizan" paid tribute to Stankovic by leaving the footballers dressed in t-shirts with his 
character on the match, and some of the club's officials appeared at his funeral.  
(KRIK, 2016) 
 
It could be argued that the state structures might have ‘taken a side’ of one of the groups in this 
war. These impression of the potential state capture by organised crime are discussed in detail 
under research question 4 below. 
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Concurrently, it may be concluded that the organised criminal groups are performing these 
murders because they feel they can do it. That is, this trend of mafia murders could in fact indicate 
a broader picture of the system’s inefficiency thus creating an impression in criminal circles that 
they are stronger than the state (again). Essentially, when a series of murders remains unresolved 
and there is sufficient freedom sensed by the organised criminal groups, they may get a 
reinforcement to continue or even intensify their activities. 
 
Another interesting finding offered by this research is a novel modus operandi in the mafia 
related murders. This research has evidenced a number of different features of mafia related 
murders which differ to a significant extent from the previously used methods of organised 
crime. It appears that the present organised criminal groups do not pay too much attention to the 
locations of the murders, potential victims or citizen’s safety overall. They started committing 
murders in the middle of the day, in very busy locations or inhabited city areas, considerably 
increasing the risk for accidental victims. Several accidental victims lost their lives in 2017 and 
2018 (Blic, 2018). Furthermore, new methods are used, such as car explosions of the targeted 
victims while driving (Blic, June 2018). It may be that these criminal groups actually feel 
stronger than the state, or they have become more brutal or just less professional than the previous 
groups. This trend is discussed in detail further below.  
 
 
5.3.5. Geographic scope of the activity (affiliation background) 
 
In terms of geographic scope of activity, findings of this research have shown that organised 
criminal groups engaged in drug trafficking in Serbia are characterised by intensive links with 
the states in the region, the EU and South America (explained below in 5.3.6.). As discussed 
above, the active functioning of the Balkan route has been confirmed, with reference to certain 
changes in regards to Central and South-Eastern route (5.3.1). With regard to the territory in 
which they operate, national, regional and international organized criminal groups are present. 
The number and composition of organized criminal groups operating in Serbia varies.  
 
The findings of this research confirm the presence of international forms of organized crime 
groups in Serbia and the Western Balkans region. A number of factors favouring such 
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developments in Serbia have been discussed in detail under Chapter II and overall involve the 
consequences of the breakup of Yugoslavia, as well as the geographical position of Serbia: i.e. 
the fact that it is located on the part of the external borders of Schengen and partly surrounded 
by the countries of the EU.  
This research has further identified a set of important border points frequently involved in drug 
trafficking, including borders between Hungary and Serbia (Horgos), the ‘fake’ or administrative 
border with *Kosovo, the borders with Croatia and BiH, as well as FYROM and Montenegro. 
Consequently, the countries in the region involved in drug trafficking with Serbian organised 
criminal groups involve Montenegro, Bulgaria, FYROM, Hungary, Croatia, BiH, Romania as 
well as *Kosovo.  
Are there specific border points frequently involved 
The border between Hungary and Serbia, Horgos. (A repression institution representative, P2.7) 
The ‘fake’ border with *Kosovo. (A repression institution representative, P2.13) 
The borders with Croatia and BiH are often reported as entry points. (A repression institution representative, 
P2.17) 
 
The types of commonly trafficked drugs involve cannabis (Albania through Montenegro and 
Serbia into the EU), heroin and cocaine (see 5.3.1). The trend of cocaine smuggling continues 
on the path South America – Europe, which includes organized criminal groups from Serbia and 
the region. Members of organised criminal groups from Serbia and the region actively participate 
in transport of cocaine from South America to the countries of Europe. Methods of trafficking 
cocaine are described in detail below under 5.3.6. 
In terms of affiliation, research findings confirm that organized criminal groups in the Balkans 
actively cooperate in their criminal activities. Their links may be explained on the basis of 
geographical origin (Yugoslavia), criminal past (wars in the 90s), family ties (Montenegro clans, 
Albania, *Kosovo) and absence of language barrier in communication.  As discussed in the 
Chapter II, a significant scope of organized crime started appearing in Serbia in the early 90s of 
the last century. In that period, the majority of former Yugoslavian states passed through a decade 
of civil wars, armed conflicts and massive political transformations, which created social 
confusion and vulnerability to crime. Corruption and misappropriation of state funds were 
widespread while the population became impoverished (Pesic 2007).  
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As findings on affiliation indicate, the criminal groups established in that period were motivated 
by profit as a common goal, which allowed close cooperation among diverse individuals 
regardless of their ethnicity, political or religious beliefs. Additionally, during the 90s, a “pact” 
between the secret services, corrupted political actors and organized crime has established strong 
grounds for the development of criminal networks with a considerable social impact (Nikolic-
Ristanovic, 2004; Trifunovic, 2007). Moreover, the routes utilised during conflicts for smuggling 
arms, cigarettes, gas, oil, cars and other products throughout the region and neighbourhood 
countries, formed a strong traffic structure unaffected by state actions. They are mostly 
"specialized" (in drugs trafficking, weapons trafficking), but those that deal with multiple forms 
of organized crime are becoming increasingly present.  
In terms of local functioning, this research offers particularly interesting findings. It appears that 
drug dealing within the state is organised in a rather different manner then in the EU states. There 
is no ghetto, at least not known to most of repression institution representatives and most of the 
sale seams to take place in the movement. Several excerpts are provided below: 
 
How drug dealing functions? Is there a drug trade ghetto? Where substance misusers get the drugs 
No, there is no ghetto in cities. (A repression institution representative, P2.2) 
Sometimes it is just in parks, hand-to/hand... but there are some groups who deliver to houses... also, it is 
done by cars going around the city, just driving around. (A civil society representative, P4.3) 
We had a guy who was driving a car of the emergency centre... and selling drugs in that car, delivering to 
customers. (A repression institution representative, P2.4) 
Is it controlled by police 
No, it is usually in movement… the places are rarely stable. (A repression institution representative, P2.8) 
No, we don’t know the exact locations, except maybe night clubs. (A repression institution representative, 
P2.3) 
 
The important impact of these findings relates to these strong links between organised criminal 
groups in a single region involving several states, which shows that their cooperation can 
smoothly continue despite law enforcement efforts. As it will be shown in detail under 4.3 and 
4.4., criminal networks can utilise a variety of gaps in the system, including police and the 
judiciary and carry on their activities regardless the political or economic situation.  
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5.3.6. Organisational model of criminal networks  
 
The findings of this research indicate that organised criminal groups in Serbia seam to be 
structured hierarchically at the internal level, while they externally operate in the form of network 
structures. This confirms contemporary conceptualizations that organized criminal groups 
function operate as loosely-organized networks of cells (Finckenauer, 2005; Lauprecht et al., 
2016; Morseli, 2009; Paoli and Fijanoau, 2004; Shelley, 2005; Varese, 2010). Network structure 
is also suggested by the findings on the key members or bosses of criminal groups who appear 
to be located in Latin America and have developed strong networks in Serbia and Europe to 
organise drug trafficking.  Concurrently, the war between various groups described above 
indicates that internal structure is based on clear hierarchy, which is also perceivable from the 
fact that bosses are outside of the country and have not been replaced so far. 
 
Criminal networks are not under the control of state institutions in Serbia. This research has 
shown that organised criminal groups function in a parallel system, strongly relying on structures 
of the state. Such findings indicate that there has been a shift in functioning of organised criminal 
networks which may be attributed to transition and EU accession processes. That is, previous 
research has suggested that “the regime of Slobodan Milosevic was not only corrupted, 
autocratic, and criminalised: it was a criminal regime, whose whole security sector was deeply 
involved not just in war crimes, but also in classic forms of organised crime: drug and weapons 
trafficking, extortion, kidnappings, and targeted assassinations” (Anastasijevic, 2006, p.2). 
Illuminating this phenomenon, Stojarova (2007) argued that “Serbian organised crime lived in 
symbiosis with the state and both players profited from this symbiosis”. However, Serbian 
organised crime today is not so manifestly connected with the state. Even though this form of 
symbiosis remained, perhaps through the ‘deep state structures’, organised crime appears to be 
more hidden today, but still reliant on the support of some state structures.  
 
The involvement of Serbia’s security services in drug trafficking has never been properly investigated. 
During the reign of Slobodan Milosevic, his government intentionally merged its law-enforcing institutions, 
and especially the security service, with organized crime to set up an extensive system of parallel grey and 
black economies to circumvent the UN-imposed sanctions. 
(Anastasijevic, 2006, p.4). 
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The groups are too broad, so it is difficult to be aware of all of them. (A repression institution representative, 
P2.5) 
Some organised criminal groups are widely known due to media promotion. (A judge, P2.23) 
Serbia has many drug trafficking groups, there is no single ‘boss’ but many of them, and it is not centralized 
as in other countries (A criminologist, P1.26). 
It was discussed with some of the repression institutions’ participants how this actually works in 
practice and few examples illustrate the modus operandi: 
Members of Serbian organised criminal groups reside in the countries of South America, establish contacts 
with the drug cartels for the purpose of purchasing and transport of cocaine overseas by ship, and get financial 
compensation to transport cocaine to the countries of Europe. (A repression institution representative, P2. 2) 
Members of Serbian criminal groups organize transportation, procurement and have direct links to the drug 
manufacturers. (A repression institution representative, P2. 15) 
Cocaine is transported via container shipments, sailing boats, but also through couriers on flights to Schengen 
zone. (A repression institution representative, P2. 10) 
 
It was repeatedly stated that Serbians play a special role in smuggling cocaine from South 
America, via Spain.  Because of established criminal connections, Serbians have spread to South 
Africa and South America, from where drug ships move to Spain and Greece. They receive 
cocaine from the ships in ports in some of the West European countries or in the open sea and 
subsequently monitor activities related to the sale of cocaine in the countries of final destinations. 
The profit generated by the smuggling of cocaine is then infiltrated into legal cash flows and the 
licit economy. Thus, an important finding is that key aspects of Serbian involvement in drug 
related organised crime involves non-resident Serbians who live, ex-patriate, at critical points in 
the trafficking network. 
These findings are consistent with relevant international reports e.g. the UNODC (2017) also 
reports that maritime transport of smuggled cocaine has considerably increased. The UNODC 
data on seizures show that 60% of seized quantities in the last five years mainly refer to the 
changed mode of cocaine smuggling (cargo in ships) and larger individual deliveries.  
Members of Serbian organised criminal groups also participate in heroin smuggling. Methods of 
transporting heroin were also identified. To illustrate: 
 
When the drug arrives in *Kosovo, criminal groups package it in smaller quantities and then transport it by 
land to European cities. (A repression institution representative, P2. 3) 
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We had cases of hiding drugs in hair dyes, spare wheels and underwear. Standard hiding places are mostly 
car holes - specially made bunkers, space under the seat, but also the gearbox. (A repression institution 
representative, P2. 10) 
Once the police found refrigerator trucks full of heroin (A state institution representative, P1. 13) 
 
Smaller quantities of drugs are smuggled more often, as they are easier to hide. (A repression institution 
representative, P2. 7) 
 
 
Participants also stated that traffickers often use unprotected green borders with neighbouring 
countries for transport. One of the commonly used methods of smuggling is the engagement of 
so-called mules, smugglers who swallow the drug shipment and carry it in the stomach, mainly 
from South America to Europe.  
 
Serbians are among the most sought and cheapest mules (A repression institution representative, P2. 7) 
 
About 40% of all attempts at drug smuggling by airplanes are mules, 50% are suitcases, the rest is hiding 
narcotics, camouflage of drugs in food or electronics (A state institution representative, P1. 13) 
 
In network science, such actors functioning as links between diverse criminal groups are known 
as brokers (Morselli, 2009; Walther, 2015a) and their role is to bridge disconnected parts of 
networks and/or develop external connections, consequently attracting resources that would 
otherwise be locally unavailable (Spiro, Acton, and Butts, 2013). Hence research findings 
strongly confirm the standpoints that the role of the brokers is increasingly important in 
transnational crime (Morselli, 2009; Spiro, Acton, and Butts, 2013; Walther, 2015b). Moreover, 
it has been supported that illegal trafficking involves different actors in a range of countries, who 
appear to function similarly to legal business organizations (Shelley, 2005).  
The research findings indicated that central roles in criminal networks nowadays are held by 
individuals who are outside of Serbia. 
Who is central in the network 
They are usually outside, in other countries. They have groups in Serbia, but organise everything from 
outside. (A repression institution representative, P2.3) 
Most bosses are in South America... they control everything from there. (A repression institution 
representative, P2.17) 
Most key members escaped in South America or the Netherlands. They are still actively involved in running 
their groups here. (A judge, P.19) 
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This may be explained as a consequence of the ongoing war between criminal groups or targeted 
law enforcement efforts which have caused the key figures to escape the country. Findings show 
that the central figures in organised criminal networks are located in other countries and organise 
everything through trusted partners in Serbia. This is an interesting shift in organisational mode 
of criminal networks if we compare their functioning in the 90s and early 2000 with the current 
set up. The previous functioning methods were based on the key ‘bosses’ who were located in 
Serbia and played important roles in public life – they were known to most citizens, they caused 
fear due to violent behaviour and appeared frequently with politicians in public places.  
On the other hand, they were highly professional – as findings indicate, these groups were 
interrelated with the special police and specially trained enforcement representatives. As reported 
by Anastasijevic: 
Members of the Zemun gang were regularly picking up heroin shipments and transported them into Serbia 
through the Presevo valley; thanks to their connections with BIA, their vehicles were often escorted by 
Serbian security officers, ensuring the trucks could pass through police checkpoints without being searched. 
The scheme worked until the leaders of the Zemun gang and their BIA accomplices were arrested in 2003, 
after they organized the assassination of Zoran Djindjic, Serbia’s Prime Minister. 
(Anastasijevic, 2006, p. 4) 
The murders committed by these organised criminal groups were precise, they didn’t involve 
accidental victims, and they were usually accompanied by absence of any evidence (e.g. burned 
cars after the murder). The organised criminal groups today seem to have different functioning 
methods. There is a notable shift in functioning, the groups make important mistakes, several 
murders during 2017 and 2018 involved accidental victims (regular citizens, girlfriends, and the 
like) or ended up in murder of a wrong person and not the target.  
This is broadly in line with the literature on “efficiency/security trade-offs” (Morselli, Giguere, 
and Petit, 2007) which suggests that lack of formal dispute resolution mechanisms in criminal 
networks often leads to violence. The authors have also supported that certain networks’ 
advantages may concurrently become their limitations: i.e. increased recruitment based on 
informal ties increases potential impact, but may also reduce mutual trust among the actors, 
hinder internal security and intensify conflicts (Morselli, Giguere, and Petit, 2007).  
The research also revealed an interesting finding related to modus operandi of drug dealing 
networks in Serbia.  It seems that drug dealing functions in Serbia in rather different ways than 
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in other states of the EU. The findings strongly supported that there are no ghetto areas in the 
cities. Dealers seem to constantly find innovative ways and means but there are no known places 
where drug dealing constantly takes place. Therefore, these places are not controlled by the 
police since drug dealing usually occurs in movement (as indicated in 5.3.5).  
This may be associated with relatively low substance misuse trends in Serbia, in comparison 
with the EU states. It is interesting to note that this trend is pertinent to all the former Yugoslavian 
states. The abuse of psychoactive substances among young people has been a prominent social 
problem for decades, however, until the early seventies, when it comes to the former Yugoslavia 
and, consequently, Serbia, it was mainly based on tobacco and alcohol while the abuse of drugs, 
especially those heavier, involved isolated cases in larger urban areas. The economic crisis, 
political tensions, the collapse of the value system and the rise in all forms of crime have resulted 
in a significantly higher presence of psychoactive substances in Serbia and other republics of the 
former Yugoslavia. This is in line with previous research suggesting that organized crime 
principally did not exist in the former Yugoslavia (Grubač, 2009). This may be explained by the 
system organization, as a socialist economy, controlled market, a one-party, semi-police state 
and well-controlled borders. As Grubac suggests, foreign trade operations and money flows were 
under direct control of the intelligence services, which were controlled directly by the party 
leadership (Grubač, 2009). Additional research could indicate whether this is also a feature of 
drug dealing in the former Yugoslavian states in the region today. 
The only relatively stable locations identified in the research involve night clubs. That is, the 
night clubs in Serbia (Belgrade mostly) are typically secured by specific groups who are 
associated with criminal networks. Findings have shown that it is mostly the members of 
organised criminal groups who provide protection to night clubs (either in the form of protection, 
or on the basis of racketeering relations). However, it is often the police members who work on 
security jobs during night, thus creating significant possibilities of cooperation between police 
and organised criminal groups. This form of cooperation is discussed in detail under research 
questions 3 and 4 below. 
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5.3.7. Conclusions 
 
To summarise, research findings have strongly confirmed the existence of organised crime in 
Serbia. As demonstrated, the main profit of organised criminal groups in Serbia comes from drug 
trafficking. Findings have further indicated that organised criminal groups in Serbia function as 
networks at the external or market level, broadly connected with other clandestine structures who 
participate in global drug trade.. Concurrently, at the internal level, these groups are hierarchical, 
with clear central players, often engaged in wars over territory. The bosses of organised criminal 
groups are usually in other states, but obviously have sufficient power to continue running the 
network through trusted individuals who remain in the country. It seems reasonable to conclude 
that this mode of functioning strongly relies on informal social exchanges (Bresson, 1999): i.e. 
that they continue to enjoy protection from relevant enforcement and/or political structures which 
enables endurance of criminal activities. This structure of drug trafficking networks in Serbia 
could be perceived as common for such types of organisations. Literature shows that group 
structure in drug trafficking business differs, pending the types of operations and motivations 
(Dorn et al., 2005; Spapens, 2011). Dorn et al. (2005) argued that groups motivated by profit are 
more likely to have a durable core with various links to other groups. At the same time, these 
groups may exhibit flexibility when reacting to particular, potentially one-off opportunities (e.g. 
Kenney, 2007). 
The scope and the endurance of the problem of organised crime in Serbia are perhaps best 
observed in the consecutive EU progress reports and other international assessments of the state 
of crime control. In discussing this issue, it is important to take count of the fact that Serbia has 
low levels of serious criminal offenses overall, when compared with most of the EU states. This 
information is often used by the state representatives to ensure citizens of their safety. 
Nevertheless, the numbers of organised crime related murders are high.  
It appears that criminal networks in Serbia have successfully adapted to the period of transition 
and the accompanying EU accession processes. The ability to adapt to disruption is a typical 
feature of criminal networks, enabling survival.  As Ayling (2009) maintained, adaptation may 
range from modifications of their topology to complete displacement from primary criminal 
activities or geographical area of operation. Moreover, resilience as an important trait of the 
networks also facilitates their endurance. Resilience refers to the ability of the network to absorb 
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disruption and adapt to changes arising from that disruption (Bouchard, 2007; Ayling, 2009). 
Here, this has been reflected in diverse models of adaptation of criminal networks. As discussed 
above, members of criminal networks have either displaced their location and continued 
operating from abroad or have started using different trafficking routes. Concurrently, criminal 
networks successfully adapted to privatisation period, using this economic transition to invest 
criminal profits into the legal market.  
Interpreting the findings of the impact of criminal networks on EU accession, it can be said that 
the endurance of organised crime has been found to be one of the key factors hindering EU 
accession. Along with recurrent reference to the problem of organised crime in relevant 
assessments, the findings of this research show that the extent of organised crime is even larger 
than EU measurements suggest. It could be argued therefore that these groups have sufficient 
power in the society to act as the captors. Given the socio-economic environment in Serbia, 
marked by poverty and wide-spread corruption, it seems that organised criminal groups have the 
most resources and deeply rooted links to enable state capture. 
 
 
 
II PART: FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION - COMBINATION OF 
CONTENT ANALYSIS AND SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS 
  
5.4. State response network - the structural holes that enable endurance of organised 
crime 
 
 
5.4.1. The state response network 
 
All institutions engaged in suppression of organised crime and drug trafficking have their 
jurisdiction clearly prescribed by relevant laws and bylaws (explained in detail in Chapter III, 
3.3). The findings therefore refer to the results of implementation or the exercise of these 
jurisdictions, mutual cooperation and key achievements and/or obstacles. Through 
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implementation of content analysis (explained in Chapter IV), this research has identified that 
the map of the state response network involves the following 20 institutions or groupings: 
 
Table V 3: Codes of institutions in the state response network 
 
 
Originally, this implied the mapping of the state response network or the identification of all the 
institutions responsible for the fight against organised crime and drug trafficking in Serbia. The 
concept ‘state response network’ was developed for the purpose of this research, as a common 
label for all the mapped institutions responsible for fighting organised crime and drug trafficking. 
An overall appraisal of the key institutions and relevant legislative framework was provided in 
Chapter III. The network of state institutions was then analysed in depth throughout this research. 
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As explained in the Chapter IV, the state response network was first analysed through the content 
analysis focused upon character, context and activities, and subsequently by the social network 
analysis, which will be explained below.  
Social network analysis offers a visual presentation of the identified groups (such as civil society 
organisations) or government institutions: i.e. the state response network. Hereafter both groups 
and institutions will be referred to as the ‘institutions’ unless for purposes of clarity it is necessary 
to distinguish the civil society organisations from the government actors. All these institutions 
are mapped in Graph V.1 below.  The visualization was performed by using the Gephi software 
package (Bastian, Heymann and Jacomy, 2009) as explained in Chapter IV (3.4.2.).  
Graph V.1 provides a graphic image of the state response network. This is an initial graph, 
representing solely the overall image of the state response network. The nodes represent the 
institutions, pursuant to their legal competences of the institutions (institutional domain of 
action) with regard to the problems identified in content analysis. The Excel file “Graph 1 Table 
jurisdiction cooperation” (Annex 6) contains data utilised to develop the graphic. The assigned 
numbers from 1 to 5 reflect the significance of the institutional domain of action per particular 
problem. The number is assigned pursuant to the share of responsibility i.e. the number 5 reflects 
the main institution while number 2 is a subordinate institution cooperating in the particular 
problem (or sharing responsibility). The social network analysis of the state response network 
shown in Graph V.1 indicates that there are 3 groups, or effective clusters of institutions. The 
different colours signpost the position of institutions in the state response network on the basis 
of their legally prescribed competences and relations of cooperation. The colour of a node 
indicates that it belongs to one of the three detected communities.  
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Graph V. 1: Network of institutions engaged in suppression of organised crime and drug 
trafficking 
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The blue colour represents the institutions engaged in repression of drug trafficking, involving 
law enforcement and financial investigative bodies. The analysis demonstrated that most of these 
institutions are largely under the umbrella of the police or the Ministry of Interior (MOI), 
including its diverse sectors responsible for different aspects of organised crime suppression 
(SBPOK, CP, PD, BIA). Therefore, the size of the node MOI is the largest in the network. 
Another institution is also in this group, namely, the VBA, which has almost negligible 
jurisdiction as a defence special police. The blue colour group also includes the institutions 
responsible for financial investigations in the case of organised crime and prevention of money 
laundering (FIU, CUST, ANTIML, TAX). The size of the SBPOK and FIU correctly indicates 
the major importance of their designated role in organised crime suppression, due to their 
institutional competence. 
The green colour represents the judicial institutions acting in cases of organised crime and drug 
trafficking, namely the Special Prosecutors’ Office for Organised Crime, the Special Court for 
Organised Crime and the Appellate court. It also involves the Directorate for Seized Assets, 
which is not a judicial institution, but its jurisdiction is related to court proceedings. The Special 
Prosecutors’ Office for Organised Crime has the largest size as a node in this network due to its 
legal competences in the fight against organised crime. It is interesting to note that the small size 
of the Appellate court indicates a kind of minor importance in the network. This is due to the fact 
that this court is responsible ‘only’ for second instance proceedings. Nevertheless, as it will be 
discussed below in this Chapter, the role of the Appellate court is particularly noteworthy in the 
face of the findings of this research. 
The orange colour represents the institutions engaged in the prevention of drug misuse and drug 
trafficking (MOJ, MOH, SERPREVDT, OFFCOMDRUG). These institutions significantly 
differ in terms of their primary jurisdiction, but consume shared responsibility in prevention of 
drug misuse and trafficking. Due to the links with these institutions, the civil society 
organisations (CSOs) are placed in this group as well. As indicated by implementing SNA, the 
Ministry of Justice as a node has the biggest size. This is due to its jurisdiction in adopting the 
relevant laws in this field which implies cooperation with other institutions. The Office for 
Combating Drugs has a similar size, due to its competence in developing and monitoring the 
strategic documents. The Office for Combating Drugs appears at two locations in the graph in 
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order to clearly demonstrate the relations with particular institutions, as well as the lack of 
linkages among certain institutions. It is interesting to note that the size of the CSOs is practically 
the same as the size of legally designated institutions in prevention of drug misuse and drug 
trafficking. This implies that there may be certain gaps, fields left uncovered or lack of efficient 
coordination, as the civil society is not expected to have the same relevance as state bodies in 
any field. 
What the research findings have shown in terms of the state response network is that it appears 
to be insufficiently mutually connected. That is, there are clearly visible 3 clusters or 
communities of institutions, but the level of connectedness between them is of low magnitude.  
An impression obtained by looking at this network is that these different groups of institutions 
are rather detached from each other. That is, it appears that there are strong linkages between the 
institutions within the same community, whereas relations with other communities do not seem 
significant. This impression is confirmed in subsequent analysis, as thoroughly discussed below 
in this Chapter.  
This finding is rather compelling, given that one could expect that the state institutions have solid 
relations, as they necessarily need to cooperate in matters of their shared jurisdiction. This 
finding implies that the actual institutions that are responsible for the fight against organised 
crime and drug trafficking do not have close cooperation. This may be explained by the practical 
differences in their jurisdiction, as some are engaged in judicial proceedings and others in 
repression for instance. That would be a possible explanation of the lawmakers or state officials. 
Nevertheless, in practice, lack of efficient cooperation between these apparently different types 
of institutions leads to a lack of knowledge and awareness of different aspects of the phenomenon 
of organised crime which is within their jurisdiction, even though prescribed in a different 
manner. For instance, the findings of this research have shown that judges are not aware of 
relevant developments in the field of drug seizures outside of the country. This may look 
irrelevant; however, if the judges deciding in drug trafficking cases are not aware that some types 
of drugs are produced in Serbia and subsequently trafficked into EU states, it is difficult to expect 
that they could adequately grasp the case in its entirety. Therefore, this evident lack of mutual 
relations may inherently complicate the functioning of the whole network. Prosecutors, in other 
words, may bring a case before the court that is not only inherently complex but that possibly 
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also stretches the judicial officer’s capacity to grasp the context of offending, given this lack of 
wider situational awareness. 
However, this may also be a consequence of the fact that these state institutions were not 
originally conceptualized as ‘the network’ by the state. That is, most of these institutions are 
regular state bodies with a whole set of responsibilities, whereby the fight against organised 
crime and drug trafficking is only one among them. If this is the case, it appears that the decision 
makers do not take into account the science based approaches to fighting organised crime. As 
discussed in Chapter II, most contemporary research on organised crime relies on network-based 
approaches in investigating criminal groups. It has been evidenced in the literature that 
investigation of criminal networks is enhanced by using network techniques (Dujin, 2016; 
Gunnell, Hillier and Blakeborough, 2016; Klerks, 2001; Seidlear and Adderlay, 2013; Sparrow, 
1991; Tayebi, and Glässer, 2016). Research on organised criminal groups has demonstrated that 
organised crime today frequently functions through networks of cells (Morselli, 2009; 
Papachristos, 2011; Varese, 2010), and that finding has been substantiated here in the Serbian 
data. Police investigations should thus be performed in a similar manner, though surveillance 
data, intelligence data or co-offending data (Gunnell, Hillier and Blakeborough, 2016; Seidlear 
and Adderlay, 2013; Tayebi, and Glässer, 2016).  In light of this, it could be expected that state 
institutions are also organised as networks of cells (institutions as nodes) whereby each of the 
cells has its role and contributes to the network efficiency. 
The findings of this research, however, show that not all the institutions (nodes) efficiently 
contribute to the network functioning, as they are not all well-connected pieces of the network. 
As it will be discussed below, some institutions do not have clear competences or have significant 
overlaps thus decreasing the overall efficiency. 
The legislative separation of competences discussed above could be addressed in practice 
through joint trainings or exchange of experiences and/or best practices. This could contribute to 
increasing knowledge of the relevant stakeholders in the institutions. Yet such an approach would 
require clear guidelines targeting an increase of capacities in addressing organised crime. 
 
194 
 
5.4.2. Cooperation of institutions with regards to identified problems in the state response 
network 
 
Based on the initial set of data, a network of institutions was modelled according to social 
networks. Initially, the network was modelled in accordance with the institutional domain of 
action (see Graph V.1 above). Institutions represent the nodes of the network, and a connection 
is established if two institutions were involved in addressing a particular problem. These 
problems were identified by the content analysis and have been linked to each institution 
responsible for these particular issues i.e. including the main institution, as well as other 
institutions sharing responsibility in each case or problem.  
Subsequently, in order to explore the cooperation among institutions in the case of particular 
problems identified by the content analysis, all the connections between two institutions for all 
the identified problems were aggregated together with their weights and the following network 
was obtained. These data are given in the Graph 2 data table (Annex 7).  
The modelled network is non-directional and weighted and the weight of the branch is the 
number of cases in which the institutions cooperate in particular problems.  
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Graph V.2: Cooperation of institutions with regards to identified problems in the state response 
network 
 
 
 
The Graph V.2 shows a modelled network. The size of the node corresponds to its degree 
(betweenness and centrality), while the colour corresponds to the community it belongs to. The 
width of the line corresponds to the weight of the branch. As described in Chapter IV, for the 
purpose of determining what will social network analysis measure, it was necessary to develop 
specific network questions that specify the two research sub-questions under examination. The 
main network questions were the following: 
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1. In order to see is the state response network sufficiently connected: 
-What are the basic characteristics of the network in terms of density and connectivity? 
-What are the average distance and diameter of the network? 
2. In order to see which issues i.e. ‘structural holes’ are central to the network and to which 
institutions they are associated? 
-Which institutions are central per different metrics? 
-Which institutions are the core of the network? 
3. In order to see which institution may appear as brokers: 
-Do some institutions represent bridges in the network? 
4. In order to see the most significant problems: 
-What is the largest weight of the relations among the issues? 
5. In order to see do institutions share responsibility for specific problems: 
-Can any communities/clusters grouped around specific issues i.e. ‘structural holes’ be 
determined? 
6. In order to see how is the network connected in regards to other networks: 
-Does the network show the characteristics of a small world? 
 
The final network was analysed using methods and metrics for analysing social networks and 
visualized using the Gephi software package. Gephi was also used to calculate basic metrics45. 
Where appropriate, the weight variation of metrics was taken into account. For network 
clustering, the Louvain method was used in the Gephi tool which is based on the maximization 
of modularity. 
The modelled network consists of 20 nodes and 37 branches, representing a relatively small 
network. The network density is 0.195, which represents a relatively dense network compared to 
typical social networks, e.g. the density of the Facebook network is about 10-6. These and other 
examples of real-world networks that show that the small-world property appears to characterize 
most real-world networks. The average distance in the network is 2.088, and the network's 
diameter is 4. As the network's diameter indicates the maximum path length (number of steps) 
between the two actors in the network, it can be concluded that the distances in the network are 
                                                             
45 The following metrics were utilized in the analysis: degree centrality, closeness and vector centrality, relational 
centrality, network density, average path length and network diameter, clustering coefficient. 
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small. With a relatively high average clustering coefficient of 0.513 and identified 22 closed 
triads in the network, a very small diameter of the network, it can be considered that the network 
expresses the characteristics of a small world. The small-world feature is an important concept 
as it can depict the ease of communications within a network.   
Based on the modelled network, the corresponding network metrics were calculated (excel file 
Graph 2 metrics results, Annex 8). Metrics for individual nodes are shown in Table V.4, sorted 
by nodes, and summary metrics for the whole network are given in the text. 
Table V.4: Basic metrics of the modelled network Graph in V.2  
 
 
The network consists of the total of three components, whereby there are two connected 
components. The third disconnected component is the Military Security Agency (VBA), and in 
the other two all other institutions. From this it can be concluded that the VBA did not cooperate 
on any problem in the data set with other institutions and therefore exists as an isolated node 
within the model network. Considering the scope of work of this institution in the field of 
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defence, this is also expected if only civilian activities are observed. Therefore, the calculated 
VBA metrics are not relevant for further analysis. 
It is noted from Table V.4 and from Graph V.2 that the central place in the network is occupied 
by the Ministry of Interior (MOI). MOI has the largest number of connections (neighbours), and 
therefore the highest degree of node (degree centrality), relational centrality and closeness 
centrality. The MOI is convincingly distinguished if a weighted degree centrality is observed, 
which really emphasizes that the efficient work of the MOI is crucial in solving a large number 
of problems. Due to the expressed relational centrality, the MOI is also a bridge between the 
institutions. According to these metrics, the Ministry of Justice (MOJ), the Ministry of Health 
(MOH) and the Financial Investigation Unit (FIU) are prominent. The Special Court for 
Organized Crime (CORGCRIM), the Service for Combating Organized Crime (SBPOK) and the 
Security Information Agency (BIA) are partially recognised. Other institutions are relatively less 
significant from the point of view of network metrics. 
In relation to the observed metrics, the mentioned institutions (except for the MOI) are ranked 
differently by different criteria. It is noteworthy that MOJ, in addition to the second node of the 
node level, falls to 5th place behind CORGCRIM, FIU, MOH, if only the weight level of the 
node is observed. Similarly, this applies to relational centrality, where MOI, FIU and MOH 
represent significant bridges, which are subsequently followed by the MOJ. In terms of distance-
based networking, the core of the network is MOI and SPBOK, as the nodes with the lowest 
eccentricity. Eccentricity represents the largest shortest distance from any node to the observed 
node in the network. The closeness centrality is again emphasized by the MOI, while the other 
nodes have relatively similar values.  
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Figure V.3: Degree distribution 
 
 
 
 
The distribution of nodes by degree is shown in Figure IV.3. It is not possible to see whether the 
network follows the power-law distribution because the network is relatively small, with a small 
number of nodes. However, there are certain indications that the preferential binding feature is 
present in the pattern of network growth. In this regard, smaller institutions have a very great 
chance to work with the "big" institutions (MOI, MOH, MOJ), than with less significant ones in 
the network. One of the reasons may be that such institutions often arise from organizational 
units of ministries. The other reason is certainly the number of competencies entrusted to them, 
which points to cooperation. In any case, it could be said that the "rich get richer - the good get 
better" rule applies here, which often applies to social networks. The core of the network are 
certainly MOI and MOJ, as indicated by the metrics.  
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The network is divided into three communities by using the Louvain method for maximizing the 
modularity. As one community represents the VBA as an isolated node, it is of interest to analyze 
the division of the gigantic component into two communities marked with red and blue in Graph 
V.2. It is interesting that within the blue community there are all prosecutorial and judicial 
instances, but also institutions in charge of financial aspects of the fight against organized crime. 
This clearly indicates that this group of institutions are a separate community and as will be 
indicated further below, entails most of the problems in the state response network functioning 
i.e. has most of the structural holes identified (see 4.3. and 4.4). Further analysis focuses on the 
exploration of the identified gaps in the functioning of the state response network.  
 
5.4.3. Gaps in functioning of the state response network identified by the content analysis and a 
network based model of structural holes  
   
5.4.3.1. Structural holes identified by the content analysis 
 
An exploration of the potential structural holes hindering the effectiveness of state institutions to 
fight organised crime and drug trafficking has been an essential segment of this enquiry. Initially, 
it is important to reflect on the motives for utilising the term ‘structural holes’ to reflect on the 
gaps in the system’s functioning. As discussed earlier, this research builds on the 
conceptualization offered by Cockayne and Roth (2017, p.8) that organized criminal networks 
in synergies with state actors infiltrate in the system through the “loopholes offered by 
corruption”. Cockayne argues that these dynamics result in “engagement in arbitrage” (2017, 
p.9), that is, enables a whole range of mutually exchanged services through institutional 
functioning.  It is therefore conceptualized in this research that gaps (structural holes) in 
institutional functioning may create space for criminal actors to exploit such opportunities. 
According to Cockayne and Roth (2017, p.19), criminal actors “may also emerge as brokers in 
informal or parallel economies, and control the gates that connect these spaces to the outside 
world”. 
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Therefore, through the exploration of the structural holes, this research question aimed to provide 
responses as to whether these gaps in the institutional functioning enable endurance of organised 
crime in Serbia. As social network research argues, in order to see the gaps, we need to look 
between the communities and nodes, as they show us what is missing. In order to address this 
research question, a set of questions was asked during the interviews. These questions mainly 
referred to the organisation of the work of institutions, their competences, mutual relations, 
obstacles in cooperation. They also involved details about particular aspects of work of the 
institutions, with an aim to assess whether it is in line with best practices or not.  
 
Content analysis implementation enabled the broad identification of the ‘structural holes’ or 
issues identified in the functioning of the state response network.  The issues are labelled ‘units 
of analysis’, explained in detail above (Table V.1.). The units of analysis identified by content 
analysis were further used to code data for social network analysis, in order to quantitatively 
confirm or reject the findings. To recap, the following traits of institutional functioning (or 
dysfunction) were identified by the content analysis: 
 
Extract from Table V.1. Key issues (units of analysis) in functioning of state response network identified 
by CA 
Theme Units of analysis 
Effectiveness of state response 
network 
1 Investigation & prosecution 
 
 operational capacities (number, trainings, relationships,)     
 multi-disciplinary teems  
 mapping of OC/DT networks 
 information exchange (secure platform, databases, intelligence 
exchange) 
 internal control 
 reliance on secret service 
 border control 
 infiltration 
2 Role of the court 
 trial (expertise, relationships in court panel, decision making, judging 
to benefit of def....) 
 appeal proceedings 
 case law 
 sentencing policy 
 independence/political influence 
 training 
3 Financial investigation 
 identification of financial assets from crime 
 sectors vulnerable for corruption 
 management of seized assets 
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 specialisation 
 anti-money laundering 
4 seizure and destruction of drugs 
 destruction issues 
 keeping of drugs 
5 legal framework 
 drafting of laws 
 implementation of laws 
 strategic framework 
6 prevention of drug misuse 
 precursors production  
 trade 
 treatment 
 research 
 
From among these units of analysis (the key issues mentioned by the interviewees or in official 
documents, the following gaps in institutional functioning were identified by the content analysis 
as 6 key structural holes in the state response network:  
1. Investigation & prosecution  
2. Role of the court 
3. Financial investigation 
4. Seizure and destruction of drugs 
5. Legal framework 
6. Prevention of drug misuse 
  
These 6 structural holes entail broad areas, contained of various elements (provided in the Table 
above). As stated, the identified problems are conceptualized in this research as structural holes, 
or gaps in the system that enable endurance of organised crime and drug trafficking in Serbia. 
Further analysis (SNA) demonstrated which particular elements of each of these structural holes 
are the most significant. The identified units of analysis were subsequently used as the key 
criterion for the development of the ID of issues (label of issues as nodes in the network) for the 
social network analysis (Chapter IV). Following the presentation of SNA results, each of these 
issues and the identified structural holes are discussed separately under this research question, 
while their potential to enable state capture is addressed in detail under 5.4.4. 
 
4.3.3.2. A network based model of structural holes across the entire state response network 
 
In the previous section, the network as a whole was analysed. This was a top- down approach to 
reveal its structure. Here, the state response network is analysed through a bottom-up approach, 
as the communities or substructures that keep the network together are explored. SNA 
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methodology offers diverse measures for identifying substructures of groups within a social 
network (Hanneman and Riddle, 2005). The Graph V.3 below shows all the relations in the state 
response network with all the identified issues or structural holes identified on the basis of 
content analysis. This is actually the “SNA universe”, or the whole network of issues, including 
the least important, as well as the key identified issues. This graph links all the institutions in 
each of their institutional domains of action, with all the identified issues (Annex 9 Graph 3 
network data).  
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Graph V.3: Network of issues or ‘structural holes’ identified across the state response network 
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As shown in the Graph V.3, there are a number of inter-related problems across the state response 
network. The analysis has demonstrated that there are multiple relations among institutions with 
regard to the identified issues. The size of the node and the label expresses the value of the 
betweenness metrics, whereas the colour depends on the weighted degree metrics i.e. the darker 
the colour, the greater the value of the metrics. 
The results are provided in the Excel file Graph 3 results first analysis (Annex 10). It contains 
calculated metrics for nodes, whereby each line refers to one node and the columns contain the 
ID of the node (name of the institution) and the metric: degree, betweenness, closeness, and so 
on. In the graph, the size of the nodes and the branches expresses the value of betweenness 
metrics, while the colour indicates the value of weighted degree metrics (the colour darker if the 
value of the metrics is higher). The calculations used in the development of this graph are based 
on the input of all the institutional domains of action and all the relations relevant for the 
identified issue or a structural hole.  The first column in excel file Graph 3 results first analysis 
involves the Node I, which is the institutional domain of action (legally prescribed jurisdiction 
relevant for the identified issue or a structural hole), and second column in excel file, Node II, 
represents the institution with which there is a relation with regard to identified issues or 
structural holes under that institutional domain of action. As already explained for the first graph, 
the coded relations between institutions were further assigned a number ranging from 1 to 5, 
depending on their legal competences relevant for the issue (Table Scaling of issues 1, Annex 
4). For example, the number 5 refers to the main institution in charge of a particular issue, 
whereas e.g. number 3 indicates that the institution functions subordinate to the main one, in case 
of a particular issue. 
Table V.5:  Scaling of issues 1 
Node I Node II Scale 
MOI 1 
investigation 
PORGCRIM 1 
investigation 
5 
MOI 1 
investigation 
CP 1 
investigation 
2 
MOI 1 
investigation 
PD 1 
investigation 
2 
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MOI 1 
investigation 
SBPOK 1 
investigation 
2 
MOI 2  
prosecution 
PORGCRIM 2 
prosecution 
3 
MOI 2  
prosecution 
CP 2 
prosecution 
2 
MOI 2  
prosecution 
PD 2 
prosecution 
2 
MOI 2  
prosecution 
SBPOK 2  
prosecution 
2 
MOI 6 
Mapping of OC/DT networks 
PORGCRIM 6 
Mapping of OC/DT networks 
5 
MOI 6 
Mapping of OC/DT networks 
BIA 6 
Mapping of OC/DT networks 
5 
Mapping of OC/DT networks Mapping of OC/DT networks 5 
CORGCRIM 28 
relationships in court panel 
APPELC 28 
relationships in court panel 
4 
CORGCRIM 29 
case law 
APELLC 29 
case law 
5 
 
Excel file Graph 3 results first analysis contains calculated metrics for the nodes in the file 
“Graph 3 network data”.  Each column refers to one node, and the columns contain the ID of the 
node and its metrics: degree, weighted degree, eccentricity, closeness centrality, harmony 
closseness centrality and betweenness centrality.  
 
Table V.6: Extract from Excel file Graph 3 results first analysis 
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As it is shown in the Graph V.3, the network is largely separated: i.e. contained of a large number 
of sub-segments which are not connected mutually. Nevertheless, there are several main 
communities, already visible in the graph, formed around specific gaps in institutional 
functioning.   
The findings derived from the first SNA analysis of the entire network have primarily indicated 
six main communities around specific problems which hinder the effectiveness of state 
institutions in suppressing organised crime and drug trafficking. It is important to emphasize that 
most of these problems or structural holes were also identified under research question 1 as 
factors hampering transition and EU accession. The SNA metrics indicate the following 
significant relations, presented in the Table below:  
Table V.7: Extract from excel file Graph 3 results first analysis 
Node Degree Weighted 
degree 
Eccentricity Closeness 
centrality 
Harmoniclosseness 
centrality   
Betweenness 
centrality 
FIU 39 8 40 1 1 1 0,001366 
MOI 12 9 34 1 1 1 0,001634 
MOI 6 6 30 1 1 1 0,00061 
MOI 3  9 16 2 0,909091    0,95 0,001927 
MOI 11 4 20 3 0,583333 0,738095 0,000732 
MOI 10 - 
CORGCRIM 10- 
APPELC 10 
3 15 3 0,5 0,642857 0,000537 
MOI 8 5 20 1 1 1 0,000488 
OFFCOMDRUG 
43 
5 15 1 1 1 0,000488 
MOH 35 5 25 1 1 1 0,000488 
MOH 36 5 25 1 1 1 0,000488 
DIRSEIZ 42 5 25 1 1 1 0,000488 
ANTIML 47 5 25 1 1 1 0,000488 
 
As shown in the Table V.7, significant results are calculated for the following issues in the 
functioning of the state response network: prevention of money laundering; information flow; 
border control; statistics; production and trade in precursors; and strategic approach. The 
important structural holes are discussed in detail in the following sections. The key communities 
are formed around the following problems:  
 identification of financial assets from crime (the node FIU 39) 
 cooperation between institutions (the node MOI3) 
 corruption (the node MOI 12) 
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 mapping of OC/DT networks (the node MOI 6).  
 
It is also important to note that these problems appear as key nodes given the multiple relations 
between institutions in that regard. This means that SNA metrics found that institutions have 
shared responsibility (i.e. maximum relations) in the case of these identified problems. 
The relations relevant for the identification of financial assets from crime are those grouped 
around the node FIU 39. It appears that identification of financial assets from crime is the most 
important ‘structural hole’ or the key issue hindering the effectiveness of the state response 
network. This finding indicates the pervasiveness of this problem across the network. It should 
be taken into account that this is a cross cutting issue, given its prevalence across the different 
types of institutions i.e. the repression institutions, the judiciary and the finance-related 
institutions. Given that EU standards and international best practices perceive identification of 
financial assets from crime as a very valuable tool for suppression of organised crime networks, 
this may be one of important indications of the ‘gaps’ enabling endurance of organised crime in 
Serbia. That is, if assets remain in possession of criminal groups, they are enabled to continue 
criminal activities or invest these funds in legal business. 
The second most important node reveals the relations relevant for the issue of corruption, which 
are reflected in the relations grouped around the node MOI 12. Corruption also appears to be one 
of the key cross cutting issues in the state response network, given that it is identified in relations 
between different institutions i.e. the police and the judiciary, the public health sector and the 
financial-like institutions. As already discussed in this Chapter (Part I), the problem of corruption 
has been identified in all relevant international assessments of Serbia (EU Progress reports, 
FATF, MONEYVAL) as one of the main problems hindering progress. Concurrently, this 
reinforces the qualitative impression from interviews of the importance of this as a key negative 
factor in terms of effectiveness of state institutions combatting organised crime and drug 
trafficking.  
Significant results are calculated for the mapping of OC/DT networks, which involves the 
relations grouped around the node MOI 6. This is an important finding, given that the lack of 
mapping of OC/DT networks has been referred to by 44 participants. This means that the 
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repression institutions do not perform mapping of organised criminal groups in an effective 
manner, and certainly represents an important factor in terms of crime control.  
Significant results were calculated for cooperation between institutions. This problem was 
identified by most of the participants, without specifying the actual institutions where it can be 
traced. The SNA metrics indicate significant the relations grouped around the node MOI 3. Even 
though cooperation is a difficult concept for assessment, given the inherent bias of any 
individual, the recurrent reference to the lack of cooperation across the state response network 
indicates that it may be an important structural hole enabling organised criminal groups to take 
advantage of this ‘loophole’. 
Further, several other relations grouped around the following problems were identified by SNA 
metrics. The problem of statistics involves the relations grouped around the node MOI 10. The 
notion of ‘statistics’ is relevant in terms of assessing the effects of investigating and prosecuting 
organised crime. The absence of statistics implies potential for hiding data or state capture, hence 
identification of the strong relevance of this problem in the state response network represents a 
valuable finding. This finding will be further discussed below. Then, an identical betweenness 
centrality of 0,000488 has been identified for several node relations. From among these diverse 
issues, the largest weight degree of 25 was calculated for the production and trade of precursors 
and medicines, prevention of money laundering and problems in information flow. The relations 
relevant for the production and trade in precursors and medicines are those grouped around the 
node MOH 35 (the same stands for identical nodes under the code 36). Given the growing 
problem of production and trade in precursors and overall an increase in use of NPS in Serbia 
and in Europe, the relevance of this finding will be discussed in detail further below. In addition, 
this problem is also linked with several state institutions and will be addressed in the context of 
lack of cooperation mentioned above. 
The relations relevant for the prevention of money laundering are those grouped around the node 
ANTIML 47. Given the frequent reference to this problem both in the written material, as well 
as in the interviews conducted, this finding was expected. As it will be indicated in the following 
sections, the additional analysis did not find this community as significant. Nevertheless, this 
structural hole is strongly associated with the main identified problem, identification of financial 
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assets from crime and corruption, and it has been identified as one of the problems shared by 
more than 5 institutions. Detailed discussion on these connected issues is given further below. 
Problems in information flow were identified in the relations grouped around the node DIRSEIZ 
42. The significance of this issue is particularly interesting, as it is identified as one of the 
problems shared by more than 5 institutions and will be discussed in detail later. It is usually 
connected to other units of analysis, such as the existence of data bases and case management 
systems. Furthermore, the issue of border control had a weighted degree of 20. The relations 
relevant for border control are those grouped around the node MOI 8. Given the major 
importance of border control in terms of drug trafficking suppression, this finding was expected. 
Its significance was predictable, given that borders per se are not referred to as an important 
problem due to numerous activities and EU support aimed at improvement of their functioning 
during the last years. The interview statements explored in detail above (4.3.1) indicate specific 
borders relevant for drug trade. Nevertheless, this problem was not identified in the detailed 
analysis as significant. It may be that the other problems cause more distress for the participants 
in performing their tasks, hence decreasing their focus on this particular issue.  
Finally, the relations relevant for the strategic approach are those grouped around the node 
OFFCOMDRUG 43. This is also a cross cutting issue that appears across the network and 
involves a number of different institutions. However, within a broader framework of legislation, 
this particular issue was not found significant in the detailed analysis. 
 
4.3.3.3. Particular structural holes identified by an in-depth SNA analysis of the communities 
of the state response network  
 
The “Graph V.4: Network of institutions” indicates the number of sub-graphs or components of 
the state response network (the communities).The whole network was described in the Graphs 
V.1 and V.2, while all the institutions and all of their relations are visualised in the Graph V.3. 
Given the degree of the lack of connectedness of the emphasized communities, the specific sub-
graphs were further analysed. There is a total of 28 relevant communities 
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Graph V.4: Network of institutions 
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The data utilised for this graph are given in the excel file Graph 4 and 5 data table for Second 
analysis (Annex 11) The data involves: a) the first column, Node I, in excel file (institution with 
its domain of action in relation to an issue or structural hole), b) the second column, Node II, 
in excel file (another institution that has a relation with regard to that issue or structural hole), 
and c) the third column, Weight, in excel file (the number of times a reference to that issue or 
structural hole appears in the interviews). Hence, network nodes are institutions – the two 
institutions are connected if they share at least one competence related to an issue or a structural 
hole. The weight of the relation represents the number of references to that issue. To express 
this number of references, in this second phase of SNA, a second scaling table was developed. 
The number of times a certain issue or a structural hole was mentioned by the interviewees was 
the key criterion for the development of the Table Scaling of Issues 2 (Annex 13). This data 
was used to explore in depth the communities identified by the SNA.  
Table V.8. Extract from the Table Scaling of Issues 2  
STRUCTURAL 
HOLES 
ISSUES PER 
ITEM 
NODE I NODE II WEIGHT 
1 Investigation/ 
prosecution 
Operational 
capacities 
(number, 
trainings, 
relationships,) 
 
 
 
Mapping of 
OC/DT 
networks 
 
 
MOI 1  
MOI 1  
MOI 1  
MOI 1 
 
 
 
MOI 3 
MOI 3 
MOI 3 
MOI 3 
MOI 3 
PORGCRIM 1 
CP1 
PD1 
SBPOK1 
 
 
 
CP 3 
PD3 
SBPOK3 
BIA2 
SERPREVDT2 
 
42 
 
 
 
 
 
 
44 
2 Role of the court 
  
Trial 
(expertise, 
relationships in 
court panel, 
decision 
making, 
judging to 
benefit of 
def....) 
 
Appeal 
proceedings 
 
Case law 
CORGCRIM 1 
CORGCRIM 1 
 
 
 
 
 
CORGCRIM 2 
 
 
CORGCRIM 3 
APELLC 1 
PORGCRIM3 
 
 
 
 
 
APELLC 2 
 
 
APELLC 3 
 
48 
 
 
 
 
 
 
56 
 
 
55 
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3 Financial 
investigation 
 
Identification 
of financial 
assets from 
crime 
 
 
Sectors 
vulnerable for 
corruption 
FIU 1 
FIU 1 
FIU 1 
FIU 1 
FIU 1 
 
FIU 2 
FIU 2 
FIU 2 
MOI 10 
CORGCRIM 7 
APPELC 7 
TAX 1 
CUST 1 
 
MOI 11 
TAX 2 
SBPOK 10 
55 
 
 
 
 
37 
 
 
The units of analysis were utilised as the ID of issues for the social network analysis (Column 
Issues per item). The grouping of data was performed on the basis of an institutional 
competence domain of action (legally prescribed jurisdiction) in relation to a particular unit of 
analysis. That is, the jurisdiction of an institution for an issue identified in the content analysis 
was coded as one node (the first column Node I in the excel file “Graph 4 communities data” 
(Annex 12). Then its relation with a second node (the second column Node II in the excel file 
“Graph 4 results centrality measures”), an institution responsible for the same issue identified 
in the content analysis, was measured. The column Weight reflects the actual number of times 
this issue was referred to in the interviews and written material collected. As noted, these data 
sets utilised in the metrics are provided in the Table Scaling of issues 2 (Annex 13) and an 
extract of this Table is provided below for reference and to example an output. The data from 
this Table Scaling of issues 2 were inserted in the Excel file Graph 4 Communities data (Annex 
12) as the basis for calculations. 
Table V.9: Extract from Excel file “Graph 4 Communities data” 
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The measures of centrality46 are provided in detail in the file “Graph 4 results centrality 
measures " (Annex 14). 
Table V.10. Extract from excel file Graph 4 results centrality measures 
 
 
As shown in the above Graph V. 4, the number of nodes is 118, the number of branches is 90. 
Network density has the value of 0.0130. The Network diameter: without weights: 2, weighted: 
110. The average path length is 1.626. 
The 28 identified communities are formed around some of the key issues. The 8 key structural 
holes that have significant metrics (degree, betweenness, eigenvector) therefore appear as the 
most significant communities in the network and include: 
1. Mapping of OC/DT networks; 
2. Reliance on secret service;  
3. Appeal proceedings;  
4. Case law;  
                                                             
46 The measures of centrality are the following: "degree" - degree centrality; "betweenness" - betweenness 
centrality; "betweenness_wt" - weighted betweenness centrality; "eigen" - Eigen vector centrality; and 
"eigen_wt" - weighted Eigen vector centrality 
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5. Identification of financial assets from crime;  
6. Implementation of laws; 
7. Seizure and destruction of drugs, 
8. Prevention of drug misuse   
The analysis confirms that these 8 structural holes represent the key problems in the functioning 
of the state response network. That is, identification of these communities by SNA confirms 
the significance of most of the key issues or structural holes identified in the content analysis. 
Each of the significant communities is analysed in detail below. 
Moreover, in order to analyse the relations between institutions in the identified communities, 
identical data was used in the second analysis (Annex 13). From among the 28 communities 
formed around the key structural holes that have significant metrics, further analysis was 
performed to see whether these issues imply cooperation among institutions (i.e. a whole 
segment of the state response network) or they are linked to a single state institution. 
The Graph V.5 “Network of institutions with main communities of size > 5” indicates the main 
communities i.e. components of the graph with more than 5 nodes. The rest of the nodes are 
white in colour as it is not possible to use a palette with 28 colours. The maximum number of 
colours for a creative image is 8 and those colours were used. Once more, an indicative excerpt 
from the relevant Excel file is provided for reference in Table V.11. 
The Graph V.5 provides an image of the relations between institutions (linked to more than 5 
nodes) in the case of the main structural holes identified. Data on the components47 are provided 
in the file 'Graph 5 Components' (Annex 15). The bigger the size of the components, more 
relations of that node are identified with other institutions. This indicates shared responsibility 
of many institutions for some of the identified problems. 
 
 
 
                                                             
47 "node_id" - ID of the node;  "node_component" - ID of the component to which the node belongs to;  
"component_size" – size of the component to which the node belongs to;  "node_color" – the color of the node  
(hexadecimal colour record) 
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Table V.11. Extract from Excel file Components Graph 5 
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Graph V.5: Network of institutions with main communities of size > 5 
 
 
As presented in the Graph V.5, the analysis identifies 8 key communities grouped around 
particular problems in the state response network which can be attributed to more than 5 
institutions. The structural holes belonging to these communities are the following:  
1. Mapping of OC/DT networks 
2. Identification of financial assets from crime 
3. Independence/political influence/corruption, 
4. Internal control, 
5. Multi-disciplinary teams, 
6. Implementation of laws, 
7. Information exchange 
8. Production and trade precursors. 
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Interesting findings arise from this analysis. That is, some of the key communities including 
more than 5 institutions are grouped around the particular structural holes which have the most 
significant metrics identified above (mapping of OC/DT networks; identification of financial 
assets from crime; independence/political influence/corruption and implementation of laws). 
However, other communities are formed around the problems which have not been identified 
above as particular structural holes which have the most significant metrics. These include 
internal control, multi-disciplinary teams, information exchange and production and trade of 
precursors. 
These identified issues offer interesting conclusions with regards to potential spheres of state 
capture. The findings actually indicate that some problems in the state network functioning are 
shared among several institutions and hence might be more difficult to address through simple 
legislative or guideline-type of measures. This finding may imply that some structural holes are 
pervasive across the state response network: i.e. that there are whole segments of the state 
response network that can be potentially affected by state capture. Concurrently, it is interesting 
that some of the significant structural holes identified in an in-depth analysis of the 
communities can be attributed to less than 5 institutions, but very well connected inside. Such 
communities were identified by Batagelj et al. (2017), who found that pending a given or 
computed property of nodes/links, different islands or maximal connected sub-networks can be 
obtained. This is the case when values of selected property inside an island are larger than 
values on the island’s neighbours and the size of the nodes is within a given range [k].  It could 
be argued that these separate islands may be Cockayne’s “spaces” (2017, p.5). They seem to 
be least connected and hence least transparent for other institutional stakeholders. This is for 
instance the case with the role of the Appellate court, which will be further discussed under 
research question 4.  
Moreover, there are no strong relations among the different communities, which implies that 
perhaps institutions know little about activities of the others. This is somewhat consistent with 
the responses in the interviews. In light of this, the key structural holes identified in the analysis 
are discussed in detail below. 
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5.4.4. Discussion - the key structural holes in the state response network 
 
 5.4.4.1. Structural holes in the field of investigation and prosecution 
 
The findings of this research identified mapping of organised crime/drug trafficking networks 
(the node MOI 6) as one of the key structural holes in the state response network (with a 
weighted degree of 30). In practice, this implies that the repression institutions do not perform 
mapping of organised criminal groups in an effective manner, and certainly represents an 
important factor in terms of crime control.  
Most participants reported that the law enforcement institutions do not perform ‘mapping’ of 
criminal groups. This does not imply that they do not undertake investigative measures, but 
rather shows that these measures are undertaken in a reactive rather than proactive or 
intelligence-led law enforcement. Nevertheless, best practices in the EU states indicate that 
mapping of the criminal groups contributes to their efficient detection. This is consistent with 
the literature on organised crime, which clearly demonstrates that contemporary organised 
criminal groups function as networks of cells and that they are increasingly investigated by the 
application of social and/or criminal network analysis (Gunnell, Hillier and Blakeborough, 
2016; Seidlear and Adderlay, 2013; Tayebi, and Glässer, 2016). Such an approach inherently 
involves different forms of mapping. 
However, most of the interviewees have reported that such an approach is overall not 
implemented in Serbia. This finding is consistent with the Progress report 2016 which states: 
“Intelligence-led policing based on SOCTA crime mapping and systematic use of threat 
assessment needs to be developed”. Similarly, the Progress report 2017 states that “Efforts to 
investigate wider criminal networks …still need to be stepped up”. 
It is interesting that the perceptions differ if the responses are provided by the prosecution and 
the law enforcement. This also confirms the above discussion on the lack of connectedness of 
the state response network, given that it clearly demonstrates that institutions are not aware of 
the efforts undertaken by other stakeholders. This is demonstrated through the following 
questions and responses: 
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Law enforcement agencies perform evaluation/mapping of the high risk places for drug trade 
No. (prosecutor, P2.2) 
Yes. (police, SBPOK, P2.14) 
Mapping involves specific places e.g. borders, airport, train/bus stations? Has this process resulted in 
important arrests 
No. (prosecutor,P2.3) 
Yes. (police, SBPOK, P2.15) 
Are other places included in mapping e.g. night clubs, bars, taxi companies, exchange offices, tattoo shops, 
houses/apartments for rent? Has this resulted in important arrests/cases 
No. (a prosecutor, P2.8) 
Yes, some important arrests happened on this basis. (police, SBPOK, P2.14) 
Yes, when used, this always results in arrests. But these are usually low-level dealers, it is not including 
the organisers. (police, SBPOK, P2.17) 
Does your institution keep a ‘database’ on the dealing areas 
No. (A repression institution representative, P2.2) 
Yes, at the level of republic, Sector for criminalistics analytics has been established. (A repression 
institution representative, P2.7) 
Frequent place control is performed 
No. (A prosecutor, P2.3) 
Yes, increased control of persons and objects is performed in such locations. (police, SBPOK, P2.16) 
Are proactive investigations on the web performed to detect places and networks 
No. (Repression institutions representatives, P2.9) 
  
The responses indicated important gaps in communication and awareness across the state 
response network in the field of investigation and prosecution. This is particularly relevant 
given that the Prosecutors Office is competent for leading the investigation, in line with the 
Criminal Procedure Code. It is therefore difficult to understand how these investigations are 
coordinated in practice. It could also be the case that that the institutions have different 
perceptions at to what is considered mapping. Furthermore, these responses might imply that 
investigation is not performed under clearly prescribed rules, thus contributing to such 
misunderstandings among the stakeholders. This may be supported by the following: 
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Proximity is important in the state’s efforts to suppress drug trafficking 
No, it is organised at republic level. (A repression institution representative, P2.2) 
No, the teams are formed in general, not in relation to proximity. (A repression institution representative, 
P2.7) 
The task force applies the ‘mirror approach’ i.e. focus on each type of OC separately? Are there special 
units for specific types of drugs, heroine, cocaine 
I never heard of that approach. (A repression institution representative, P2.8) 
No, the teams are organised without reflecting the type of crime. (A repression institution representative, 
P2.3) 
Are mobile observations performed 
No. (A repression institution representative, P2.2) 
 
As a part of investigation and prosecution, the reliance on secret service has also been identified 
by the social network analysis as an important structural hole. In order to grasp this problem, it 
requires further clarification. The police in Serbia perform special investigative measures 
through the Security Information Agency (BIA). The reasons for this are of a technical nature, 
or essentially financial – the police does not have sufficient resources to get the equipment 
necessary for special investigative techniques. Nevertheless, the utilisation of a body like BIA 
causes concerns with regard to civil control and opportunities for abuse of power. The 
underlying motives for such perceptions are strongly related with the Serbian past experiences 
and will be discussed thoroughly in the context of state capture. 
Several elements of investigation and prosecution were found as relatively significant structural 
holes, such as cooperation between institutions, border control and information exchange. 
Interestingly, these problems were also identified as significant structural holes attributed to > 
5 institutions (see Graph V.5). Cooperation between institutions (the node MOI3) was found as 
one of these relatively significant structural holes. Certainly, cooperation is a difficult notion 
for assessment, given the inherent bias of individuals, but it has been cited by most of the 
interviewees as an important obstacle. The responses differed with regard to aspects of 
cooperation, for instance, some perceive that there is a lack of cooperation with a particular 
institution, whereas others experience problems in working with their colleagues (e.g. in a court 
panel, where corrupt or ‘captured’ appointees were noted by their colleagues). Lack of 
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cooperation was also commonly referred to in the context of destruction of drugs, as one of the 
key features hindering this process. 
How would you assess the standpoint of other state actors towards this court 
Ambivalent. (A judge, P2.1) 
Usually not very honest, suspicious. (A judge, P2.20) 
Would you say that different services share a common goal 
Yes. (A repression institution representative, P2.16) 
Services yes, but not all the persons working in the system. (A judge, P2.23)  
 
The recurrent reference to the lack of cooperation across the state response network indicates 
that it may be an important structural hole enabling organised criminal groups to take advantage 
of this ‘loophole’. Finally, the findings show that problems in border control and information 
flow are moderately significant (weighted degree of 20). That is, they were identified as 
relevant communities, but their importance (or impact) is of lesser value than the other 
structural holes described hereby. These structural holes are associated with the jurisdiction of 
various institutions, and were therefore identified by SNA metrics as communities of problems 
including > 5 institutions.  
Identification of border control was expected, due to its inherent association with drug 
trafficking and organised crime. Specific border points frequently involved in illegal activities 
were analysed under research question 2, also in terms of specific methods of drug trade. 
Certainly, corruption is viewed here as an important factor related to border control. The 
identified problems in information flow were perhaps not so significant, but are closely related 
to the main structural hole, which is financial investigation. The potential mechanisms of state 
capture arising from these problems will be discussed in detail under research question 4. 
The problem of statistics has also been identified as relatively significant. The relations relevant 
for statistics are those between the police, the prosecution and the courts for organised crime in 
both instances.48 The notion of ‘statistics’ could seem rather irrelevant for a reader, however, 
in terms of investigating state capture, identification of the strong relevance of this problem in 
                                                             
48 The statistics relevant for the nodes MOI 10 with PORGCRIM 10, CORGCRIM 11 and APPELC 10. 
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the state response network represents a valuable finding. The lack of coherent statistics in 
Serbia has been an ongoing problem for decades. In fact, the impossibility to compare the data 
of the police, prosecution and the judiciary hinders in depth analysis of the effectiveness (or 
lack thereof) of their work. In the context of EU integration and the need to measure progress 
in the field of organised crime, drug trafficking and anti-corruption through track record tables, 
one might say ‘how convenient’ that there are no clear statistical data. Therefore, what these 
SNA statistics do is they point to the lack of coordination and a major gap in data availability, 
which can be understood as a proxy for ineffectiveness. The gaps in coordination have therefore 
a practical impact as they limit the potential of many institutions to contribute to suppression, 
given the lack of knowledge or awareness of the actions undertaken by other state authorities.  
 
Finally, with regard to operational capacities and infiltration, no significant metrics confirm 
their relevance. This could be explained by the fact that most participants tend to demonstrate 
that institutions are working well, given that EU accession process in fact requires the country 
to have sufficient capacities for the reforms and their implementation. On the contrary, it could 
be that individual operational capacities are good, but the institutional set up and methods of 
functioning hinder their work. With regards to infiltration, this finding of the content analysis 
was not confirmed as a relevant gap in SNA metrics. It should be noted that the participants 
didn’t refer to this as a problem, thus it may be assumed that infiltration of repression 
institutions’ representatives in criminal networks functions well. Also, it may be that this 
technique is not widely or sufficiently used, hence most individuals potentially are not aware 
of the problems in that regard.  
 
Other aspects of investigation and prosecution were not identified by SNA metrics as relevant, 
even though various deficiencies have been identified in the content analysis. For instance, 
training was not identified as significant, but qualitative data imply the presence of problems 
in this field as well. For instance, even though judges claim that training is organised 
occasionally and that lectures are of good quality, it seems that during the last 5 years, the 
training for judges in this field was not organised. This finding is highly correlated with the 
above discussion on capacity building of the stakeholders. It also indicates that operational 
capacities might not be at the expected level. What this points to is the need to examine both 
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the content analysis and the SNA together. The latter can usefully quantify some of the data 
and relationships identified in the former, but it is not in a sense ‘better’, it is another approach 
or another lens, and the content analyses on their own have rendered useful finings that cannot 
be, as it were, overwritten by the view provided by SNA. 
 
These findings all raise important questions with regard to investigation and prosecution 
aspects of the state response network. Some of these may be questions such as ‘why there is no 
mapping? or, why cooperation is dysfunctional?’. An attempt to respond to these questions is 
made under research question 4, further below.  
 
5.4.4.2. Structural holes in the field of the role of the court  
 
What this research has found is that three components of the broad unit of analysis, role of the 
court, represent the second significant structural hole in the state response network. This was 
identified in the content analysis and confirmed through primary SNA, while all of its elements 
were identified in an in-depth social network analysis. The following were identified as 
significant structural holes: 
1. Appeal proceedings;  
2. Case law;  
3. Trial related issues. 
  
Several excerpts from the interviews illustrate the main problems: 
 
Please comment on the role of the Appellate court with regard to judgements of the Special Court for 
Organized Crime 
Negative role mostly. They have a lack of consistent legal standpoints, inconsistent sentencing policies. (A 
repression institution representative, P2.5) 
That court shows arbitrariness in making decisions. (A judge, P2.21) 
Insecurity in decision making. (A judge, P2.1) 
Very long duration of appeal proceedings. (A repression institution representative, P2.8) 
No unified case law. (A repression institution representative, P2.19) 
Appellate court cancels everything we do... it is as if they work for organised crime and not against it... (A 
repression institution representative, P2.25) 
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That court has some magic ways to interpret the evidence always to the benefit of defendant... (A judge, 
P2.23) 
The rationales of their decisions are an example that should be studied in law schools... it is amazing how 
they always set people free for anything they do... (A state institution representative, P1.18) 
 
The interesting insights provided by the application of SNA is particularly visible in this case. 
That is, despite the small size of the Appellate court (the node APPELC), both the appeal 
proceedings and case law which are in its jurisdiction appear as most significant problems.  
This is due to the fact that this court is responsible ‘only’ for second instance proceedings; 
hence SNA metrics cannot adequately measure its importance in relation to other institutions 
because they are influenced by the size of the node, such as here where it has a small number 
of connections with other nodes (responsible institutions). Nonetheless, once the network of 
issues or structural holes is analysed, the SNA metrics strongly confirm the significance of 
these problems. It must be noted here that all the participants referred to these problems as the 
key issues hindering effective trial of organised crime and drug trafficking cases.  
 
What does this tell us? It could be argued that the identified role of the Appellate court actually 
demonstrates the practical structural hole, visible in practice. That is, when there is no case law 
or it is not taken into account, or when most of the appeal proceedings end up in acquittals, it 
could be argued that a message is sent to lower instance courts, prosecutors and the police that 
they are investing efforts in suppressing organised crime for no reason.  For instance, the 
Minister of Justice stated in January 2019, that about 60% of decisions set the defendants in 
organised crime cases free or on conditional sentences (Rts, January 2019).  
 
The questions that arise here are whether the state allows organised crime through this form of 
work of the appellate court? Given the inter-connected phenomenon of corruption, such 
behaviour of the appellate court is frequently explained in this way.  Does the state allow this, 
or is this a form of state capture? Given that Serbia is not characterised as a state that has a rule 
of law highly focused upon presumptive bail and defendant rights e.g. legal framework is not 
yet aligned with the new EU acquis on procedural safeguards, state representatives often breach 
the presumption of innocence, this high standard of the rule of law most probably is not the 
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rationale for Appellate court decisions in specific cases. These are questions that will be 
discussed in detail below in the research question 4.  
 
The analyses also revealed some unexpected findings. For example, independence and political 
influence, as components of the role of the court, have been commonly reported in previous 
studies to be related with failure to adequately suppress organised crime (e.g. Hiber and 
Begovic, 2006). Unexpectedly, in implementing these metrics, no such relationship was found 
as significant. A possible explanation of this contradiction with the background literature may 
be that in this research focused on a whole set of practical and measurable features of the work 
of institutions; hence the participants gave emphasis to the actual problems they experience. 
Likewise, the lack of independence and political influence on judges is considered as a constant 
problem in Serbia. In other words, it may be so assumed as seldom to require verbalising as a 
distinct feature of legal and political processes. Nevertheless, given that the subsequent analysis 
identified the problem of independence and political influence as significant (see Graph V.5), 
this entails a cross-cutting issue and will be addressed in more detail with a view to state capture 
under research question 4.  
 
Finally, the trial related issues encompass a variety of items, such as relationships in court 
panel, decision making methods, judging to benefit of defendant, and court expertise. 
Evidently, the reference to these issues by the participants has indicated that these problems 
exist in practice. However, the discussion on state capture will additionally reflect on these 
problems. This is mainly due to the fact that each of these problems is broadly related to other 
identified structural holes in the state response network and in fact demonstrates the potential 
state capture mechanisms. 
 
 
5.4.4.3. Structural holes in the field of financial investigation  
 
The analysis has indicated that identification of financial assets from crime is the most 
significant ‘structural hole’ or the key issue hindering the effectiveness of the state response 
network. This structural hole (the node FIU 39) had the highest weighted degree of 40, which 
is the highest weighted degree in the network (e.g. other important also involve 25). This was 
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confirmed both through primary SNA analysis, as well as through SNA in depth analysis of 
communities in state response network. 
This finding was somewhat surprising, given that it was expected that some of the repression 
related issues would be the most significant. Nevertheless, this finding perhaps uncovers to 
whole essence of the endurance of organised crime in Serbia. An explanation is offered hereby. 
The analysis has shown that the problems with identification of financial assets from crime are 
pervasive across the state response network. This problem was also identified in the research 
question 1, as a factor contributing to prolonged transition and EU accession processes. Its 
significance lies in the pervasiveness across the different types of institutions, including the law 
enforcement, the judiciary and the financial-like institutions. What this means in practice is that 
organised criminal groups (and individuals as their members) have the opportunity to preserve 
the profit from crime, even if they are prosecuted or eventually convicted.  
The interviewees repeatedly stated that there are no sufficient capacities for financial 
investigations in the relevant institutions. In addition, they stated that the data bases are not 
sufficiently or sometimes indeed at all connected, thus identification of various relevant 
financial data (e.g. property registers). Despite certain state efforts in 2018 to improve the 
financial investigation (such as comprehensive trainings, adoption of a new law), it is still too 
early to evaluate the results thereof. 
Overall, this finding is very interesting in the context of the discussion on potential state 
capture. The official justifications of the lack of identification and seizure of financial assets 
from crime indicate that this structural hole could actually represent ‘the point of arbitrage’. 
Once again, this is a very important point, but full discussion of it will be held over to research 
question 4, where all of these elements are brought together.  
Prevention of money laundering has also been identified as an important structural hole (node 
ANTIML 47). This finding was confirmed both through primary SNA analysis, as well as 
through SNA in depth analysis of communities in state response network. This problem is also 
pervasive across the state response network, as it involves several institutions, namely the anti 
money laundering agency, customs, and tax administration, but also repression institutions 
SBPOK and BIA, and finally the Special Court for Organised Crime.  
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The problem of money laundering has been frequently referenced in the published material, 
particularly EU progress reports and other international assessments (such as MONEYVAL, 
discussed in Par 1 of this Chapter). Given the transnational nature of this phenomenon, it is not 
surprising that the EU and other states perceive this issue as one of the key obstacles to the 
accession of Serbia. The conducted interviews indicated that this problem is almost perceived 
as an ordinary social fact. That is, money laundering is considered a common process 
accompanying organised crime activities, or its integral element.  
When this finding is observed along with another significant structural hole, the identification 
of sectors vulnerable for corruption, it becomes evident why most of the aspects of institutional 
functioning aimed at tracking criminal money flows are verified as the most important 
loopholes of the system. The relation to the main structural holes identified above i.e. 
identification of financial assets from crime and corruption, prevention of money laundering 
and identification of sectors vulnerable for corruption, demonstrates that the mechanisms for 
freezing, managing and confiscating criminal assets are not effective. 
The identified deficiencies in the financial investigations, coupled with extensive money 
laundering, allow for reinvestment of substantial profits in the Serbian economy. The 
commonly corruption-related sectors referred to in the interviews and other written material 
include real estate, infrastructure projects, healthcare, education, spatial planning, and 
privatisation of public enterprises.  This enables further investments of profits from crime into 
continuance of the activities of the organised criminal groups, or in the legal business. Either 
way, the power of the criminal groups does not decrease regardless successful repression 
actions. Given that EU standards and international best practices perceive identification and 
confiscation of financial assets from crime as a very valuable tool for suppression of organised 
crime networks, this may be one of important indications of the ‘gaps’ enabling endurance of 
organised crime in Serbia.  
 
5.4.4.4. Structural hole in the field of seizure and destruction of drugs 
 
This research has found that one of the major problems hindering state network effectiveness 
is the seizure and destruction of drugs. The author was aware of this problem; however, the 
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findings of this research indicated its outstanding particularities. The most compelling 
findings were actually the interview statements. For instance: 
Drug seizures? Where are the drugs kept 
I had a case where the police station claimed that there is no sample of drugs, because it was eaten by 
mice...Who would believe that?“  (A judge, P2.1) 
Drugs are not destroyed during the duration of a trial...This leaves a lot of room for abuse...” (A prosecutor, 
P2.10) 
In MOI, police stations. (A repression institution representative, P2.3) 
In police stations across the country, but they are overcrowded. (A repression institution representative, 
P2.7) 
This is a big problem, we have these amounts in the corridors, in our offices. (A repression institution 
representative, P2.21) 
What is causing this problem is the duration of court proceedings, repeated expertise , long time for the 
actual enforcement of sentences. (A repression institution representative, P2.8) 
 
This is a known problem among the Serbian professionals engaged in this field. Several EU 
peer review missions discussed this topic in particular, aiming to improve the situation. The 
state had taken some steps in this regard, but it seems that not much change has been achieved. 
For instance, Progress report 2018 (p.40) states:  
The lack of secure storage of seized drugs and drug precursors prior to destruction 
remains an issue of concern. An appropriate process for the destruction of precursors has 
yet to be set up. Furthermore, according to current legislation, it is not possible to keep 
only a small drug sample as material evidence for court proceedings, but the entire seized 
quantity has to be stored. Overall, and although progress was made, this policy area would 
benefit from a more proactive and holistic approach. 
It appears that every aspect of the seizure and destruction of drugs is problematic. This may be 
due to various reasons, however, the findings indicate several important systemic gaps which 
explain the current situation in this regard. Primarily, the seizure of drugs represents a serious 
problem, given that the drugs are kept in the police stations across the country.  As interviewees 
stated, this involves corridors, offices, basically all the available locations in their buildings. 
Understandably, it is difficult to ensure the control of such substances, both with regard to their 
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amount, as well as prevention of their disappearance, or their cutting or replacement. The police 
stations are therefore overcrowded with drugs.  
Secondly, drugs are not destroyed during the duration of a trial. The legislative framework 
prescribes this, so it is difficult to discuss about institutional responsibility. Such framework 
leaves a lot of room for abuse, in particular in the court proceedings. In fact, as a judge 
explained, nobody can claim that the drugs seized from the defendant are the exact ones that 
are sent for analysis subsequently. This damages the court proceedings to a great extent.  As a 
consequence, judges claim that the expertise on the type of drug and its features is challenging, 
given that nobody can confirm that it is the same drug seized from the defendant. Further, and 
not surprisingly, lawyers often use this in defence strategies. 
It has also been asserted that the whole process of court expertise on the substances is not 
sufficiently clear. It seems that there are no guidelines or clear procedures that would ensure 
that the same substance that is taken for analysis is exactly the one examined. As it appears, the 
person taking the drugs for analysis does not need to sign any documentation as to the amount 
of substance, which enables a variety of abuses. 
Furthermore, the destruction of seized drugs has also been identified as an issue hindering the 
fight against drug trafficking and organised crime. Beyond the reasons discussed above, the 
problem is that the responsible authority for the destruction of precursors is not effectively 
determined. This is a rather convenient situation and will be discussed below in the context of 
potentials for state capture. Overall, this structural hole appears to be an excellent ‘point of 
arbitrage’ or space for informal social exchanges between state actors and criminal networks. 
The consequences of the deficiencies in this area enable the drugs to remain in the system, 
either by being sold, trafficked or used. Finally, this situation reflects the overwhelming gaps 
in the state response network to a great extent. 
 
5.4.4.5. Structural holes in the field of legal framework  
 
The aspects covered by this indicator titled legal framework involve the process of drafting of 
laws and strategic frameworks, as well as their implementation. The component 
‘implementation of laws’ was identified as one of the main problems through SNA in-depth 
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analysis of communities in the state response network. This is consistent with other findings 
discussed earlier, under research question 1, as well as with most of the official EU reports on 
Serbia.  
 
As described under research question 1, the problems with implementation of legal frameworks 
in Serbia are often associated with socio-political context and the absence of the so-called 
political will. The need for political will indicates that institutions remain weak and dependent 
on current political options. Moreover, the absence of impact assessments of relevant laws or 
their amendments hinders evaluations of their results. Finally, it is important to note that the 
assessments of alignment and/or transposition of the EU acquis mostly indicate partial 
harmonisation of Serbian legislative framework. In the context of the delayed transition and 
EU accession, it appears that there is still a lot of work to be done. Lack of implementation of 
laws also represents a cross cutting issue that appears throughout the state response network 
and involves a number of different institutions (> 5 institutions). This will be further discussed 
below in the context of the potential for state capture. 
The findings of this research also identified the strategic approach as a relatively significant 
structural hole (the node OFFCOMDRUG 43). The notion of a strategic approach here refers 
to the preparation of strategies and action plans in the field of organised crime and drug 
trafficking suppression and their implementation. Interestingly, the drafting of laws was not 
found as a significant problem. This is somewhat understandable, given that references to other 
aspects of the legal framework were more recurrent. For the purpose of discussion, it is 
nevertheless important to note that there are visible problems in this process as well, mainly 
associated with reluctance of state institutions to accept proposals of the professionals aimed at 
improvement of the normative framework. Concurrently, the normative changes aimed at 
acquis alignment are often perceived by the stakeholders as a burden, or are viewed as 
additional financial burdens to the state and therefore postponed.  An impression from the 
interviews, as well as a personal experience, is that state institutions’ staff do not perceive any 
need to amend or improve legislative frameworks and often refuse to accept new norms or 
mechanisms, usually followed by a standpoint “We have always been doing that in this way”.  
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 5.4.4.6. Structural holes in the field of prevention of substance misuse 
 
The field of substance misuse prevention was not the focus of this research, but rather just an 
indicator of the presence of drug trafficking in the country. The state of the field of drug misuse 
and treatment was considered relevant for this research, as it provides deeper insight with regard 
to the prevalence of drug use and types of drugs. This was coupled with the data on the role of 
civil society and the media, in terms of prevention of drug misuse and relevant research. 
The findings of this research have shown that prevention of substance misuse represents an 
important structural hole in the state response network. The primary SNA metrics found that 
the community grouped around the problem of production and trade of precursors is significant. 
These relations involve the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Interior and its relevant 
sectors (Criminalistics police, Police department, BIA and SBPOK).   
This is consistent with other findings of this research, indicating a shift in substance misuse 
trends in Serbia. As discussed above, the analysis has demonstrated that there is an increase in 
substance misuse overall, as well as a growing trend in the use of NPS. The participants 
explained this trend in various ways, for instance, a CSOs representative stated the following: 
This comes as a result of various factors, including wrong and outdated approach to drug policy, inefficient 
measures, critical cultural models, lack of prevention, corruption and organized crime. (P4.3) 
The representatives of repression institutions, on the other hand, consider that this is a 
consequence of the fact that the country is a transit route for drugs and that the prevalence of 
drug trafficking groups results in decreased prices of narcotics. The CSOs representatives stated 
that the use of NPS is mostly visible among young people, in nightlife and festival settings and 
in music business. However, they also stated that “traditional drugs fight back - the market 
started responding to the change” (A CSO representative, P4.5).  
Furthermore, lack of research has been identified through an in depth social network analysis 
as one of the key structural holes. This could be surprising for a reader, given that the state 
response network contains much more important aspects. Nevertheless, this finding is essential 
for the context of this research, as it indicates significant lack of awareness and knowledge 
about this topic among professionals. In view of the potential state capture, this actually shows 
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that most of the problems generally acknowledged or discussed among individuals working 
across the state response network remain concealed. 
The following responses appear to best portray this state of affairs: 
Most of the governmental bodies are not willing to cooperate with CSOs. The key reason is that then they 
have to work more and better, which is not their approach. Instead, they tend to do only what they have to. 
(A CSO representative, P4.3) 
What is missing is the political will and commitment to fight the problem. (A CSO representative, P4.4) 
Public authorities are rarely willing to provide information/access to independent researchers. Only if under 
pressure. Even than not always. (A CSO representative, P4.2) 
 
The absence of effective treatment for drug addiction has not been identified as significant in 
the SNA metrics. Nevertheless, this is an exceptionally important field that requires distinct 
research. For the purposes of this research, it will simply be observed that treatment availability 
in Serbia is limited, in particular in penitentiary institutions (only methadone substitution 
therapies available).  
The fact that incarcerated drug users that do not have access to treatment represents violation of human 
rights.... There is a significant lack of treatment inside the penitentiary institutions. (An EU expert working 
on accession project in Serbia, P1.27) 
  
The analysis shows that most CSOs are advocating for decriminalization of possession and 
using drugs. They believe that such an approach would allow for concentrating efforts on the 
crime related to drugs, not the drug use. This is in line with contemporary approaches that 
perceive sentencing drug users as an outdated approach (MacGregor and Whiting, 2010; 
Stöver, and Kastelic, 2014; Stevens, Stöver, and Brentari, 2010; Papamalis, 2017). Research 
has indicated that bigger sentences and imprisonment are not an effective response to the drug 
problem and do not contribute to the decrease of drug use and dependence (Bretteville-Jensen 
et al., 2017) This outdated approach usually remains in countries with populist political 
strategies: i.e. the prevailing public opinion that the more severe penalties, the better, is then 
used by politicians for purposes of electoral competition.  
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Taking into account that in the last two decades most of the states have amended drug laws to 
focus on public health-oriented approaches instead of punishment policies, it may be argued 
that such changes are necessary in Serbia as well, particularly in view of these research findings. 
 
5.4.5. Conclusions  
 
To summarise, the combination of the content analysis and the social network analysis enabled 
identification of the key structural holes in the state response network. The content analysis 
identified 6 key units of analysis; each consisted of several key elements. The SNA metrics 
identified the particular structural holes under these key units of analysis. This was one of the 
key rationales for implementation of SNA in this research: i.e. the confirmation of the findings 
of the content analysis aimed at increasing the reliability of conclusions. 
To recap the details briefly, the findings of this research identified legal framework, prevention, 
investigation, financial investigation, trial and seizure and destruction of drugs which hinder 
the effectiveness of state institutions in suppressing organised crime and drug trafficking. It is 
important to emphasize that most of these problems or structural holes were also identified 
under research question 1 as factors hampering transition and EU accession. Additionally, in 
depth social network analysis of the entire network determined the total of 28 relevant 
communities focused around the particular elements of the main 6 areas of problems. The 
conceptualisation of this research views these 28 identified communities as ‘structural holes’ 
or, in the language of Cockayne (2016, p.8), as ‘points of arbitrage’ between licit and illicit 
domains. The most significant communities among them, precisely eight areas with strong state 
capture potential (identification of financial assets from crime, the role of the Appellate court, 
case law, mapping of criminal networks, seizure and destruction of drugs, implementation of 
legal framework, reliance on secret service, prevention of substance misuse), have been 
analysed and discussed in more detail. 
 
Even though other deficiencies have also been confirmed and explained in this section, it is 
interesting to observe these main structural holes together. Research supports that efforts to 
understand and fight organised crime must take into account the interaction between the unique 
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ecologies of states and illicit networks (Cockayne and Roth, 2017). The unique ecologies may 
be formed in the dangerous “spaces”, including legal gaps, geographical or functional cavities. 
Given that fragile institutional capacity of the state contributes to the ease of illegal operations, 
identification of state vulnerabilities in the field of crime control may prevent their further 
exploitation by the criminal networks. Therefore, taken together, the identified vulnerabilities 
strongly indicate that organised criminal networks have practically “all the system” covered. 
The picture that emerges is thus multifaceted. For example, there are  vulnerabilities in 
investigation: i.e. mapping of criminal networks and financial investigation that ensure 
protection from law enforcement and secure the proceeds from crime for further investment; 
concurrently, drugs are not seized or, if they are, they will probably not be destroyed until the 
finalisation of the proceedings and may often ‘go missing’; and finally, the court, rather than 
serving the rule of law, too often appears to be there to ensure the acquittal of important network 
members. 
 
It is important to note that corruption, lack of independence and political influence have been 
identified as cross-cutting issues across the state response network. This is of concern since 
critical social determinants of organized crime refer to the quality, independence and integrity 
of the institutions safeguarding the rule of law, including police services and the judiciary. 
Organised criminal networks in synergies with state actors infiltrate the system through the 
“loopholes offered by corruption” (Cockayne and Roth, 2017, p.8). Contemporary 
investigations emphasize the importance of the emergence of a symbiosis between legitimate 
actors and criminal networks, highlighting an increasingly active role of the legal sector in 
facilitating different forms of crime. Such symbiosis hinders effective suppression of organized 
crime and eventually leads to state capture, sometimes (as the interview data seem to illustrate), 
partly due to honest members of repression institutions or the judiciary feeling so undermined 
by captured colleagues that they wonder if they should not just ‘throw in the towel’. 
 
Corruption was referenced by almost all interviewees and it is given particular attention in the 
EU reports. As already discussed, the prevalence of corruption in Serbia, as a transition country, 
requires particular attention. This problem was discussed under the research question 1 as well 
and it has been confirmed as significant in the SNA metrics. The significance of the problem 
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of corruption lies in its ability to further destabilise the state response network and hinder 
suppression efforts. Moreover, corruption is a phenomenon associated with the judiciary to a 
major extent (TI, 2018). This is consistent with the findings of the GRASP report (2019), as 
well as the Functional Review of the World Bank (2014). This means that in practice, if the 
corrupting actions do not lead to prevention of law enforcement efforts, they may still be 
successful in the court. Unfortunately, the following discussion on the role of the court strongly 
supports such perceptions.  
 
Therefore, the opportunities created by fragile state response network and state participants’ 
proneness or availability to corruption can be exploited by well-positioned criminal groups, 
which appear to have established deeply-rooted links with state structures. This symbiosis is 
additionally discussed below with a view to state capture. It is suggested that the strengths and 
weaknesses of the state critically impact the forms and strategies of its illicit counterpart. The 
following section will discuss how the actions of the state and criminal actors are understood 
as state capture. 
 
 
5.5. Mechanisms of state capture –the opportunities created by the identified structural 
holes  
 
5.5.1. Segments of the state response network affected by the identified structural holes 
  
This research question was as follows: do, and if so, how do the identified structural holes 
indicate state capture in this aspect of the state functioning: i.e. in the field of crime control.  
To recap, the findings discussed under research question 3 confirmed the existence of structural 
holes in the state response network. Overall, a total of 28 communities were identified in SNA 
metrics as significant relations grouped around the particular problems in state response 
network functioning. From among these communities, an in-depth social network analysis 
determined 8 key structural holes in the network with significant metrics.  Furthermore, the 
analysis indicated which structural holes are related to the functioning of more than 5 
institutions and which are isolated cases.  
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The identified structural holes are located across the entire state response network, in different 
degrees. However, the findings of this research indicate which particular segments of the state 
response network are significantly affected by the identified structural holes. It is demonstrated 
that these segments are in fact the key aspects of the functioning of institutions designed to 
address organised crime and drug trafficking. Considering the extent of organised crime 
elucidated in this research, the affected segments of the state response network seem to have 
the potential to be a fertile ground for criminals to actor as captors.  
In view of the literature suggesting that state capture remains an unclear concept, hardly 
distinguished from the phenomenon of corruption (Priebe, 2018), these findings provide 
important implications. Overall, the findings of this research contribute to this debate by 
indicating that the state capture phenomenon consists of various elements spread across the 
entire state system in a given field. Corruption in that sense represents solely one of the 
elements, a structural hole or a tool enabling state capture. These findings offer an added value 
to current knowledge, as they specify the particular capacity gaps and loopholes in the state 
response network.  
This section explains how the capture occurs in practice, focusing on the dynamics between the 
opportunities created by these structural holes and mechanisms arising thereof. Through this 
interplay between almost obviously intentional capacity gaps of the system, and their particular 
positioning within the state response network, the findings indicate that Serbian crime control 
is captured. Deeply rooted points of arbitrage offer a range of opportunities to organised 
criminal networks to act as captors. 
 
5.5.2. The role of the network-identified structural holes contributing to state capture 
 
5.5.2.1. The opportunities created by structural holes in investigation and prosecution  
 
The findings indicated several loopholes in the field of investigation and prosecution.  Most of 
the issues have been identified in the process of investigation, including lack of mapping of 
organised crime/drug trafficking networks, over-reliance on secret service, internal control and 
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border control; whereas operational capacities and information exchange (secure platform, 
databases, intelligence exchange) are relevant for prosecution as well. 
These issues have been addressed in detail under research question 3, while here it is important 
to evaluate how the identified problems in state response network may enable or show signs of 
potential state capture. If we look at the actual deficiencies, it seems that the investigative phase 
is inherently hampered by several important obstacles such as insufficient operational 
capacities (including staff capacity) and complications in information exchange. In practice, 
the absence of a secure platform for information exchange and the lack of connected databases 
hinder the efforts of the police and consequently prosecution. It reduces the progress of 
investigations and impedes the availability of data without unnecessary administrative steps.  
As shown in the Part I of this Chapter, the EU consistently emphasizes these issues, but no 
progress is acknowledged during a number of years. The identified problems in cooperation 
were supported by a report on EU peer review mission which states the following:  
Relationship between Police and Prosecutors, in spite of clear legal provisions, is not on 
an acceptable level. The Police is not sufficiently coordinating their work with 
Prosecutors. Conflicts in executing their investigative tasks for the Prosecutors were 
mentioned. It was also reported that the Police was not always willing to abandon their 
own investigative agenda and obey Prosecutors' orders. 
(EU peer review mission, JHA IND/EXP 64816, 2017) 
Concurrently, the problems of internal control and over-reliance on the secret service may 
indicate that these gaps enable the exertion of political influence in practice. That is, for 
investigations that may be ‘politically interesting’ or involve state officials, reliance on the state 
security agency (which is controlled by political officials) to perform investigative measures 
may be perceived as a ‘point of arbitrage’. So far, there were several occasions that important 
political figures appeared in photos or videos with highly positioned members of organised 
criminal groups. The perceptions of the professionals in this regard commonly involved the 
understanding that the state security agency provided this material. Coupled with weak internal 
control, this system deficiency causes concern and appears susceptible to corruption and trading 
in influence. 
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In addition, as one of the key issues, lack of mapping of organised crime/drug trafficking 
networks was identified. What is more distressing in this case, is the different level of 
knowledge on mapping among relevant actors. As this research indicated, some repression 
institutions are not even familiar with the concept of ‘mapping criminal networks’. This is 
rather interesting, given that even the media refer to persons ‘belonging to a group of XY...’ 
This could imply that repression institutions are surely aware of ‘networks’ as modes of 
functioning of organised criminal groups but do not think of mapping these networks as an 
operational imperative. The aforementioned report on the EU peer review mission, which was 
based on a review of 20 cases of high-level corruption, money laundering and organised crime, 
supports this finding concluding that: 
It was observed that investigations weren’t (always) targeting the potential criminal 
organisation and its leaders. In cases linked to high-level crime it was observed that not 
all investigative possibilities were used. This as such is very concerning because in cases 
of a lower level all investigative measures were used. It is recommended not to limit 
investigative activities to easy cases but to seize more opportunities to investigate serious 
organised crime cases. 
 (EU peer review mission, JHA IND/EXP 64816, 2017) 
 
Border control has also been identified as a significant structural hole. As Williams (2002) 
argued, such capacity gap is particularly visible in transitional states, given that during the 
period of transition, border controls may be more relaxed in order to promote trade with 
neighbouring countries so to as facilitate economic growth. This is broadly in line with the 
literature on transition in Serbia presented in Chapter III and strongly indicates that this process 
has been overly prolonged. Given that border control is directly linked to state sovereignty, this 
is a particular problem in Serbia, as there is still an administrative border with *Kosovo which 
is commonly referred to as a key drug trafficking route. 
Another important aspect needs to be addressed, with a view to insufficient cooperation of the 
state authorities discussed in the research question 3. Despite some of the efficient legislative 
solutions, this lack of cooperation hinders potentially good effects. For instance, the concept of 
protected witnesses, introduced into the Criminal Procedure Code in 2013, is still not fully 
operational in practice. This is due to incoherence of domestic legislation, which does not allow 
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a protected witness to really change his or her identity. In practice, this means that the person 
cannot get a new birth number, diplomas or other documents necessary for the new identity. 
Hence potential witnesses who could testify against organised criminal groups are not 
motivated as they cannot obtain documentation for a new life and consequently protection. 
An interesting conclusion also arises from the fact that there are ‘gaps’ in investigation and 
prosecution. With a view to the Chapters II and Part I of this Chapter, indicating that key leaders 
of organised criminal groups are rarely prosecuted, the findings of this research question 
support such inferences. It may be argued that the identified structural holes in investigation 
and prosecution, taken together, result in prosecution of small street dealers instead of the 
organisers. As the findings indicate, the law does not allow for a small amount for personal use, 
hence drug users are prosecuted in line with the Criminal Code (Art. 246, 246a, and 247). 
Interestingly, the participants in this study had different perceptions about the prosecution of 
drug users; while some suggest that it is not allowed, having a small amount for personal use, 
others stated that it depends from evaluation and is assessed on a case-by-case basis. It appears 
that there is no unified practice, even though the law is clear.  
A study by Diogenis (2016) which evaluated sentencing policies in Southeast Europe found 
that in Serbia most drug offenders are prosecuted for and convicted of possession of drugs for 
personal use. That study also claims that drug possession rates are the highest drug crime rates 
in general. It is not clear how such conclusions were made and what methodology was utilised, 
given that in Serbia no statistical data are available in this regard. More precisely, the courts 
and prosecutors’ offices do not keep such data and nor do the available ICT systems allow for 
extraction of particular data related to drug use. Relevant authorities do not keep statistical data 
on drug related offenses, which further complicates the analysis, as it remains unclear whether 
individuals are prosecuted due to possession of drugs for personal use or for the actual criminal 
offense involving unauthorized sale of narcotics. If such data was available, it would be 
interesting to compare data on drug use in regards to the convictions or plea agreements 
concluded for the offense of Unauthorized Possession of Narcotics referred to in the Article 
246 of the Criminal Code to see whether individuals are prosecuted for drug-trade related 
offences or solely for possession for personal use. 
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Table V.12: Convicted adults per criminal offense, 2013–2017 
Convicted adults 
per criminal 
offense, 2013–
2017 
No. No. No. No. No. 
 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Against life and 
body 
2397 2611 2074 1935 1913 
Against the 
freedoms and 
rights of citizens 
783 1112 887 972 934 
Against marriage 
and family 
3102 3465 3512 3766 4400 
Against property 9729 11236 11301 11302 10307 
Against human 
health 
2883 2972 2970 3234 3660 
 
Source: Republic institute for Statistics, 2018 
 
As shown in the Table V.12, the overall ratio between convictions for other frequent criminal 
offences (such as violence in family, offences against life and body, property offences) does 
not depart significantly from the convictions for drug related offences (offences against human 
health), although the numbers are rather high. Nevertheless, if observed in detail, we see that 
the individuals who use drugs appear to be facing more consequences that those who produce 
or trade narcotics. As demonstrated in the Table V.13 below, the number of convicted 
individuals for possession of drugs is almost double than the number of those who produce or 
circulate drugs. This trend remains stable during several years. 
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Table V.13: Sentences for drug possession and trade 
 
Republic institute for Statistics, 2018 
 
Beyond the above discussed perception that it is usually small dealers who face prosecution, it 
could also be supported that those who use drugs might not have sufficient resources to get a 
good lawyer or engage in corruption. Also, they probably do not have social or political 
influence to procure protection from prosecution, unlike members of organised criminal 
groups. The EU peer review mission report supports similar conclusions: 
It was observed that cases weren’t (always) extended to the top of the criminal 
organisation to which the suspects may have belonged. 
 (EU peer review mission, JHA IND/EXP 64816, 2017, p.3) 
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Moreover, political influence is also notable in certain aspects of investigation and prosecution.  
A recent public announcement that prescribed sentences will be significantly increased for 
offences of organised crime, has been perceived in the public as a political campaign. These 
announcements followed a ‘weekend arrest’ of 150 individuals in January 2019, allegedly 
related to organised crime and drug trafficking. This was widely covered by the media, and 
promoted as a big success of the state. However, data indicate that the Special prosecutor’s 
office for organised crime was not even involved, and neither were any of the arrested persons 
brought in to their premises. According to a journalist Cvijic (2019):  
If you arrest 150 people in one day, it's a campaign, it's for political reasons. That means that you had been 
collecting data for days before and you held the huge number of people for whom you had information at 
large, waiting for a moment to make mass action, which is a political move, not a move of crime 
suppression.   
(Cvijic, a statement for Blic, 2015). 
According to the President of the Centre for Judicial Research: 
It has been unambiguously proved that the tightening of the penal policy does not affect the reduction of 
crime, including the introduction of life imprisonment. This has been proven in practice in our country as 
well, since this is not the first time that the representatives of the authorities resort to this solution. And as 
there was no reduction in crime rates at that time, it is not going to be the case this time.  
(Majic, a statement for N1, 2019) 
Overall, it appears that the state idles in its efforts to improve organised crime suppression. 
Instead of resorting to evidence based practices, such as granting prosecutorial independence 
and absence from political interference, legal tools, budget and additional incentives to 
prosecute, which have all been proven as exceptionally effective tools, the state announces 
stricter penalties despite their minimal influence to organised crime. 
What this research has found therefore indicates that the mechanism of capture in the 
investigation and prosecution area implies almost a studious lack of interest and attention to the 
substantive aspects of tasks of the responsible institutions. As indicated, by commonly 
prosecuting possession, the institutions focus on those aspects that will have low consequence 
for the business model of the organised crime networks. Accordingly, the key players are rarely 
‘touched’ by the system, except in the politically useful media reports. This could be perceived 
a kind of habitus or a result of low motivation, perhaps associated with the expected behaviour 
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of the courts, discussed below. Nevertheless, given the identified capacity gaps in the judiciary 
and inadequate confiscation of the proceeds from crime, the loopholes in the area of 
investigation and prosecution may be seen as the first dam ensuring protection to criminal 
networks.  
 
5.5.2.2. The opportunities created by structural holes in the judiciary  
 
As described in this Chapter under research question 3, the results of this research demonstrate 
that three components of the role of the court represent significant structural holes in the state 
response network. These loopholes were identified in the content analysis and confirmed both 
through primary SNA, as well as in depth social network analysis. The key structural holes 
involve: a) appeal proceedings, b) case law and c) trial related issues. Here, it is valuable to 
explain how these structural holes in the judiciary may enable state capture and hence why it is 
important to recognize them. 
 
As discussed under research question 3, the small size of the Appellate court implies its 
marginal importance in the overall state response network. Nevertheless, despite the small size 
of the Appellate court (the node APPELC) in the basic network (Graphs V.1 and V.2), both the 
appeal proceedings and case law which are in its jurisdiction appear among the most significant 
problems in the state response network. This is due to the fact that this court is responsible 
‘only’ for second instance proceedings; hence SNA metrics cannot adequately measure its 
importance in relation to other institutions, but solely the first instance court. Therefore the low 
degree centrality of the Appellate court is explained by the fact that it is not inter-related with 
other institutions except the Special court.  Campana (2015) scrutinised this feature of SNA in 
detail, suggesting that conclusions depending solely on structural measures may be equivocal. 
As he argues, SNA results need to be interpreted taking into account the relevant context along 
with the qualitative data.    
 
This standpoint was in fact confirmed in an in depth analysis of the network, whereby the SNA 
metrics identified the significance of the particular problems in the jurisdiction of the Appellate 
court. Concurrently, the qualitative data from the interviews as well as the published material 
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consistently indicated that these issues hinder effective trial of organised crime and drug 
trafficking cases. For instance: 
 
Please comment on the role of the Appellate court with regard to judgements of the Special Court for 
Organized Crime 
Negative role mostly. They have a lack of consistent legal standpoints, inconsistent sentencing policies. (A 
repression institution representative, P2.5) 
Insecurity in decision making. (A judge, P2.1) 
Very long duration of appeal proceedings. (A repression institution representative, P2.8) 
Appellate court cancels everything we do... it is as if they work for organised crime and not against it... (A 
repression institution representative, P2.25) 
That court has some magic ways to interpret the evidence always to the benefit of defendant... (A judge, 
P2.23) 
The rationales of their decisions are an example that should be studied in law schools... it is amazing how 
they always set people free for anything they do... (A state institution representative, P1.18) 
I think that for a criminal group, it is sufficient to pay one member of the court panel...as decisions are 
made by the three judges. (A judge, P2.24) 
Many judges remain from the period of Milosevic... they tend to work for the criminal groups from that 
period. (A state institution representative, P1.12) 
I think some of my colleagues work for some of them... because I cannot find another reason for them 
acting in the way they do when we make decisions. (A judge, P2.14) 
 
It is thus important to provide qualitative data examples as to how this loophole mechanism 
functions in practice. For example, in the ongoing case against Darko Šarić, the alleged drug 
boss, interesting developments have been noted recently. While waiting for the appeal 
deadlines to pass, against a decision convicting him for organising trafficking of 5.7 tons of 
cocaine, the judges of the Appellate court decided to revoke the detention49. This was done just 
before Christmas holidays (someone could say there was a reason for this timing, given the 
lack of public attention in that period). However, when they were deciding on appeal against 
first-instance verdict in May 2016, the Appellate court clearly stated that there were several 
reasons why Šarić should remain in detention until the verdict becomes final. These involve 
the severity of the prescribed punishment, the fact that he had been hiding for a number of 
                                                             
49 http://rs.n1info.com/Vesti/a448524/Darku-Saricu-ukinut-pa-ponovo-odredjen-pritvor.html 
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years, along with the strongest arguments that he could escape, because his group’s enormous 
profits have largely not been found so far (CINS, 2019). He was convicted to 15 years 
imprisonment in first instance and these reasons for detention have not changed. In addition, 
22 hearings were lately successively postponed, prompting the prosecution to warn that this is 
performed in order to enable the release of Šarić from detention. Taking these into account, the 
decision of the Appellate court to release him was perceived as rather unusual in the 
professional public (Radisic, N1, 2019). It is interesting to note here that proceedings against 
other members in his group in Slovenia, Spain and the Netherlands have been finalised long 
time ago; only in Serbia they are still ongoing. 
 
Once an aspect of court proceedings, such as appeal proceedings, is identified as an issue in the 
functioning of the state response network in the field of suppression of organised crime and 
drug trafficking, it is necessary to flag this concern and particularly address it. In view of the 
discussions on the links of organised criminal groups with state actors, such links may be 
especially valuable if they can ensure ‘final’ decisions. That is, when second instance court is 
a potential ‘point of arbitrage’ (Cockayne, 2016), it has the potential too offer worthy objects 
of arbitrage (e.g. freedom) to the criminal group, making its significance much higher than for 
instance corrupt police officers.  
 
The Court of Appeal has the power to set the defendant free and thus has the capacity to hamper 
the efforts of the police, prosecution and also the first instance court. It is important to recap 
here that Serbia has a Special court for organised crime, as a court of first instance in cases of 
criminal offences with elements of organised crime. As the interviewees indicated, the most 
common offenses before this court involve drug trafficking, high-level corruption cases, human 
trafficking, extortion and the like. The judges working in this court have been selected on the 
basis of previous experience, successful track record in decision making and good quality 
judgements. They work under increased pressure, when compared with the judges of the other 
courts, both due to the type of cases, as well as the political interest in certain cases. In addition, 
they can be a convenient target of the defendants or groups linked to them. As this research 
notes, cases of threats to judges of Special court for organised crime have been reported and 
some received special police protection. 
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Do judges have protection 
Not a permanent protection, it depends on the assessment of the security. (A judge, P2.1) 
Have they ever been threatened, attacked 
Not directly… usually indirectly, also through media. (Several state institution representatives, judges) 
Yes. (Several state institution representatives, judges) 
Yes... a female judge had packages left in from of her house. (State institution representative, P1.15) 
Yes a deputy prosecutor was beaten in front of the court.. Presumed for parking issues.. (State institution 
representative, P1.4) 
 
 
On the other hand, the Appellate court is a regular court of first instance, whose criminal 
department acts as a second instance for decisions of the Special court for organised crime. 
Hence, given the identification of the appeal proceedings as a loophole in the state response 
network, it is this exact sphere that has probably the highest potential for state capture. As 
Morselli (2009) held, sometimes a one-time partnership to execute a criminal venture is 
sufficient.  Hence it is not necessary to develop a continuum of relations in a criminal network 
– it is possible to use a single link once, or a single actor – actor relation. This seems a real 
possibility here, where a highly selective and professionalised lower court is subordinate to an 
Appellate court with questionable allegiance to rule of law principles, at least amongst some of 
its members. 
This particularly stands in a country with pervasive corruption and low track record in 
prosecuting high-level corruption cases. In addition, as discussed under research question 1, 
the judiciary in Serbia is in overall bad situation. It is described as inefficient, lacking 
capacities, dependent on undue political influence (European Commission, 2018). In such state 
of play, expectations of various influences are valid. 
Another possible explanation related to a seemingly marginal role of the Appellate court arising 
from the metrics may be found in Cockayne’s (2017, p.10) suggestion of “safe spaces”. This 
seemingly marginal community may be like a separate island which may in practice entail a 
“dangerous space” enabling criminal activities and corruption. Batagelj et al. (2017) found that 
pending a given or computed property of nodes/links, different islands i.e. maximal connected 
sub-networks can be obtained, such that values of selected property inside island are larger than 
values on the island’s neighbours and the size (number of island’s nodes) is within a given 
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range. Similarly, Campana (2015) argues that the absence of a tie can be an equally important 
feature of a criminal network. Following this line of thought, it could be argued that institutions 
with low degree centrality solely seem to be least connected and are perhaps less transparent 
for other actors in the network, thus enabling space for ‘informal social exchanges’ so 
characteristic of corruption and influence.  
 
The problems related to case law were also identified in this research by SNA metrics as 
significant. Lack of jurisprudence has been one of the difficulties the Serbian judiciary has 
confronted for a long time.  
No, the case law of Appellate court does not exist, and that circumstance influences the Special court as 
a first instance court in organised crime cases. (A judge, P2.20) 
That court shows arbitrariness in making decisions. (A judge, P2.1) 
No unified case law. (A repression institution representative, P2.19) 
 
 
In interpreting this finding, it should be taken into account that Serbia does not belong to 
countries with a precedent/case-law tradition, but to a continental legal system (overall, a 
mixture of an adversarial and inquisitorial systems). This implies that case law is not a source 
of the law, but it is taken into account in decision making. Serbia has four Appellate courts. 
The court relevant for this research is the Appellate court in Belgrade which acts as a second 
instance court in organised crime cases. The Supreme Court of Cassation has the role of 
unifying case law by adopting standpoints.  
 
The problems related to case law are valuable for this research, as there is a tendency of 
adopting absolutely different court decisions in similar situations. Namely, it happens that the 
Appellate court adopts certain case law in its previous decisions, but than a judge departs from 
such practice and adopts a different decision. For instance, case law articulates that a plea 
agreement is considered evidence in linked cases for other suspects, and those who signed the 
plea agreement do not appear as witnesses; nevertheless, sometimes a judge acts contrary to 
this practice e.g. ‘the countrymen trial’ (Cvijic, 2015). Other examples are is also interesting: 
the court panel of a higher court within a single month adopts two absolutely contrary decisions 
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in the same case (Alo, 2018) or the Supreme Court adopts a decision contrary to its own 
established practice (Reljanović, 2016). 
 
Moreover, repeated proceedings are also a common problem. This often leads to a so-called 
‘ping-pong effect’: i.e. the Appellate court constantly returns the case to re-adjudication, and 
the first instance court brings the same judgment again. According to some perceptions, many 
judgments are abolished because of the pressure to be tried quickly. Also, this could be a 
consequence of repeated legislative changes preventing judges from getting well acquainted 
with a variety of new laws (Stojanovic, 2008). According to a president of the Judges 
Association, the justice system “requires stability, and our society has been in an unstable 
situation for two decades” (Spasojević, 2014). Concurrently, this may be perceived as a method 
of buying the time for the defendant with an aim to obtain acquittal.  
 
Lastly, a number of the trial related issues were identified as loopholes in state network 
functioning. The term ‘trial related issues’ was utilised as a unit of analysis in order to cover a 
variety of problems in the court proceedings referred to by the interviewees. These problems 
are perceived as largely important, given that they are usually undetectable, difficult to assess 
and also rarely communicated outside the court. In this context, the findings of this research 
revealed an interesting insight that court decisions are often made ‘to the benefit of the 
defendant’, which was suggested by several interviewed judges and prosecutors (e.g. P2.1; P2. 
3; P2. 15). This confirms the previous findings in a study on Southeast European states 
including Serbia (Diogenis, 2016), which identified that judges interpret legislation in very 
different ways. The study showed that the vast majority of judges are more lenient than the 
legislator, as they commonly take into consideration all aspects of the situation of the offender 
(family, social and economic situation, previous convictions) and often pronounce suspended 
sentences. Moreover, some perceive drug possession per definition as drug trafficking, while 
only a small number of judges impose severe sanctions. 
 
The Criminal Code in Serbia prescribes that drug offenders who are members of a criminal 
organisation shall be punished with imprisonment of at least ten years. Nevertheless, the 
aforementioned study also found that in Croatia and Serbia the courts habitually applied the 
standard of “effective regret” to circumvent the prescribed legislative minimum. This particular 
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criminal legal standard allows the courts to mitigate the sanction if the drug offender has 
substantially and voluntarily contributed to the revelation of the drug offence. Similar 
standpoints have been suggested by a number of authors, who argue that regular acceptance of 
various mitigating circumstances by the courts leads to conclusions that penal policy is 
“inadequate” or “soft”, and should therefore be directed by legislative changes in order to 
effectively suppress crime Delić, 2010; Mrvić-Petrović & Đorđević, 1998; Ćirić, Đorđević, & 
Sepi 2006). 
 
Finally, as discussed earlier, interesting rationales of the judicial decisions liberating the 
defendants often lead to conclusions of corruption in the judiciary. For instance, an individual 
charged with organising a criminal group which committed murders, blackmails, drug 
trafficking, was recently released, while other group members were convicted for 20 years of 
imprisonment. In the rationale of the decision, it was stated that there was not enough evidence, 
while the same evidence and testimonies of protected witnesses were used to convict other 
members of the group.  Such explanations, coupled with the reasons for cancelling 1st instance 
court decisions and confusing standpoints of the Appellate court and its inconsistent case law, 
reflect references to state capture to a great extent. 
In discussing these findings, the factor of ‘free judicial opinion’ also needs to be taken into 
account. This concept is commonly used in the Serbian judiciary to explain different decisions 
in similar or even equal situations. Despite the attempts to revise this option though 
amendments to the Constitution which are currently in progress, it appears that such an option 
will remain. In an effort to strengthen the respect of case law and minimise corruption 
opportunities, the state has proposed limitation of a ‘free judicial opinion’. Nevertheless, the 
Venice Commission opposed these changes claiming that it ensures judges’ independence. 
Unfortunately, it appears that the Council of Europe had insufficient information with regard 
to the application of the free judicial opinion in Serbia or its impact on numerous proceedings. 
That is, if the judges in the USA, for example, who are considered fully independent, utilise 
specific guidelines in decision making, it remains unclear why Serbian judges would be less 
independent if a similar concept would be applied. Further, the situation in Serbia is unlike 
many other countries where judicial discretion is more tightly bound, as noted earlier, by 
precedent and tight ascription to case law. When this is not the case, and when ‘free judicial 
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opinion’ provides a kind of carte blanche to decide in any way one likes, fertile ground is laid 
for capture of judicial decision making. 
 
5.5.2.3. The opportunities created by structural holes in financial investigation 
 
Given the determination of financial investigation and asset seizure as structural holes in the 
state response network, a conclusion arises that the organised criminal groups are enabled to 
re-invest their profits in criminal activities or in the legal business. It needs to be taken into 
consideration that money laundering was also found as a significant loophole in the system. 
Such gaps, taken together, demonstrate that one of the key tools for combating organised crime 
that is freezing of assets derived from crime, in not functional.  
Coupled with the identified areas vulnerable to corruption, these structural holes reflect a 
practically ideal environment for criminal ventures. This could explain a number of rapidly 
growing economy areas, such as construction, real estate, in a country characterised by poverty, 
low GDP and overall slow development. Such conclusions are in line with Savona and Riccardi 
(2015) who maintain that areas of legal business in which organised criminal groups tend to 
launder money are largely the same. Varese (2011) argued that certain markets are prone to 
territorial forms of illegal governance, such as construction, bars and restaurants. Serbian 
market shows similar developments; the only developing sectors appear to be construction and 
night clubs, usually owned by ‘controversial businessman’ and drawing upon their links and 
influence with political parties and key political figures. Even though it is difficult to point to 
precise evidence, it is widely recognized that it is almost impossible to get a business space in 
Serbia’s capital without links to political parties or criminal groups. This is broadly in line with 
the perceptions of corruption in Serbia (Transparency International, 2018). Nevertheless, an 
interesting conclusion may arise if it is hypothesized that this is not the manifestation of state 
capture, but rather the actual mechanism of the state to provide a false image of the growth in 
economy by facilitating organised criminal groups to carry on their activities.   
Accordingly, in what way do the identified loopholes indicate potential for state capture? As 
Williams (2002, p.172) argued, the practical manifestation of the lack of state capacity to ensure 
adequate business regulation frameworks is that organised criminal groups are empowered to 
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become a replacement in the system. Where state capacity gaps arise, organised criminal groups 
make sure that their set of rules are implemented, thus replacing the official system with a form 
of criminal governance (of which the Italian mafia must surely be archetypal). In such an 
environment, illicit activity logically increases.  
These problems are certainly not a particularity of Serbia; corrupt investments in business may 
be traced worldwide. In the EU, various measures are reviewed to address these problems. For 
instance, scholars suggest that effective measures that facilitate cross-border arrest, the 
collection and sharing of evidence in investigation and during trial and asset seizure would lead 
to improved results (Savona, 2015; Campana, 2015). Savona and Riccardi (2015) proposed 
greater use of instruments alternative to seizure and monitoring of asset seizure at the EU level 
ensuring ensure consistent standards of proof across the EU. These are all advanced 
mechanisms aimed at improving the efficiency of suppression of money laundering in a 
regulated environment such as the EU. However, in the EU countries, these phenomena 
represent an exception, while the rest of the commercial area functions properly, without impact 
on regular citizens’ business activities. On the contrary, the impact of such activities is 
considerably higher in Serbia. 
It could also be argued that the whole setting in Serbia allows for money laundering; as noted 
in the Chapter III, Serbia does not regulate illicit enrichment. This has potentially enabled a 
whole set of warlords from the 90s, the corrupt politicians in the 2000 and eventually criminal 
groups, to efficiently legalise their crime-related or war-related profits into the economy. Along 
with the identified gaps in the connectedness of the relevant data-bases (tax authority, property 
registers), it may appear that the state of Serbia is a ‘wonderland’ for cleaning dirty money. As 
(Williams, 2002) suggested, when there are gaps in the state capacity to ensure oversight and 
accountability, organised criminal groups are offered an opportunity for extensive corruption.  
It should be noted that Serbia also undertakes certain measures to improve the situation in this 
field. These measures involve the new Law on organization and Jurisdiction of State 
Authorities in the fight against organized crime, terrorism and corruption (Official Gazette RS, 
no. 94, 2016), as well as comprehensive training. These new measures are aimed at improved 
coordination of state institutions in the field of financial investigations. Nevertheless, the 
strategic and legislative measures do not give an impression of sufficient determination of the 
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state, given the inherent lack of implementation of similar good normative or strategic solutions 
e.g. in this research, lack of implementation of laws was found as one of the main structural 
holes. Thus, in a state with high poverty levels, were reports indicate that most of the apartments 
were paid in cash in 2018 (B92, 2018), financial investigations should evidently be given a 
priority. 
The identified structural holes in financial investigation should be viewed in the context of 
pervasive corruption, money laundering and notable corruption tolerance. This implies that 
legislative solutions are just a segment of a single framework; however, without connected data 
bases enabling access to all relevant institutions and increased independent control of financial 
transactions, the loopholes may solely be displaced in another area of the system. That is, even 
if there appears an improvement in the efficiency of financial investigation as a result of legal 
amendments, the judiciary may become more relevant actor in protecting the assets derived 
from organised crime. As this research showed, the judges do not often decide on confiscation 
of criminal assets even when these are traced by the prosecution and police. The 
interconnectedness of these structural holes within the system thus implies that there is a need 
for an –depth change of the whole environment and simultaneous measures to adequately 
instigate restructuring of such environment.  
 
5.5.2.4. The opportunities created by structural holes in seizure and destruction of drugs 
 
As described under research question 3, the seizure and destruction of drugs represent one of 
the key structural holes in the state response network. The serious impact of this structural hole 
is perceived in allowing the drugs to remain in the system, either by being sold, trafficked or 
used.  
This problem is particularly interesting, given that it is intrinsically associated with legislative 
framework, corruption and deficiencies in cooperation among responsible institutions. In 
addition, the process itself it is not sufficiently transparent hence enabling various ‘informal 
social exchanges’. This problem is also symptomatic as it is acknowledged solely by the limited 
circle of the professionals and insufficiently recognised in the public. It could therefore be 
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argued that it is a well-kept secret of the system, rarely discussed outside of the involved 
stakeholders, and exceptionally as a part of the EU peer review missions. 
The discussion on the research question 3 demonstrated that the seized drugs are kept in the 
police stations across the country.  The lack of oversight is inherent to such situation, as it is 
literally impossible to ensure the control of various substances located in corridors and\or 
offices. As the interviewees explained, this results from the legal provisions prescribing that 
the seized drugs cannot be destroyed during the trial.  This is a rather peculiar approach, given 
that the seized amounts of drugs could be sent for analysis for the purpose of the proceedings 
and subsequently destroyed, particularly given that court proceedings in Serbia tend to last for 
several years. This implies that legal framework leaves a lot of room for abuse.  
As already mentioned, interviewees stated that consequently nobody can claim that the drugs 
seized from the defendant are the exact ones that are sent for analysis. The vast impact of this 
structural hole on the court proceedings is not frequently discussed, but it seems that judges are 
aware of the mechanisms enabled by this framework – even if one gets to a trial, it will 
eventually be difficult to prove that the analysed substances were the ones seized, or even if 
they are illegal drugs. For example, a judge (P2.1) stated that the expert analysis in one case 
showed that the seized drugs were cannabis. Nevertheless, the Appellate court allowed for 
additional analysis in order to determine “the actual amount of THC” in the substances seized. 
The defence subsequently claimed that the amount is not sufficient to be considered a drug. 
The question that remained is which substance was sent for analysis? 
The destruction of seized drugs represents a fundamentally associated problem, which appears 
to have similar causes and consequences. The convenience of a lack of regulation of the main 
responsible authority for destroying drugs was already mentioned, but what does this mean in 
practice? This absence of responsibility leads to a ping-pong effect among institutions, and 
creates a problem that has been evident for years. It is sufficient that one of the participating 
institutions expresses certain concern (e.g. with regard to consequences to the environment, or 
the present officials) and the destruction process is postponed. Overall, it seems that the state 
preserves this field unregulated for some reason; otherwise, a set of guidelines would have 
already been developed to clarify the procedures, ensure oversight and introduce 
accountability. Here, then, there is another instance in which reduced state capacity to counter 
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high level organised crime is achieved by piecing together small elements, and in this case it is 
by retaining a confused and almost hapless approach to seizure and destruction of drugs. This 
haplessness would be incongruent if it were not for the fact that such haplessness is so common 
across the network as to amount to something like a strategy in its own right. 
5.5.2.5. The opportunities created by structural holes in the legal framework 
 
As described under research question 3, structural holes have been identified in drafting of 
legislation and/or strategic documents and their implementation. This finding was expected, 
due to a variety of reasons. 
There were a number of interview questions referring to the legal framework. A part of these 
questions was already addressed through a thorough desk review presented in detail in the 
Chapter III (3.3.3.). Moreover, the reports of the European Commission provide a very detailed 
assessment of the legal framework. The Serbian legal framework has undergone significant 
changes in the process of EU accession. The assessments indicate that in the field of organised 
crime, the legal framework is partially aligned with the EU acquis. Even though the EU has 
been successful at obliging member states to introduce additional legislation, Serbia accepts 
these obligations somewhat slowly.  
The results of this research indicated significant resistance of the local stakeholders to amend 
legislation due to EU accession. Participants from several ministries: 
Our legal framework is fine... we should not be an example state, we should reach a medium level of EU 
member states... we should not be expected to have better legal solutions than EU member states. (P1.8) 
We are fed up with these legal amendments... we change laws all the time because of the EU accession. 
(P1.5) 
There is no way we are going to change the law again... that will never pass.  (P1.21) 
We have no budget to make these changes... it will need to be postponed for several years. (P1.16) 
 
This may be explained by the fact that the process is taking too long and has perhaps caused 
change-fatigue. On the other hand, there are perceptions that the state should implement its own 
normative framework, without relying to the EU law, since Serbia is not yet a member state. In 
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a study by Di Nicola et al (2015), the interviewed experts suggested that organised crime 
legislation should reflect the domestic threat and the nature of the activities. 
It is possible that these may be the causes of identification of the legal framework as one of the 
structural holes. However, it is the author’s perception based on all these data that there are 
much more deeply rooted causes contributing to this finding. These primarily involve multiple 
‘legal gaps’ often found in Serbian legislation, which allow for diverse interpretations and cause 
multi-annual disagreements, without any action of the legislator towards resolving them. 
Additionally, difficulties and delays in the process of transposition of the EU acquis may result 
from the lack of coordination between administrative departments in charge. Ministries often 
exhibit disagreements, so it happens that the Ministry of Justice attempts to adopt a law while 
the Ministry of Interior disagrees and vice versa, hence postponing the whole process. Systemic 
weaknesses are commonly associated with legislative barriers, bureaucracy and domestic 
administrative problems, thus leading to poor rate of compliance in transposing the acquis. 
Moreover, there is often a lack of clear language and correct definitions in legislation, causing 
misinterpretations. Definitions are frequently included in the national legislation without the 
appropriate terms used in the EU acquis. Where definitions provided in the national legislation 
are not completely and accurately translated and transposed, this affects the scope of the 
transposing legislation. The correct transposition of the definitions is very important since the 
meaning of the national laws can be very different from the EU acquis and may cause practical 
problems as well. 
Lack of implementation of the legislative framework has been a matter of concern for a number 
of years. As thoroughly presented in the Part I of this Chapter, consecutive EU progress reports 
note this problem. The discussions with the key stakeholders imply that this may be due to 
weak infrastructure for the later stages of the harmonisation, thus hindering effective and 
transparent decision making and the effective implementation. Nevertheless, in the context of 
the results of this research, it appears that there are other reasons associated with 
implementation issues. These involve lack of clear rules of procedures, guidelines and 
awareness of existing protocols. It is often the case that implementation bylaws are missing, 
which is the responsibility of state institutions once a law is adopted. It remains unclear why 
the state bodies delay in adopting relevant acts for implementation of laws they propose.  
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Concurrently, this research has also indicated that there is significant lack of available 
resources, understaffing and the lack of necessary capacity within the ministries and other state 
bodies. Such an environment logically leads to delays, low motivation and commitment. One 
of the compelling findings is that the majority of the responsible institutions for supressing 
organised crime and drug trafficking (as well as drug use) are significantly understaffed. This 
has tremendous consequence on the quality of the provision of services and directly affects the 
implementation. 
 
5.5.2.6. The opportunities created by structural holes in prevention of substance misuse 
 
Even though this was not the main field of the research, it is highly correlated with the impact 
of drug trafficking and organised crime. It may seem that this structural hole is not related to 
the effectiveness of state institutions in suppressing organised crime and drug trafficking, but 
the fact that gaps are identified in this field tells a lot about the depth of the problem. Current 
circumstances in the field of drug misuse and treatment were considered relevant for this 
research, as they provide deeper insight with regard to the prevalence of drug use and the types 
of drugs used.  
This research has found that there is a notable increase in substance misuse in Serbia. The 
identified trends show that the commonly used substances involve marijuana, NPS, heroin and 
to a lesser extent cocaine. As brought up in the research question 3, Serbia did not have 
significant rates of substance misuse historically. It used to be mainly a transit country, with 
very little amount staying for local use. 
Would you say that drug misuse has increased during the last years 
Yes, especially among young population. (A civil society representative P4.2) 
Yes, usually it is about cannabis and synthetic drugs. (A repression institution representative, P2.2) 
Young people increasingly use NPS, not other drugs. (A civil society representative, P4.3) 
 
Nevertheless, the increased substance misuse rates nowadays indicate a shift in this trend. As 
the analysis showed, the potential causes vary, ranging from the low prices associated with 
spread of organised crime and drug trafficking, to the perceptions that Serbia has become a 
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source of certain substances, mainly cannabis and NPS. The fact that the country lies on the 
drug transit route along with the extent of drug trafficking groups certainly increases the 
availability. Moreover, research data strongly support that Serbia has also become a source 
country for NPS and cannabis.  Studies have shown that substance misuse and crime are inter-
related categories (Belenko and Houser, 2012; Gillespie, 2005; Hakansson, 2009; Houser et al., 
2011; Fridell, Hesse, Jaeger, and Kuhlhorn 2008; Radulović, 2013). 
It is important to recap that there are no valid data on the numbers of substance misusers in 
Serbia. The last research was performed in 2011 on prevalence of drug use among young 
population. Unfortunately, the latest EMCDDA report (2018) also refers to those data, despite 
a lot of time that has passed. Assessments of the numbers of users therefore differ. Civil society 
representatives claim that numbers are much higher. In addition, the interviewees from the civil 
society (P4.2, P4.3, P4.5) stated that young users do not seek treatment, so data is unavailable. 
The available treatments do not involve psychosocial support, but usually psychiatric hospitals 
and methadone substitution treatments.  
 
The increasing prevalence of new psychoactive substances worldwide poses serious cross-
border threats to health, indicating the need to enhance monitoring, early warning systems and 
response mechanisms. Early warning systems and networks are the tools to identify potential 
threats, review new and existing legislation, and provide the basis for the decision making. The 
sui generis nature of drug precursors control calls for the local regulatory frameworks to 
prevent the diversion of drug precursors for the purpose of illicit trade and at the same time, 
protect the legitimate industrial, medical and scientific uses of such substances (Bretteville-
Jensen et al., 2017). This new threat to public health can be addressed only through regulated 
systems which are capable to respond.  
 
Concurrently, the level of poverty in Serbia is rather high, including high unemployment rates, 
especially among youth. This provides a fruitful ground for recruitment by organised criminal 
groups. As studies have shown, when the state cannot ensure functional markets, the organised 
criminal groups take over the market, in this case employment market, creating a workforce 
that operates outside the legal framework (Varese, 2010). Several interviewees referred to 
young dealers utilised by organised criminal groups, particularly in the night clubs. The Serbian 
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capital has recently acquired a whole series of hookah bars (or a shisha bar, where a 
shared hookah is placed at each table for visitors), visited almost entirely by minors. When this 
is viewed in the context of the security of night clubs selling drugs, the potentials for hiring 
new minors who desire swift money steadily increase. These data taken together indicate that 
there is a significant lack of reliable knowledge on the extent of substance misuse in Serbia. 
Such a framework, coupled with a minor role of civil society and a lack of research, entails an 
important capacity gap in terms of prevention of drug misuse. 
 
5.5.3. Conclusions 
 
The findings of this research question offer a view of the identified structural holes in the state 
response network, illustrating how they work as they do. These findings also indicate the extent 
of the impact on the state structure and provide an explanation as to how these gaps in the 
system actually function in practice.  
 
As discussed in detail under Chapter IV, the combination of the content analysis and the social 
network analysis elucidated that the map of the state response network in Serbia involves the 
total of 20 institutions. The implementation of social network analysis further indicated that 
that there are 3 groups of institutions within the state response network, including: a) the 
institutions engaged in repression of drug trafficking (law enforcement and financial 
investigative bodies), b) the judicial institutions acting in cases of organised crime and drug 
trafficking, and c) the institutions engaged in the prevention of drug misuse and drug 
trafficking. Moreover, the analysis showed that the state response network is well connected, 
but these different groups of institutions are somewhat detached from each other. That is, strong 
linkages are identified between the institutions within the same community, whereas relations 
with other communities do not seem significant.  
If this state network is compared to common criminal networks’ features, it appears that it is 
less connected. Criminal networks have high demand for efficiency, that is, their resilience 
depends on the dynamic balance between efficiency and security (Morselli et al., 2006). 
Efficiency of the criminal network involves efficient exchange of information and goods 
between actors, ensuring coordination of complex criminal operations across different 
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geographies. The high demand for efficiency leads to increased density and redundancy in the 
overall structure of criminal networks (Morselli et al., 2006). The picture found here is the 
contrary, the Serbian state network apparently does not have its own need for efficiency. In 
view of the exploration of the persistent gaps of the state network functioning, this network 
feature may explain much of the state’s failure to effectively fight organised crime.  
The findings further discussed under research question 3, confirmed the existence of structural 
holes in the state response network. Overall, a total of 28 communities were identified in SNA 
metrics as significant relations grouped around the particular problem in state response network 
functioning. Among these communities, 8 key structural holes have been identified in the 
analysis and thoroughly discussed above. Furthermore, the analysis showed that there are 8 key 
loopholes in the network which can be attributed to more than 5 institutions. This implies that 
such problems may create ‘pervasive capture opportunities’ across the state system.  
The analysis indicated that the network of institutions responsible for addressing organised 
crime and drug trafficking in Serbia (state response network) belongs to a small world network. 
A small-world network is a network in which most actors can be reached from every other actor 
through a small number of steps (Watts and Strogatz, 1998), with the overall topology described 
as loose connections between densely connected clusters. Literature shows that small world 
networks may contain multiple structural holes (Burt, 2004). The concept of a structural hole 
in the network science commonly signifies the vacuum that exists between two or more densely 
connected clusters. In this research, the term structural holes refers to the gaps or vacuums in 
the system functioning. It was conceptualised that these gaps or structural holes create 
opportunities for organised criminal networks to capture the state. Research demonstrates that 
structural holes provide opportunities for criminal actors to organize the flow of information 
and illegal goods (Burt, 2004; Labun and Wittek, 2014).  
 
The network analysis also identified several institutions as ‘bridges’, such as the key 
ministries. This is a logical consequence of the institutional set up, which is based on 
fundamentally robust jurisdiction of the ministries and lesser jurisdiction of other bodies 
hierarchically subordinated to them. This suggests that a substantial part of the state response 
network depends on these central actors for information flow. According to (Williams, 1998),  
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in case legitimate institutions have high brokerage capital, they would be able to ensure a 
certain degree of protection from law enforcement activities.  
Interestingly, however, different institutions appear as relevant nodes in the communities 
formed around the key structural holes identified in the state response network. These involve 
the Appellate court and financial investigation institutions. Given that network research 
indicates that actors with particular skills play an important role in bridging the gaps, these 
institutions might play a role of criminal brokers. Criminal brokers with unique networking 
possibilities may seek for new brokerage opportunities, strengthening the small world effect 
and leading to additional connections between criminal networks (Morselli and Roy, 2008; 
Dujin, 2016 ). Labun and Wittek (2014) argue that actors on either side of the structural hole 
have access to different flows of information. 
To summarise, the key structural holes identified in the state response network involve financial 
investigation, the judicial proceedings, mapping of criminal networks and finally, seizure and 
destruction of drugs. These findings are fully in line with the relevant international reports on 
Serbia, but they also offer an added value, because they specify the particular capacity gaps and 
in the broader areas identified as deficient. The implications of the identification of these 
structural holes is in fact a demonstration of how these systemic gaps may become ‘loopholes’ 
in practice and thus may be identified and abused by organised criminal groups. Research 
suggests that efforts to understand and fight organised crime must take into account the 
interaction between the unique ecologies of states and illicit networks (Cockayne, 2017). The 
unique ecologies may be formed in the “dangerous spaces”, including legal gaps, geographical 
or functional cavities. 
The potential mechanisms of state capture described under this research question give special 
emphasis on the interaction of the state institutions in the identified structural holes thus clearly 
indicating that all important systemic spheres are affected. The discussion of the functioning of 
these mechanisms entails a description of the actual ways through which the structural holes 
can be (or are) utilised. What is particularly important in this discussion is the joint effect of 
the identified structural holes.  
The literature increasingly acknowledges that institutions do not exist in isolation, but 
habitually interact with each other (Böhmelt and Spilker, 2014; Gehring and Faude, 2014). This 
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interplay might induce influence, affecting institutions’ development and performance. 
Following this line of opinion, this research adds to current knowledge by systematically 
analysing the quantitative evidence on how institutional interaction drives institutional 
effectiveness from a network perspective. What does this mean in practice? It means that 
effectiveness of institutions in fighting organised crime is hampered by various deeply rooted 
problems. Institutional effectiveness is a priori limited by diverse gaps in the legislative 
framework and subsequently hindered by inter-dependent activities of other actors in the 
network.  The loopholes in investigation and prosecution, along with the lack of confiscation 
of criminal assets and the controversial behaviour of the Appellate court generate an image of 
a network with significant systemic gaps. Bearing also in mind the problems in seizure and 
destruction of drugs and wide spread corruption, the state response network does not show 
signs of increased effectiveness essential for successful EU integration.  
These systemic gaps and the associated behaviour of state institutions is increasingly referred 
to as state capture (Perry and Keil, 2018; Popovikij, 2018; Priebe, 2018). As Joel Hellman and 
Daniel Kaufmann (2001) defined this phenomenon, in transition economies, corruption has 
taken on a new image whereby oligarchs shape policy formation and rules to their own 
substantial advantage. Taking into account the contemporary debates on the usefulness of the 
concept of state capture as a different phenomenon from corruption, it could be argued that it 
is in fact the ‘capture’ that prevents system effectiveness, whereas corruption is solely a tool. 
In this context, state capture refers to a set of covert practices across institutions that have the 
potential to disrupt the expected lawful behaviour, without breaking the law. This may be 
illustrated by the following comments from the interviews:  
Selectivity in prosecution, in terms of murders and other most serious crimes, however, indicates the link 
between organized criminal groups and the state. (A CSO representative, P4.4).  
It is necessary to accept with reserve statistical data that are presented to the public because, due to different 
methodology, there is a big difference between the Statistics Office, the Prosecutor's Office and the courts. 
(A judge, P2.10).  
Hence, in the field of crime control explored in this research, a state capture phenomenon entails 
diverse state institutions’ practices, unknown to wider public or individuals outside the system, 
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which have the capacity to enable criminal actors to capture the system. The following section 
will discuss how the actions of the state and criminal actors are understood as state capture. 
 
Chapter VI: State capture of a country undergoing EU accession - the 
extent of organised criminal networks in Serbia arising from the 
loopholes of the system 
 
6.1. Introduction 
 
This research examined whether the effectiveness of state actions in suppressing organised 
criminal networks in Serbia, as an EU candidate country, shows indications of state capture in 
the crime control system. The research relied strongly on the growing interest in the literature 
on the phenomenon of state capture, particularly in the EU accession countries (e.g. Chayes, 
2015; Perry and Keil, 2018; Priebe, 2018; Savona, 2014). By building on Cockayne’s (2016) 
conceptualisation of the points of arbitrage as particular gaps or realms present in diverse 
aspects of the state system, this research seeked to identify particular structural holes in the 
crime control system that have the capacity to enable capture. This was analysed through 
several sub-questions or stages of verifying state capture in the field of crime control and 
discussed above.  
For the purpose of this discussion on state capture, it is valuable to recap what this concept 
stands for. As discussed in Chapter III (see 3.5.), the concept of state capture pertinent to this 
research refers to the inferences of links of state institutions with organised crime, mutual 
interests and corruption at various levels of state governance leading to decreased effectiveness 
of state actions aimed at suppressing organised crime. Later in this section, a more specific 
concept of state capture is proposed as a result of this research.  
The notion of state capture was used in this exploration to label the inexplicable deficiencies of 
the crime control system in Serbia. One of the core motives to use this particular term was the 
fact that the European Commission recently stated that the Western Balkan countries: 
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Show clear elements of state capture, including links with organized crime and corruption 
at all levels of government and administration. (COM, 2018). 
 
Despite recurrent reference to state capture in the literature (Perry and Keil, 2018; Popikij, 
2018; Priebe, 2018; Weber, 2017), there is fragmented agreement on what exactly it signifies. 
The phenomenon of state capture is commonly associated with the relations between the state 
and business (Hellman, Jones and Kaufmann, 2000; Martin and Ligeti, 2017), or more 
specifically public procurement (Fazekas and Tóth, 2016). These links have been titled state 
capture and imply the business sector in the role of a captor. In addition, several authors have 
examined political capture (Innes, 2014; Jancsics and Jávor 2012; Leitner and Meissner, 2017; 
Lugon-Moulin, 2010). For instance, a study by Jancsics and Jávor (2012), explored a symbiosis 
of oligarchs with influential public decision-makers, which enables illicit extraction of public 
finances from the system. This form of capture is even more difficult to confirm, given the 
typical lack of evidence. Notwithstanding the inherent potential of political bias in studying 
this form of state capture, these queries provide an important aspect of the phenomenon: i.e. 
they indicate how the control over the system administration, exercised by political parties, and 
politicised bureaucratic organs of state results in governing the opportunities for capture. 
However, beyond these important explorations of diverse aspects of state capture, some fields 
of latent impact on the state by other types of captors are left un-covered, thus creating a gap 
in knowledge on diverse potentials to seize the state. One of such fields is crime control. Studies 
have examined the influence of mafia over the state (e.g. Maharaj, 2017; Felbab-Brown, 2011), 
but have not attributed these links to the phenomenon of state capture. Therefore, crime control 
has not been extensively studied as a potential capture area.  
In order to address this gap, this research examined whether the extent, form or characteristic 
methods of organised criminal networks in Serbia arises from loopholes of the system, areas of 
strategic weakness that offer what Cockayne (2017, p.8) termed ‘points of arbitrage’ that 
together we can interpret as indicating evidence of state capture. Given that Serbia is in the 
process of implementing various reform measures as a part of its EU accession process, recent 
references to state capture represent a serious concern with regard to impact of these measures, 
as well as the effects of the EU policy (Chapter III.). In this study’s examination of such 
problems, the network of state institutions responsible for suppression of organised crime and 
265 
 
drug trafficking, referred to as the state response network, was scrutinised to identify gaps in 
its functioning. Building on the Cockayne’s concept of the ‘loopholes offered by corruption’ 
(Cockayne and Roth, 2017, p.8), it was conceptualised that these structural holes may be abused 
by organized criminal networks to infiltrate into the system and secure their enduring influence.  
This research has shown that the extent of organised criminal networks in Serbia, as a country 
undergoing EU accession, indicates state capture of its crime control system. The findings 
under the four sub-questions confirmed that there are strong indications of state capture in the 
field of crime control in Serbia, and just how that was so was described and discussed in Chapter 
V. Here the sum of these findings will be discussed with respect to the key theoretical 
development contributing to understanding of Serbia’s current position, state capture. 
 
6.2. The elements of state capture  
 
The literature distinguishes several models describing the key elements of capture. For instance, 
Priebe (2018) maintains that three essential elements involve the existence of capture, the object 
of capture and the subject of capture. Similarly, Southeast Europe Leadership for Development 
and Integrity (SELDI, 2017) proposed the following elements of state capture: the actors, who 
have the capacity to be the captors, pending the type of relationship developed; the results, 
referring to the privileges and status the captor obtains; and the state capture mechanisms. These 
elements are reflected in the formulation developed here. The key elements identified in this 
research to indicate state capture thus include the following phenomena: 
1. Conditions for capture: Serbia is in the process of EU accession; however, it remains a 
state in democratic transition (issues related to weak institutions, media, 
democratisation). 
2. The captors: Organised criminal networks are deeply rooted, persistent, commonly 
engaged in drug trafficking, as well as other multiple forms of crime and operate at both 
local and international level.  
3. Opportunities and mechanisms of capture: Significant systemic gaps, i.e. structural 
holes, in the functioning of state institutions responsible for suppressing organised 
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crime and drug trafficking are present. There are perceptible capture mechanisms 
exploiting this background. 
Since, as noted, these elements have been examined in detail in the Chapter V, enabling 
comprehensive understanding of the state of play of crime control in Serbia, the discussion to 
follow shall elucidate how the actions of the state along with the extent of organised criminal 
networks are understood as state capture within the three-part model just described.  
 
6.2.1. Conditions for capture 
 
Serbia is in the process of EU accession; however, it remains a state in democratic transition. 
The findings of this research indicate that Serbia is still going through an overly long process 
of democratic transition. Literature shows that the phenomenon of state capture is commonly 
associated with transition countries (Helmann and Kaufmann, 2001; Perry and Keil, 2018; 
Popikij,, 2018; Sitorius, 2011). Such an environment represents a fertile ground for state 
capture. As Sitorius (2011) suggests, transition states have proceeded in the economic sphere, 
i.e. liberalisation and privatisation, but they have been unable to complete the complementary 
and necessary institutional reforms. Such frameworks enable capture opportunities across 
different spheres of the system such as legislation, judiciary, and executive power (Sitorius, 
2011). Likewise, Williams (2002) argued that capacity gaps in the state functioning are 
regularly observable in transitional and weak states. This comes as a consequence of non-
finalised, partial reforms in transition countries. Moreover, as a consequence of transition, “the 
lines distinguishing political and economic power are often blurred: oligarchs, high-level 
criminals and politicians can be one and the same” (Nova Europa, cited in Priebe, 2018, p.3). 
As demonstrated in this research, Serbia has not yet finalised the process of democratic 
transition and, indeed, if anything this goal increasingly seems to recede on the horizon. This 
is particularly evidenced by continuous problems in the rule of law recurrently cited in the EU 
progress reports (2013-2018) as one of the key obstacles to accession (along with wide-spread 
corruption, independence of the judiciary, as discussed in Chapter V). The progress of Serbia 
in the process of EU accession is materially hindered by the endurance of criminal networks 
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and wide-spread corruption shown in this research. Moreover, the assessments of 
democratisation, explored in detail in Chapter V, all indicate that there remain important 
difficulties in the field of rule of law, independence of the judiciary, organised crime and 
prevention of money laundering. In addition, the latest Freedom House assessment places 
Serbia in the group of semi-consolidated democracies, or partially free countries (Freedom 
house, 2018). This is Serbia’s lowest Democracy Score in Nations in Transition since 2003. 
Such assessment results follow from a democratic decline in areas of the independence of the 
media, the judiciary, civil society, and national democratic governance (Freedom house, 2018). 
Here, it seems that the fact that a state is trapped in overly long transition process represents a 
fertile ground for potential state capture and may well be an important marker of capture 
processes at work. An interesting explanation as to why this may be the case was offered by 
Sitorius (2011), who argued that transition states are characterised by the mechanisms for 
formulating legal frameworks or policies which remain mostly hidden from the public. The 
findings of this research are largely in line with this, as they grasp a set of concealed institutional 
practices and systemic omissions. As discussed in Chapter V, there is significant lack of 
research in this field in Serbia, which decreases public awareness and even the awareness of 
the professionals with regard to the extent of the capture opportunities arising from unfinished 
transition. Even though this research did not focus on civic awareness, its conjunction with the 
capture mechanisms should also be considered as an accompanying element of stalled transition 
states (Golubovic, 1999; Teitel, 2014). As shown in this research, such an environment is 
favourable for various types of abuses of power and based on the experience of Serbia examined 
here seems to entail an important factor contributing to state capture. 
For example, interview data illustrate the lack of relevant participation of the civil society and 
the media: 
Please comment on the role of media in terms of organised crime suppression 
For the field of organized crime: sensationalism, exclusively political context, lack of relevant info coming 
from public authorities. (A civil society representative, P4.1) 
For the field of drug trafficking: Complete marginalization of problem. (A civil society representative, P4. 
3) 
They have the ambition to influence the public in specific court cases, and consequently to the court. (A 
judge, P2.1) 
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Sometimes good, it creates attention with regard to particular method of executing criminal offences. (A 
repression institution representative, P2.6 ) 
Sometimes very bad, spinning and publishing fake news. (A repression institution representative, P4.5) 
Very bad, information leeks are a constant problem... (A state institution representative,P1.3) 
Media make criminals to become famous, like role models. (A civil society representative, P4.4) 
Please comment on the role of the civil society in terms of organized crime and drug trafficking suppression 
Organized crime and drug trafficking are not in the main focus of CSOs in Serbia. Mostly, they are subject 
of public discussion and conferences as some kind of “side issue” when discussing EU accession processes. 
The situation is bit different when it comes to engagement of CSOs which are not typical but belong to 
academic and professional community (research institutes and professional associations of judges and 
prosecutors). These organizations periodically organize scientific conferences and round tables to discuss 
problems in practice, current trends and developments and possible legislative amendments. (A civil 
society representative, P4.1) 
 
Are CSOs active in the field of contemporary drug policies   
Not enough. (A civil society representative, P4.3) 
No. It is almost impossible to ensure project support for researches in this field. (A civil society 
representative, P4.2) 
Campaigns – why lacking  
Lack of resources- focus of donor community. (A civil society representative, P4.1) 
How would you describe social attitudes regarding organized crime and drug trafficking? 
Growing problems, but marginalized in public discourse. (A civil society representative, P4.3) 
 
The analysis has indicated that civil society and the media do not effectively exercise their role 
to safeguard the rule of law in a democratic society. It appears that the field of crime control in 
Serbia remains significantly hidden from the public. This is particularly true when it comes to 
the debates on the results of crime control, despite relatively transparent discussions on the 
normative framework. How has the stalled transition process contributed to the creation of an 
environment susceptible to capture in this way? It seems this is primarily the result of remaining 
problems in the rule of law, undeveloped culture of accountability of public officials and 
insufficient transparency of public policies, of which this absence of media and civil society is 
an important element (Chapter V). In parallel, such an environment hinders EU accession 
processes, consequently decreasing the potential for full alignment with the EU standards and 
adequate systemic regulation. This unregulated space allows the state capture to arise 
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uncontested or in a publicly invisible manner, thus obstructing to efforts to shape good 
governance. 
In such an environment, actors having sufficient power and resources may utilise the available 
opportunities to capture any system of the state. Essentially, it appears that the EU utilised this 
concept as a description of the situation in Serbia, following multiannual attempts to emphasize 
the particular problems detected.  
 
6.2.2. The captors: Organised criminal networks 
 
Organised criminal networks are deeply rooted, persistent, commonly engaged in drug 
trafficking, as well as other multiple forms of crime and operate at both local and international 
level 
Once the concept of state capture relevant for this research and the fact that Serbia remains a 
country in transition have been determined, it is necessary to grasp who may be the captors in 
the field of crime control. As discussed in the Chapter III (3.5.), different interest groups appear 
in the literature as potential captors (private companies, high ranking officials, politicians). This 
research focused on investigating criminal networks as potential captors in Serbia. As 
thoroughly reviewed in Chapter V, the extent of organised crime and drug trafficking in Serbia 
represents an important indicator of state capture. The existence of organised crime has been 
confirmed by the use of an adapted Bisogno framework (2016) and additional, state-particular 
criteria. The determinants of organised crime involved:  
1. Trends in drug trafficking and links with other crimes (types of illegal activities) 
2. Trends in drug use 
3. Drug seizures  
4. War between criminal groups 
5. Geographic scope of the activity (affiliation background) 
6. Organisational model of criminal networks (local/national/international group; models 
of group functioning, modus operandi) 
 
To recap, the existence and operation of organised criminal networks in Serbia was confirmed 
and described in the analysis on the basis of all six determinants (Chapter V). Overall, research 
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findings under research question 3 indicated that organised criminal groups in Serbia externally 
function as networks and are mainly, though certainly not exclusively, engaged in drug 
trafficking. The business is often organised from abroad, through reliable Serbian 
intermediaries in the drug-source country. Serbian criminal networks are well-connected with 
other regional and international groups and contribute to global drug trade (5.3.1.). They are 
actively involved in multiple types of illegal activities and usually carry out money laundering 
in the country of their origin. Concurrently, at the internal level, organised criminal networks 
show elements of hierarchical, Mafia-like organisations. They are engaged in wars over 
territory, protection businesses, they have been associated with political murders and their main 
players act as “bosses”. 
Cockayne and Roth (2017, p.8) maintain that “sovereignty and the rule of law may be corrupted 
by private and often criminal interests”. Likewise, according to Vesna Pesic, a state may be 
captured by: 
Any group or social strata, external to the state, that seizes decisive influence over state 
institutions and policies for its own interests and against the public good. 
Vesna Pesic (2007, p. 1) 
The evidenced presence of organised crime, along with deeply rooted links with the state 
structures in Serbia, have therefore confirmed the initial hypothesis that the extent of criminal 
networks implies that they are in position to be the captors of the crime control system in Serbia. 
Such evaluation was offered by the European Commission recently: 
Today, the countries show clear elements of state capture, including links with 
organised crime and corruption at all levels of government and administration, as 
well as a strong entanglement of public and private interests.  
(COM, 2018 (65), p.3) 
There is a number of indications that organised crime has the capacity to act as the captor of 
the state. Previous research by Serbian authors suggested strong linkages between organised 
crime and public sector corruption, with criminal networks greatly relying on corruption to 
ensure the protection from law enforcement efforts, facilitate money laundering and ensure 
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legal investments based on illicit trade (Nikolic-Ristanovic, 2004; Trifunovic, 2007). As 
mentioned earlier, members of one of the strongest organised crime groups have been convicted 
for the murder of the Prime Minister in 2003 at the Government entrance. Various political 
murders in the 90s have also been associated with the main criminal groups (Anastasijevic, 
2006). Hence, these groups have formerly established an image of being equally strong as the 
state and have managed to keep such an impression even nowadays. 
Moreover, large profits generated through organised crime certainly provide the potential for 
criminal networks to act as captors. Resources generated by drugs and/or arms trade during 
conflicts, coupled with the privatization proceeds at the beginning of transition in Serbia, made 
criminal networks powerful actors who exert influence on politics and business. As a result, 
they have been able to penetrate the highest spheres of government, impact the political agenda 
and develop close relationships with diverse circles of power. As argued by Mendelski: 
The EU supported or cooperated with clientelistic and corrupt elites or even with 
members of governments that collaborated or were part of organized crime. 
 (Mendelski, 2015, p.337). 
 
However, the prevalence of corruption discussed throughout the research also implies that there 
may be other actors exercising the capture. For instance, it may be argued that the politicians 
themselves are the captors. This may potentially be true in some specific, isolated cases 
(difficult to prove) tangentially associated with crime, however it cannot be considered a valid 
explanation in the context of Serbian political life. This is primarily the case as most individuals 
engaged in politics are “exchangeable goods”, they usually come from unsuccessful businesses 
or have been ‘surviving’ in politics for a number of years mainly as a sort of civil servants (with 
better connections and salaries). Their background, financial power and their acting often does 
not indicate the potential to act as captors. Certainly, it may be the case that there are few 
politicians with a strong capture potential, probably similar to other states in transition, but they 
could not actually capture the whole crime control system alone and would not have specifically 
clear benefit in doing so. On the contrary, if perceived through the lenses of high-level 
corruption, it seams more likely that the criminal networks have the potential to be the captors, 
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while the politicians habitually have financial interest to exchange favours and enable the 
capture.  These deviant relations between the state actors and crime imply high potential for the 
state capture. 
Another alternative explanation of the potential captors could include the wealthy businessmen 
or corporations as potential captors of the crime control system. This could be the case, given 
their social and financial potential to exert certain pressure or engage in corruption. Probably 
this kind of activity is not rare. Nevertheless, such cases broadly fall under the phenomenon of 
(grand) corruption, and would mainly refer to public tenders, financial crime and the like, 
whereas state capture of the crime control system entails a much more dangerous phenomenon 
for the society as a whole. For instance, there has been no reference to a war between successful 
businesses that leads to murders, while organised crime groups openly show their power in the 
society without fear of consequences. In this context, it could therefore be argued that this 
research provides sufficient indications that organised crime in Serbia has strong potential to 
act as a captor of the system of crime control through diverse mechanisms described below.  
The resistance of the state plays a major role at this point, given that capacity gaps in the system 
may create opportunities for capture by organised criminal networks. Cockayne (2017, p.37) 
refers to these gaps as “gates between different jurisdictions and realms” which may generate 
opportunities for arbitrage. Organised criminal networks represent particularly dangerous 
captors, given that in the course of expanding their operations, they are able to use significant 
financial resources gained through illegal activities to gradually weaken, disable, or seize the 
functions of political and judicial institutions (Sitorius, 2011). This is of concern since critical 
social determinants of organized crime refer to the quality, independence and integrity of the 
institutions safeguarding the rule of law, including police and the judiciary. Contemporary 
investigations consistently indicate that a number of states are characterized by strong 
interdependent links between organised crime, politics and the public sector (Fazekas, and 
Tóth, 2016; Felbab-Brown, 2011; Garay and Villaveces, 2009; Leitner and Meissner, 2017 
Maharaj, 2017; Prelevic, 2018; Schultze-Kraft, 2016; Varese 2010; Williams, 2001), resulting 
in the emergence of a symbiosis between legitimate actors and criminal networks. As Cockayne 
(2017, p.6) argues, these are no longer two distinct worlds – an upperworld and an underworld, 
but rather “a single strategic space in which state, criminal and other actors compete to govern”. 
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Such symbiosis hinders effective suppression of organized crime and eventually leads to state 
capture.  
This symbiosis was reviewed in detail in Chapter III, showing that extended process of 
transition, coupled with well-established links between criminal groups created during the 
conflicts in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, have decisively influenced the development 
of certain forms of organized crime and trafficking routes in the Balkans. The analysis further 
demonstrated that organised criminal groups have effectively adapted their activity to the new 
circumstances of transition and continued to successfully govern the criminal markets in the 
region. In fact, the process of transition enabled criminal groups to legalize their profits through 
privatisation and establish adequate links with the political elites. It seems reasonable to 
conclude that this mode of functioning strongly relies on “informal social exchanges” (Bresson, 
1999) i.e. that they continue to enjoy protection from relevant enforcement and political 
structures which enables endurance of criminal activities. As already discussed, in the period 
of early 2000 it was perceived that in Serbia “mafia has the state”, which resulted in the murder 
of a Prime minister. This implies that organised criminal groups have also been effective in 
engaging in ‘governance’ and it is difficult to believe that they don’t continue to do so. 
Cockayne and Roth (2017, p.8) argue that organised criminal networks in synergies with state 
actors infiltrate in the system through the “loopholes offered by corruption”. Such state of play 
is perceived by Williams (2002, p.172) as the “iron triangle” implying a complex and symbiotic 
relationship of state officials, political, criminal and business actors. Diverse forms of this 
symbiosis are certainly inherent to organised crime worldwide, however, the problems increase 
when such a relationship is overly visible and starts affecting the system functioning and 
eventually the citizens. 
Capture by organised criminal networks also fits in the theoretical framework of the World 
Bank (2002). According to this framework, state capture involves obstruction of the reforms 
and “the equilibrium of partial reforms” (World Bank, 2002, p. 94). The obstruction of the 
reforms implies the existence of social groups aiming to slow down or prevent political or 
economic transformation of a state. Such social groups exert influence on the state to implement 
exceptional or preferential policies, which is supported by private payments or corruption, thus 
resulting in state capture.  This aspect of a captured state results in the second element i.e. the 
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equilibrium of partial reforms (World Bank, 2002). This implies that political or economic 
transformation shall not be accomplished due to the disproportion of the political and economic 
sphere which hinders the consolidation of democratic institutions. Organised criminal groups 
in Serbia, as indicated in the Chapter V, have apparently been able to influence policy choices 
in the field of crime control thus creating lucrative ‘points of arbitrage’, to use Cockayne’s very 
useful term. One example that emerged in this research concerns a controversial policy, enabled 
through legislation, to keep the whole amount of seized drugs throughout the duration of legal 
proceedings (see Chapter V). Given that judicial proceedings in Serbia tend to last for several 
years, such an unusual normative approach (certainly unnecessary, in international norms are 
any guide) opens up such a point of arbitrage, laying the conditions not only for further trade 
in these drugs but also for extended disputes over the legitimacy of examined samples in legal 
proceedings. As the findings of this study showed, these drug amounts frequently are not 
controlled and indeed ‘simply disappear’ are often thus unavailable in the later stages of the 
trial.   
Along with the obstruction of the reforms, the specificities of state capture by organised crime 
are evidenced in the efforts of organised criminal groups to prevent the enforcement of the law, 
thus installing “a culture of impunity” (Sitorius, 2011, p. 59). As the findings indicate, it is not 
lack of law per se, but rather lack of implementation of laws that represents one of the main 
problems in Serbia. In fact, lack of implementation was found to be one of the main structural 
holes attributable to more than five institutions (as shown in the Graph V.5. Once again we can 
observe that such structural holes imply the potential for pervasive capture opportunities, due 
to their prevalence across multiple institutions in the crime control system.  
 
6.2.3. Opportunities and mechanisms for capture 
 
Significant systemic gaps, i.e. structural holes, in the functioning of state institutions 
responsible for suppressing organised crime and drug trafficking are present. There are 
perceptible capture mechanisms exploiting this background. 
As shown in Chapter V, significant systemic gaps, i.e. structural holes, in the functioning of the 
Serbian state response network exist. Beyond the identification of the structural holes in the 
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system of crime control in Serbia, this discussion on the opportunities for capture also points 
to the object of state capture, as suggested by Priebe (2018) above. The object of the capture in 
this case involves the state institutions engaged in organised crime and drug trafficking 
suppression i.e. the crime control system.  
To summarise briefly the findings presented in Chapter V, the analysis identified a total of 28 
communities grouped around the particular gaps in state response network functioning. Among 
these communities, the 8 main structural holes have been identified. The main problems 
identified involve: identification of financial assets from crime, the role of the Appellate court, 
case law, mapping of criminal networks, seizure and destruction of drugs, implementation of 
laws, the reliance on secret service and prevention of substance misuse. Additionally, in the 
analysis of relations of the institutions responsible for the 28 identified problems it was found 
that eight key problems or structural holes in the network can be attributed to more than five 
institutions. This implies that such problems may create pervasive capture opportunities across 
the state system. Viewed together, these particular structural holes indicate that all important 
systemic spheres are affected. Moreover, it is the joint effect of the identified structural holes 
that has exceptional relevance. As Cockayne (2017, p.8) points out: 
Individuals and groups generate and exploit opportunities in their environments to extract 
criminal rents. Those opportunities frequently arise at the points of arbitrage, the ‘gates’ 
between realms, markets or communities governed by different actors: at border 
crossings; at the boundaries between different markets or jurisdictions, where smuggling 
networks can benefit from price arbitrage; at the legal and financial boundaries between 
different tax and regulatory jurisdictions; at the boundary between the legal and the 
illegal. 
Cockayne (2017, p.8) 
Following this line of thought, the reasons why the specific structural holes indicate state 
capture in the field of crime control lie in their particular positioning and jurisdiction, which 
enables them to represent the ‘gates’. Namely, the state response network consists of multiple 
jurisdictions but not all of those jurisdictions have equivalent power. Among those 
jurisdictions, there are some institutional domains of action which are principal stakeholders 
and have the largest potential to be ‘points of arbitrage’ (Cockayne, 2017, p.8), or what we 
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could otherwise think of as important focal  points: points where an important balance may be 
tipped either way, in favour of the state or of criminal groups. Therefore, identification of 
system vulnerabilities in those institutional domains of action, such as judiciary or investigative 
bodies, is especially important since it points to key locations of possible state capture. This is 
particularly so when such vulnerabilities are persistent for a long period.    
Thus, the identified systemic gaps per se do not necessarily signify state capture; they could be 
viewed as certain reparable inefficiencies of the system to suppress organised crime. They 
could also be viewed as a consequence of incompetence, lack of funds or inadequate training. 
These problems do exist in the Serbian system, however, the analysis has not identified them 
as relevant. The potential of these various issues which certainly may influence the 
effectiveness of organised crime suppression does not appear to be strong enough to cause the 
loopholes identified.   
However, it is the positioning of these particular loopholes and their pervasiveness across the 
state response network that strongly endorses the notion of state capture as the rationale for 
such state of crime control in Serbia. Precisely, the way these loopholes are positioned prevents 
the effectiveness of practically every suppression effort. In practice, this means that each phase 
of organised crime and drug trafficking suppression has its own potential ‘point of arbitrage’. 
The table below indicates the identified loopholes in the system, according to the affected 
phase. 
 
Table VI.1. Phases of organised crime and drug trafficking suppression as potential ‘points of 
arbitrage’ 
Suppression phases The main network identified 
loopholes 
Pervasive capture opportunities 
Phase I  
Legal framework 
Implementation of laws  
 
Independence/political 
influence/corruption 
 
Implementation of laws 
 
Information exchange 
 
Mapping of OC/DT networks 
 
Phase II  
Prevention 
 
Prevention of drug misuse 
 
 
Lack of research 
 
Phase III 
Investigation 
 
Mapping of criminal networks 
 
Reliance on secret service 
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Phase IV 
Financial investigation 
Identification of financial assets from 
crime 
 
Internal control 
 
Multi-disciplinary teams 
 
Identification of financial assets 
from crime 
 
Production and trade precursors 
Phase V  
Trial 
 
The role of the Appellate court 
 
Case law 
 
Phase VII 
Seizure and destruction of 
drugs  
 
Keeping of seized drugs 
 
Destruction of drugs 
 
 
The effectiveness of institutions in fighting organised crime is evidently hampered therefore by 
numerous deeply rooted problems. The capture mechanisms in these phases are elucidated 
below. 
 
6.2.3.1. Phase I Legal framework – capture mechanisms 
 
As shown in the analysis, institutional effectiveness is a priori limited by diverse gaps in the 
legislative framework and subsequently hindered by inter-dependent activities of other actors 
in the network. As the analysis showed, the significance of these gaps differs (e.g. drafting was 
found to be less relevant, while implementation is one of the key structural holes). Nevertheless, 
content analysis showed that each of these phases i.e. drafting strategies, laws and 
implementation faces various challenges. In exploring these legislative difficulties in Serbia, 
Dallara (2014) argued that the laws adopted in the period of euphoric approach of Serbian elites 
towards the EU often lacked practical implementation and enforcement. A similar standpoint 
was held by Hiber and Begović (2006), who argued that judges and politicians avoided pursuing 
reforms due to their puzzling alliance (p.3). They explain this alliance as a result of the judges’ 
fear of replacement and political desire to preserve effective control over the judiciary. 
Therefore, these systemic gaps create either uneven treatment or lack of implementation (or 
both).  
The identified structural hole i.e. lack of implementation of laws enables an excellent point of 
arbitrage. As discussed in Chapter V, this is a known practice in Serbia, often perceived as a 
given fact. Even the EU uses the formulation “the legal framework is adequate, but 
implementation is lacking”. Such a state of affairs would seem to create realistic expectations 
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among criminal networks and actors that laws do not necessarily need to be implemented and 
that they can influence this process. These expectations arise from a long-term behaviour of 
state institutions, which have demonstrated that normative frameworks are often not efficiently 
and equally applied.  
In a study on Serbian accession (discussed in Chapter III), Mendleski (2016, p.351) also 
identified lack of implementation of legislation, referring to it as ‘a pathological lack of 
enforcement of laws’. He found that laws in Serbia are formally adopted but often not 
implemented in practice, due to high domestic costs and veto players who were against these 
reforms. Mendelski also identified the lack of generality of law, which he understood as 
insufficient neutrality resulting from introduction or amendments of laws aimed at fulfilment 
of “particular interest of influential captors” who wanted to fight their competitors (Mendleski, 
2016, p.354). In light of this, identification of loopholes in implementation of laws indicates a 
fertile ground for various informal social exchanges or, inexplicable practices of the 
institutions. 
Given that the lack of implementation of laws also represents a cross-cutting issue, present 
across the entire state response network (see Chapter V), this structural hole symbolises an 
integral element of capture mechanisms, given that it directly provides numerous possibilities 
for undue influence. 
 
6.2.3.2. Phase II Prevention – capture mechanisms 
 
The identified structural holes in the field of prevention of substance misuse are particularly 
interesting. Even though this area was not the focus of this research, the decision to include the 
preventive aspect has resulted in important findings. It must be noted primarily that, as 
evidenced in this research, the use of new psychoactive substances has substantially increased. 
This creates a new field for profit of criminal networks and demonstrates that preventive 
mechanisms are not sufficient to changing trends and thus unlikely to be effective. Growing 
demand in this new area seems to have caused an increase in supply, and such clearly 
contributes to the circle of trafficking. Further, the potentials of broader prevention are 
decreased in the Serbian case due to overlapping responsibilities of state institutions responsible 
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for drug trafficking prevention, while the methods used so far for the prevention of substance 
misuse appear to be outdated. 
 
Interestingly, as one of the cross-cutting issues (Chapter V, Part II, Graph V.5) the production 
and trade in precursors has been identified by the network analysis as important gap in this 
phase. The method in which this particular factor contributes to capture mechanisms is the 
overlapping jurisdictions in the framework for precursors, which hinders accountability of 
institutions. Any efforts to combat NPSs in Serbia will ultimately have to reckon with the 
challenge of this fractured enforcement and regulatory environment. Namely, a number of 
inter-related bodies is responsible for this field, but no clear separation of jurisdictions has been 
prescribed. In fact, the responsibility is shared to such extent that several unrelated institutions 
participate through negligible actions, yet without any key responsible body. This structural 
hole particularly illustrates Cockayne’s (2017, p.8) notion of “boundaries between different 
jurisdictions” and the opportunities that are offered there.  
 
An additional element identified by the network analysis as an important gap in this phase 
involves lack of research. With a view to capture mechanisms, this particular gap ensures that 
most of the problems in this field remain concealed. Beyond limited groups working within the 
system, absence of research decreases the chances for debate thus resulting in lack of both 
institutional and public knowledge. Where there is no awareness, the pressure of the public is 
not exerted and there are hence a number of crime-enabling actions which are not subject to 
civic oversight, monitoring or control. The potential for effective actions is further reduced due 
to insufficient cooperation with civil society, which involves front-line workers worldwide and 
represents one of the key support pillars in substance misuse prevention. Lack of contemporary 
research at the national level decreases capacities of relevant stakeholders and prevents 
exchange of best practices. All these factors in the prevention phase create a major gap, leaving 
the space for criminal networks to infiltrate, take advantage of the youth population and gain 
profit. 
 
 
280 
 
6.2.3.3. Phase III Investigation and prosecution – capture mechanisms 
 
The loopholes in investigation and prosecution enable further exploitation of this fragile legal 
framework and their relevance is of particular importance, given that they indicate that best 
practices are not utilised. The absence of mapping of criminal networks in the global drug trade, 
organised as it is by loose networks connecting into Serbia for various points, implies either a 
serious lack of capacities or an intentional blindness. This results in inefficient investigation, 
commonly reactive rather than proactive, thus by dint of omission facilitating the functioning 
of criminal networks. In practice, this means that intelligence-led policing and proactive 
investigations are not sufficiently implemented, which results in lack of detection of wider 
criminal networks. 
One important finding in this research has been the identification of Serbia’s reliance on its 
secret service in the context of investigation and the way this hampers detection of legal actors 
who have the capacity to assist criminal networks. Ceding jurisdiction to the secret service, 
which is overseen and controlled by politicians, opens up the possibility that involvement of 
state officials will be concealed and ‘tracks covered’ through the use of the secret service’s 
special investigative techniques. As described in Chapter V, the political control of this service 
renders it inherently less transparent than other bodies and interviewees suggested it therefore 
offers safe mechanisms for undue influence and consequently, we might conclude, capture. 
When these ‘points of arbitrage’, enabled through policy choices are coupled with the lack of 
effective and independent internal control in the police, it is reasonable to conclude that 
investigations on corruption are impeded. 
 
To put some data to this hypothesis, the two tables below illustrate the results of internal control 
mechanisms of the police. What is the particularly interesting is the very small number of 
persons accused of trading in influence. This is in some ways logical, due to the difficulties in 
proving this criminal offence. However, it is these informal links that represent an integral 
element of capture and have the potential to obstruct independent investigations, given that 
state capture is based on personal relations. 
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Table VI.2: Police reports by the Sector for Internal Control  
Structure of criminal offenses with elements of corruption 
 (the so-called corruptive offenses) 
Criminal offense 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Abuse of official 
position, Art. 359. 
CC 
72   
 
75 94 259 
Taking bribe, Art. 
367. CC  
 26   98 77 71 
Giving bribe, 
Art.368. CC 
14  / 3 22 
Trading in influence, 
Art. CC 
1 3 2 6 
Abuse of position of a 
responsible person,  
Art.. CC 
1 2 2 3 
Unlawful Production 
and Circulation of 
Narcotics Article, 
Art. 246. CC 
2 / 4 12 
 
Source: Ministry of Interior, 2017 
 
Table VI.3: Review of the number of proposed measures by the Internal control sector for the 
initiation of disciplinary proceedings 
Review of the number of 
proposed measures by 
the Internal control 
sector for the initiation of 
disciplinary proceedings 
Number of police officers 
against which measures are proposed 
 
 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Proposal to initiate 
disciplinary proceedings 
for serious violation of 
official duty 
280   
 
178 253 245 
Proposal to initiate 
disciplinary proceedings 
due to a minor violation of 
official duty 
26   
 
14 16 19 
 
Source: Ministry of Interior, 2018 
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In addition, in societies where institutionalised corruption is present it can be concluded that a 
culture of state capture already exists. It is thus simpler in such circumstances to avoid 
implementation of rules due to ineffective accountability or control. Corruption-tolerance in 
Serbia allows for deviations from democratic rules in many ways, and this illustrates one of 
them. An excerpt from the official report of the Ministry of Interior illustrates this social 
acceptance: 
 
Citizens are not ready to report a case of corruption, because by giving bribes to the police it is easier to 
solve, for example, traffic offense; or if they deal with illicit trafficking, smuggling of goods, they are very 
motivated to give the police a smaller amount of money to quickly and successfully transport goods or 
cross the border, and such "cooperation" remains undiscovered. That's why it is hard to provide the 
evidence needed to file criminal charges, primarily because of citizens' unwillingness to report corruption, 
and also because of their possible criminal liability. 
 
Ministry of Interior, Report on the work in 2016, p.10 
 
Given that this report is available at the website of the ministry, it is interesting that it justifies 
the corruption in police by citizens’ willingness to offer bribes. Perhaps this is a finest 
illustration of the meaning of wide-spread corruption. 
 
Overall, the effects of these gaps in investigation and prosecution in practice lead to a 
significantly poor track record in organised crime and drug trafficking cases (EU Progress 
report, 2018, p. 30 and 31; see also p .4 and 19). When the phase of investigation is vulnerable 
and when international best practices are not implemented, it is difficult to expect successful 
results in the field of repression. 
 
6.2.3.4. Phase IV Financial investigation – capture mechanisms 
 
The analysis in this study has shown that problems with identification of financial assets from 
crime represent significant structural holes in the state response network. This appears to be 
one of important indications of the ‘gaps’ enabling endurance of organised crime in Serbia. Its 
significance lies in the pervasiveness across the different types of institutions, including the law 
enforcement, the judiciary and the financial institutions. The capacities for financial 
investigation in Serbia are limited and therefore impact each of the suppression phases. As the 
findings indicate, investigation commonly does not result in identification of financial assets 
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from crime. This is usually explained by insufficient cooperation from the financial 
investigation unit or a lack of necessary information exchange. However, given the 
comprehensive trainings undertaken by repression institutions’ staff, prosecutors and judges in 
the last couple of years, it seems difficult to believe that capacities remain inadequate.  
 
Concurrently, lack of connected data bases enabling access to different types of institutions 
certainly contributes to such state of affairs since the full ‘picture’ is never seen and thus state 
actors continually work with ‘one hand tied behind their back’. Finally, even when financial 
assets derived from crime are identified, the judiciary shows reluctance to confiscate the assets. 
This may be due to lack of competence to use these findings or lack of understanding why this 
is important. Nonetheless, given the behaviour of the court (described below) there may be 
other ‘inexplicable’ reasons for Serbia’s markedly poor track record in confiscation of criminal 
assets.  
 
What the failure of this mechanism enables in practice is that organised criminal groups (and 
key individuals as their members) have the opportunity to preserve the profits of crime, even if 
they are prosecuted or eventually convicted. The importance of this for criminal networks as 
businesses cannot be underestimated. In financial terms, failure to confiscate proceeds of crime 
means that ‘liquidity’ is maintained and trade and business can thus continue. The identified 
deficiencies in the financial investigations, coupled with extensive money laundering, thus 
allow for reinvestment of substantial profits derived from crime in the Serbian economy. The 
common corruption-related sectors include real estate, infrastructure projects, healthcare, 
education, spatial planning, and privatisation of public enterprises (Progress report, 2018, p.21).  
 
Taking into account the discussion on transition-related profits of the state officials, derived 
through privatisation, and their links established with illegal actors during the conflicts in 
former Yugoslavia, this appears to be a deeply-rooted loophole and a valuable space for 
arbitrage. So far, as the findings indicate, these profits are re-invested in Serbia. However, the 
potential offered by global markets and the future EU accession may enable organised criminal 
groups from Serbia to invest drug related profits in the EU Member States as well. This is 
particularly important in view of the findings that most of the bosses of criminal groups are 
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located outside the country.  Certainly, the results of eliminating this loophole should be quickly 
visible and are something that could be monitored by the EU through the accession process 
review mechanisms.  
 
6.2.3.5. Phase V Trial – capture mechanisms 
 
One of the most significant loopholes has been identified in the phase of court proceedings for 
organised crime and drug trafficking. As described in Chapter III, Serbia has a Special court 
for organised crime. Interestingly, no systemic deficiencies have been identified in this court, 
as a first instance court in this field. However, the second instance proceedings are marked by 
two significant problems, namely the lack of case law and performance of the Appellate court. 
These structural holes additionally destabilise the state response network, due to their potential 
to annul the actions of other state bodies. The importance and the danger of these loopholes 
principally lies in their ability to send a message to repression institutions that it's not even 
worth trying. This phase of suppression efforts is therefore particularly important, given that 
potential capture in this position can be very successful: i.e. it can result in final decisions and 
ensure acquittal of individuals belonging to organised criminal groups. That is, if the case gets 
to a trial or if something goes wrong in the first instance, the Appellate court is there for the 
final decision. This mechanism is additionally facilitated by inconsistent case law and the 
notion of free judicial opinion, discussed in Chapter V. These tools enable corrupt exchanges 
and ensure that anything is possible, including the reversal, at Appellate level, of a decision 
rendered against you in the specialist lower court.   
The twisted logic inherent to state capture is evidenced in the results. For instance, the Appellate 
court appears as a regular second instance court responsible to control the legality of the 
decisions. Looking at its decisions, without acknowledging the wider context, one might 
conclude that it particularly takes care of the human rights of defendants. Nevertheless, the 
findings of this research show that this court shows an extraordinary understanding for 
individuals accused in these cases, as it often interprets the law ‘to the benefit of the defendant’. 
This has resulted in a number of members of organised criminal groups being released and 
there are instances of these same individuals being later associated with new mafia-related 
murders. Importantly, the same strict attention to rights of the defendant is seldom extended to 
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the many low level drug-related offenders who, for reasons that may be assumed to be related, 
find themselves the primary target of enforcement activities. 
 
All this results in very limited outcomes in the field of crime control. As the findings clearly 
show, the track record in this field cannot be considered effective by any means. With over 100 
mafia-related murders in the last couple of years to 2019 and the ongoing war between criminal 
groups, the state appears to be mute. Except several media reports of multiple arrests, none of 
these cases had a judicial closure. There are very few indictments and even fewer final 
convictions in drug trafficking and organised crime cases. Concurrently, the number of plea 
agreements in organised crime and drug trafficking cases indicates certain crime control efforts. 
As shown in the Table VI.4, in the period from 2012 to 2017, the number of concluded plea 
agreements for organised crime and unauthorised production and trade in drugs is constantly 
increasing.  
Table VI.4: Plea agreements for organised crime and drug trafficking cases 
Year Criminal offense No. of plea agreements 
2012 Unauthorized Production and Distribution of Narcotic 
Drugs (Art. 246 CC) 
16  
2013 Unauthorized Production and Distribution of Narcotic 
Drugs (Art. 246 CC) 
19  
2014 Criminal alliance (Art.350 CC) 9 
2015 Unauthorized Production and Distribution of Narcotic 
Drugs (Art. 246 CC)  
 
Criminal alliance (Art.350 CC) 
12 
 
46 
2016 Unauthorized Production and Distribution of Narcotic 
Drugs (Art. 246 CC)  
 
Criminal alliance (Art.350 CC 
13 
 
31 
2017 Unauthorized Production and Distribution of Narcotic 
Drugs (Art. 246 CC) 
 
Possession of Narcotic Drugs (Art. 246a CC) 
 
Criminal alliance (Art.350 CC) 
11 
 
2 
 
52 
 
Source: Special Prosecutors’ Office for Organised Crime, 2018 
This number of plea agreements raises questions about whether the repression institutions can 
prove these cases or the plea is a form of pressure, or perhaps related to efficiency as a goal. 
Nevertheless, the augmented number of plea agreements perhaps reflects the possibility that 
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most of these individuals are in fact substance misusers and not important members of 
organised criminal groups engaged in drug trafficking.  
Overall, the determination of court proceedings as one of the main loopholes in the system was 
not surprising, given that the field of judiciary has been considered to be under undue political 
influence for decades. Even though “research on Europeanisation of the judiciary in candidate 
countries remains rare” (Kmezić, 2014, p. 61), a number of authors and international 
assessments referred to this problem. For instance, Dallara (2014) argued that domestic actors 
strongly opposed the judicial reforms as a part of the accession process thus hampering the 
influence exerted by the EU. The deeply rooted problem of lack of independence is perhaps 
best described by the following: 
A truly free judiciary was almost impossible because its genuine independence would 
have profoundly undermined the basis of elite power. 
(Dallara, 2014, p. 101) 
Along with the EU Progress reports which consecutively refer to the need to improve 
independence of the judiciary, the Freedom House report of 2018 states that “judges and 
prosecutors routinely complain of political pressure, while reforms necessary for EU accession 
are stalling” (Freedom house, 2018, p.12). The fusion of political influence, corruption and lack 
of accountability for the decisions made, implies that the loopholes in the judiciary may be 
among the key ‘points of arbitrage’ available. Interestingly, in the report on state capture, Priebe 
(2018, p. 7) states that the judiciary in Albania “became a key node of state capture by particular 
political and criminal interests”. In the present research, the judiciary was not found to be a key 
node, rather the analysis showed that court proceedings represent separate ‘islands’, or 
insufficiently connected sites, where only limited number of individuals has a full overview of 
the undertaken actions. Capture mechanisms can therefore be widely used without any 
particular interference. This conclusion is in line with the EU assessment that Serbia’s the track 
record in organised crime cases remains low (Progress report, 2018, p. 30 and 31). In 2019, the 
EU has therefore requested that the state enables access to court case files for the purpose of 
monitoring the undertaken actions of the judiciary. It appears that the EU has decided to stop 
closing its eyes to the presence of these judicial strategies and is attempting to grasp the capture 
potential situated in the Serbia’s courts.  
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6.2.3.6. Phase VI Seizure and destruction of drugs – capture mechanisms 
 
One further and particularly important loophole identified concerns the framework of seizure 
and destruction of drugs. This synthesis of legislative gaps, the lack of guidelines and clear 
procedures in this field represents a major point of arbitrage. The capture mechanism enabled 
through this loophole allows, as mentioned earlier, that drugs seized from a suspect are not 
destroyed until the end of the trial. In this way, the drugs remain in the system, and they can be 
sold, trafficked or used.  
As shown in this research, the seized drugs are kept in police stations across the country, 
without any control, and frequently vanish during the often years-long trial time. In this way, 
policy choices lead to a creation of systemic gaps and opportunities for exchange of services. 
The framework is practically dependent of the expectations that individuals will not take 
advantage of the situation. This mechanism therefore belongs to one of the inexplicable 
deficiencies in the system and strongly indicates capture: why, after all, would such a well-
known opportunity for collusion and the diversion (and thus, destruction) of criminal evidence 
for illicit purposes not be closed off?  Moreover, the responsible authority for the destruction 
of drugs and precursors is not yet even clearly determined, which creates additional space for 
informal social exchanges.  
This convenient normative set-up hinders the fight against drug trafficking and organised 
crime. The review of the opportunities for state capture specified the affected areas of state 
institutions’ functioning by indicating the particular capacity gaps and loopholes in the state 
response network. Nevertheless, in order to fully understand their significance, it is essential to 
grasp what are the mechanisms of state capture offered by these loopholes. The Graph below 
proposes a map of the identified capture mechanisms in the field of crime control in Serbia.
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Graph VI.1. Map of state capture mechanisms in the field of crime control 
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The diagram indicates the map of the identified capture mechanisms in all phases of organised 
crime suppression, including prevention. The different colours are utilised solely for design 
purposes. The arrows showing corruption indicate its pervasiveness across the state response 
network. 
 
Each of these capture mechanisms is explained above, with a view to research findings and the 
phases of state actions described above. In order to fully understand these capture mechanisms, 
it is important to take into account the identified pervasive capture opportunities as well. Most 
of the structural holes are attributable to more than five institutions, as shown in Chapter V. 
Nevertheless, the structural hole relating to independence/political influence and corruption 
appears solely as a pervasive issue and has not been identified in a single specific phase: i.e. 
implying that it is prevalent across different phases. Therefore, this factor is presented above in 
the Graph VI.1 as an overall problem with presence across the state response network.  
Corruption in Serbia remains a concern due to significantly low incomes, social inertia and a 
culture of tolerance of corruption in public administration and law enforcement (Chapter V, 
Part I). As cited in the Progress report 2018 (p.19), there were 50 final convictions for high 
level corruption offences and 26 acquittals in 2017. The results of anti-corruption efforts are 
therefore not surprising, given that there remain problems with the independence of the 
judiciary, as discussed above. Essentially, if there are no independent prosecutors, it is 
unrealistic to expect investigation of politically sensitive, high-level corruption cases. In this 
context, a recent study indicates that political pressure is routinely exerted in the judiciary 
(Association of Judges, 2017).  
 
In addition, insufficient information exchange also appears only as a pervasive issue and has 
not been identified in a single specific phase. As discussed in Chapter V, Serbia’s network of 
crime control institutions is not well connected. Hence, many if not most institutions know little 
about the activities of other bodies, thus decreasing the potential for effective systemic actions 
aimed at organised crime suppression. In a country such as Serbia where, as this study has 
shown, multiple state actors and entities are in some way subject to capturing influences, the 
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absence of inter-connected data bases appears convenient for all stakeholders, since it hinders 
the potential to assess both the nature of the problem and the results of state actions.  
 
Overall, these loopholes generate an image of an organised crime suppression network with 
significant systemic gaps. Therefore, it seems reasonable that the EU has not labelled these 
gaps solely as system inefficiencies, but has decided to use the term state capture. As Cockayne 
argues: 
The site and nature of the gates between ‘realms’ where arbitrage occurs, and where 
vulnerabilities emerge that give rise to protection needs are, in turn, products of policy 
choices by states – and of choices by other actors to develop and shape realms below, 
outside or beyond the governmental power of the state. 
Cockayne (2017, p.9) 
What this research has shown is that a whole set of these intertwined gaps depends on policy 
choices. This implies that the vulnerable ‘sites of criminal rent extraction” (Cockayne, 2017, 
p.9) have been allowed by the state, a strong indication of state capture. 
 
6.3. Conclusions 
 
To summarise, this research identified the main elements of state capture in the field of 
organised crime and drug trafficking suppression in Serbia. They have been confirmed through 
the existence of the three elements of capture: the stalled democratic transition and EU 
accession, as conditions for capture; the organised criminal networks as the potential captors; 
and pervasive capture opportunities and deeply rooted mechanisms, revealed through the 
loopholes in the system. Overall, the field of crime control is affected by various structural 
holes which offer significant potential for state capture.  
Primarily, the loopholes in the system’s function offer a plethora of opportunities and 
mechanisms of capture to organised criminal networks. This is due to the fact that they are 
well-distributed across the state response network, thus enabling exertion of a variety of 
influences in different institutions. No heavy footprint is left in any one place, but a diffuse yet 
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connected network of interventions is revealed that works effectively and has probably grown 
organically over time to head off new threats to organised crime as they have arisen. The 
research literature shows that such loopholes create spaces which are commonly ‘informally 
governed’ (Cockayne and Roth, 2017, p. 19), with or without participation of state actors.  
Secondly, given that state capture inherently entails a network phenomenon, it implies the 
existence of diverse linkages between the legal and illegal actors. These links would need to be 
deeply established in order to establish a trustful relationship between the captors and the actors 
of the object of capture: i.e. in this case the state institutions. In practice, such mechanisms 
involve a whole set of informal social exchanges (Bresson, 1999). Given the lack of lustration 
referred to in Chapter III and the links established in Yugoslavian conflicts, such relations 
enabled the creation of an elite that has been ruling Serbia and shaping the system for a long 
time. The uninterrupted authority of these present and former elites has resulted in governance 
based on personal links.  
Literature shows that symbiosis between state actors and organized crime during the process of 
creation of new states leads to permanent transformation of state interests into private ones and 
fosters the development of criminalised, corrupt and non-transparent societies (Grozdanic and 
Martinovic, 2012; Ivanova, 2010). Systems with similar characteristics are referred to as 
neopatrimonialism. Erdmann (2012) defined neopatrimonialism as a system in which the legal-
rational system of modern statehood overlaps with a patrimonial system of personal rule, 
clientelism and patronage. He describes this scheme in the following manner: 
The patrimonial system (of personal rule) penetrates the legal-rational system, twists its 
logic, functions and output (…), as formal and informal institutions and behaviour are 
intimately linked to each other in various ways and to varying degrees and this mixture 
becomes institutionalised’ (Erdmann 2012, p. 47), while in neopatrimonialism “all power 
relations between ruler and ruled, political as well as administrative relations, are 
personal relations. 
 (Erdmann and Engel 2006, p.18).  
It is this twisted logic that represents an essential element of the state capture phenomenon, as 
it clearly depicts the patterns of governance in captured systems. That is, these systems appear 
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functional from the outside, they send an image of democratic establishments; however inside 
of the system, at various levels, the institutional behaviour is not based on the pre-defined set 
of rules but rather on informal practices, deeply hidden from the public view. Looking at the 
identified deficiencies in the crime control system i.e. the state response network in the context 
of EU accession, it could be argued that there exist within Serbia strong incentives not to 
implement the accession obligations because while that would put the country closer to entry, 
in fact it is this phase – a kind of pre-accession limbo – that is most convenient for a diverse 
interests groups. The present ‘gap’ situation of stalled EU accession implies less control, 
enables accumulation of capital, and absence of strict rules. An overly long period of transition 
seems to have contributed to the creation of a safe house for organised criminal groups from 
the region. Evidently, both the upperworld and the underworld actors benefiting from this state 
of play utilise diverse systemic loopholes to preserve this status and their own position and 
interests. 
 
Chapter VII Conclusions 
 
7.1. Main findings  
 
Previous theoretical investigations of the state capture phenomenon mainly focused on the 
influence of the private sector and corruption, largely ignoring the interplay between criminal 
networks and state actors. This research focused instead on a single potential area of state 
capture in Serbia, i.e. organised crime and drug trafficking suppression, and has identified 
serious obstacles in this field all of which in various ways are hindering the EU accession 
process. 
In an effort to determine whether the extent of organised crime  in Serbia indicates state capture 
of the crime control system in a country undergoing EU accession, this research identified 
significant structural holes in the functioning of state institutions responsible for organised 
crime and drug trafficking suppression (Chapters V and VI). The identified structural holes 
represent an essential element of state capture in the field of crime control in Serbia, given that 
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they confirm fragmented state response network mechanisms. Coupled with stalled transition 
and the extent of organised crime identified in this research, it may be argued that the existence 
of state capture referred in various reports on Serbia is evident in the field of crime control.  
To summarise, the findings of this research confirmed state capture of the crime control system 
by determining: 
1. The conditions for capture, including stalled transition and democratisation; 
2. The captors, organised criminal groups who appear to have the highest capture potential 
due to deeply established links with the ruling elites and financial resources to exert 
pressure; 
3. The mechanisms for capture, including a set of different methods, such as lack of 
implementation of laws, inconsistencies in judicial decisions, ineffective financial and 
criminal investigations, unclear policies in seizure and destruction of drugs, wide-
spread corruption, all of which may ensure impunity of organised crime.  
 
The findings have indicated that these systemic deficiencies, spread across the entire crime 
control system, entail a plethora of institutional practices unknown to wider public, which have 
the capacity to enable state capture in the given field. Nevertheless, the sole existence of the 
systemic deficiencies does not necessarily imply that the crime control system is indeed 
captured. It is the positioning of these particular deficiencies that entails high capture potential 
as it can be clearly associated with evidenced inefficiency of the system identified in this 
research.  
The paragraphs below briefly summarise the detailed findings of this research, along with the 
discussion on systemic loopholes identified at all levels of crime control. The map of capture 
elements (Chapter VI, 6.2.3) shows insufficient synchronisation of state institutions’ activities, 
along with inadequate information exchange and pervasive corruption. The identified loopholes 
(Chapter VI, 6.2.3) in investigation hinder detection of criminal networks and investigative 
capacities. The loopholes in judicial proceedings (Chapter VI, 6.2.3), through the lack of 
coherent case law, questionable acting of the second instance court and problems with judicial 
independence allow for a lack of clarity and thus standards or norms against which actions of 
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the judiciary might be assessed and imply pervasive capture opportunities. The identified gaps 
in financial investigation (Chapter VI, 6.2.3) show limited capacities for identification of 
criminal assets, thus preventing seizure and confiscation and enabling further investments of 
profits from crime. The loopholes in legislative framework (Chapter VI, 6.2.3) hinder 
implementation of laws resulting in lack of clarity in prosecution, questionable court decisions 
and controversial sanctioning policies. Response mechanisms in the prevention of substance 
misuse (Chapter VI, 6.2.3) show lack of transparency and overlapping jurisdictions which 
prevent accountability.  
As discussed earlier, these deficiencies could also be explained by other factors, such as 
incompetence, lack of resources, genuine system inefficiency and the like.  Some of these 
factors may definitely contribute to a lack of efficiency in the crime control system, but they 
are sporadic and their individual strength is not sufficient to enable such gaps in organised 
crime suppression.  
It could also be argued that these systemic gaps are not a result of state capture, but rather a 
consequence of organised crime navigating between different areas of the state. What this 
research has found, however, is that the duration of these systemic gaps and their significant 
pervasiveness, are not typical for non-captured states. That is, an abuse of diverse state 
vulnerabilities worldwide is a prerequisite for organised crime to function. However, the 
particular loopholes identified in this research imply that the whole state mechanism in the field 
of crime control is subjected to capture, because it is difficult to understand why, unless if they 
had been captured, would state actors not change certain dysfunctionalities of the system, which 
are identified systemically throughout the years? It is also valuable to note that the described 
elements of state capture do not inherently involve the indications of its extent or do not 
necessarily indicate ‘how bas the situation is’. The extent of problems referred to as ‘state 
capture’ perhaps best indicates the key underlying motive for labelling such phenomena a 
‘capture’ rather than state dysfunctionality, corruption or a weak state. The term ‘capture’ 
portrays the magnitude of the problem; it implies that someone else, external to the captured 
object, has the power to resolve the problem. 
For those familiarised with the functioning of effective crime control systems, the extent of the 
capture is particularly evident when observing the trials and rather extraordinary statements 
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that are available as public explanations. For instance, the fact that court experts in Saric trial 
discussed above, didn’t even examine whether the money was legal (or coming from cocaine 
trafficking), but have solely: “noted all the cash flows and did not find anywhere a problematic 
transfer for the bank that carried it out” (KRIK, 2019), in fact entails an annulment of the 
expertise itself and implies a perception of the society as absolutely ignorant. But isn’t the 
‘capture’ best revealed in the ability to issue such public statement in relation to the main drug 
trade trial in this decade, without any ‘discomfort’ about potential public reactions or additional 
questions of the colleagues?   
Moreover, the extent of the capture of the crime control system in Serbia could perhaps be well 
described if we consider that the difference between the crime control system captured by 
organised crime and the one potentially captured by bankers or corporations lies it the social 
consequences of these different situations. In the role of a state captor, organised crime feels 
equalised with the state and acts as if there was nothing to fear of. As thoroughly reviewed in 
this research, this seams to be the case in Serbia, given the number of organised crime related 
murders and the methods of these acts.  In real life, such a position involves a feeling of threat 
experienced by the citizens. In Serbia, there is widespread social awareness of the power of 
organised crime (reflected in fear of visiting certain places, having an accidental traffic 
argument with members of criminal groups and the like). In a non-captured state, most of the 
citizens who are not professionals in the field of crime control do not really know about grand 
corruption, neither such phenomenon influences their daily life. In Serbia, however, there is 
this constant perception of the presence of organised crime and its link with top officials, 
irrespectively of the dominant political party at any time. Reports on weekly murders between 
members of criminal groups in the inhabited areas certainly contribute to this feeling. Ganev 
(2007, p.3) referred to such relations of the state and organised crime as “a dynamic 
autonomously generated within the state domain itself”.  
Finally, it is important to take into account that the crime control system is not an isolated 
element. Therefore, capture of this element of the state is consequently reflected in other aspects 
of the state functioning, which may be of interest to the potential captors. References to such 
phenomena have already been discussed in relation to money laundering of criminal proceeds 
through construction, privatisation, or ownership of restaurants and other similar businesses.  
296 
 
The intention of this research was not to entirely resolve contemporary debates about the 
elements of state capture. However, the findings of this research add to our knowledge by 
identifying mechanisms of state capture in the field of crime control, indicating that it is a useful 
concept. Given that the whole phenomenon of ‘state capture’ implies that it is an inherently 
hidden structure, these particular mechanisms are relevant because they specify the particular 
areas where the capture is situated. In any system, such as judiciary, law enforcement, the 
media, very few individuals from the inside know about specific issues or systemic gaps that 
can be abused. That is, one needs to know whom to ask for a favour and how it can be 
accomplished. What this research offers is the identification of the loopholes in the system of 
crime control that are susceptible to state capture, as indicated by a wide range of individuals 
working at various points in the system.  
Despite the fact that organised crime and corruption are pervasive problems across transition 
countries, the notion of state capture appears to best portray their joint impact on state systems’ 
functioning. The concept of state capture provides added value to this research, as it illuminates 
different phenomena than the corruption per se. It demonstrates that state capture is a useful 
term or label for a whole set of identified vulnerabilities in state institutions’ functioning which 
may be utilised by organised criminal groups to extract value and ensure the safety and even 
expansion of their illicit business. The theoretical framework of this research thus offers a 
concept of structural holes to specify how the system allows the development of the ‘points of 
arbitrage’ proposed by Cockayne (2017, p.8). 
Taking into account contemporary debates (Perry and Keil, 2018; Popikij, 2018; Priebe, 2018) 
on the usefulness of the concept of state capture as a phenomenon distinct from corruption, it 
could be argued that it is in fact the ‘capture’ that prevents system effectiveness, whereas 
corruption is solely a tool. This is an important point, and an important distinction. In this 
context, state capture refers to a set of covert practices across institutions that have the potential 
to disrupt the expected lawful behaviour, without breaking the law. These problems in the 
functioning of the system cannot be explained solely by referring to corruption. This view is in 
line with Helmann and Kaufmann (2001) who argued that state capture has become not merely 
a symptom for but also a fundamental cause of poor governance. Therefore, pursuant to this 
research, state capture may be defined as a set of inexplicable system deficiencies involving 
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patterns of structural omissions and covert practices that have the potential to disrupt 
legitimate institutional behaviour and exert influence by using corruption and other forms of 
personal linkages. 
Use of the term ‘inexplicable’ in this definition is important, for it points to the way capture 
mechanisms work to undermine the logic of effective and efficient state mechanisms. This was 
well illustrated in the present study with the example of drug seizure and storage procedures 
remaining so obviously poor and open to abuse, as indeed has been found to be the case. 
Systemic weaknesses such as these can be articulated through diverse deficiencies identified in 
institutional functioning, thus leading to often markedly decreased effectiveness in providing 
the basic functions of the state. Williams (2002, p. 170) observed that such weaknesses of the 
state involve “capacity gaps which result in functional holes”. The functional holes described 
by Williams or ‘loopholes’ proposed by Cockayne and Roth (2017) are conceptualised in this 
research as ‘structural holes’, illustrating the gaps in institutional functioning that enable 
endurance of organised crime. As shown in this research, these loopholes provide a range of 
opportunities for organised criminal groups to secure protection from law enforcement and the 
judiciary. In fact, these loopholes are prevalent across the entire state response network, thus 
enabling a variety of undue influences. The identified structural holes might actually be 
imagined in the form of a display map of mechanisms available for captors. They can choose 
where to try to influence and target the system. Such an image of the state response network 
indicates that only direct and concrete measures addressing the identified loopholes may 
penetrate and destabilise this deeply rooted framework. 
The findings of this research show that state capture in the field of crime control enables 
organised criminal groups’ expansion and smooth functioning without efficient interference by 
the state institutions. With this being said, it is not implied that institutions do not work 
properly; on the contrary, they achieve certain success and send an image of a functional 
system. That is, for those who are less familiarised with the crime control system functioning, 
these occasional successful actions might seem perfectly fine. Nevertheless, the particular 
structural holes indicate that it actually functions as a well-established mechanism – the state 
institutions exist, the legislative framework is broadly in place and the cooperation with the EU 
provides a form of umbrella for promising additional reforms. Moreover, the institutional set 
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up is often characterised by denying responsibility and hiding behind the competence of other 
institutions as an excuse to avoid accountability. Low motivation associated with low income, 
coupled with corruption tolerance and political influence as an identified cross-cutting issue, 
fully sustain such state of affairs. 
The affected segments of institutional functioning are broadly recognised as factors 
contributing to stalled transition. Given that democratic transition, quantifiable through the 
respect of the rule of law, represents an essential pre-condition for EU accession, addressing 
these shortcomings is a conditio sine qua non in the context of Serbia’s EU membership. 
Nevertheless, the particular loopholes are not observable in the EU reports, as the reports are 
necessarily generalised and based on broader indicators which prevents some important issues 
coming the surface, or being recognised. Despite the vast body of literature on these issues and 
significant financial resources of the EU invested in policies and operational responses in Serbia 
that should address the problems of organised crime and corruption, significant challenges 
remain. The European Union utilised the term ‘state capture’ in its assessment of the Western 
Balkan states, i.e. the candidate countries, on several occasions in 2018, using it to describe 
systemic gaps and the associated behaviour of state institutions. The elements of state capture 
are allegedly notable across different sectors - the economy, the judiciary, public 
administration, and the media. The Priebe report (2018) elucidates that the causes of the 
problem are not so much in bad laws, but rather in the institutions that do not exercise their 
powers due to fear or interest and thus find ways to circumvent the laws. As this study has 
shown, however, the causes of inexplicable institutional behaviour may be a consequence of 
the close relationships between the upperworld and the underworld, in some cases established 
as long ago as during the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia. As attempting to identify these 
relationships is not feasible, the identification of the particular systemic areas in which they are 
abused could be a useful method towards their detection. Given that social processes, similar 
to individuals, require a closure, it is profoundly necessary to finalise the democratic transition 
in Serbia and put an end to overly long period of unfinished reforms. 
 
To summarise, this research identified systemic shortcomings in the functioning of the Serbian 
institutions responsible for crime control. The positioning of these systemic gaps implies a 
symbiosis of state actors, corruption and criminal networks, which hinders effective 
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suppression of organized crime and eventually leads to state capture. The specific points of 
arbitrage identified in this research show high potential to enable state capture in the field of 
crime control. Hence what this research revealed is the particular capture mechanisms that exist 
(or even co-exist) across the Serbian crime control system, implying the need for an in-depth 
system restructuring. Identification of these systemic shortcomings may have an important 
impact to policy making at the local level, as it can provide a guideline for the future reforms.  
 
7.2. Implications 
 
The findings of this research have implications for the study of state capture, in particular 
related to transition and accession countries. The stalled transition and prolonged EU accession 
processes in Serbia appear to be heavily influenced by organised crime. Findings on the extent 
of drug trafficking and overall activities of organised criminal networks indicate that the effects 
of crime control are a cause for concern. Nevertheless, in the context of EU accession what 
needs to be taken into account is that deficiencies in crime control cannot be addressed solely 
through the acquis. They also involve horizontal linkages across different sectors, hence 
contributing to state capture. The positioning of these systemic gaps in police, the judiciary, the 
security services, and financial investigation units, indicate that they are located in the sites 
where state monopoly of power is placed. Due to the nature of their work, activities of these 
institutions are often hidden from the public. 
 
The loopholes traced in the field of crime control are therefore not associated solely with this 
field; they entail an important tool for a wider state capture. The identified loopholes can 
indicate an essential degradation of the rule of law in multiple fields, independently from the 
suppression of organised crime. It is therefore the systemic approach that needs to be altered, 
as well as the policy choices that enable continuing existence of such systemic gaps.  
 
Moreover, the findings of this research have important implications for the process of EU 
accession in the region. In view of the expected EU enlargement, it would thus be valuable to 
pay particular attention to these affected segments of the state response network, not solely 
through pro forma monitoring of the chapters or implementation of reforms, but rather on the 
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basis of a targeted revision of the system functioning. Given the similarities of the systems in 
candidate countries in the Western Balkans, the positioning of these particular loopholes is 
most likely to be found in these states as well. Identification of these ‘points of arbitrage’ may 
signpost where to target efforts to reform the efficiency of the crime control systems and 
accelerate accession processes in the region. All of this suggests that the EU’s separate 
monitoring of the interconnected problems of corruption, organised crime and drug trafficking 
may in practice prevent the detection of a wider picture and pattern of influence, which is a 
deeply rooted state capture that enables endurance of these undesirable and ultimately crippling 
phenomena. Overall, progress in any of these fields cannot be expected unless the network of 
inexplicable patterns of institutional functioning is recognised and its negative influences 
dissolved.  
 
Finally, this research offers important practical implications for the system of crime control in 
Serbia, indicating the potential reform paths which should be science-based and aligned with 
international best practices in order to achieve sustainable goals of improvement in organised 
crime suppression. 
 
 
7.3. Contributions and further research  
 
This research has several important contributions. First, it offers a contribution to the theoretical 
framework of state capture garnered through an examination of the aspects of the crime control 
system.  Given the lack of a single established definition of this phenomenon, a variety of terms 
are used to describe similar manifestations, without adequately capturing its entire meaning, 
thus resulting in overlapping definitions, inconsistency in operationalisation and measurement. 
This research offers a conceptual model/framework which has the capacity to address these 
theoretical ambiguities. On the basis of the findings of this research, theory and previous 
studies, a new definition of state capture is proposed. The phenomenon is defined as a set of 
“inexplicable” system deficiencies involving patterns of structural omissions and covert 
practices that have the potential to disrupt legitimate institutional behaviour and exert 
influence by using corruption and other forms of personal linkages.  
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The findings of this research also and importantly contribute to contemporary debates on state 
capture by indicating that this concept differs from other corruption-related phenomena, given 
that it involves a distinctive arrangement of system deficiencies, patterns of structural 
omissions and covert practices that have the potential to hinder legitimate institutional 
behaviour. As discussed above, corruption and other forms of personal linkages utilized by 
captors – in this case, those operating on the crime control network – to exert pressure, represent 
tools or accompanying elements of state capture. Previous studies on state capture mainly 
explored this phenomenon on a higher systemic level, describing its perception or discussing 
its consequences in different states, but have not demonstrated how capture works in practice 
with respect to a distinct area of state responsibility. 
The innovative contribution of this research lies also in its identification of an operational 
conceptualisation of state capture, one which enables determination of its constituting elements 
reflected in the loopholes of the given state system (in this case, the crime control network). 
The value of identifying the loopholes or structural holes as an integrative part of this 
phenomenon lies in its ability to enable measurable exposure to capture, thus disentangling it 
from various other, at times misleading and overlapping concepts. 
Literature on state capture offers little explanation about the process through which the state 
systems become captured. To address this gap, this research narrowed the scope of exploration 
to the system of crime control and detected ways in which this element of the state is captured. 
In doing so, the findings of this research offer an added value to current knowledge on state 
capture, by specifying the particular capacity gaps or loopholes in the system of crime control 
which function as mechanisms of capture. In the framework of Cockayne's (2017) idea of points 
of arbitrage, these systemic loopholes, placed in the context of networks and systems, disclose 
the dynamics of capture. Systemic loopholes may open up opportunities that allow legal and/or 
illegal actors at various levels to weaken state capacity and undermine the rule of law. The 
identification of the constituting elements and mechanisms of capture may therefore provide 
responses to questions often posed, such as: Why did the court allow the person it had convicted 
of aggravated murder to move freely despite the verdict and continue committing criminal 
offences or leaving the country? Why does the state have such a favourable attitude towards 
football fans and their criminal behaviour (could it be that by letting them to engage in drug 
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trade, the state expects a favour in return, for other activities)? Why don't the authorities do 
something to prevent mafia murders? At a purely abstract level, it is highly unlikely that the 
Serbian state is totally powerless to fight the drug trafficking groups. Yet they appear to operate 
with relative impunity. The analytic value of the concept developed here of structural holes is 
that it may offer an explanation of these peculiar structures of opportunities and of actions of 
state authorities in the crime control system. 
The findings of this research indicated that state capture takes place along institutional 
‘borders’, in systemic loopholes regulated under different jurisdictions – or what Cockayne 
(2017) terms realms – whereby informal links among politics and criminal groups notable in 
transition states can be used to extract value for personal/criminal interest. Such an environment 
substitutes the expected legitimate behaviour of the state institutions, twisting the logic of crime 
control itself and eventually damaging the society at large.  
One further key contribution to knowledge offered by this research lies in its demonstration of 
what could be achieved by a more science-based identification of particular measurable 
elements of state capture. Building on the knowledge acquired through previous studies, this 
research is unique in terms of utilization of a quantitative method for examination of the extent 
of state capture in relation to state actions in suppressing criminal networks. This entails an 
important methodological contribution to the study of state capture. This research applied 
Social Network Analysis in an innovative manner. It was used here to study institutional 
relations, illustrating how this approach can be utilised to grasp the existence and elements of 
state capture in relation to crime control obligations of the state, but also how the method might 
enable identification of state capture mechanisms in other fields, beyond the crime control 
domain. This is an important value of the present work, given that the loopholes traced in the 
field of crime control are not associated solely with this field. Indeed, it is likely they entail one 
important tool within a wider process of state capture. By using objective measurements and 
quantifying the data, this method could assist researchers to verify state capture in fields which 
have to date not been thought of as easily quantifiable and thus go some way to strengthening 
or testing observations generated by qualitative or interpretive means. The framework of the 
proposed definition and identification of structural holes as measurable elements of state 
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capture, may be utilised to explore the presence of state capture by excluding other confounding 
variables and thus enabling replication. 
The findings of this research also offer an important contribution to the EU accession policy 
and by implication practice. As demonstrated in this research, Serbia as an accession country 
appears to observe the reports of the EU and take count of the recommendations contained 
therein, but does little to actually resolve the key issues identified. This research showed that 
the separate indicators monitored by the EU in fact, and perhaps unwittingly, represent pieces 
of the capture puzzle.  This brings into question the effectiveness of methods used in the EU 
enlargement policy so far, in terms of the potential to dissolve diverse forms of state capture in 
candidate countries by monitoring identified problems solely at the individual level. The 
indicators monitored by the EU appear to entail a set of independent data points, while their 
joint effects are overlooked and while state capture is frequently mentioned in reports no 
explicit model of it – in contrast to what is offered here – is ever developed and/or tested.  This 
implies that the EU may be addressing a multi-dimensional issue of state capture through a 
unidimensional approach. Or, to adopt an analogy, to be scaling a mountain without a map of 
its contours. Through examination of Serbia’s crime control system, this research has 
demonstrated how the capture processes work in practice, thus offering the opportunity for a 
more holistic and effective approach to understanding difficult processes and dynamics of 
democratic transition. 
This research therefore contributes to understanding the EU monitoring mechanisms applied in 
the accession countries. It appears that the EU conditionality was effective while the EU was 
pushing for and requiring certain results, while the current attitude of ‘closing the eyes’ seems 
to foster something of a return to former misbehaviour in candidate states. In this way, the EU 
may have facilitated a delayed democratisation process by constantly ignoring the absence of 
true reforms and various warnings in that regard from the states in the region. Nevertheless, in 
the given monitoring settings, the question arises what the EU could do to alter such outcome. 
This research informs the EU monitoring processes by demonstrating that the phenomenon of 
state capture may have been – and exactly how it has been – the cause of the lack of 
implementation of the reforms in Serbia. Thus, in relation to the idea of EU enlargement in 
practice, the maladaptive pattern of accession countries like Serbia regularly reporting on the 
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given indicators without illustrating significant progress, while the EU acknowledges minor 
reform steps undertaken, would need to be transformed. Practically, the findings of this research 
indicate that in the field of crime control, separate monitoring of organised crime, corruption, 
independence of the judiciary and associated indicators, could be potentially and much more 
usefully viewed under a single, broader index of state capture. This could offer the benefit of 
making it possible to grasp the effectiveness of multiple reform steps, without losing the 
perception of the whole picture.  Further research could usefully explore whether the focus of 
the EU on isolated elements in other areas susceptible to capture is sufficient or the systemic 
challenges in these areas could also be better addressed on the joint level and with a more 
conceptual model, such as has been offered here. 
As such, this research further contributes to an understanding of the relevance of the context, 
reflected in a delayed transition and an increasing discrepancy between the normative model 
and what evidence, such as those gathered here, reveals to be something like the ‘real’ situation. 
This discrepancy between model and environment, coupled with the prolonged enlargement 
process itself, weakens the leverage of the EU and fosters reform reluctance. It is this fertile 
ground that contributes to deeply-rooted opportunities for capture, the awakening of old 
informal relations with organised crime and thus all together an increased proneness to state 
capture. Consequently, a captured crime control system is likely related to failing confidence 
in state institutions in general.  
Finally, this research is a unique case study of an EU accession country characterised by many 
external observers, including the EU, as a captured state. By identifying specific loopholes in 
the crime control system, this research offers an important ground for exploring state capture 
in other transition and EU accession countries which face similar problems. Since Serbia is a 
candidate country, the findings of this research could be replicated in other states in the region 
which are also in the process of EU accession and share similar legal and institutional 
frameworks. Additional research exploring the dynamics of the links between legal and illegal 
actors in accession countries could therefore further elucidate how these relationships function 
and last through time, which services are exchanged to support them and, indeed, which 
systems, beyond the crime control network, create exposure or opportunity for capture. This 
research has also highlighted the contribution of institutionalised, widely accepted corruption 
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as a feature of societies in transition. A better understanding of this could also add value to the 
model of state capture developed here. Overall, then, this thesis has provided a multifaceted 
view, analysis and test of oft-observed claims of state capture in Serbia. It has used an 
innovative methodology combining qualitative interview data from numerous, often elite, 
actors across the state crime control system, with a quantitative application, social network 
analysis. By drawing a sharp focus on the fertile but often ambiguous idea of state capture by 
examining it via Serbia’s crime control system this research has laid the foundations for a new 
way of thinking about stalled democratic transition in Serbia, the Western Balkans and beyond. 
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Annex 2 Interview questions 
 
Table legal framework 
 
Questions 
Competence of your Ministry in this regard 
Criminal Code, Criminal Procedure Code? Changes aimed at suppression of OC/DT? Please elaborate. 
Cooperation with other state bodies in drafting the amendments? Please elaborate 
Is there a monitoring mechanism to indicate the impact of these changes? 
How does the European Commission assess these amendments? Please elaborate 
Are there any plans to additionally improve the legislative framework? Please specify. 
Are there any strategies related to improved implementation? Please specify. 
How is the data provided to the EC developed? Who aggregates the existing data? Please explain. 
What is the legal framework for cultivation, production, trade and use of drugs? 
Please specify the laws regulating cultivation, production, trade and use of drugs? 
Is Serbia a party of the Convention on narcotic drugs 1961? 
Is the Convention on psychotropic substances 1971 ratified? 
Is Serbia a party of the Convention on psychotropic substances 1988? 
Are these conventions implemented directly in the legal framework? 
Have specific laws been adopted to specify the implementation of the conventions? 
Is the list of internationally prohibited substances utilized in practice? 
Which institutions are competent for this? Please specify. 
Which obstacles they face in utilizing the list? 
Is Serbia in a process of changing legislative framework related to drug use? 
 If yes, what is the main underlying concept of these changes? 
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Table court 
 
Questions 
What is the role of the Special Court for Organized Crime? 
Achievements/obstacles encountered so far? 
What is the role of the Special Prosecutors office for Organized Crime? 
All organized crime cases go before the Special Court for Organized Crime? 
Is there a special prosecutor designated to address Drug Trafficking offences? 
If not, have the judges in courts of general jurisdiction received training on key issues of OC, DT? 
Did these individuals receive specific training? Please specify. 
Who organized and conducted the trainings? 
International experts participated? 
On the basis of which criteria were the judges elected for this post? 
How is the integrity of judges ensured? 
Without specifying the identity, were any of the judges associated to corruption? 
Were they prosecuted? 
Do judges have protection? 
Have they ever been threatened, attacked? 
How would you assess the standpoint of other state actors towards this court? 
Would you say that the work of the court is given a priority? Please elaborate 
Please comment on the role of the Appellate court with regard to judgements of the Special Court for 
Organized Crime? 
Cooperation with other state bodies? Please comment on the perceived obstacles. 
New Criminal Procedure Code 2011? Please comment. 
Implementation before the Special Court for Organized Crime, please elaborate? 
Focus on enterprise? When was it introduced? How it works in practice? 
Who approves special investigative techniques i.e. wiretapping? 
Who is implementing special investigative techniques? 
How many convictions? Acquittals? 
Measures of witness protection? 
How is this addressed in the new code? 
Identity of the protected witnesses? 
Protected witnesses – different types? 
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The role of lawyers? Are they usually the same or different attorneys appear in different cases? Please 
comment 
The role of the media? 
Is drug trafficking one of the key activities of organized groups active in the region? 
 If found during the action on drug trafficking, evidence about other offences can be used at court (e.g. HT, 
ML.)?  
Have any of the 3rd shell non-criminal facilitators been prosecuted (lawyers, tax administration experts, 
doctors, etc.)? 
Which type of corruptive offenses has been prosecuted so far? 
Which individuals are prosecuted? Please do not use names, but professions 
 
General 
 
 
Corruptive criminal offenses are a focus? 
Which type of corruptive offenses has been prosecuted so far? 
Which individuals are prosecuted? Please do not use names, but professions. 
How many convictions? 
Impact of the new measures, strategies? 
Any links with DT? 
Minor drug offences? Please elaborate on the number  
Drug dealers are usually young? Any differences in the trends? Please elaborate 
Recidivism is a rule? 
Drug users are prosecuted? Please elaborate 
The relationship of misdemeanours and criminal offences in these cases? 
Entry of the precursors as misdemeanour? Please elaborate 
Any specialized training for drug offences? 
Cooperation with other state bodies? Please comment on the perceived obstacles. 
 
Table sentencing policies 
 
Questions 
Drug use is sentenced in line with the criminal law? Misdemeanour law? 
Does the law permit possession of a “small amount” of drugs for personal use? Please specify the amount. 
What are the sentences for drugs use?  
What are the sentences for street dealing? 
Are there sentencing or enforcement practices that make differences on the basis of quantities or types of 
drugs? 
What is the prescribed sentence for drug trafficking? 
Are major drug dealers often arrested? What is the overall duration of their sentences? 
Is the judicial practice strict in this regard or often gives lower sentences? 
Is this offence prosecuted as organized crime? In which cases? 
Have most people access to lawyers after being arrested and during trial? 
Do they have to cover the court expenses themselves or they are entitled to free legal aid? 
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In case of mandatory treatment for drug misuse, individuals have a right to an attorney?  
Alternative sanctions are implemented for drug abuse sentencing? 
Are there special types of alternative sanctions in case of minors? 
These measures are only prescribed in law or implemented in practice as well? 
What are the results? 
 
Table prison 
 
Questions 
Can you estimate what percent of the imprisoned individuals is sentenced for drug law offences?  
Are the majority of them imprisoned for possession of drugs or for trafficking? 
These individuals usually involve small street dealers or the ‘bosses’? 
What is the most prevalent type of offences? For what type of offences and how long is their sentence? 
Does drug misuse continue in prisons? Relevant institutions keep this kind of data? 
Are convicted individuals able to continue organizing trafficking from the prison? 
Are there available harm reduction services in prison? Which percent of the offenders utilizes these services? 
Is there a problem of overcrowded prisons? 
Are there prison gangs? 
The offenders have relatives or friends in prisons? 
 
Table drug control strategies and policies 
 
Questions 
Does Serbia have a national drug control strategy? Which period it covers? 
Is there a national policy on demand/supply reduction (push & pull)? If yes, please specify the main 
activities? 
Please specify the competent authorities.  
Please indicate, what sort of challenges, if any, authorities encounter in the area of demand/supply reduction? 
Are harm reduction policies implemented? Are these policies supported by state authorities or the civil 
sector?  
Are there any considerations on decriminalization of drug use? 
Which groups or actors are supporting this approach? 
How would you evaluate the Belgrade Special Hospital for Addiction –Public Prosecutors’ Office agreement? 
Do you support the application of the principle of opportunity in case of possession? Please elaborate. 
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What is your opinion regarding decriminalization of personal drug use? 
 
Table legal framework 
 
Questions 
Competence of your Ministry in this regard 
Criminal Code, Criminal Procedure Code? Changes aimed at suppression of OC/DT? Please elaborate. 
Cooperation with other state bodies in drafting the amendments? Please elaborate 
Is there a monitoring mechanism to indicate the impact of these changes? 
How does the European Commission assess these amendments? Please elaborate 
Are there any plans to additionally improve the legislative framework? Please specify. 
Are there any strategies related to improved implementation? Please specify. 
How is the data provided to the EC developed? Who aggregates the existing data? Please explain. 
What is the legal framework for cultivation, production, trade and use of drugs? 
Please specify the laws regulating cultivation, production, trade and use of drugs? 
Is Serbia a party of the Convention on narcotic drugs 1961? 
Is the Convention on psychotropic substances 1971 ratified? 
Is Serbia a party of the Convention on psychotropic substances 1988? 
Are these conventions implemented directly in the legal framework? 
Have specific laws been adopted to specify the implementation of the conventions? 
Is the list of internationally prohibited substances utilized in practice? 
Which institutions are competent for this? Please specify. 
Which obstacles they face in utilizing the list? 
Is Serbia in a process of changing legislative framework related to drug use? 
 If yes, what is the main underlying concept of these changes? 
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Civil society organizations 
 
Questions 
What are the activities in the civil society sector in terms of organized crime and drug 
trafficking suppression? Field actions; Conferences; Publications; Public statements; 
Outreach campaigns 
Your cooperation with authorities – common projects, actions? How would you evaluate 
this cooperation? What are the main obstacles? 
Have you provided any critique of governments’ actions in suppressing organized crime 
and drug trafficking? 
What are your recommendations for improvement? 
Please indicate other CSOs addressing the problem? 
Would you suggest any particular training of state institutions’ staff to be necessary? 
How would you describe social attitudes regarding organized crime and drug trafficking? 
How would you assess the media reporting on such cases? 
Campaigns – why lacking? 
Would you say that the media act at times as the warning system for the accused 
How would you evaluate the impact of media reporting? Heroes vs. war on drugs? 
Has there been any independent research on the issues related to organized crime and 
drug trafficking? 
Are public authorities willing to provide information/access to independent researchers? 
Are CSOs active in the field of contemporary drug policies?  What are their main 
recommendations? Please specify. 
Has there work been supported by international donors? 
Are there any research institutes addressing current challenges in drug policy? Please 
specify. Are there any ongoing efforts in this regard? 
State provides funds to CSOs to act in this field? 
Are any of the CSOs performing ‘sensitization of actors’ e.g. in terms of access to health, 
justice, social inclusion, discrimination, etc.? 
Did police members or officials participate in trainings that promote modern human 
rights based approaches towards drug misuse? 
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Annex 3 Study Info Sheet  
 
Rationale of the research  
This study aims to explore the impact of actions undertaken by the Government of Serbia in 
combating organized crime and drug trafficking, as well as the potential obstacles to their 
effectiveness related to a variety of sociopolitical factors. Considering that Serbia lies on the 
Balkan route, the key drug trafficking route worldwide, examining how these criminal networks 
can be addressed represents a transnational crime problem. In view of the increased regional 
and international cooperation against drug trafficking and organized crime, it is of importance 
to assess the actions undertaken by the state,  as they may be a vital link for addressing the 
problem of international drug traffic. The results may be used as a science-based approach to 
inform drug trafficking and organized crime suppression policies. 
 
Research aim  
The aim of this research is to assess the effectiveness of state actions undertaken to address 
organized crime and in particular drug trafficking. Analysis will focus on the key obstacles 
encountered in the work. The data will be analysed with a view to stalled transition and EU 
accession of Serbia, given that efficient suppression of organised crime is one of the key factors 
related to accession. 
 
Method  
Data collection will be performed by the researcher. It will also involve written sources, 
statistics and official reports of Serbian institutions and international organisations. A 
methodology applied for the analysis will be Social network analysis.  A ‘map’ of institutions 
engaged in drug trafficking suppression will be designed to identify and explore specific 
relationships among them. The participating institutions will be conceptualized as a ‘response’ 
network. The sample will include state officials from the main institutions in the field of 
combating organized crime and drug trafficking such as public authority bodies, judiciary 
(courts and prosecutors’ offices) and ministries in the Republic of Serbia, as well as relevant 
CSO representatives. The perspectives of the civil society organizations (CSOs) active in this 
field are also incorporated, in order to indicate the importance of multidisciplinary and inter-
sectoral cooperation in combating drug trafficking.  
All the interviews will be performed by the researcher. Eligible participants will be preselected 
on the basis of their position, role, competence or field experience. Interviews will be semi-
structured, formulated on the basis of research questions and official data from the institutions 
and international law enforcement agencies.. Interviews will be conducted in Serbian language. 
Data will be translated for the analysis. All the participants will be contacted by phone or email 
to arrange meetings at their convenience. Meetings will be conducted individually, at the 
official premises of the institutions. 
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Confidentiality   
Due to the specific nature of the participants and the positions they hold, personal data 
protection, anonymity and confidentiality will be particularly emphasized. Participation in the 
study is voluntary, and you can withdraw at any time. All study related documents will be 
included in the records, ensuring personal data protection of both participants and institutions. 
All identifying data will be coded, removing any personal information that might be used to 
recognize the participants during the analysis or the publication of the study findings.  
  
The utilization of research results  
The research results may be presented at scientific conferences and presentations, maintaining 
the anonymity and confidentiality of all the participants. Any information obtained will be used 
only for the purpose and aims of the particular research and in no other case. All data collection 
processes (interviews, documents, analyses) will be performed by the researcher. The final 
results will be provided to the University of Sheffield and South East European Research 
Centre. 
 
Contact for Further Information 
Darja Koturovic 
PhD candidate of the University of Sheffield 
South East European Research Centre (SEERC), 
Proxeniou Koromila 24, 54622, Thessaloniki, 
Contact: +38163360082           
Email: dkoturovic@seerc.org  
Thank you. 
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Annex 4 Table Scaling of issues 1 
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Annex 5 Ethics approval 
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Annex 6 Graph 1 Table jurisdiction cooperation 
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Annex 7 Graph 2 data table 
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Annex 8 Graph 2 metrics results 
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Annex 9 Graph 3 network data 
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Annex 10 Graph 3 results first analysis
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Annex 11 Graph 4 and 5 data table for Second analysis 
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Annex 12 Graph 4 communities data 
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Annex 13 Table Scaling of Issues 2  
 
ISSUES ISSUES PER ITEM NODES NODES WEIGHT 
1 investigation 
prosecution 
  
 
 
 
operational capacities 
(number, trainings, 
relationships,)                   
 
 
 
multi-disciplinary 
teems  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mapping of OC/DT 
networks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
information exchange 
(secure platform, 
databases, intelligence 
exchange 
 
 
 
 
 
internal control 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
reliance on secret 
service 
 
 
 
 
border control 
 
 
 
 
 
MOI 1  
MOI 1  
MOI 1  
MOI 1  
 
 
MOI2  
MOI2 
MOI2 
MOI2 
MOI2 
 
 
MOI 3 
MOI 3 
MOI 3 
MOI 3 
MOI 3 
 
 
 
MOI4 
MOI4 
MOI4 
MOI4 
MOI4 
MOI4 
 
 
 
 
MOI5 
MOI5 
MOI5 
MOI5 
MOI5 
 
 
 
MOI6 
MOI6 
MOI6 
 
 
 
MOI7 
MOI7 
 
 
 
MOI8 
PORGCRIM 1 
CP1 
PD1 
SBPOK1 
 
 
CP 2 
PD2 
SBPOK2 
BIA1 
SERPREVDT1 
 
 
CP 3 
PD3 
SBPOK3 
BIA2 
SERPREVDT2 
 
 
PORGCRIM2 
CP 4 
PD4 
SBPOK4 
BIA3 
SERPREVDT3 
 
 
 
 
 
CP 5 
PD5 
SBPOK5 
BIA4 
SERPREVDT4 
 
 
 
BIA5 
SBPOK6 
SERPREVDT5 
 
 
PD6 
SBPOK7 
 
 
 
 
CP6 
42 
 
 
 
 
 
24 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
44 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
50 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
45 
 
 
 
 
 
 
49 
 
 
 
 
22 
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infiltration 
 
MOI8 
MOI8 
PD7 
SBPOK8 
9 
 
375 
 
2 role of the court 
  
trial (expertise, 
relationships in court 
panel, decision 
making, judging to 
benefit of def....) 
 
appeal proceedings 
 
 
case law 
 
 
 
sentencing policy 
  
 
 
independence/political 
influence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Training 
 
CORGCRIM 1 
CORGCRIM 1 
 
 
 
 
CORGCRIM 2 
 
 
CORGCRIM 3 
 
 
CORGCRIM 4 
 
 
 
CORGCRIM 5 
CORGCRIM 5 
CORGCRIM 5 
CORGCRIM 5 
CORGCRIM 5 
 
 
 
CORGCRIM 6 
CORGCRIM 6 
 
APELLC 1 
PORGCRIM3 
 
 
 
 
APELLC 2 
 
 
APELLC 3 
 
 
APELLC 4 
 
 
 
PORGCRIM4 
APELLC 5 
MOI9 
BIA6 
SBPOK9 
 
 
 
APELLC 6 
PORGCRIM5 
 
48 
 
 
 
 
 
56 
 
 
55 
 
 
 
46 
 
 
 
41 
 
 
 
 
 
 
28 
 
3 financial 
investigation 
  
 
identification of 
financial assets from 
crime 
 
 
 
 
sectors vulnerable for 
corruption 
 
 
 
 
management of seized 
assets 
 
 
 
specialisation 
 
 
 
 
 
anti-money 
laundering 
 
FIU 1 
FIU 1 
FIU 1 
FIU 1 
FIU 1 
 
 
FIU 2 
FIU 2 
FIU 2 
 
 
 
MOJ 1 
 
 
 
 
FIU 3 
FIU 3 
FIU 3 
FIU 3 
 
 
FIU 4 
MOI 10 
CORGCRIM 7 
APPELC 7 
TAX 1 
CUST 1 
 
 
MOI 11 
TAX 2 
SBPOK 10 
 
 
 
DIRSEIZ 1 
 
 
 
 
MOI 12 
DIRSEIZ 2 
CORGCRIM 8 
APPELC 8 
 
 
ANTIML 1 
55 
 
 
 
 
 
37 
 
 
 
 
 
 
42 
 
 
 
 
26 
 
 
 
 
 
45 
376 
 
4 seizure and 
destruction of 
drugs 
 
 
destruction issues 
 
 
 
where drugs are kept 
 
 
MOI 13 
MOI 13 
 
 
 
MOI 14 
 
 
 
 
MOJ 2 
MOH 1 
 
 
 
CORGCRIM 9 
55 
 
 
 
 
57 
 
 
5 legal framework 
  
drafting of laws 
 
 
 
 
 
 
implementation of 
laws 
 
 
 
 
 
 
strategic framework
  
 
MOJ 3 
MOJ 3 
MOJ 3 
 
 
MOJ 4 
MOJ 4 
MOJ 4 
MOJ 4 
MOJ 4 
MOJ 4 
MOJ 4 
MOJ 4 
 
 
MOI17 
MOI17 
MOI17 
MOI 15 
MOH 2 
OFFCOMDRUG1 
 
 
MOI16 
MOH3 
PORGCRIM6 
APELLC9  
CP7 
PD8 
SBPOK11 
BIA7 
 
 
MOJ5 
MOH4 
OFFCOMDRUG 2 
16 
 
 
 
 
 
 
37 
 
 
 
 
 
 
18 
6 prevention of 
drug misuse 
  
 
precursors production  
 
 
 
trade 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
treatment 
 
 
research 
MOH 5 
MOH 5 
MOH 5 
 
MOH 6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MOH7 
 
 
MOH 8 
MOH 8 
MOH 8 
 
MOI 18 
SBPOK12 
BIA8 
 
MOI 19 
COMMPSYCH 1 
CSOs 1 
CP 8 
PD 9 
BIA 9 
SBPOK 13 
 
CSOs 2 
 
 
MOI 20 
MOJ 6 
CSOs 3 
18 
 
 
 
 
 
39 
 
 
 
 
 
 
19 
 
 
 
16 
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Annex 14 Graph 4 results centrality measures 
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Annex 15 Graph 5 Components 
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